Marvell CN913x platforms use common phy framework for configuring and
linking serdes lanes according to their usage.
Each CP (X) features 5 serdes lanes (Y) represented by cpX_comphyY
nodes.
CN9131 SolidWAN uses CP1 serdes lanes 3 and 5 for eth1 and eth2 of CP1
respectively. Devicetree however wrongly links from these ports to the
comphy of CP0.
Replace the wrong links to cp0_comphy with cp1_comphy inside cp1_eth1,
cp1_eth2.
Fixes: 1280840d20 ("arm64: dts: add description for solidrun cn9131 solidwan board")
Signed-off-by: Josua Mayer <josua@solid-run.com>
Signed-off-by: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@bootlin.com>
The CMN PLL hardware block is available in the Qualcomm IPQ SoC such
as IPQ9574 and IPQ5332. It provides fixed rate output clocks to Ethernet
related hardware blocks such as external Ethernet PHY or switch. This
driver is initially being enabled for IPQ9574. All boards based on
IPQ9574 SoC will require to include this driver in the build.
This CMN PLL hardware block does not provide any other specific function
on the IPQ SoC other than enabling output clocks to Ethernet related
devices.
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Luo Jie <quic_luoj@quicinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250103-qcom_ipq_cmnpll-v8-3-c89fb4d4849d@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org>
Meta (Facebook) has a preference for all of our secondary flash
chips to be labelled "alt-bmc" for consistency of userspace tools
deal with updates. Bletchley, Harma, Minerva, and Catalina all
follow this convention but for some reason Yosemite4 is different.
Adjust the label in the dts to match the other platforms.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Williams <patrick@stwcx.xyz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250107162726.232402-1-patrick@stwcx.xyz
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au>
The x86 shadow stack support has its own set of registers. Those registers
are XSAVE-managed, but they are "supervisor state components" which means
that userspace can not touch them with XSAVE/XRSTOR. It also means that
they are not accessible from the existing ptrace ABI for XSAVE state.
Thus, there is a new ptrace get/set interface for it.
The regset code that ptrace uses provides an ->active() handler in
addition to the get/set ones. For shadow stack this ->active() handler
verifies that shadow stack is enabled via the ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK bit in the
thread struct. The ->active() handler is checked from some call sites of
the regset get/set handlers, but not the ptrace ones. This was not
understood when shadow stack support was put in place.
As a result, both the set/get handlers can be called with
XFEATURE_CET_USER in its init state, which would cause get_xsave_addr() to
return NULL and trigger a WARN_ON(). The ssp_set() handler luckily has an
ssp_active() check to avoid surprising the kernel with shadow stack
behavior when the kernel is not ready for it (ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK==0). That
check just happened to avoid the warning.
But the ->get() side wasn't so lucky. It can be called with shadow stacks
disabled, triggering the warning in practice, as reported by Christina
Schimpe:
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1773 at arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c:198 ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x6e/0x80
? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
? __warn+0x91/0x150
? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
? report_bug+0x19d/0x1b0
? handle_bug+0x46/0x80
? exc_invalid_op+0x1d/0x80
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
? __pfx_ssp_get+0x10/0x10
? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
? ssp_get+0x52/0xa0
__regset_get+0xad/0xf0
copy_regset_to_user+0x52/0xc0
ptrace_regset+0x119/0x140
ptrace_request+0x13c/0x850
? wait_task_inactive+0x142/0x1d0
? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90
arch_ptrace+0x102/0x300
[...]
Ensure that shadow stacks are active in a thread before looking them up
in the XSAVE buffer. Since ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK and user_ssp[SHSTK_EN] are
set at the same time, the active check ensures that there will be
something to find in the XSAVE buffer.
[ dhansen: changelog/subject tweaks ]
Fixes: 2fab02b25a ("x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack")
Reported-by: Christina Schimpe <christina.schimpe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Christina Schimpe <christina.schimpe@intel.com>
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250107233056.235536-1-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
Despite CM_IDLEST1_CORE and CM_FCLKEN1_CORE behaving normal,
disabling SPI leads to messages like when suspending:
Powerdomain (core_pwrdm) didn't enter target state 0
and according to /sys/kernel/debug/pm_debug/count off state is not
entered. That was not connected to SPI during the discussion
of disabling SPI. See:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-omap/20230122100852.32ae082c@aktux/
The reason is that SPI is per default in slave mode. Linux driver
will turn it to master per default. It slave mode, the powerdomain seems to
be kept active if active chip select input is sensed.
Fix that by explicitly disabling the SPI3 pins which used to be muxed by
the bootloader since they are available on an optionally fitted header
which would require dtb overlays anyways.
Fixes: a622310f7f ("ARM: dts: gta04: fix excess dma channel usage")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andreas Kemnade <andreas@kemnade.info>
Reviewed-by: Roger Quadros <rogerq@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241204174152.2360431-1-andreas@kemnade.info
Signed-off-by: Kevin Hilman <khilman@baylibre.com>
In SNP guest environment with Secure TSC enabled, unlike other clock sources
(such as HPET, ACPI timer, APIC, etc), the RDTSC instruction is handled
without causing a VM exit, resulting in minimal overhead and jitters. Even
when the host CPU's TSC is tampered with, the Secure TSC enabled guest keeps
on ticking forward. Hence, mark Secure TSC as the only reliable clock source,
bypassing unstable calibration.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250106124633.1418972-10-nikunj@amd.com
The hypervisor should not be intercepting RDTSC/RDTSCP when Secure TSC is
enabled. A #VC exception will be generated if the RDTSC/RDTSCP instructions
are being intercepted. If this should occur and Secure TSC is enabled,
guest execution should be terminated as the guest cannot rely on the TSC
value provided by the hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250106124633.1418972-9-nikunj@amd.com
Secure TSC enabled guests should not write to the MSR_IA32_TSC (0x10) register
as the subsequent TSC value reads are undefined. On AMD, MSR_IA32_TSC is
intercepted by the hypervisor by default. MSR_IA32_TSC read/write accesses
should not exit to the hypervisor for such guests.
Accesses to MSR_IA32_TSC need special handling in the #VC handler for the
guests with Secure TSC enabled. Writes to MSR_IA32_TSC should be ignored and
flagged once with a warning, and reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the
result of the RDTSC instruction.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250106124633.1418972-7-nikunj@amd.com
Add support for Secure TSC in SNP-enabled guests. Secure TSC allows guests
to securely use RDTSC/RDTSCP instructions, ensuring that the parameters used
cannot be altered by the hypervisor once the guest is launched.
Secure TSC-enabled guests need to query TSC information from the AMD Security
Processor. This communication channel is encrypted between the AMD Security
Processor and the guest, with the hypervisor acting merely as a conduit to
deliver the guest messages to the AMD Security Processor. Each message is
protected with AEAD (AES-256 GCM).
[ bp: Zap a stray newline over amd_cc_platform_has() while at it,
simplify CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC check ]
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250106124633.1418972-6-nikunj@amd.com
In commit 892f7237b3 ("arm64: Delay initialisation of
cpuinfo_arm64::reg_{zcr,smcr}") we moved access to ZCR, SMCR and SMIDR
later in the boot process in order to ensure that we don't attempt to
interact with them if SVE or SME is disabled on the command line.
Unfortunately when initialising the boot CPU in init_cpu_features() we work
on a copy of the struct cpuinfo_arm64 for the boot CPU used only during
boot, not the percpu copy used by the sysfs code. The expectation of the
feature identification code was that the ID registers would be read in
__cpuinfo_store_cpu() and the values not modified by init_cpu_features().
The main reason for the original change was to avoid early accesses to
ZCR on practical systems that were seen shipping with SVE reported in ID
registers but traps enabled at EL3 and handled as fatal errors, SME was
rolled in due to the similarity with SVE. Since then we have removed the
early accesses to ZCR and SMCR in commits:
abef0695f9 ("arm64/sve: Remove ZCR pseudo register from cpufeature code")
391208485c ("arm64/sve: Remove SMCR pseudo register from cpufeature code")
so only the SMIDR_EL1 part of the change remains. Since SMIDR_EL1 is
only trapped via FEAT_IDST and not the SME trap it is less likely to be
affected by similar issues, and the factors that lead to issues with SVE
are less likely to apply to SME.
Since we have not yet seen practical SME systems that need to use a
command line override (and are only just beginning to see SME systems at
all) and the ID register read is much more likely to be safe let's just
store SMIDR_EL1 along with all the other ID register reads in
__cpuinfo_store_cpu().
This issue wasn't apparent when testing on emulated platforms that do not
report values in SMIDR_EL1.
Fixes: 892f7237b3 ("arm64: Delay initialisation of cpuinfo_arm64::reg_{zcr,smcr}")
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241217-arm64-fix-boot-cpu-smidr-v3-1-7be278a85623@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
In commit 77b5334115 ("KVM: s390: VSIE: sort out virtual/physical
address in pin_guest_page"), only pin_scb() has been updated. This
means that in unpin_scb() a virtual address was still used directly as
physical address without conversion. The resulting physical address is
obviously wrong and most of the time also invalid.
Since commit d0ef8d9fbe ("KVM: s390: Use kvm_release_page_dirty() to
unpin "struct page" memory"), unpin_guest_page() will directly use
kvm_release_page_dirty(), instead of kvm_release_pfn_dirty(), which has
since been removed.
One of the checks that were performed by kvm_release_pfn_dirty() was to
verify whether the page was valid at all, and silently return
successfully without doing anything if the page was invalid.
When kvm_release_pfn_dirty() was still used, the invalid page was thus
silently ignored. Now the check is gone and the result is an Oops.
This also means that when running with a V!=R kernel, the page was not
released, causing a leak.
The solution is simply to add the missing virt_to_phys().
Fixes: 77b5334115 ("KVM: s390: VSIE: sort out virtual/physical address in pin_guest_page")
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241210083948.23963-1-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <20241210083948.23963-1-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
