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a12578e147
Introduce the core infrastructure to enable host userspace to mmap() guest_memfd-backed memory. This is needed for several evolving KVM use cases: * Non-CoCo VM backing: Allows VMMs like Firecracker to run guests entirely backed by guest_memfd, even for non-CoCo VMs [1]. This provides a unified memory management model and simplifies guest memory handling. * Direct map removal for enhanced security: This is an important step for direct map removal of guest memory [2]. By allowing host userspace to fault in guest_memfd pages directly, we can avoid maintaining host kernel direct maps of guest memory. This provides additional hardening against Spectre-like transient execution attacks by removing a potential attack surface within the kernel. * Future guest_memfd features: This also lays the groundwork for future enhancements to guest_memfd, such as supporting huge pages and enabling in-place sharing of guest memory with the host for CoCo platforms that permit it [3]. Enable the basic mmap and fault handling logic within guest_memfd, but hold off on allow userspace to actually do mmap() until the architecture support is also in place. [1] https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/tree/feature/secret-hiding [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/cc1bb8e9bc3e1ab637700a4d3defeec95b55060a.camel@amazon.com [3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/c1c9591d-218a-495c-957b-ba356c8f8e09@redhat.com/T/#u Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Co-developed-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com> Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-11-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>