When the MDS revokes capabilities, handle_cap_grant() normally
guarantees a response by setting `CHECK_CAPS_FLUSH_FORCE` (see
commit 31634d7597 ("ceph: force sending a cap update msg back to MDS
for revoke op")), so ceph_check_caps() sends a cap message even if the
client would otherwise decide it has nothing to do. That guarantee is
skipped whenever the revoke has to be deferred (via revoke_wait):
revoking Fb while dirty data is still buffered (writeback is queued
first) or revoking Fc while pages are cached (async invalidation is
queued first).
In those cases, the ack is left to the deferred completion
(ceph_put_wrbuffer_cap_refs() after writeback, or the invalidate
worker after invalidation); both of which call ceph_check_caps(ci,0)
i.e. without `CHECK_CAPS_FLUSH_FORCE`. Nothing gets sent under one
of the following conditions:
- the inode is retaining caps because the file was used recently
(file_wanted != 0; retain |= CEPH_CAP_ANY)
- the revoked cap is still used because the page was re-cached (e.g. a
file being re-read)
- the MDS has meanwhile re-granted, so `issued==implemented` and the
client sees nothing being revoked
The client then never emits the cap message which the MDS is waiting
for. The MDS blocks on the revoke indefinitely and logs, for minutes
or hours:
client.NNN isn't responding to mclientcaps(revoke), ino 0x... pending
pAsxLsXsxFsxcrwb issued pAsxLsXsxFsxcrwb, sent 964.899182 seconds ago
The client-side state at that point shows the full cap set still
issued, nothing in the revoking/flushing sets. Thus nothing gets
sent.
This patch fixes it by remembering that a forced response is expected.
When a revoke is deferred, set `CEPH_I_FLUSH_FORCE` on the inode.
ceph_check_caps() replays it as `CHECK_CAPS_FLUSH_FORCE`, so whichever
path re-checks the inode next (the writeback/invalidate completion,
the delayed worker, or any other caller) is guaranteed to send a cap
message to the MDS. __prep_cap() clears the flag once a message is
actually built.
This is the deferred-path counterpart of the existing
`CHECK_CAPS_FLUSH_FORCE` handling; a normal (non-deferred) revoke
still forces the response inline as before.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 31634d7597 ("ceph: force sending a cap update msg back to MDS for revoke op")
Fixes: 257e6172ab ("ceph: don't let check_caps skip sending responses for revoke msgs")
Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
crush_decode() stores bucket data by array slot, and the mapper later
derives the per-bucket workspace index from the decoded bucket id. A
malformed map can therefore make one bucket reuse another bucket's
workspace by encoding an id different from -1 - slot.
For uniform buckets, the second replica selection expands the source
bucket's permutation into that aliased workspace buffer. If the source
bucket is larger than the aliased bucket, the write runs past the smaller
permutation array and can escape the kvmalloc'd CRUSH workspace. KASAN
reports a slab OOB write of 4 bytes in bucket_perm_choose().
Reject buckets whose encoded id does not match their array slot. Valid
CRUSH maps already use the canonical negative id corresponding to the
bucket slot, so this restores the invariant expected by
work->work[-1 - in->id] without changing valid map behavior.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 66a0e2d579 ("crush: remove mutable part of CRUSH map")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
MDSMap export_targets entries are monitor controlled. check_new_map()
uses each entry as a bit number in a fixed stack bitmap, so a rank
outside the protocol namespace can make set_bit() write past the end of
the array.
Reject ranks outside CEPH_MAX_MDS while decoding the map. Do not
validate against possible_max_rank here because maps may legitimately
reference ranks beyond a temporarily reduced max_mds.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d517b3983d ("ceph: reconnect to the export targets on new mdsmaps")
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
ceph_dirty_folio() takes a wrbuffer claim on each newly dirtied folio: it
bumps i_wrbuffer_ref (taking an ihold() on the 0->1 transition) and
attaches the snap_context to folio->private. That claim is released only
by ceph_put_wrbuffer_cap_refs(), which for a submitted write runs from
writepages_finish().
In ceph_submit_write(), if ceph_inc_osd_stopping_blocker() fails -- which
happens during umount -- the request is aborted before submission: the
already-collected folios are only redirtied and unlocked, so
writepages_finish() never runs and the claim is leaked.
redirty_page_for_writepage() -> folio_redirty_for_writepage() ->
filemap_dirty_folio() sets PG_dirty directly and does not go through
->dirty_folio, so ceph_dirty_folio() is not re-entered to rebalance it.
Because every subsequent writeback also fails the osd_stopping_blocker,
i_wrbuffer_ref never returns to 0, the ihold() is never dropped, and the
inode cannot be evicted:
VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of ceph
kernel BUG at fs/super.c:650!
Release the orphaned claim in the abort path before redirtying, via
ceph_undo_wrbuffer_claim(): detach the snap_context, drop the wrbuffer
reference (letting i_wrbuffer_ref reach 0 and iput() the inode), and drop
the snap_context reference -- i.e. do what writepages_finish() would have
done for these never-submitted folios.
Only the locked_pages entries are undone; folios still in the fbatch were
never dirty-cleared by this call (folio_clear_dirty_for_io() is the
ownership-transfer point, and a successful move NULLs the fbatch slot), so
they hold no claim this call owns.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fd7449d937 ("ceph: fix generic/421 test failure")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Brown <matthew@bargrove.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubo.li@clyso.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
ceph_put_page_vector() was paired with ceph_get_direct_page_vector(),
which was removed in commit 97a385e558 ("libceph: remove
ceph_get_direct_page_vector()"). Its only remaining caller,
finish_netfs_read(), uses it to put a page vector allocated with
iov_iter_get_pages_alloc2(), which is confusing. Open-code the
put_page() loop and kvfree() there instead.
The caller passed dirty = false, so this also removes the dead dirty
branch and with it a call to the deprecated set_page_dirty_lock().
Signed-off-by: Tal Zussman <tz2294@columbia.edu>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
When parsing the Ceph messenger v2 protocol banner, the `payload_len` field
is decoded from the banner prefix. If a client sends a banner with a
`payload_len` of 0, the kernel sets up a 0-length socket read. This
violates an invariant in the state machine, triggering a warning in
`populate_in_iter()`:
------------[ cut here ]------------
!iov_iter_count(&con->v2.in_iter)
WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at populate_in_iter
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 [inline], CPU#1: kworker/1:3/5070
WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x6634/0x6810
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3159, CPU#1: kworker/1:3/5070
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ceph_con_workfn+0x1f5/0x14a0 net/ceph/messenger.c:1575
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3322 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa8e/0x14e0 kernel/workqueue.c:3405
worker_thread+0xa47/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3486
kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
According to the msgr2 protocol specification, the banner payload is
expected to contain at least two 64-bit integers (`server_feat` and
`server_req_feat`). Therefore, `payload_len` must be at least 16 bytes.
Fix this by adding a check in `process_banner_prefix()` to reject a
`payload_len` smaller than 16 bytes. This prevents the 0-length read and
correctly aborts the connection with a protocol error.
Fixes: cd1a677cad ("libceph, ceph: implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)")
Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.5-flash Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview syzbot
Reported-by: syzbot+87c7c2d63c44e41c77a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=87c7c2d63c44e41c77a3
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/ai_job?id=c8ca3d63-717a-4933-89ec-f3d761b8690d
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
The kernel CephFS client has historically treated a cluster or pool
NEARFULL condition as a request to force successful writes through
generic_write_sync(). That effectively turns otherwise buffered writes
into synchronous writes and can cause a severe throughput drop as soon
as a single OSD or the file data pool crosses the nearfull threshold.
On modern large clusters, NEARFULL is primarily an operator health
signal rather than an immediate client-side capacity failure. Operators
can still have substantial usable capacity while a cluster is
rebalancing, splitting PGs, or expanding onto new devices. RBD, RGW and
the userspace CephFS client do not impose this extra client-side
sync-write throttle, so the kernel client behavior is surprising and
operationally painful.
Change the default behavior so NEARFULL no longer changes normal
write-sync semantics. FULL and pool FULL still fail with -ENOSPC, and
explicitly synchronous writes continue to be synced by
generic_write_sync().
Add a nearfull_sync mount option for deployments that want the legacy
backpressure behavior. When this option is set, successful writes are
promoted to IOCB_DSYNC if the cluster or file data pool is marked
NEARFULL, preserving the old behavior for conservative deployments.
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/74849
Signed-off-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubo.li@clyso.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
ceph_cap_reclaim_work() re-queues itself for as long as
ceph_trim_dentries() returns -EAGAIN, which happens whenever a lease
walk exhausts its `nr_to_scan` budget. This creates a busy loop that
consumes CPU without making any progress when there is nothing to
reclaim: with no cap pressure (`count==0`) and every scanned lease
still valid, each pass runs the full scan budget down to zero and
returns `-EAGAIN`, only to be queued again immediately.
The dir-lease walk made this worse. When `expire_dir_lease` is
`false` (i.e. we have no intention of reclaiming dir leases),
__dir_lease_check() returned `TOUCH` for every valid lease. `TOUCH`
moves the dentry to the tail of the list and resets `di->time` via
__dentry_dir_lease_touch(), so a walk over N valid leases pointlessly
rewrote the list, refreshed the timestamps (preventing them from ever
aging out) and always drained `nr_to_scan`, guaranteeing the `-EAGAIN`
requeue.
Fix this in three steps:
- Return `KEEP` instead of `TOUCH` when `expire_dir_lease` is
`false`. If we are not going to reclaim the lease, leave it in
place instead of churning the list and resetting its timestamp; the
walk then terminates naturally (or via `STOP` at the first fresh
lease).
- Only return `-EAGAIN` from the first (dentry-lease) walk when something
was actually freed. A full batch that frees nothing means retrying
the same list immediately is futile; fall through to the dir-lease
walk instead.
- After both walks, bail out with success (0) when nothing was freed
and there is no cap pressure (`count==0`). There is no reason to
keep retrying when we are not over the cap limit and made no
progress.
Under real cap pressure (`count>0`) the reclaim path is unchanged and
still retries via `-EAGAIN`.
Without this patch, I saw 500 ceph_trim_dentries() calls per second on
our web servers. This is very visible in `/proc/lock_stat` (5 minute
capture):
class name con-bounces contentions waittime-min waittime-max waittime-total waittime-avg acq-bounces acquisitions holdtime-min holdtime-max holdtime-total holdtime-avg
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock: 126180 128218 0.04 8063.44 15986965.20 124.69 1573354 5296812 0.04 8291.28 74164526.48 14.00
-----------------------
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 111736 [<000000007b11e319>] __ceph_dentry_dir_lease_touch+0x7c/0xa8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 2631 [<0000000050597999>] __dentry_leases_walk+0x64/0x2c8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 3878 [<00000000c0022f62>] __ceph_dentry_lease_touch+0x5c/0xa8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 9973 [<000000002f27cb6f>] __dentry_lease_unlist+0x50/0xa0
-----------------------
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 123621 [<0000000050597999>] __dentry_leases_walk+0x64/0x2c8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 1822 [<000000007b11e319>] __ceph_dentry_dir_lease_touch+0x7c/0xa8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 2720 [<000000002f27cb6f>] __dentry_lease_unlist+0x50/0xa0
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 55 [<00000000c0022f62>] __ceph_dentry_lease_touch+0x5c/0xa8
With this patch:
class name con-bounces contentions waittime-min waittime-max waittime-total waittime-avg acq-bounces acquisitions holdtime-min holdtime-max holdtime-total holdtime-avg
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock: 1203 1215 0.16 408.88 33082.88 27.23 4320501 7357389 0.04 500.64 1961578.00 0.27
-----------------------
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 1029 [<000000003c9aea8a>] __ceph_dentry_dir_lease_touch+0x7c/0xa8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 169 [<000000002038c577>] __dentry_lease_unlist+0x50/0xa0
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 16 [<00000000c991106d>] __ceph_dentry_lease_touch+0x5c/0xa8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 1 [<00000000612fe15f>] __dentry_leases_walk+0x64/0x2c8
-----------------------
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 158 [<000000002038c577>] __dentry_lease_unlist+0x50/0xa0
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 858 [<000000003c9aea8a>] __ceph_dentry_dir_lease_touch+0x7c/0xa8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 182 [<00000000612fe15f>] __dentry_leases_walk+0x64/0x2c8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 17 [<00000000c991106d>] __ceph_dentry_lease_touch+0x5c/0xa8
__dentry_leases_walk() is almost gone. The total wait time is reduced
by a factor of 483. That will give some latency gains to
ceph_readdir().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 37c4efc1dd ("ceph: periodically trim stale dentries")
Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
handle_reply() held `mdsc->mutex` across parse_reply_info(),
i.e. across the full decode of the reply message. For large replies
(a big readdir allocates and parses many dir_entries), this can take a
while and blocks ceph_mdsc_submit_request() calls meanwhile.
The decode does not need `mdsc->mutex`: parse_reply_info() mostly
fills the request's `r_reply_info`. Create replies may also add
delegated inode numbers to the session xarray, but that xarray is
protected by its own lock and is not serialized by `mdsc->mutex`
today. By the time we reach parse_reply_info(), all
`mdsc->mutex`-protected state has already been updated under the lock
(the request has either been unregistered (safe reply) or added to the
session's unsafe list (unsafe reply)) and the request is pinned by the
reference taken in lookup_get_request().
Drop `mdsc->mutex` before calling parse_reply_info() so reply decoding
no longer blocks request submission. This only widens the existing
unlocked window that already covers the heavier ceph_fill_trace() /
ceph_readdir_prepopulate() processing, so no new races are introduced.
Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubo.li@clyso.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
check_new_map() iterates mdsc->sessions[] and for each active session
drops mdsc->mutex to perform per-session operations. The forced-close
path (rank removed from map) correctly takes a reference on s via
ceph_get_mds_session() before releasing mdsc->mutex, but three other
paths do not:
Path A (address changed): mutex_unlock → mutex_lock(&s->s_mutex)
Path B (reconnect): mutex_unlock → send_mds_reconnect(mdsc, s)
Path C (active transition): mutex_unlock → mutex_lock(&s->s_mutex)
Without the extra reference, another thread can acquire mdsc->mutex
during the unlock window, call __unregister_session() which drops the
last reference on s, and free it. The original thread then accesses
freed memory via s->s_mutex.
Fix by adding ceph_get_mds_session(s) before each mutex_unlock and
ceph_put_mds_session(s) after the corresponding mutex_lock, matching
the pattern already used in the forced-close path.
Race timeline (Path A):
Thread A (check_new_map) Thread B (another map update
holds mdsc->mutex or session teardown)
-------------------------- --------------------------
s = mdsc->sessions[i]
(refcount == 1, held only by
sessions[] array)
mutex_unlock(&mdsc->mutex)
---> acquires mdsc->mutex
__unregister_session(mdsc, s)
sessions[i] = NULL
ceph_put_mds_session(s)
refcount: 1 -> 0
kfree(s) <--- freed!
mutex_lock(&s->s_mutex)
UAF on freed s->s_mutex
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubo.li@clyso.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
list_for_each_entry() iterates ci->i_cap_flush_list but drops
i_ceph_lock to send cap messages. During the unlock window,
handle_cap_flush_ack() can acquire i_ceph_lock, detach cf entries
with tid <= flush_tid from the list, release i_ceph_lock, and free
them via ceph_free_cap_flush() outside any lock. When the original
thread reacquires i_ceph_lock and the for-loop macro advances via
cf = list_next_entry(cf, i_list), it dereferences cf->i_list.next
on freed memory.
The race timeline:
__kick_flushing_caps() handle_cap_flush_ack()
----------------------- -----------------------
holds i_ceph_lock <---
iterates to cf (tid=10)
prepares FLUSH message
drops i_ceph_lock <---
__send_cap() ── FLUSH(tid=10)
MDS sends FLUSH_ACK(tid=10)
---> acquires i_ceph_lock
cf->tid(10) <= flush_tid(10),
detaches cf from i_cap_flush_list
drops i_ceph_lock
ceph_free_cap_flush(cf) <- frees it!
acquires i_ceph_lock <---
for-loop advances:
cf = list_next_entry(cf, i_list)
-- UAF on freed cf->i_list.next
The cf was just sent by __kick_flushing_caps itself via __send_cap().
The MDS may respond with FLUSH_ACK quickly enough that
handle_cap_flush_ack() frees cf before __kick_flushing_caps can
finish the iteration.
Fix by converting to a manual while loop: save the next pointer
under i_ceph_lock before dropping it, then use the saved pointer
after reacquiring, so the potentially-freed cf is never accessed again.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubo.li@clyso.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
All these functions already have a ceph_inode_info pointer, so let's
use that instead of letting every function reload it from RAM
(i.e. `ceph_cap.ci`). This eliminates several memory accesses.
Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
__ceph_remove_cap() erases the ceph_cap object from the RB tree, thus
it seems natural to use RB_CLEAR_NODE() / RB_EMPTY_NODE() for the
removal check.
Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
ceph_parse_deleg_inos() decodes interval sets of delegated inode numbers
from an MDS create-with-delegation reply. For each set it reads a 64-bit
start and a 64-bit len with ceph_decode_64_safe(), which only validates
that the eight bytes are present in the message, not the value, and then
loops over len while inserting entries into s_delegated_inos.
len is fully attacker controlled. A malicious or compromised MDS can send
one huge interval, many intervals in one reply, duplicate intervals, or
repeated replies that accumulate delegated inodes on the same session.
The original code bounded none of these and could spin the insert loop or
grow the xarray without limit.
Bound both dimensions with a single enforcement point. Track the number
of delegated inodes held by each MDS session in an atomic counter and
grow it only in ceph_insert_deleg_ino(), which uses atomic_add_unless()
to refuse to push the count past CEPH_MAX_DELEG_INOS. Because that helper
is the only place the counter grows, the per-session population can never
exceed the cap, so no separate per-session pre-check is needed. The
counter is decremented when async create consumes a delegated inode or
when an insert fails, incremented when a delegated inode is restored,
initialized with the session xarray, and reset when reconnect destroys
the xarray.
A per-session cap alone still lets one reply spin the insert loop on
duplicate ranges without growing the counter, so also cap the aggregate
interval length accepted from a single reply. Together these bound both
the loop trip count per reply and the xarray population across replies.
The cap is a fixed, client-chosen constant rather than a value derived
from the MDS. mds_client_prealloc_inos is a userspace MDS configuration
option; it is never sent to the kernel client on the wire, and a
server-supplied bound could not be trusted for a defensive limit in any
case. The constant is set well above that option's documented default of
1000 (a generous multiple), so legitimate refill behavior is unaffected
while the CPU and xarray memory a malformed delegation stream can consume
stays bounded.
Impact: a malicious or compromised Ceph MDS can no longer make a client
spin through an unbounded delegated-inode interval or grow one session's
delegated-inode xarray without limit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d484648787 ("ceph: decode interval_sets for delegated inos")
Suggested-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
ceph_mdsmap_decode() in fs/ceph/mdsmap.c reads num_export_targets from
each per-mds info record and advances the decode cursor by
num_export_targets * sizeof(u32) without first checking that many bytes
remain. The only upper-bound check that catches a runaway cursor
(*p > info_end) is gated on info_v >= 4, because info_end is left NULL
for info_v 2 and 3. When the monitor sends an MDS map whose per-mds
info version is 2 or 3 with an oversized num_export_targets, the cursor
moves past the message front buffer and the later export-targets loop
calls the unchecked ceph_decode_32() on out-of-bounds memory.
A kernel client processes CEPH_MSG_MDS_MAP from its monitor session
(net/ceph/mon_client.c dispatches it; fs/ceph/super.c routes it to
ceph_mdsc_handle_mdsmap(), which sets end to the front buffer bound and
calls ceph_mdsmap_decode()). A malicious or compromised monitor, or an
on-path attacker on an unsigned/unencrypted messenger session, can
therefore drive an out-of-bounds read in the client kernel; on x86_64
with KASAN it is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read in
ceph_mdsmap_decode(). The decoded values land in the internal
info->export_targets[] array, so the consequence is a kernel
out-of-bounds read, not an information leak to the attacker.
Impact: a malicious or compromised Ceph monitor sending an MDS map with
a per-mds info version of 2 or 3 and an oversized num_export_targets
field triggers an out-of-bounds read in the CephFS client kernel.
Add a ceph_decode_need() for the export-targets array before advancing
the cursor, so the bound is enforced for every info_v >= 2, not only
info_v >= 4. This mirrors the count-then-need idiom already used for
m_data_pg_pools later in the same function.
Compute the export-targets byte count with size_mul() and reuse that
checked length when advancing the cursor, so the attacker-controlled
num_export_targets multiplication fails closed on overflow rather than
relying on the later kcalloc() guard.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d463a43d69 ("ceph: CEPH_FEATURE_MDSENC support")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
handle_session() decodes the MDSCapAuth records carried by a
CEPH_SESSION_OPEN message (msg_version >= 6). For each record the
match.path and match.fs_name byte strings are read by first decoding a
32-bit length and then copying that many bytes with the bare
ceph_decode_copy(). Unlike the surrounding fields, which all use the
_safe decode variants, these two copies are not preceded by a
ceph_decode_need() bounds check, and the enclosing MDSCapAuth and
MDSCapMatch struct_len fields are skipped rather than enforced as an
upper bound. A length larger than the bytes remaining in the message
front makes ceph_decode_copy() read past the end of the front buffer.
The message front is a dedicated allocation (ceph_msg_new2() ->
kvmalloc), so the over-read runs off that object. A malicious or
compromised MDS can trigger this with the first post-connect message on
mount, with no client-side user interaction; under KASAN it is reported
as a slab-out-of-bounds read in handle_session().
Impact: a malicious MDS can force the kernel client to read up to 4 GiB
past the message front allocation during session setup, crashing the
client (out-of-bounds read).
Switch both copies to ceph_decode_copy_safe(), which performs the
ceph_decode_need() bounds check before the copy and branches to the
existing bad label, matching the rest of the decoder and the error path
that frees the partially decoded cap_auths array.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1d17de9534 ("ceph: save cap_auths in MDS client when session is opened")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
__build_xattrs() decodes the MDS-supplied xattr blob one attribute at a
time. For each attribute it reads a 32-bit name length, advances past the
name bytes, reads a 32-bit value length, records the value pointer, and
advances past the value bytes. The two length fields are read with
ceph_decode_32_safe(), but the value bytes themselves are advanced over
with a bare "p += len" and no ceph_decode_need() check that "len" bytes
remain in the blob.
For every attribute except the last, the next iteration's
ceph_decode_32_safe() on the following name length implicitly verifies
that the previous value did not run past the blob end. The final
attribute has no successor, so its decoded value length is never checked
against the blob bounds. A malicious or compromised metadata server can
set the last attribute's value length larger than the bytes actually
present in the blob.
The blob is a dedicated kvmalloc() allocation sized to the wire length
(ceph_buffer_new() in ceph_fill_inode()). __set_xattr() records the
oversized length in xattr->val_len verbatim, and a later getxattr(2) runs
memcpy(value, xattr->val, xattr->val_len) into a user-supplied buffer,
copying bytes past the end of the allocation back to user space.
Impact: a malicious metadata server discloses adjacent kernel heap bytes
to a local user via getxattr(2) on a CephFS file. Add the missing
ceph_decode_need() so an out-of-bounds value length on the final
attribute fails the decode and returns -EIO instead of being stored.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 355da1eb7a ("ceph: inode operations")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
ceph_get_name() copies the MDS-supplied name into the caller's
NAME_MAX-sized buffer with memcpy(name, rinfo->dname, rinfo->dname_len)
and then writes name[rinfo->dname_len] = 0, without checking dname_len
against NAME_MAX. A malicious or buggy MDS that returns a LOOKUPNAME reply
with dname_len > NAME_MAX overflows the buffer. __get_snap_name() copies
rde->name / rde->name_len the same unchecked way.
Impact: a malicious or compromised Ceph MDS overflows the NAME_MAX name
buffer in a client's NFS-export get_name path, a slab out-of-bounds write
reported by KASAN. Reachable when a CephFS mount is re-exported over NFS.
Add ceph_export_copy_name(), which rejects lengths above NAME_MAX with
-ENAMETOOLONG before the copy, and use it in both ceph_get_name() and
__get_snap_name().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 19913b4eac ("ceph: add get_name() NFS export callback")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
net/ceph/osd_client.c:osd_sparse_read() validates that the sparse-read
data length matches the summed extent lengths, but it does not validate
that each OSD-supplied extent is monotonic and lies inside the original
request range. A malformed authenticated OSD reply can advertise a
far-forward nonzero extent offset with a matching data length and make
the client advance the message-data cursor beyond the request buffer.
This reaches the BUG_ON(!*length) assertion in ceph_msg_data_next() from
the client receive path.
Impact: A malicious or compromised authenticated Ceph OSD peer can crash
a kernel Ceph client via a malformed sparse-read reply.
Reject sparse extent maps that overflow, move backwards, overlap, or
extend outside the original sparse-read request before advancing the
cursor.
[ idryomov: perform sparse_extent_map_valid() check a bit earlier,
in CEPH_SPARSE_READ_DATA_LEN instead of CEPH_SPARSE_READ_DATA_PRE
state ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f628d79997 ("libceph: add sparse read support to OSD client")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5-xhigh
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
For O_APPEND writes, ki_pos is set to the current EOF via
generic_write_checks() after fetching i_size from the MDS. However,
ceph_get_caps() may need to wait for Fwx exclusive caps if the write
extends the file (endoff > i_max_size). While waiting for Fwx, the
previous Fwx holder (another client) may have already extended the
file. When the MDS grants us Fwx, the cap grant message updates the
local i_size, but ki_pos remains at the old EOF, causing the append
write to land at a stale offset and overwrite data from the other
client.
Fix by re-reading i_size_read(inode) after ceph_get_caps() returns.
At this point we hold Fwx exclusive caps, no other client can modify
the file, and i_size reflects the true EOF from the MDS cap grant.
No extra MDS round-trip is needed. Only adjust ki_pos when the EOF
has actually changed.
After adjusting ki_pos forward, the write range [pos, pos+count) may
now exceed the i_max_size that was validated by ceph_get_caps() for
the old range. Re-check against i_max_size and truncate the write
if necessary to stay within the MDS-granted limit.
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/7333
Fixes: 8e4473bb50 ("ceph: do not execute direct write in parallel if O_APPEND is specified")
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubo.li@clyso.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
The NULL check for "ci" in __ceph_remove_cap() was dead code because
ci was dereferenced via &ci->netfs.inode before the check, and
cap->session was dereferenced via session->s_mdsc->fsc->client even
earlier. On a double-remove, both cap->ci and cap->session are set
to NULL by the first call, so the second call would crash before
ever reaching the guard.
Move ci, session, cl, and inode initializations after the NULL check
so that the early-return actually works.
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubo.li@clyso.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
When a LOOKUP/LOOKUPSNAP in a snapped directory returns ENOENT
without a trace, ceph_finish_lookup() creates a negative dentry
via d_add(dentry, NULL). For live directories this is fine — the
dentry naturally expires. But for snapped directories,
ceph_d_revalidate() unconditionally trusts all cached dentries
(valid = 1), so a negative dentry created by a transient error
persists forever, hiding entries that genuinely exist in the
snapshot.
Only cache negative dentries for live (non-snapshotted) parent
directories. For snapped parents, skip the negative dentry so
that VFS retries the lookup on the next access. Since the
conditions that trigger a negative dentry (MDS transient error,
local ENOENT shortcut, or MDS null dentry lease) are all rare in
snapped directories, the performance impact of this change is
negligible.
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/78529
Reported-by: Andras Pataki <apataki@flatironinstitute.org>
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubo.li@clyso.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
__ceph_pool_perm_get() has six allocations for building OSD STAT
requests, five of which used GFP_NOFS and one (the page vector
allocation) used GFP_KERNEL, making them inconsistent.
The function is only called from ceph_try_get_caps() and
__ceph_get_caps(), both of which are in the user I/O path (read,
write, fallocate, mmap fault), not in the writeback path. There is
no risk of recursive writeback, so GFP_NOFS is unnecessarily
restrictive. Use GFP_KERNEL consistently for all six allocations.
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubo.li@clyso.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
ceph_alloc_cap_flush() is called from ceph_writepages_start() inside
the writeback layer, where other allocations in the same path
(ceph_osdc_alloc_request, ceph_osdc_alloc_messages) already use
GFP_NOFS. A GFP_KERNEL allocation here can trigger direct reclaim
that recursively enters the filesystem writeback path:
ceph_writepages_start() // inode A writeback
ceph_alloc_cap_flush()
kmem_cache_alloc(..., GFP_KERNEL)
[direct reclaim]
try_to_free_pages()
shrink_slab()
super_cache_scan()
prune_icache_sb()
inode_lru_isolate()
iput() -> evict(inode_B)
[inode_B has dirty pages]
filemap_flush()
ceph_writepages_start() // re-enters writeback
ceph_alloc_cap_flush()
-> RECURSION / STACK OVERFLOW
All 11 callers of ceph_alloc_cap_flush() are in write or writeback
contexts: writepages (x2), write_iter, fallocate, copy_file_range,
setxattr, setattr, and page_mkwrite.
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubo.li@clyso.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
__touch_cap() moves one capability to the end of the LRU list; this
list is sorted by access time for just one thing: ceph_trim_caps().
That function is supposed to discard the least-recently used
capabilities.
__touch_cap() is called extremely often - several times for every
system call, but ceph_trim_caps() is only called rarely.
__touch_cap() causes considerable lock contention on
`ceph_mds_session.s_cap_lock`; this is a /proc/lock_stat I captured on
one of our web servers for 5 minutes:
class name con-bounces contentions waittime-min waittime-max waittime-total waittime-avg acq-bounces acquisitions holdtime-min holdtime-max holdtime-total holdtime-avg
&s->s_cap_lock: 336304046 341686597 0.04 4905.76 418498578.76 1.22 892783632 1957814739 0.04 959.40 355752146.24 0.18
--------------
&s->s_cap_lock 339379730 [<00000000a2197200>] __ceph_caps_issued_mask+0x1bc/0x240
&s->s_cap_lock 1268054 [<00000000c96a24b7>] ceph_add_cap+0x234/0x3e0
&s->s_cap_lock 1021360 [<00000000aa76f996>] ceph_add_cap+0x108/0x3e0
&s->s_cap_lock 16042 [<0000000099463548>] __ceph_remove_cap+0x1f4/0x270
--------------
&s->s_cap_lock 338509619 [<00000000a2197200>] __ceph_caps_issued_mask+0x1bc/0x240
&s->s_cap_lock 1937864 [<00000000c96a24b7>] ceph_add_cap+0x234/0x3e0
&s->s_cap_lock 1203451 [<00000000aa76f996>] ceph_add_cap+0x108/0x3e0
&s->s_cap_lock 202 [<00000000888f212a>] __ceph_remove_cap+0x7c/0x270
In this /proc/lock_stat output, __touch_cap() is inlined in
__ceph_caps_issued_mask(). It is responsible for 99% of all
contentions.
Since __touch_cap() is called so often, it is acceptable to just skip
most calls. The most busy capabilities will still gravitate towards
the end of the linked list, and if not, it doesn't hurt as much as the
lock contention. This is still good enough for ceph_trim_caps().
This patch adds a static variable that gets incremented with each
call, and 255 out of 256 calls will just be skipped. I didn't bother
to make the increment atomic or use READ_ONCE because I don't think
that makes a practical difference for this use case.
Another /proc/lock_stat for 5 minutes with this patch (__touch_cap()
is no longer inlined probably because it contains a static variable):
class name con-bounces contentions waittime-min waittime-max waittime-total waittime-avg acq-bounces acquisitions holdtime-min holdtime-max holdtime-total holdtime-avg
&s->s_cap_lock: 1043711 1065182 0.04 502.72 737472.88 0.69 10522578 25069948 0.04 796.44 11053669.64 0.44
--------------
&s->s_cap_lock 1043074 [<00000000f4367d73>] __touch_cap.isra.0+0x50/0xa8
&s->s_cap_lock 12147 [<0000000096f45706>] ceph_add_cap+0x234/0x3e0
&s->s_cap_lock 9472 [<0000000038a23e0f>] ceph_add_cap+0x108/0x3e0
&s->s_cap_lock 471 [<00000000e2eba934>] __ceph_remove_cap+0x1f4/0x270
--------------
&s->s_cap_lock 978499 [<00000000f4367d73>] __touch_cap.isra.0+0x50/0xa8
&s->s_cap_lock 57794 [<0000000038a23e0f>] ceph_add_cap+0x108/0x3e0
&s->s_cap_lock 27226 [<0000000096f45706>] ceph_add_cap+0x234/0x3e0
&s->s_cap_lock 1581 [<00000000e2eba934>] __ceph_remove_cap+0x1f4/0x270
__touch_cap() is still responsible for 91% of all contentions, but the
number of contentions has been reduced by a factor of 320 and the
total wait time by a factor of 567.
Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
system_wq (per-CPU) and system_unbound_wq (unbound) are the older
workqueue name, replaced by system_{percpu|dfl}_wq.
The new workqueues have been introduced by:
128ea9f6cc ("workqueue: Add system_percpu_wq and system_dfl_wq")
Usage of older workqueues will now trigger a pr_warn_once() because they are
marked as deprecated as per commit:
64d8eae3f8 ("workqueue: Add warnings and fallback if system_{unbound}_wq is used")
So change the used workqueue with the newer, keeping the same behavior.
Suggested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marco Crivellari <marco.crivellari@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
The fscrypt subsystem uses the scatterlist crypto API, inheriting its
requirement that any buffers are in the linear mapping region. However,
the messenger client uses kvmalloc() to create buffers for messages,
which will occasionally place those buffers in the vmalloc() region when
physical memory fragmentation doesn't permit a large enough kmalloc().
The various callers of ceph_fname_to_usr() directly pass (slices of) raw
messages from the MDS without considering that the messages may be in
vmalloc() buffers, resulting in oopses especially on non-x86 platforms
(see 'Closes:' for more details and a reproducer).
Make ceph_fname_to_usr() explicitly tolerant of vmalloc()-allocated
fname->ctext, fname->name, and/or oname->name buffers, using `tname`
(which, when non-null, must be a linear address; when null, is briefly
allocated as necessary) as a bounce buffer to avoid passing any
inappropriate addresses to fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr().
Additionally change parse_reply_info_readdir() -- the only function to
supply its own `tname` -- to follow the new "tname must never come from
vmalloc()" rule by passing NULL when the message is not in the linear
region. Though this causes a per-dentry kmalloc()+kfree(), this overhead
exists only when processing the minority of messages that spill into
vmalloc(). My (crude) testing puts this at only about 1 in 8,000 readdir
messages. Still, if the overhead proves unreasonable in the future, it
is easy enough to mitigate: a future change could allocate a bounce
buffer in parse_reply_info_readdir() and use that as `tname` instead.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 888d33b208: ceph: pass fscrypt `tname` buffers directly
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 457117f077 ("ceph: add helpers for converting names for userland presentation")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/ceph-devel/20260415034020.11530-1-CFSworks@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Sam Edwards <CFSworks@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
ceph_fname_to_usr() needs a temporary buffer for some operations
(currently only base64-decoding ciphertext) and it is convenient to
allow the caller to specify this buffer to avoid a heap allocation, so
it has a (nullable) `tname` argument. Until now, this argument was a
`struct fscrypt_str`; however, this is unnecessary for two reasons:
1. `tname->len` isn't used anywhere: ceph_fname_to_usr() assumes a
buffer large enough to hold the ciphertext, and
parse_reply_info_readdir() -- the only caller to use tname -- doesn't
set it.
2. While the `tname` parameter is documented "may be NULL,"
parse_reply_info_readdir() always passes it but with `tname->name`
sometimes NULL in violation of the contract, indicating that the
unnecessary container creates actual confusion.
Therefore, change the type to `unsigned char *` and pass the buffer
directly.
Signed-off-by: Sam Edwards <CFSworks@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
When mkdir succeeds, ceph_mkdir() sets ret to ERR_PTR(0) which is
incorrect. It should return NULL instead for success.
Fixes: 88d5baf690 ("Change inode_operations.mkdir to return struct dentry *")
Signed-off-by: Hongling Zeng <zenghongling@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Pull scheduler fix from Borislav Petkov:
- Make sure a delayed sched entity's runtime stats are updated at the
right time so that it receives the proper lag compensation
* tag 'sched_urgent_for_v7.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
sched: Update time before requeueing delayed entities
Pull timer fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Detect a broken EL2 virtual timer in the bcm2712 SoC boards (RPi5)
and fallback to the physical one instead
- Fix a build error with ARM rpc_defconfig and function tracer enabled
* tag 'timers_urgent_for_v7.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
clocksource/drivers/arm_arch_timer: Workaround bcm2712 broken EL2 virtual timer
tick: Include ktime.h and jiffies.h in linux/tick.h
Pull rseq fix from Borislav Petkov:
- Prevent a lockup when rseq grants a timeslice extension
* tag 'core_urgent_for_v7.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
rseq: Prevent hard lockup on granted time slice extension
Split mt7921_mcu_regd_update() into two functions to prevent recursive
mutex acquisition. Introduce __mt7921_mcu_regd_update() as the internal
implementation that assumes the mutex is already held by the caller,
while mt7921_mcu_regd_update() remains as the external interface that
handles mutex acquisition and release.
This fixes a deadlock issue when mt7921_regd_set_6ghz_power_type() is
called with the device mutex already held. Without this change, calling
mt7921_mcu_regd_update() would attempt to acquire the same mutex again,
causing a recursive lock deadlock.
The __mt7921_mcu_regd_update() function can be safely called when the
caller has already acquired the device mutex, avoiding the deadlock
while maintaining proper synchronization for regulatory domain updates.
Fixes: dc2608cf5224 ("wifi: mt76: mt7921: refactor regulatory notifier flow")
Signed-off-by: Charlie-cy Wu <Charlie-cy.Wu@mediatek.com>
Tested-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Devin Wittmayer <lucid_duck@justthetip.ca>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull perf fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Prevent the use of exited events as group leaders
- Avoid use-after-free of an event's group leader by promoting detached
sibling events to standalone entities and correct related accounting
and state transitions
* tag 'perf_urgent_for_v7.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/core: Fix group leader use-after-free after sibling detach
perf: Reject exited events as group leaders
Pull x86 fix from Borislav Petkov:
- Add a proper kernel cmdline option to control the TLB invalidation
method on x86 prompted mainly by a recent finding on AMD related to
INVLPGB/TYLBSYNC invalidations.
Having the command line option is simply another way to alleviate
the situation short-term
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v7.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/CPU: Add a tlbi= cmdline switch
Pull block fix from Jens Axboe:
"A single fix for a regression in this cycle, where drbd would leak
shared secrets over netlink. This restores the behavior to match
what we had before"
* tag 'block-7.2-20260815' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/axboe/linux:
drbd: don't leak the shared secret to unprivileged netlink dumps
Pull io_uring fix from Jens Axboe:
"Just a single fix for a potential issue on 32-bit x86 with PAE"
* tag 'io_uring-7.2-20260815' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/axboe/linux:
io_uring/rsrc: reject overflowing regvec bvec byte counts
The conversion to explicit netlink serialization dropped the
exclude_sensitive parameter from net_conf_to_skb(), so each caller has
to sanitize by hand. Two dump paths were missed:
drbd_nl_get_connections_dumpit() and the volume-less connection branch
of get_one_status(). Neither op carries GENL_ADMIN_PERM, so any
unprivileged local user could read the CRAM-HMAC secret.
Add a net_conf_to_skb_sanitized() wrapper and route all three callers
through it.
Fixes: 8098eeb693 ("drbd: replace genl_magic with explicit netlink serialization")
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <vivek.parikh@breachx.ai>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Böhmwalder <christoph.boehmwalder@linbit.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260814151617.73752-1-christoph.boehmwalder@linbit.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Pull SoC fixes from Arnd Bergmann:
"These are three last-minute fixes for the 7.2 release, though nothing
alarming:
- one error handling fix for optee firmware
- incorrect i2c data for the apple M3 that was added in 7.2
- a boot time warning fix for nvidia tegra"
* tag 'soc-fixes-7.2-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/soc/soc:
arm64: tegra: Add EL2 virtual timer interrupt for Tegra194
arm64: dts: apple: t8122: Fix I2C resources
optee: ffa: Add NULL check in optee_ffa_lend_protmem
Pull OpenRISC fix from Stafford Horne:
"A bug fix found by researchers:
- mask all privileged bits when restoring the supervisor register
from sigreturn"
* tag 'for-linus' of https://github.com/openrisc/linux:
openrisc: signal: do not restore privileged SR bits on sigreturn
restore_sigcontext() copies the whole supervision register (SR) from the
signal frame and only clears SPR_SR_SM before the value is reloaded into
the hardware SR (through ESR and l.rfe) on the return to user space. All
other SR bits are left under user control.
An unprivileged task can thus return from a signal handler through a
crafted sigframe that clears SPR_SR_DME. With the data MMU disabled the
CPU performs no translation or protection on data accesses, so the task
gains read and write access to arbitrary physical memory, a local
privilege escalation. SPR_SR_IME, SPR_SR_SUMRA, SPR_SR_LEE, SPR_SR_EPH
and the cache-enable bits are exposed the same way. The ptrace GPR regset
already refuses any change to SR for exactly this reason.
Restore only the arithmetic flag bits (F, CY, OV) from the signal frame
and take every privileged control bit from the SR the kernel saved on
signal entry.
Verified with qemu-system-or1k -M or1k-sim: before this change an
unprivileged PoC clears SPR_SR_DME in rt_sigreturn and writes a marker to
physical address 0x03000000 (beyond the kernel's mem=32M); afterwards the
same PoC receives SIGSEGV and physical memory is unchanged.
Fixes: ac689eb7f9 ("OpenRISC: Signal handling")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Pull input fixes from Dmitry Torokhov:
- A couple of fixes to the sur40 touchscreen driver to correct
registration and teardown ordering, and to fix error path
unwinding when video device registration fails.
* tag 'input-for-v7.2-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dtor/input:
Input: sur40 - fix V4L error path cleanup
Input: sur40 - fix input device registration ordering
Pull drm fixes from Dave Airlie:
"While this is large for rc8 time but also AI driven fixes is a lot of
it, we had a more traditional screw up, and a regression was just
found in the fair scheduling patches that went in back in rc1. This
reverts the fair scheduler back to an option and sets the default back
to what it should have been. We might have been a bit overly zealous
in switching over, but at least it feels more normal than the AI
driven fixes.
Apart from the scheduler, it's mostly amdgpu and xe fixes, with some
misc fixes to the log code and connector code.
scheduler:
- revert fair scheduler patches due to regression
- mark fair as experimental
connector:
- fix OOB read in hdmi audio infoframe
log:
- fix divide by 0 if module param is set to 0
- fix OOB read on empty message
- fix infinite loop for too large scale
xe:
- Fix DPT Allocation paths
- Fixes around UM queue BO
- Order ring writes before ring tail updates
- Add termination on resume for PXP
- Document Sentinel and make CTX_TIMESTAMP read TOCTOU-safe
- Fix sync entry leak on OA config emit failure
- Check managed mutex initilization errors
- Fix min frequency setting
- Fix xe_device_probe error path
amdgpu:
- Bounds checking fix in CS IOCTL
- Bounds checking fix in GEM IOCTL
- Display fixes
- GPUVM fix
- ASPM fix
- UVD bounds checking fixes
- VCE 3 fix
- BT.2020 fixes
- NBIF 6.3.1 fix
- IP discovery fix
radeon:
- Runtime pm fix
amdxdna:
- skip attempting to populate unmapped pages"
* tag 'drm-fixes-2026-08-15' of https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/kernel: (51 commits)
drm/log: Fix infinite loop when scale is too large for display
drm/log: Fix out-of-bounds read on empty message length
drm/log: Fix division by zero when scale module parameter is 0
drm/xe: Fix xe_device_probe() failure
drm/xe: Fix a bug in pc_adjust_freq_bounds()
drm/xe/oa: Check managed mutex initialization errors
drm/xe/oa: Fix sync entry leak on OA config emit failure
drm/xe/lrc: document sentinel and make CTX_TIMESTAMP read TOCTOU-safe
drm/xe/pxp: add termination on resume
drm/xe: Order ring writes before ring tail updates
drm/xe/guc_ads: use uncached mapping for UM queue BO
drm/xe/guc_ads: allocate UM queues in VRAM on dGFX
drm/xe/guc_ads: allocate UM queues in a separate BO
drm/xe: Fix DPT allocation paths.
accel/amdxdna: Skip unmapped range in aie2_populate_range()
drm/amdgpu: Prefer default discovery offset
drm/amdgpu: Reject UVD message with invalid number of h265 refs
drm/amdgpu: fix nbif 6.3.1 l1 low power not functional
drm/amd/display: fix BT.2020 YCbCr output CSC matrices for DCE
drm/amd/display: fix BT.2020 YCbCr limited output CSC matrix
...
Pull clk fixes from Stephen Boyd:
"Fixes for the Qualcomm, Rockchip, and SpacemiT clk drivers:
- Keep audio working on Rockchip rk3588 by skipping disabling unused
clks
- Fix SpacemiT USB2 clk data so they actually work and keep the HDMA
bus clk enabled to avoid system hangs
- Avoid clk hangs on Qualcomm Eliza display hardware and revert a
patch that breaks PCIe on some Qualcomm platforms"
* tag 'clk-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/clk/linux:
dt-bindings: clock: Replace bouncing emails
Revert "clk: qcom: regmap-phy-mux: Rework the implementation"
clk: spacemit: k3: set hdma clock as critical
clk: spacemit: k3: fix USB2 bus clock
clk: qcom: dispcc-eliza: Fix disp_cc_mdss_mdp_clk_src RCG stall on Eliza EVK
clk: rockchip: rk3588: don't disable unused I2S MCLK output gates
Pull spi fixes from Mark Brown:
"A couple of relatively minor (but as ever important if you're hitting
them) and straightforward driver specific fixes, plus one new device
ID documented in the DT bindings for the DesignWare controller"
* tag 'spi-fix-v7.2-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/spi:
spi: virtio: mark device ready before registering the controller
spi: dw: fix wrong RX_SAMPLE_DLY setting after resume
spi: dt-bindings: snps,dw-apb-ssi: Document Axiado AX3005
