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0680cbbf39ca61c70be16141b5259f822e7cdb3b
1447217 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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0680cbbf39 |
btrfs: trigger cow fixup via dirty_folio()
The problem scenario:
If we have a folio mmapped shared and then somebody does a dio read with
that folio as the read destination, then it is possible that the dio
will see a dirty destination page when it starts (and thus skip
dirtying and just GUP pin it) but then while it is doing the read, btrfs
finishes writing it back and by the endio, the folio is clean. In that
case, the dio read must re-dirty the folio with aops->dirty_folio():
btrfs_check_read_bio()
|- __iomap_dio_bio_end_io() from btrfs_bio_end_io()
|- bio_check_pages_dirty()
|- bio_dirty_fn()
|- bio_release_pages(bio, true)
|- __bio_release_pages(bio, mark_dirty == true)
|- folio_lock()
|- folio_mark_dirty()
|- aops->dirty_folio()
|- folio_unlock()
A data block normally moves through writeback as follows:
TASK
folio_lock
write clean -> dirty bit + delalloc
folio_unlock
WRITEBACK
for-each-dirty-folio:
folio_lock
run_delalloc delalloc consumed -> dirty bit + OE
submission dirty bit consumed -> writeback bit + OE
folio_unlock
ENDIO
endio OE bytes accounted
OE finish writeback -> clean; destroy OE
Three critical invariants that this path maintains are:
I1. Any dirty block is covered by delalloc xor an ordered extent
I2. Any dirty block covered by an OE will be submitted into that OE
I3. Any dirty block already submitted into an OE will not be submitted
again into the same OE.
These ensure that the block will be written exactly once. It is clear
that not reserving delalloc for the re-dirty case violates I1.
This situation, even without bs < folio_size, has long required btrfs to
fixup such dirty pages during writeback with an asynchronous worker that
is allowed to do this expensive work and writeback does not proceed for
a folio while it is doing this work.
Commit
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c4c0673e4c |
btrfs: raid56: fix scrub read assembly submitting no reads
Commit |
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ab602da96a |
btrfs: zoned: skip fully truncated ordered extents at zone finish
A fully truncated ordered extent (truncated_len == 0) wrote no data, so its ->csum_list is empty and btrfs_finish_ordered_zoned() trips: assertion failed: !list_empty(&ordered->csum_list), in fs/btrfs/zoned.c:2141 Since commit |
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0d214d14be |
btrfs: initialize 'args' to avoid compiler warning in btrfs_ioctl_get_csums()
[COMPILER WARNING]
With GCC 11.5.0 and KASAN enabled on ARM, the following warning is
triggered during compiling:
In file included from ./include/asm-generic/rwonce.h:26,
from ./arch/arm64/include/asm/rwonce.h:81,
from ./include/linux/compiler.h:369,
from ./include/linux/array_size.h:5,
from ./include/linux/kernel.h:16,
from fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:6:
In function ‘instrument_copy_from_user_before’,
inlined from ‘_inline_copy_from_user’ at ./include/linux/uaccess.h:184:2,
inlined from ‘copy_from_user’ at ./include/linux/uaccess.h:222:9,
inlined from ‘btrfs_ioctl_get_csums.isra’ at fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:5220:6:
./include/linux/kasan-checks.h:38:27: warning: ‘args’ may be used uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
38 | #define kasan_check_write __kasan_check_write
./include/linux/instrumented.h:146:9: note: in expansion of macro ‘kasan_check_write’
146 | kasan_check_write(to, n);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c: In function ‘btrfs_ioctl_get_csums.isra’:
./include/linux/kasan-checks.h:20:6: note: by argument 1 of type ‘const volatile void *’ to ‘__kasan_check_write’ declared here
20 | bool __kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:5201:43: note: ‘args’ declared here
5201 | struct btrfs_ioctl_get_csums_args args;
| ^~~~
[POSSIBLE FALSE ALERTS]
This seems to be a false alert from certain GCC versions.
The @args is immediately over-written by copy_from_user(), and there is
no code touching that @args until copy_from_user() finished correctly.
[WORKAROUND]
Initialize 'args' to zero, which suppresses the warning.
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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8bc4d72096 |
btrfs: zoned: fix missing chunk metadata reservation
reserve_chunk_space() stores the return value of
btrfs_zoned_activate_one_bg() in ret. The helper can return 1 after
successfully activating a block group, but ret is later used to decide
whether to reserve metadata for chunk tree updates.
As a result, successful activation skips btrfs_block_rsv_add() and leaves
trans->chunk_bytes_reserved unchanged. Use a separate variable for the
activation result so positive success does not affect the later
reservation. Keep activation failures in ret instead of returning early so
the function uses the common tail path.
Fixes:
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330dcc553f |
btrfs: raid56: fix an incorrect csum skip during scrub
Commit |
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c438d34ec1 |
btrfs: report missing raid stripe tree root during lookup
When rescue=ibadroots ignores a failure to load the raid stripe tree root, fs_info->stripe_root remains NULL. After the rescue mount proceeds, reading file data that requires the raid stripe tree reaches btrfs_get_raid_extent_offset(). Currently btrfs_search_slot() handles the NULL root and returns -EINVAL. This avoids a NULL pointer dereference, but provides no diagnostic and incorrectly describes missing filesystem metadata as an invalid argument. Check stripe_root before allocating a path, emit a rate-limited error with the logical address, and return -EUCLEAN. Lookups with a valid stripe root are unchanged. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Dongjiang Zhu <zhudongjiang@fnnas.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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51a0e83998 |
btrfs: skip global block reserve accounting for rescue mounts
[BUG] Mounting with rescue=ibadroots after corrupting the block group tree root triggers a NULL pointer dereference: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000100 RIP: 0010:btrfs_update_global_block_rsv+0x9d/0x1c0 [btrfs] Call Trace: fill_dummy_bgs+0xd4/0x120 [btrfs] open_ctree+0xc6e/0x1ca0 [btrfs] btrfs_get_tree+0x50d/0xa40 [btrfs] The same crash occurs with a corrupted raid stripe tree root, via btrfs_read_block_groups() instead of fill_dummy_bgs(). [CAUSE] With rescue=ibadroots, btrfs_read_roots() allows the mount to continue when either root cannot be read, leaving the corresponding root pointer NULL while its on-disk feature bit remains set. btrfs_update_global_block_rsv() then dereferences the missing root based on the feature bit alone. [FIX] Rescue mounts are fully read-only and cannot start transactions, so the global reserve is never consumed. Under btrfs_is_full_ro(), mark the reserve as full and return before performing the accounting. And since we need to check if the fs is mount fully RO, export fs_is_full_ro() as btrfs_is_full_ro(), and move it to fs.h. Fixes: |
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5fabb1cf25 |
btrfs: zoned: reset meta_write_pointer on zone reset
btrfs_reset_unused_block_groups() resets a block group's zone and sets
alloc_offset back to 0 so the space can be reused, but it leaves
meta_write_pointer pointing at the previous end of the zone.
Once the block group is reactivated and reused for metadata, newly
allocated tree blocks live before that stale write pointer.
btrfs_check_meta_write_pointer() then sees them behind the write pointer,
so they can never be written out in sequential order: the dirty extent
buffers are stranded and pin their btree_inode folios until unmount.
Reset meta_write_pointer back to the start of the block group for
metadata and system block groups.
Fixes:
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1ebe51c29f |
btrfs: zoned: fix deadlock between metadata writeback and transaction commit
When writing out metadata extent buffers in a zoned filesystem,
btree_writepages() holds fs_info->zoned_meta_io_lock across the whole
writeback loop, including the call to btrfs_check_meta_write_pointer() ->
check_bg_is_active().
For the tree-log block group, check_bg_is_active() may fail to activate
the zone and fall back to btrfs_zone_finish_one_bg() to free an active
zone. That path waits for the running transaction to commit while still
holding zoned_meta_io_lock, but the committer needs that same lock to
write out the tree extents, so the two tasks deadlock:
Task A (kworker, metadata writeback) Task B (fsstress, transaction commit)
------------------------------------ -------------------------------------
wb_workfn() btrfs_commit_transaction(T)
btree_writepages() btrfs_write_and_wait_transaction()
btrfs_zoned_meta_io_lock() btrfs_write_marked_extents()
btrfs_check_meta_write_pointer() btree_writepages()
check_bg_is_active() [treelog_bg] btrfs_zoned_meta_io_lock()
btrfs_zone_finish_one_bg() <blocks on zoned_meta_io_lock,
btrfs_zone_finish() held by Task A>
do_zone_finish()
btrfs_inc_block_group_ro()
btrfs_wait_for_commit()
<blocks waiting for commit
of transaction T, done by
Task B>
The sibling branch in check_bg_is_active() already drops zoned_meta_io_lock
around do_zone_finish() for this exact reason. Do the same in the tree-log
branch: release the lock around btrfs_zone_finish_one_bg() and re-acquire
it afterwards. The lock only protects fs_info->active_{meta,system}_bg,
which this branch does not touch, and ctx->zoned_bg keeps a reference to
the block group across the unlock, so nothing is lost while the lock
is dropped.
This hang occasionally reproduces with fstests generic/475 on a zoned
btrfs filesystem.
Fixes:
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6881f45d0e |
btrfs: fix leaking BTRFS_FS_STATE_REMOUNTING flag
[BUG]
The following script can lead to unexpected qgroup rescan failure:
# mkfs.btrfs -f -O quota $dev
# mount $dev $mnt
# mount -o remount,rescue=ibadroots $mnt
^^^^^ This above command is expected to fail
# btrfs quota rescan -w $mnt
^^^^^ The above qgroup rescan is not expected to fail
# btrfs qgroup show $mnt
WARNING: qgroup data inconsistent, rescan recommended
Qgroupid Referenced Exclusive Path
-------- ---------- --------- ----
0/5 16.00KiB 16.00KiB <toplevel>
The above short script will be converted to a proper fstests case.
[CAUSE]
Inside btrfs_reconfigure(), if either btrfs_check_options() or
btrfs_check_features() failed, we will always have
BTRFS_FS_STATE_REMOUNTING set for the fs until the next successful
remount.
That BTRFS_FS_STATE_REMOUNTING flag will interrupt several operations,
including:
- Qgroup rescan
- Auto defrag
- Space reclaim
[FIX]
Change the error handling of btrfs_check_options() and
btrfs_check_features() to goto restore label.
Fixes:
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75a41e3e51 |
btrfs: fix GET_SUBVOL_INFO after compat refactor
btrfs_search_slot() returns a positive value when the search key does
not exactly match an item. This is expected here, since offset 0 is used
to find the first ROOT_BACKREF for the subvolume and the actual key has
the parent root ID as its offset.
Before the compat ioctl refactoring, the native handler still copied the
filled structure to userspace when the search returned 1. After the
lookup was moved to a shared helper, both native and compat callers
treat the positive return value as a failure and skip copy_to_user(),
leaving BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO unusable for non-top-level
subvolumes.
Reset ret after successfully validating and reading the ROOT_BACKREF so
the helper reports success and both callers copy the result to
userspace.
Fixes:
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6a8269b645 |
btrfs: free mapping node on duplicate reloc root insert
__add_reloc_root() allocates a mapping_node before inserting it into
rc->reloc_root_tree. If rb_simple_insert() finds an existing entry, it
returns the existing rb_node and leaves the newly allocated node unlinked.
The error path then returns -EEXIST without freeing the new node. Since
the node was never inserted into reloc_root_tree, the later cleanup in
put_reloc_control() cannot find it either.
Free the newly allocated node before returning -EEXIST.
The callers currently assert that -EEXIST should not happen, so this is a
defensive cleanup for an unexpected duplicate insert path. If the path is
ever reached, the local allocation should still be released.
Fixes:
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9b73625a4f |
btrfs: fix a regression where PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY is never cleared
[BUG] The following script (already submitted as generic/798) will report incorrect dirty page numbers, with 64K page size systems and 4K fs block size: # mkfs.btrfs -s 4k -f $dev # mount $dev $mnt # xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 64K" -c fsync -c "cachestat 0 64K" $mnt/foobar Cached: 1, Dirty: 1, Writeback: 0, Evicted: 0, Recently Evicted: 0 Note that the dirtied page number is still 1. [CAUSE] The cachestat() goes through the XArray of the page cache, but instead of checking each folio's flag, it uses the PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY tag to report dirty pages. Since commit |
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5eff4d5b17 |
btrfs: don't propagate EXTENT_FLAG_LOGGING to split extent maps
When btrfs_drop_extent_map_range() splits an extent map, the new split maps inherit the original map's flags through a local 'flags' variable. Commit |
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8b5a09ceb6 |
btrfs: fix u32 to s64 type conversion in dirty_metadata_bytes accounting
The percpu_counter dirty_metadata_bytes is updated by negating eb->len and passing it to percpu_counter_add_batch(), whose amount parameter is s64. Since commit |
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f0c1f14cc1 |
btrfs: fix NULL pointer deref during assertion in btrfs_backref_free_node()
In btrfs_backref_free_node() we have the following assertion:
ASSERT(node->eb == NULL, "node->eb->start=%llu", node->eb->start);
and a user reported the following crash:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 10422 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted 7.1.0-02765-g6b5a2b7d9bc1-dirty #44 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:btrfs_backref_free_node fs/btrfs/backref.c:3057 [inline]
RIP: 0010:btrfs_backref_free_node+0xb9/0x200 fs/btrfs/backref.c:3051
Code: 00 fc ff (...)
RSP: 0018:ffa0000006b0f3c0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff840eb78b
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff840eafa5 RDI: ff110000742ab768
RBP: ff110000742ab700 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ff110000742ab700 R11: 00000000000a81f9 R12: ff11000107a92020
R13: ff1100005c182ea8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 0000555575536500(0000) GS:ff11000183985000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fa3d0e9d580 CR3: 000000002232a000 CR4: 0000000000753ef0
PKRU: 00000000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
btrfs_backref_cleanup_node+0x27/0x30 fs/btrfs/backref.c:3133
relocate_tree_block fs/btrfs/relocation.c:2604 [inline]
relocate_tree_blocks+0x11b0/0x1a20 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:2707
relocate_block_group+0x499/0xf30 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3635
do_nonremap_reloc fs/btrfs/relocation.c:5323 [inline]
btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x1749/0x5fb0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:5490
btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12b/0x950 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3647
__btrfs_balance fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4586 [inline]
btrfs_balance+0x1c7f/0x55c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4973
btrfs_ioctl_balance fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3474 [inline]
btrfs_ioctl+0x38a4/0x5d20 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:5570
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18f/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x11f/0x860 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fb38e3b56dd
Code: 02 b8 ff (...)
RSP: 002b:00007fff04115788 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb38f6b0020 RCX: 00007fb38e3b56dd
RDX: 00002000000003c0 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007fb38e451b48 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fb38f6b0020 R15: 00007fb38f6b002c
</TASK>
It seems that this happens on some systems for some reason, when the
ASSERT() macro calls the inline function verify_assert_printk_format()
to evaluate the format string and arguments, causing the NULL pointer
dereference on node->eb.
So change the assertion to check for a NULL node->eb before dereferencing
it. Also, while at it, make the assertion more useful by printing the
owner of the extent buffer as well as its level.
Reported-by: Yue Sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20260626065542.38413-1-samsun1006219@gmail.com/
Fixes:
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9411aafdf3 |
btrfs: only account delalloc bytes for regular file inodes in btrfs_getattr()
btrfs_getattr() unconditionally reads BTRFS_I(inode)->new_delalloc_bytes
and adds it (sector-aligned) to stat->blocks for every inode type.
However, new_delalloc_bytes lives in a union with last_dir_index_offset:
union {
u64 new_delalloc_bytes; /* files only */
u64 last_dir_index_offset; /* directories only */
};
For a directory inode this memory holds last_dir_index_offset, which is
set during directory logging (e.g. flush_dir_items_batch()) to the
offset of the last logged BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY. That offset grows with
the number of entries ever created in the directory (dir indexes are
monotonic and never reused), so it can be arbitrarily large.
As a result, after a directory has been logged (e.g. via an fsync that
triggers directory logging), btrfs_getattr() reports inflated st_blocks
for that directory. The inflation is purely in-core and disappears
after the inode is evicted and reloaded (btrfs_alloc_inode() zeroes the
union), e.g. after a remount.
Reproducer (on a btrfs filesystem):
D=/mnt/btrfs/d
mkdir -p $D
for i in $(seq 1 20000); do touch $D/f$i; done
sync # commit, push dir index high
touch $D/trigger # dirty the dir in a new transaction
xfs_io -c fsync $D # log the directory -> sets last_dir_index_offset
stat -c '%b' $D # st_blocks is now inflated (e.g. 40)
# umount + mount -> st_blocks drops back to the correct value
The evict path already knows this union is type-dependent and guards the
corresponding WARN_ON with !S_ISDIR() in btrfs_destroy_inode(); only
btrfs_getattr() was missing the equivalent check.
Only read new_delalloc_bytes for regular files, which are the only
inodes that ever set it.
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chen <davechen@synology.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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800b519602 |
btrfs: reject inline file extents item in get_new_location()
Commit |
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ae4316f332 |
btrfs: do not try compression for data reloc inodes
[BUG]
There is a syzbot report that the check inside get_new_location()
triggered:
BTRFS info (device loop0): found 31 extents, stage: move data extents
BTRFS info (device loop0): leaf 8908800 gen 16 total ptrs 28 free space 1676 owner 18446744073709551607
item 0 key (256 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 3835 itemsize 160
inode generation 5 transid 0 size 0 nbytes 0
block group 0 mode 40755 links 1 uid 0 gid 0
rdev 0 sequence 0 flags 0x0
atime 1669132761.0
ctime 1669132761.0
mtime 1669132761.0
otime 0.0
item 1 key (256 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 3823 itemsize 12
index 0 name_len 2
item 2 key (258 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 3663 itemsize 160
inode generation 1 transid 16 size 733184 nbytes 106496
block group 0 mode 100600 links 0 uid 0 gid 0
rdev 0 sequence 24 flags 0x18
item 3 key (258 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 3595 itemsize 68
generation 16 type 0
inline extent data size 47 ram_bytes 4096 compression 1
[...]
item 27 key (18446744073709551611 ORPHAN_ITEM 258) itemoff 2376 itemsize 0
BTRFS error (device loop0): unexpected non-zero offset in file extent item for data reloc inode 258 key offset 0 offset 9277520992061368337
------------[ cut here ]------------
btrfs_abort_should_print_stack(__error)
[CAUSE]
The above dump tree shows the first file extent item is inlined, which
should make no sense for data reloc inodes, as such inodes just
represent where the data extents are in the relocation destination chunk.
However the relocation path preallocates space for each block,
then dirties them, cluster by cluster.
It's possible to have a single block at the beginning of the block
group, and no other block in the same cluster.
So relocation will preallocate a file extent for that block and dirty
the first block. Then memory pressure forces the data reloc inode to be
written back, before any other blocks are dirtied/allocated.
Finally commit
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b95181f392 |
btrfs: declare btrfs_ioctl_search_args_v2::buf as __u8
The variable-sized buffer buf in struct btrfs_ioctl_search_args_v2 is
declared as __u64[], but it holds a packed byte stream of search results,
where all offsets into the buffer are in bytes.
Declaring buf as __u64[] makes it easy for user space to write incorrect
pointer arithmetic: adding a byte offset directly to a __u64 pointer
scales the offset by 8, landing at byte position offset*8 instead of
offset.
This recently caused an infinite loop in btrfs-progs: the accessor read
all-zero data from misaddressed items, which fed zeroed search keys back
into the ioctl loop and spun forever. The issue was worked around at the
time by disabling TREE_SEARCH_V2 entirely in btrfs-progs (d73e69824854:
"btrfs-progs: temporarily disable usage of v2 of search tree ioctl").
The kernel side already treats buf as a byte buffer, so change the
declaration to __u8[] to match the actual semantics and prevent similar
misuse in user space. The change is ABI compatible: both the structure size
and alignment are unchanged.
Fixes:
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b78fe9563e |
btrfs: fix reloc root cleanup in merge_reloc_roots()
If the root we got has zero root refs in its root item, we are resetting the root's ->reloc_root without using barriers like we do everywhere else. Sashiko complained about this while reviewing another patch, and it's correct (see the Link tag below). Also, we should not clear BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE from the root unless the root points to the reloc root we have. Fix this by using clear_reloc_root(), which issues the memory barrier after setting the root's ->reloc_root to NULL and before clearing the bit BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE from the root. Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/cf84f1a217c719e25b6b69e4298dd7afd36c9427.1781194426.git.fdmanana%40suse.com Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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83201804ef |
btrfs: fix use-after-free on reloc root after error in insert_dirty_subvol()
If during relocation we fail in insert_dirty_subvol() because
btrfs_update_reloc_root() returned an error, we will leave a root's
reloc_root field pointing to a reloc root that was freed instead of NULL,
resulting later in a use-after-free, or double free attempt during
unmount.
The sequence of steps is this:
1) During relocation the call to btrfs_update_reloc_root() in
insert_dirty_subvol() fails, so insert_dirty_subvol() returns the
error to merge_reloc_root() without adding the root to the list
rc->dirty_subvol_roots;
2) Then merge_reloc_root() aborts the current transaction because
insert_dirty_subvol() returned an error;
3) Up the call chain, merge_reloc_roots() gets the error, adds the
reloc root for root X to the local reloc_roots list and jumps to the
'out' label, where it calls free_reloc_roots() to free all the reloc
roots in the local reloc_roots list. This frees the reloc root for
root X;
4) We go up the call chain to relocate_block_group() which calls
clean_dirty_subvols() to go over dirty roots and set their
->reloc_root field to NULL, but root X is not in the dirty_subvol_roots
list, so its ->reloc_root still points to a reloc root;
5) Relocation finishes, with an error and a transaction abort, but the
->reloc_root field for root X still points to the reloc root that was
freed in step 3;
6) When unmounting the fs we end up calling:
btrfs_free_fs_roots()
btrfs_drop_and_free_fs_root()
--> calls btrfs_put_root() against root X's ->reloc_root
which is not NULL and points to the already freed
reloc root in step 4 above
Resulting in a use-after-free to a double free attempt.
Syzbot reported this with the following dmesg/syslog:
[ 106.004389][ T5339] BTRFS error (device loop0 state A): Transaction aborted (error -5)
[ 106.014266][ T5339] BTRFS: error (device loop0 state A) in merge_reloc_root:1655: errno=-5 IO failure
[ 106.021891][ T1061] BTRFS error (device loop0 state A): error while writing out transaction: -5
[ 106.026964][ T1061] BTRFS warning (device loop0 state A): Skipping commit of aborted transaction.
[ 106.033807][ T5340] BTRFS error (device loop0 state A): bdev /dev/loop0 errs: wr 3, rd 0, flush 0, corrupt 0, gen 0
[ 106.039265][ T1061] BTRFS: error (device loop0 state A) in cleanup_transaction:2067: errno=-5 IO failure
[ 106.044382][ T5339] BTRFS info (device loop0 state EA): forced readonly
[ 106.074329][ T5339] BTRFS: error (device loop0 state EA) in merge_reloc_roots:1887: errno=-5 IO failure
[ 106.081004][ T5356] BTRFS info (device loop0 state EA): scrub: started on devid 1
[ 106.085611][ T5339] BTRFS info (device loop0 state EA): balance: ended with status: -30
[ 106.089517][ T5356] BTRFS info (device loop0 state EA): scrub: not finished on devid 1 with status: -30
[ 106.662365][ T5338] BTRFS info (device loop0 state EA): last unmount of filesystem 3a375e4e-b156-4d76-a2ad-16e198ce1409
[ 106.682946][ T5338] ==================================================================
[ 106.686574][ T5338] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in btrfs_put_root+0x2f/0x250
[ 106.690090][ T5338] Write of size 4 at addr ffff88803f978630 by task syz.0.0/5338
[ 106.693173][ T5338]
[ 106.694279][ T5338] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5338 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
[ 106.694293][ T5338] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 106.694300][ T5338] Call Trace:
[ 106.694308][ T5338] <TASK>
[ 106.694314][ T5338] dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150
[ 106.694331][ T5338] print_address_description+0x55/0x1e0
[ 106.694343][ T5338] ? btrfs_put_root+0x2f/0x250
[ 106.694358][ T5338] print_report+0x58/0x70
[ 106.694368][ T5338] kasan_report+0x117/0x150
[ 106.694384][ T5338] ? btrfs_put_root+0x2f/0x250
[ 106.694399][ T5338] kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0
[ 106.694416][ T5338] btrfs_put_root+0x2f/0x250
[ 106.694430][ T5338] btrfs_drop_and_free_fs_root+0x160/0x210
[ 106.694447][ T5338] btrfs_free_fs_roots+0x2f9/0x3c0
[ 106.694464][ T5338] ? __pfx_btrfs_free_fs_roots+0x10/0x10
[ 106.694479][ T5338] ? free_root_pointers+0x5bf/0x5f0
[ 106.694494][ T5338] close_ctree+0x798/0x12d0
[ 106.694511][ T5338] ? __pfx_close_ctree+0x10/0x10
[ 106.694526][ T5338] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x74/0x80
[ 106.694599][ T5338] ? rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_irqrestore+0x906/0xbc0
[ 106.694620][ T5338] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x83/0xe0
[ 106.694636][ T5338] ? btrfs_put_super+0x48/0x1c0
[ 106.694652][ T5338] ? __pfx_btrfs_put_super+0x10/0x10
[ 106.694667][ T5338] generic_shutdown_super+0x13d/0x2d0
[ 106.694682][ T5338] kill_anon_super+0x3b/0x70
[ 106.694695][ T5338] btrfs_kill_super+0x41/0x50
[ 106.694710][ T5338] deactivate_locked_super+0xbc/0x130
[ 106.694722][ T5338] cleanup_mnt+0x437/0x4d0
[ 106.694736][ T5338] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x23/0x50
[ 106.694752][ T5338] task_work_run+0x1d9/0x270
[ 106.694769][ T5338] ? __pfx_task_work_run+0x10/0x10
[ 106.694784][ T5338] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4d/0x210
[ 106.694802][ T5338] do_exit+0x70f/0x22c0
[ 106.694817][ T5338] ? trace_irq_disable+0x3b/0x140
[ 106.694835][ T5338] ? __pfx_do_exit+0x10/0x10
[ 106.694848][ T5338] ? preempt_schedule_thunk+0x16/0x30
[ 106.694863][ T5338] ? preempt_schedule_common+0x82/0xd0
[ 106.694878][ T5338] ? preempt_schedule_thunk+0x16/0x30
[ 106.694892][ T5338] do_group_exit+0x21b/0x2d0
[ 106.694906][ T5338] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 106.694918][ T5338] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40
[ 106.694932][ T5338] x64_sys_call+0x221a/0x2240
[ 106.694944][ T5338] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 106.694954][ T5338] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x40/0x90
[ 106.694967][ T5338] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 106.694978][ T5338] RIP: 0033:0x7f958ef9ce59
[ 106.694988][ T5338] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f958ef9ce2f.
[ 106.694994][ T5338] RSP: 002b:00007fffd4058318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
[ 106.695008][ T5338] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f958ef9ce59
[ 106.695015][ T5338] RDX: 00007f958c3f8000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 106.695022][ T5338] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f958f1e73e0
[ 106.695028][ T5338] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 106.695034][ T5338] R13: 00007f958f1e73e0 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00007fffd40583d0
[ 106.695046][ T5338] </TASK>
[ 106.695050][ T5338]
[ 106.821635][ T5338] Allocated by task 1061:
[ 106.823446][ T5338] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
[ 106.825498][ T5338] __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0
[ 106.827381][ T5338] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x31c/0x660
[ 106.829525][ T5338] btrfs_alloc_root+0x75/0x930
[ 106.831458][ T5338] read_tree_root_path+0x127/0xb00
[ 106.833556][ T5338] btrfs_read_tree_root+0x34/0x60
[ 106.835553][ T5338] create_reloc_root+0x6b3/0xcb0
[ 106.837556][ T5338] btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2ec/0x4b0
[ 106.839557][ T5338] record_root_in_trans+0x2ab/0x350
[ 106.841685][ T5338] btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x15c/0x180
[ 106.844237][ T5338] start_transaction+0x39c/0x1820
[ 106.846638][ T5338] btrfs_finish_one_ordered+0x88e/0x2680
[ 106.849436][ T5338] btrfs_work_helper+0x37b/0xc20
[ 106.851549][ T5338] process_scheduled_works+0xb5d/0x1860
[ 106.853807][ T5338] worker_thread+0xa53/0xfc0
[ 106.855773][ T5338] kthread+0x389/0x470
[ 106.857548][ T5338] ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70
[ 106.859493][ T5338] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 106.861504][ T5338]
[ 106.862527][ T5338] Freed by task 5339:
[ 106.864224][ T5338] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
[ 106.866180][ T5338] kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50
[ 106.868371][ T5338] __kasan_slab_free+0x5c/0x80
[ 106.870462][ T5338] kfree+0x1c5/0x640
[ 106.872180][ T5338] __del_reloc_root+0x341/0x3b0
[ 106.874290][ T5338] free_reloc_roots+0x5f/0x90
[ 106.876282][ T5338] merge_reloc_roots+0x73f/0x8a0
[ 106.878489][ T5338] relocate_block_group+0xbcc/0xe70
[ 106.880742][ T5338] do_nonremap_reloc+0xa8/0x5b0
[ 106.882885][ T5338] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x7e6/0xc40
[ 106.885336][ T5338] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x115/0x820
[ 106.887502][ T5338] __btrfs_balance+0x1db0/0x2ae0
[ 106.889543][ T5338] btrfs_balance+0xaf3/0x11b0
[ 106.891456][ T5338] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x3d3/0x610
[ 106.893672][ T5338] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170
[ 106.895530][ T5338] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 106.897518][ T5338] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 106.900101][ T5338]
[ 106.901123][ T5338] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88803f978000
[ 106.901123][ T5338] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
[ 106.906907][ T5338] The buggy address is located 1584 bytes inside of
[ 106.906907][ T5338] freed 4096-byte region [ffff88803f978000, ffff88803f979000)
[ 106.912980][ T5338]
[ 106.914022][ T5338] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 106.916716][ T5338] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x3f978
[ 106.920390][ T5338] head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
[ 106.923834][ T5338] flags: 0x4fff00000000040(head|node=1|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[ 106.927104][ T5338] page_type: f5(slab)
[ 106.928898][ T5338] raw: 04fff00000000040 ffff88801ac42140 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
[ 106.932507][ T5338] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000800040004 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
[ 106.936193][ T5338] head: 04fff00000000040 ffff88801ac42140 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
[ 106.939856][ T5338] head: 0000000000000000 0000000800040004 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
[ 106.943601][ T5338] head: 04fff00000000003 fffffffffffffe01 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
[ 106.947268][ T5338] head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008
[ 106.950988][ T5338] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 106.953710][ T5338] page_owner tracks the page as allocated
[ 106.956198][ T5338] page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd2820(GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 24, tgid 24 (kworker/u4:2), ts 105728970387, free_ts 29540875453
[ 106.964984][ T5338] post_alloc_hook+0x22d/0x280
[ 106.966956][ T5338] get_page_from_freelist+0x2593/0x2610
[ 106.969307][ T5338] __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18d/0x380
[ 106.971839][ T5338] allocate_slab+0x77/0x660
[ 106.973709][ T5338] refill_objects+0x339/0x3d0
[ 106.975696][ T5338] __pcs_replace_empty_main+0x321/0x720
[ 106.978136][ T5338] __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x572/0x7b0
[ 106.981009][ T5338] __alloc_skb+0x2c1/0x7d0
[ 106.982983][ T5338] nsim_dev_trap_report_work+0x29a/0xb90
[ 106.985356][ T5338] process_scheduled_works+0xb5d/0x1860
[ 106.987710][ T5338] worker_thread+0xa53/0xfc0
[ 106.989847][ T5338] kthread+0x389/0x470
[ 106.991727][ T5338] ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70
[ 106.993722][ T5338] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 106.995900][ T5338] page last free pid 77 tgid 77 stack trace:
[ 106.998479][ T5338] __free_frozen_pages+0xc1c/0xd30
[ 107.000819][ T5338] vfree+0x1d1/0x2f0
[ 107.002631][ T5338] delayed_vfree_work+0x55/0x80
[ 107.004848][ T5338] process_scheduled_works+0xb5d/0x1860
[ 107.007366][ T5338] worker_thread+0xa53/0xfc0
[ 107.009388][ T5338] kthread+0x389/0x470
[ 107.011177][ T5338] ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70
[ 107.013313][ T5338] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 107.015454][ T5338]
[ 107.016460][ T5338] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 107.019052][ T5338] ffff88803f978500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 107.022691][ T5338] ffff88803f978580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 107.026264][ T5338] >ffff88803f978600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 107.029721][ T5338] ^
[ 107.032062][ T5338] ffff88803f978680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 107.035547][ T5338] ffff88803f978700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 107.038865][ T5338] ==================================================================
Fix this by resetting a root's ->reloc_root if we get an error while
trying to merge a reloc root.
Reported-by: syzbot+b3d472d13f9d7bf20669@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/6a1ebde9.c1435f33.112120.0176.GAE@google.com/
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
||
|
|
c0041b502e |
btrfs: print-tree: print header owner as signed
When dumping a tree block, btrfs_header::owner is printed as unsigned, which can result in numbers that are hard to read, e.g.: BTRFS info (device loop0): leaf 8908800 gen 16 total ptrs 28 free space 1676 owner 18446744073709551607 For the above output, 18446744073709551607 is (s64)-9, the root id of data reloc tree. Despite those predefined root ids that are already negative, existing subvolume trees will not have any negative values, as subvolume trees can only utilize the lower 48 bits, so there will be no output change for existing subvolumes, thus no extra confusion. Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Sun YangKai <sunk67188@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
|
|
9e37d187e1 |
btrfs: decentralize transaction aborts in create_reloc_root()
Decentralize transaction aborts in create_reloc_root(), so that it is obvious which call failed and what caused the transaction abort. Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
|
|
3dc22abc21 |
btrfs: tree-checker: validate INODE_REF's namelen
[BUG] A crafted btrfs image can trigger the following crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffd1dc42884000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 1034 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.1.0-rc4-custom+ #383 PREEMPT(full) 46af0a92938a63be7132e0dfd71e62327c51d5c2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022 RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x10 Call Trace: <TASK> read_extent_buffer+0xe4/0x100 [btrfs 3cf0785dd58fec8c5ff84633b772f17ce1f92a8f] btrfs_get_name+0x15e/0x1e0 [btrfs 3cf0785dd58fec8c5ff84633b772f17ce1f92a8f] reconnect_path+0x165/0x390 exportfs_decode_fh_raw+0x337/0x400 ? drop_caches_sysctl_handler+0xb0/0xb0 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x10 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [CAUSE] TThe crafted image has the following corrupted INODE_REF item: item 9 key (258 INODE_REF 257) itemoff 11544 itemsize 4106 index 2 namelen 4096 name: d\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000 The itemsize matches the namelen, but the namelen is 4096, way larger than normal name length limit (BTRFS_NAME_LEN, 255). Meanwhile the memory of the @name is only 255 byte sized, this will cause out-of-boundary access, and cause the above crash. [FIX] Add extra namelen verification for INODE_REF, just like what we have done in ROOT_REF checks. Now the crafted image can be rejected gracefully: BTRFS critical (device dm-2): corrupt leaf: root=5 block=30572544 slot=14 ino=259, invalid inode ref name length, has 4096 expect [1, 255] BTRFS error (device dm-2): read time tree block corruption detected on logical 30572544 mirror 2 Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/aik0hEV6ehKx6Ldv@Air.local/ Acked-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com> [ Rebase, add a Link: tag, add an simple cause analyze ] Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
|
|
1cb15b153c |
btrfs: lzo: add error message for invalid headers
Inside btrfs we always pair -EUCLEAN error with an error message to indicate which data is corrupted. However there are 3 cases inside lzo decompression where there is no error message for corrupted headers. Add those missing error messages to show exactly where the corruption is. Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
|
|
3dcd507308 |
btrfs: fallback to transaction csum tree on a commit root csum miss
We have been running with commit root csums enabled for some time and
have noticed a slight uptick in zero csum errors. Investigating those
revealed that they were same transaction reads of extents that were just
relocated, but the extent map generation was long ago.
It turns out that relocation intentionally does not update the extent
generation (replace_file_extents()), but must write a new csum since the
data has moved, so we must account for this with commit root csum reading.
Luckily this is a short lived condition: after the relocation transaction
the commit root will once again have the csum. So we can add a generic
fallback to the lookup to try again with the transaction csum root.
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
ce6050bafb |
btrfs: fix root leak if its reloc root is unexpected in merge_reloc_roots()
If we have an unexpected reloc_root for our root, we jump to the out label
but never drop the reference we obtained for root, resulting in a leak.
Add a missing btrfs_put_root() call.
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
a2d8d5647e |
btrfs: reject free space cache with more entries than pages
When loading a v1 free space cache, __load_free_space_cache() takes
num_entries and num_bitmaps straight from the on-disk
btrfs_free_space_header. That header is stored in the tree_root under a key
with type 0, which the tree-checker has no case for, so neither count is
validated before the load trusts it.
The load loops num_entries times and maps the next page whenever the current
one runs out, going through io_ctl_check_crc() -> io_ctl_map_page(), which
does io_ctl->pages[io_ctl->index++]. But pages[] is allocated in
io_ctl_init() from the cache inode's i_size, not from num_entries:
num_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(inode), PAGE_SIZE);
io_ctl->pages = kcalloc(num_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_NOFS);
So if num_entries claims more records than the pages can hold, io_ctl->index
runs off the end of pages[]. The write side never hits this because
io_ctl_add_entry() and io_ctl_add_bitmap() both stop once
io_ctl->index >= io_ctl->num_pages; the read side just never had the same
check.
To trigger it, take a clean cache (num_entries = <N> here), set num_entries
in the header to 0x10000, and fix up the leaf checksum so it still passes
the tree-checker. The cache inode has i_size = 65536, so num_pages is 16 and
pages[] is a 16-pointer (kmalloc-128) array. The load now tries to read
65536 entries, io_ctl->index walks up to 16, and pages[16] is read past the
array:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in io_ctl_check_crc (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:420 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:565)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800c833a80 by task kworker/u8:3/58
io_ctl_check_crc (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:420 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:565)
__load_free_space_cache (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:655 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:820)
load_free_space_cache (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:1017)
caching_thread (fs/btrfs/block-group.c:880)
btrfs_work_helper (fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:312)
process_one_work
worker_thread
kthread
ret_from_fork
free-space-cache.c:420 is io_ctl_map_page(), inlined into io_ctl_check_crc()
at line 565, which is why that is the frame KASAN names. The out-of-bounds
slot is then treated as a struct page and handed to crc32c(), so the bad
read turns into a GP fault.
Add the missing check to io_ctl_check_crc(), which is where both the entry
loop and the bitmap loop end up. When num_entries is too large the load now
fails like any corrupt cache: __load_free_space_cache() drops it and rebuilds
the free space from the extent tree, so a valid cache is never rejected.
Reported-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
9d78a98796 |
btrfs: fix transaction abort logic in btrfs_fileattr_set()
There's no need to abort the transaction if we failed to set or delete a property, as we haven't done any change. However we need to abort if we set a property or delete a property and then fail to update the inode item, as that would leave the inode's state in subvolume tree inconsistent. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
|
|
cf1afec09e |
btrfs: validate properties before setting them
We set the xattr and then attempt to apply the property. If the apply fails we then attempt to delete the xattr to avoid an inconsistency. However we don't verify if the deletion succeed, so if it fails we leave an inconsistency between the state in the btree and the in-memory inode. Address this by validating first if we can apply the property, then set the xattr, then apply the property, and this last step should not fail since the validation succeeded before - assert that it does not fail but leave code to attempt to delete the xattr if it happens, and then abort the transaction only if the xattr delete failed. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
|
|
ae2eb64bfd |
btrfs: fix use-after-free after relocation failure with concurrent COW
If we get a failure during relocation, before we update all the extent buffers that have file extent items pointing to extents from the block group being relocated, we can trigger a user-after-free on the reloc control structure (fs_info->reloc_control) if we have a concurrent task that is COWing a subvolume leaf. This happens like this: 1) Relocation of data block group X starts; 2) Relocation changes its state to UPDATE_DATA_PTRS; 3) A task doing a rename for example, COWs leaf A from a subvolume tree and ends up at btrfs_reloc_cow_block() and extracts fs_info->reloc_ctl into a local variable, which then passes to replace_file_extents(); 4) The relocation task gets an error and under the label 'out_put_bg' in btrfs_relocate_block_group() calls free_reloc_control(), which frees the reloc control structure that the rename task is using; 5) The rename task triggers a use-after-free on the reloc control structure that was just freed. Syzbot reported this recently, with the following stack trace: [ 88.389822][ T5325] BTRFS error (device loop0 state A): Transaction aborted (error -5) [ 88.389842][ T5325] BTRFS: error (device loop0 state A) in cleanup_transaction:2067: errno=-5 IO failure [ 88.389864][ T5325] BTRFS info (device loop0 state EA): forced readonly [ 88.392277][ T5324] BTRFS: error (device loop0 state EA) in btrfs_sync_log:3572: errno=-5 IO failure [ 88.396630][ T5325] BTRFS info (device loop0 state EA): balance: ended with status: -5 [ 88.400135][ T5346] ================================================================== [ 88.400148][ T5346] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in replace_file_extents+0x85f/0x1590 [ 88.400288][ T5346] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888012312010 by task syz.0.0/5346 [ 88.400299][ T5346] [ 88.400306][ T5346] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5346 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) [ 88.400319][ T5346] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 88.400325][ T5346] Call Trace: [ 88.400331][ T5346] <TASK> [ 88.400336][ T5346] dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 [ 88.400351][ T5346] print_address_description+0x55/0x1e0 [ 88.400364][ T5346] ? replace_file_extents+0x85f/0x1590 [ 88.400378][ T5346] print_report+0x58/0x70 [ 88.400389][ T5346] kasan_report+0x117/0x150 [ 88.400405][ T5346] ? replace_file_extents+0x85f/0x1590 [ 88.400420][ T5346] replace_file_extents+0x85f/0x1590 [ 88.400440][ T5346] ? __pfx_replace_file_extents+0x10/0x10 [ 88.400452][ T5346] ? update_ref_for_cow+0xa71/0x1270 [ 88.400473][ T5346] btrfs_force_cow_block+0xa4d/0x2450 [ 88.400492][ T5346] ? __pfx_btrfs_force_cow_block+0x10/0x10 [ 88.400508][ T5346] ? __pfx_btrfs_get_32+0x10/0x10 [ 88.400523][ T5346] btrfs_cow_block+0x3c4/0xa90 [ 88.400542][ T5346] push_leaf_left+0x2ac/0x4a0 [ 88.400561][ T5346] split_leaf+0xd16/0x12e0 [ 88.400574][ T5346] ? btrfs_bin_search+0x924/0xc70 [ 88.400592][ T5346] ? __pfx_split_leaf+0x10/0x10 [ 88.400602][ T5346] ? leaf_space_used+0x177/0x1e0 [ 88.400618][ T5346] ? btrfs_leaf_free_space+0x14a/0x2f0 [ 88.400634][ T5346] btrfs_search_slot+0x2641/0x2d20 [ 88.400654][ T5346] ? __pfx_btrfs_search_slot+0x10/0x10 [ 88.400669][ T5346] ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0 [ 88.400681][ T5346] ? trace_kmem_cache_alloc+0x29/0xe0 [ 88.400694][ T5346] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x190 [ 88.400711][ T5346] btrfs_insert_inode_ref+0x229/0xcb0 [ 88.400724][ T5346] ? __pfx_btrfs_insert_inode_ref+0x10/0x10 [ 88.400736][ T5346] ? __pfx_btrfs_qgroup_convert_reserved_meta+0x10/0x10 [ 88.400751][ T5346] ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x124/0x180 [ 88.400767][ T5346] ? start_transaction+0x8a0/0x1820 [ 88.400778][ T5346] ? btrfs_set_inode_index+0x5e/0x100 [ 88.400787][ T5346] btrfs_rename2+0x17bb/0x40d0 [ 88.400800][ T5346] ? check_noncircular+0xda/0x150 [ 88.400814][ T5346] ? add_lock_to_list+0xc7/0x100 [ 88.400828][ T5346] ? __pfx_btrfs_rename2+0x10/0x10 [ 88.400842][ T5346] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7a/0x110 [ 88.400901][ T5346] ? lock_acquire+0x221/0x350 [ 88.400915][ T5346] ? down_write_nested+0x174/0x210 [ 88.400931][ T5346] ? __pfx_down_write_nested+0x10/0x10 [ 88.400941][ T5346] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4d/0x210 [ 88.400952][ T5346] ? try_break_deleg+0x5b/0x180 [ 88.400963][ T5346] ? __pfx_btrfs_rename2+0x10/0x10 [ 88.400973][ T5346] vfs_rename+0xa96/0xeb0 [ 88.400992][ T5346] ? __pfx_vfs_rename+0x10/0x10 [ 88.401010][ T5346] ovl_fill_super+0x46b7/0x5e20 [ 88.401030][ T5346] ? __pfx_ovl_fill_super+0x10/0x10 [ 88.401042][ T5346] ? xas_create+0x1902/0x1b90 [ 88.401060][ T5346] ? __pfx___mutex_trylock_common+0x10/0x10 [ 88.401076][ T5346] ? trace_contention_end+0x3d/0x140 [ 88.401094][ T5346] ? shrinker_register+0x124/0x230 [ 88.401111][ T5346] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x1be/0x6f0 [ 88.401127][ T5346] ? shrinker_register+0x61/0x230 [ 88.401143][ T5346] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 88.401158][ T5346] ? __pfx___mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x10/0x10 [ 88.401177][ T5346] ? __raw_spin_lock_init+0x45/0x100 [ 88.401196][ T5346] ? sget_fc+0x962/0xa40 [ 88.401208][ T5346] ? __pfx_set_anon_super_fc+0x10/0x10 [ 88.401222][ T5346] ? __pfx_ovl_fill_super+0x10/0x10 [ 88.401241][ T5346] get_tree_nodev+0xbb/0x150 [ 88.401257][ T5346] vfs_get_tree+0x92/0x2a0 [ 88.401272][ T5346] do_new_mount+0x341/0xd30 [ 88.401283][ T5346] ? apparmor_capable+0x126/0x170 [ 88.401301][ T5346] ? __pfx_do_new_mount+0x10/0x10 [ 88.401311][ T5346] ? ns_capable+0x89/0xe0 [ 88.401322][ T5346] ? path_mount+0x690/0x10e0 [ 88.401333][ T5346] ? user_path_at+0xd4/0x160 [ 88.401346][ T5346] __se_sys_mount+0x31d/0x420 [ 88.401358][ T5346] ? __pfx___se_sys_mount+0x10/0x10 [ 88.401370][ T5346] ? __x64_sys_mount+0x20/0xc0 [ 88.401381][ T5346] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 88.401391][ T5346] do_syscall_64+0x15f/0xf80 [ 88.401403][ T5346] ? trace_irq_disable+0x3b/0x140 [ 88.401413][ T5346] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x40/0x90 [ 88.401421][ T5346] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 88.401429][ T5346] RIP: 0033:0x7fa1ff79ce59 [ 88.401436][ T5346] Code: ff c3 66 (...) [ 88.401443][ T5346] RSP: 002b:00007fa2005affe8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 88.401456][ T5346] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa1ffa16180 RCX: 00007fa1ff79ce59 [ 88.401464][ T5346] RDX: 0000200000000100 RSI: 0000200000002240 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 88.401474][ T5346] RBP: 00007fa1ff832d6f R08: 0000200000000440 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 88.401481][ T5346] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 88.401488][ T5346] R13: 00007fa1ffa16218 R14: 00007fa1ffa16180 R15: 00007ffc734fba78 [ 88.401500][ T5346] </TASK> [ 88.401506][ T5346] [ 88.401510][ T5346] Allocated by task 5325: [ 88.401516][ T5346] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 [ 88.401529][ T5346] __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 [ 88.401542][ T5346] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x31c/0x660 [ 88.401554][ T5346] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x217/0xc40 [ 88.401568][ T5346] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x115/0x820 [ 88.401577][ T5346] __btrfs_balance+0x1db0/0x2ae0 [ 88.401587][ T5346] btrfs_balance+0xaf3/0x11b0 [ 88.401596][ T5346] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x3d3/0x610 [ 88.401612][ T5346] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 [ 88.401626][ T5346] do_syscall_64+0x15f/0xf80 [ 88.401640][ T5346] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 88.401650][ T5346] [ 88.401653][ T5346] Freed by task 5325: [ 88.401659][ T5346] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 [ 88.401671][ T5346] kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 [ 88.401680][ T5346] __kasan_slab_free+0x5c/0x80 [ 88.401692][ T5346] kfree+0x1c5/0x640 [ 88.401703][ T5346] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x95d/0xc40 [ 88.401715][ T5346] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x115/0x820 [ 88.401724][ T5346] __btrfs_balance+0x1db0/0x2ae0 [ 88.401733][ T5346] btrfs_balance+0xaf3/0x11b0 [ 88.401742][ T5346] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x3d3/0x610 [ 88.401757][ T5346] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 [ 88.401770][ T5346] do_syscall_64+0x15f/0xf80 [ 88.401785][ T5346] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 88.401795][ T5346] [ 88.401798][ T5346] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888012312000 [ 88.401798][ T5346] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 [ 88.401807][ T5346] The buggy address is located 16 bytes inside of [ 88.401807][ T5346] freed 2048-byte region [ffff888012312000, ffff888012312800) [ 88.401819][ T5346] [ 88.401822][ T5346] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 88.401829][ T5346] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x12310 [ 88.401840][ T5346] head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 [ 88.401849][ T5346] flags: 0xfff00000000040(head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) [ 88.401860][ T5346] page_type: f5(slab) [ 88.401871][ T5346] raw: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801ac42000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 [ 88.401881][ T5346] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000800080008 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 [ 88.401892][ T5346] head: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801ac42000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 [ 88.401902][ T5346] head: 0000000000000000 0000000800080008 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 [ 88.401913][ T5346] head: 00fff00000000003 fffffffffffffe01 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff [ 88.401923][ T5346] head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008 [ 88.401929][ T5346] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 88.401935][ T5346] page_owner tracks the page as allocated [ 88.401941][ T5346] page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 9, tgid 9 (kworker/0:0), ts 83905464494, free_ts 83674944822 [ 88.401961][ T5346] post_alloc_hook+0x231/0x280 [ 88.401975][ T5346] get_page_from_freelist+0x24ba/0x2540 [ 88.401990][ T5346] __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18d/0x380 [ 88.402004][ T5346] allocate_slab+0x77/0x660 [ 88.402019][ T5346] refill_objects+0x339/0x3d0 [ 88.402033][ T5346] __pcs_replace_empty_main+0x321/0x720 [ 88.402043][ T5346] __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x572/0x7b0 [ 88.402055][ T5346] __alloc_skb+0x2c1/0x7d0 [ 88.402067][ T5346] mld_newpack+0x14c/0xc90 [ 88.402080][ T5346] add_grhead+0x5a/0x2a0 [ 88.402093][ T5346] add_grec+0x1452/0x1740 [ 88.402105][ T5346] mld_ifc_work+0x6e6/0xe70 [ 88.402116][ T5346] process_scheduled_works+0xb5d/0x1860 [ 88.402127][ T5346] worker_thread+0xa53/0xfc0 [ 88.402138][ T5346] kthread+0x389/0x470 [ 88.402150][ T5346] ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 [ 88.402161][ T5346] page last free pid 5282 tgid 5282 stack trace: [ 88.402168][ T5346] __free_frozen_pages+0xbc7/0xd30 [ 88.402180][ T5346] __slab_free+0x274/0x2c0 [ 88.402191][ T5346] qlist_free_all+0x99/0x100 [ 88.402201][ T5346] kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x148/0x160 [ 88.402211][ T5346] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x22/0x80 [ 88.402221][ T5346] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x2ba/0x660 [ 88.402231][ T5346] kernfs_fop_open+0x3f0/0xda0 [ 88.402253][ T5346] do_dentry_open+0x785/0x14e0 [ 88.402262][ T5346] vfs_open+0x3b/0x340 [ 88.402270][ T5346] path_openat+0x2e08/0x3860 [ 88.402281][ T5346] do_file_open+0x23e/0x4a0 [ 88.402292][ T5346] do_sys_openat2+0x113/0x200 [ 88.402300][ T5346] __x64_sys_openat+0x138/0x170 [ 88.402309][ T5346] do_syscall_64+0x15f/0xf80 [ 88.402326][ T5346] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 88.402336][ T5346] [ 88.402339][ T5346] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 88.402345][ T5346] ffff888012311f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 88.402352][ T5346] ffff888012311f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 88.402359][ T5346] >ffff888012312000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 88.402365][ T5346] ^ [ 88.402370][ T5346] ffff888012312080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 88.402380][ T5346] ffff888012312100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 88.402385][ T5346] ================================================================== Fix this by: 1) Making the reloc control structure ref counted; 2) Make revery place that access fs_info->reloc_ctl outside the relocation code, which at the moment it's only replace_file_extents() and btrfs_init_reloc_root(), get a reference count on the structure. There's also btrfs_update_reloc_root() that is called outside the relocation code, but this case is safe because it's only called in the transaction commit path while under the fs_info->reloc_mutex protection, but nevertheless grab a reference to make the code more consistent and avoid false alerts from AI reviews; 3) Add a spinlock to protect fs_info->reloc_ctl, since we can not take the fs_info->reloc_mutex as that would cause a deadlock since that lock is taken in the transaction commit path. That spinlock is taken before setting fs_info->reloc_ctl to an allocated structure, setting it to NULL and reading fs_info->reloc_ctl; 4) Make sure the structure is freed only when its reference count drops to zero. Reported-by: syzbot+0eea49bba18051dea35e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/6a1df323.bb0696ed.125a22.000a.GAE@google.com/ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
|
|
50c134f2a9 |
btrfs: move WARN_ON on unexpected error in __add_tree_block()
There's no point in having the WARN_ON(1) inside the if statement for the unexpected error. Move it into the if statement's condition, which brings a couple benefits: 1) It marks the branch as unlikely, hinting the compiler to generate better code; 2) The WARN_ON() produces a stack trace after the dumped leaf and error message which can hide that more important information in case we get a truncated dmesg/syslog. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
|
|
f51228e1ba |
btrfs: move locking into btrfs_get_reloc_bg_bytenr()
It does not make sense for the single caller to have the responsability to lock the relocation mutex before calling the function and then have the function to assert the lock is held. As this is a function in relocation.c, move the locking details into it. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
|
|
b0d27d4379 |
btrfs: lzo: reject compressed segment that overflows the compressed input
lzo_decompress_bio() validates each on-disk segment length seg_len only
against the workspace cbuf size, not against the compressed input size
(compressed_len, the total folio bytes of the bio). A crafted extent can
carry a segment whose seg_len passes the cbuf check but runs past the end
of the bio, so copy_compressed_segment() walks off the last folio:
get_current_folio() then returns the NULL folio from bio_next_folio(), and
with CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT disabled (default) folio_size(NULL) faults.
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in lzo_decompress_bio (fs/btrfs/lzo.c:383)
Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000000 by task kworker/u8:1/29
Workqueue: btrfs-endio simple_end_io_work
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:590)
lzo_decompress_bio (fs/btrfs/lzo.c:383)
end_bbio_compressed_read (fs/btrfs/compression.c:1065)
btrfs_bio_end_io (fs/btrfs/bio.c:135)
btrfs_check_read_bio (fs/btrfs/bio.c:180 fs/btrfs/bio.c:285)
simple_end_io_work
process_one_work
worker_thread
Reject any segment whose payload would extend beyond compressed_len before
copying it, treating it as corruption like the other on-disk validation
failures in this function.
Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
acf9ed3a6c |
btrfs: retry faulting in the pages after a zero sized short direct write
Currently btrfs_direct_write() will not try to fault in the pages, but
directly fall back to buffered writes, if the first page of the buffer
can not be faulted in.
For example, during generic/362 with nodatasum mount option, there is a
write at file offset 0, length PAGE_SIZE, and the page is not faulted in.
Then we go the following callchain and directly fall back to buffered
IO:
btrfs_direct_write()
|- btrfs_dio_write()
|- __iomap_dio_rw()
| |- iomap_iter()
| | |- btrfs_dio_iomap_begin()
| | Now an ordered extent is allocated for the 4K write.
| |
| |- iomi.status = iomap_dio_iter()
| | Where iomap_dio_iter() returned -EFAULT.
| |
| |- ret = iomap_iter()
| | |- btrfs_dio_iomap_end()
| | | | return -ENOTBLK
| | |- return -ENOTBLK
| |- if (ret == -ENOTBLK) { ret = 0; }
| Now the return value is reset to 0.
|
|- ret = iomap_dio_complete()
| Since no byte is submitted, @ret is now zero.
|
|- if (iov_iter_count() > 0 && (ret == -EFAULT || ret > 0))
| @ret is zero, thus not meeting the above retry condition
|
|- Fallback to buffered
Just slightly loosen the condition to allow retry faulting in pages after
a zero sized short write.
Unlike the previous two bug fixes, this one is not really cause any real
bug, but only reducing the chance to do zero-copy direct IO.
Thus it doesn't really require stable-CC nor fixes-tag.
Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
||
|
|
ff66fe6662 |
btrfs: fix incorrect buffered IO fallback for append direct writes
[BUG]
With the previous bug of short direct writes fixed, test case
generic/362 (*) still fails with the following error with nodatasum
mount option:
generic/362 0s ... - output mismatch (see /home/adam/xfstests/results//generic/362.out.bad)
- output mismatch (see /home/adam/xfstests/results//generic/362.out.bad)
--- tests/generic/362.out 2024-08-24 15:31:37.200000000 +0930
+++ /home/adam/xfstests/results//generic/362.out.bad 2026-05-27 10:13:09.072485767 +0930
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
QA output created by 362
+Wrong file size after first write, got 8192 expected 4096
Silence is golden
...
*: If the test case has been executed before with default data checksum,
the failure will not reproduce. Need the following fix to make it
reliably reproducible:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20260528111659.87113-1-wqu@suse.com/
[CAUSE]
Inside btrfs_dio_iomap_begin() for a direct write, we increase the isize
if it's beyond the current isize.
But if the direct io finished short, we do not revert the isize to the
previous value nor to the short write end.
Then if we need to fall back to buffered writes, and the write has
IOCB_APPEND flag, then the buffered write will be positioned at the
incorrect isize.
The call chain looks like this:
btrfs_direct_write(pos=0, length=4K)
|- __iomap_dio_rw()
| |- iomap_iter()
| | |- btrfs_dio_iomap_begin()
| | |- btrfs_get_blocks_direct_write()
| | |- i_size_write()
| | Which updates the isize to the write end (4K).
| |
| |- iomap_dio_iter()
| | Failed with -EFAULT on the first page.
| |
| |- iomap_iter()
| | |- btrfs_dio_iomap_end()
| | Detects a short write, return -ENOTBLK
| |- if (ret == -ENOTBLK) { ret = 0;}
| Which resets the return value.
|
|- ret = iomap_dio_complet()
| Which returns 0.
|
|- btrfs_buffered_write(iocb, from);
|- generic_write_checks()
|- iocb->ki_pos = i_size_read()
Which is still the new size (4K), other than the original
isize 0.
[FIX]
Introduce the following btrfs_dio_data members:
- old_isize
- updated_isize
If the direct write has enlarged the isize.
Then if we got a short write, and btrfs_dio_data::updated_isize is set,
revert to the correct isize based on old_isize and current file
position.
And here we call i_size_write() without holding an extent lock, which is
a very special case that we're safe to do:
- Only a single writer can be enlarging isize
Enlarging isize will take the exclusive inode lock.
- Buffered readers need to wait for the OE we're holding
Buffered readers will lock extent and wait for OE of the folio range.
Sometimes we can skip the OE wait, but since all page cache is
invalidated, the OE wait can not be skipped.
But I do not think this is the most elegant solution, nor covers all
cases. E.g. if the bio is submitted but IO failed, we are unable to do
the revert.
I believe the more elegant one would be extend the EXTENT_DIO_LOCKED
lifespan for direct writes, so that we can update the isize when a
write beyond EOF finished successfully.
However that change is too huge for a small bug fix.
So only implement the minimal partial fix for now.
[REASON FOR NO FIXES TAG]
The bug is again very old, before commit
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66ff4d366e |
btrfs: fix false IO failure after falling back to buffered write
[BUG]
The test case generic/362 will fail with "nodatasum" mount option (*):
MOUNT_OPTIONS -- -o nodatasum /dev/mapper/test-scratch1 /mnt/scratch
generic/362 0s ... - output mismatch (see /home/adam/xfstests/results//generic/362.out.bad)
--- tests/generic/362.out 2024-08-24 15:31:37.200000000 +0930
+++ /home/adam/xfstests/results//generic/362.out.bad 2026-05-27 10:21:17.574771567 +0930
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
QA output created by 362
+First write failed: Input/output error
Silence is golden
...
*: If the test case has been executed before with default data checksum,
the failure will not reproduce. Need the following fix to make it
reliably reproducible:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20260528111659.87113-1-wqu@suse.com/
[CAUSE]
Inside __iomap_dio_rw(), the -EFAULT/-ENOTBLK error is not directly returned.
Thus we never got an error pointer from __iomap_dio_rw().
The call chain looks like this:
btrfs_direct_write()
|- btrfs_dio_write()
|- __iomap_dio_rw()
| |- iomap_iter()
| | |- btrfs_dio_iomap_begin()
| | Now an ordered extent is allocated for the 4K write.
| |
| |- iomi.status = iomap_dio_iter()
| | Where iomap_dio_iter() returned -EFAULT.
| |
| |- ret = iomap_iter()
| | |- btrfs_dio_iomap_end()
| | | |- btrfs_finish_ordered_extent(uptodate = false)
| | | | |- can_finish_ordered_extent()
| | | | |- btrfs_mark_ordered_extent_error()
| | | | |- mapping_set_error()
| | | | Now the address space is marked error.
| | | | return -ENOTBLK
| | |- return -ENOTBLK
| |- if (ret == -ENOTBLK) { ret = 0; }
| Now the return value is reset to 0.
| Thus no error pointer will be returned.
|
|- ret = iomap_dio_complete()
| Since no byte is submitted, @ret is 0.
|
|- Fallback to buffered IO
| And the buffered write finished without error
|
|- filemap_fdatawait_range()
|- filemap_check_errors()
The previous error is recorded, thus an error is returned
However the buffered write is properly submitted and finished, the error
is from the btrfs_finish_ordered_extent() call with @uptodate = false.
[FIX]
When a short dio write happened, any range that is submitted will have
btrfs_extract_ordered_extent() to be called, thus the submitted range
will always have an OE just covering the submitted range.
The remaining OE range is never submitted, thus they should be treated
as truncated, not an error. So that we can properly reclaim and not
insert an unnecessary file extent item, without marking the mapping as
error.
Extract a helper, btrfs_mark_ordered_extent_truncated(), and utilize
that helper to mark the direct IO ordered extent as truncated, so it
won't cause failure for the later buffered fallback.
[REASON FOR NO FIXES TAG]
The bug itself is pretty old, at commit
|
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c4e7778580 |
btrfs: use verbose assertions in backref.c
While debugging a relocation issue I hit an assertion in backref.c but it was not super useful, since it could not tell what was the unexpected value that triggered the assertion. The stack trace was this: [583246.338097] assertion failed: !cache->nr_nodes, in fs/btrfs/backref.c:3158 [583246.339588] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [583246.340573] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/backref.c:3158! [583246.342075] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [583246.343294] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 677957 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 7.1.0-rc4-btrfs-next-234+ #1 PREEMPT(full) [583246.345715] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [583246.348694] RIP: 0010:btrfs_backref_release_cache.cold+0x61/0x84 [btrfs] [583246.350759] Code: 90 d5 7c (...) [583246.354923] RSP: 0018:ffffd4fc88c93ad8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [583246.355982] RAX: 000000000000003e RBX: ffff8dec90d97020 RCX: 0000000000000000 [583246.357459] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [583246.359517] RBP: ffff8dec8eeb78c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 3fffffffffefffff [583246.361180] R10: ffffd4fc88c93970 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8decd21f3470 [583246.363184] R13: 00000000fffffffe R14: ffff8decd21f3000 R15: ffff8decd21f3000 [583246.364666] FS: 00007f9a51751400(0000) GS:ffff8df3f4255000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [583246.366287] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [583246.367443] CR2: 00007f9a518ed8f5 CR3: 00000004467c8002 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [583246.368969] Call Trace: [583246.369541] <TASK> [583246.370040] relocate_block_group+0xf2/0x520 [btrfs] [583246.371243] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x9a9/0x22e0 [btrfs] [583246.372443] ? preempt_count_add+0x47/0xa0 [583247.532978] ? btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x19/0x90 [btrfs] [583247.534520] ? mutex_lock+0x1a/0x40 [583247.602233] ? btrfs_scrub_pause+0x2e/0x120 [btrfs] [583247.603543] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x3b/0x1a0 [btrfs] [583247.604893] btrfs_balance+0x9d5/0x1920 [btrfs] [583247.606189] ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 [583247.607030] btrfs_ioctl+0x260c/0x2a20 [btrfs] [583247.608015] ? __memcg_slab_free_hook+0x156/0x1a0 [583247.636971] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x92/0xe0 [583247.679247] do_syscall_64+0x60/0xf20 [583247.753297] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x60/0xb0 [583247.756321] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [583247.787018] RIP: 0033:0x7f9a5186a8db [583247.787787] Code: 00 48 89 (...) [583247.791410] RSP: 002b:00007fff2ffa6ac0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [583247.792897] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f9a5186a8db [583247.794319] RDX: 00007fff2ffa6bb0 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000003 [583247.795714] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [583247.797149] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff2ffa903f [583247.798685] R13: 00007fff2ffa6bb0 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000002 [583247.800136] </TASK> So update all simple assertions in backref.c to print out the values when they aren't testing simple boolean conditions. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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7af30ba6eb |
btrfs: print a message when a missing device re-appears
There is a bug report that fstrim crashed, and that crash is eventually pinned down to a missing device which re-appeared and screwed up callers that only checks BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING, but not BTRFS_DEV_STATE_WRITEABLE nor device->bdev. A missing device re-appearing can be very tricky, as for now it will result in a device without WRITEABLE or MISSING flag, and still no bdev pointer. As the first step to enhance handling of such re-appearing missing devices, add a dmesg output when a missing device re-appeared. Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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1b1937eb08 |
btrfs: do not trim a device which is not writeable
[BUG]
There is a bug report that btrfs/242 can randomly fail with the
following NULL pointer dereference:
run fstests btrfs/242 at 2026-06-01 10:25:08
BTRFS: device fsid d4d7f234-487c-4787-88e4-47a8b68c9874 devid 1 transid 9 /dev/sdc (8:32) scanned by mount (122609)
BTRFS info (device sdc): first mount of filesystem d4d7f234-487c-4787-88e4-47a8b68c9874
BTRFS info (device sdc): using crc32c checksum algorithm
BTRFS warning (device sdc): devid 2 uuid fbe72d72-3272-482d-80fb-ab88ed398192 is missing
BTRFS warning (device sdc): devid 2 uuid fbe72d72-3272-482d-80fb-ab88ed398192 is missing
BTRFS info (device sdc): allowing degraded mounts
BTRFS info (device sdc): turning on async discard
BTRFS info (device sdc): enabling free space tree
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000018
user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000013fd6b000
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 122625 Comm: fstrim Not tainted 7.0.10-2-default #1 PREEMPT(full) openSUSE Tumbleweed e9a5f6b24978fba3bf015a992f865837fdfff3dd
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20250812-19.fc42 08/12/2025
pstate: 01400005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : btrfs_trim_fs+0x34c/0xa00 [btrfs]
lr : btrfs_trim_fs+0x1f0/0xa00 [btrfs]
Call trace:
btrfs_trim_fs+0x34c/0xa00 [btrfs f02c1d570ceea621c69d302ba75dd61868083840] (P)
btrfs_ioctl_fitrim+0xe8/0x178 [btrfs f02c1d570ceea621c69d302ba75dd61868083840]
btrfs_ioctl+0xdd4/0x2bd8 [btrfs f02c1d570ceea621c69d302ba75dd61868083840]
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x108
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x5c/0xd0
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xf0
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x40
el0_svc+0x40/0x1d0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe8
el0t_64_sync+0x1b0/0x1b8
Code: 17ffff83 f94017e0 f9002be0 f9402ea0 (f9400c00)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Also the reporter is very kind to test the following ASSERT() added to
btrfs_trim_free_extents_throttle():
ASSERT(device->bdev,
"devid=%llu path=%s dev_state=0x%lx\n",
device->devid, btrfs_dev_name(device), device->dev_state);
And it shows the following output:
assertion failed: device->bdev, in extent-tree.c:6630 (devid=2 path=/dev/sdd dev_state=0x82)
Which means the device->bdev is NULL, and the dev_state is
BTRFS_DEV_STATE_IN_FS_METADATA | BTRFS_DEV_STATE_ITEM_FOUND, without
BTRFS_DEV_STATE_WRITEABLE flag set.
[CAUSE]
The pc points to the following call chain:
btrfs_trim_fs()
|- btrfs_trim_free_extents()
|- btrfs_trim_free_extents_throttle()
|- bdev_max_discard_sectors(device->bdev)
So the NULL pointer dereference is caused by device->bdev being NULL.
This looks impossible by a quick glance, as just before calling
btrfs_trim_free_extents_throttle(), we have skipped any device that has
BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING flag set.
However in this particular case, there is a window where the missing
device is later re-scanned, causing btrfs to remove the
BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING flag:
btrfs_control_ioctl()
|- btrfs_scan_one_device()
|- device_list_add()
|- rcu_assign_pointer(device->name, name);
| This updates the missing device's path to the new good path.
|
|- clear_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING, &device->dev_state)
This removes the BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING flag.
This allows the missing device to re-appear and clear the
BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING flag. However the device still does not have
the BTRFS_DEV_STATE_WRITEABLE flag set, nor is its bdev pointer updated.
The bdev pointer remains NULL, triggering the crash later.
[FIX]
This is a big de-synchronization between BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING and
device->bdev pointer, and shows a gap in btrfs's re-appearing-device
handling.
The proper handling of re-appearing device will need quite some extra
work, which is out of the context of this small fix.
Thankfully the regular bbio submission path has already handled it well
by checking if the device->bdev is NULL before submitting.
So here we just fix the crash by checking if the device is writeable and
has a bdev pointer before calling bdev_max_discard_sectors().
Reported-by: Su Yue <glass.su@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/wlwir19t.fsf@damenly.org/
Fixes:
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dad845f192 |
btrfs: return real error after lookup failure in btrfs_ioctl_default_subvol()
If we fail to lookup the dir item, we are always returning -ENOENT but that may not be the reason for the failure, as btrfs_lookup_dir_item() can return many different errors, such as -EIO or -ENOMEM for example. Fix this by returning the real error, and also fixup the silly error message, including the id of the directory and the error. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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00608e3416 |
btrfs: use mapping shared locking for reading super block
There's no need to exclusively lock the mapping, shared locking is enough to protect from a concurrent set block size operation (BLKBSZSET ioctl). Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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1ba72d847c |
btrfs: use lockless read in nr_cached_objects shrinker callback
Under heavy memcg-driven slab reclaim with many memcgs and CPUs, shrink_slab_memcg() invokes the per-superblock count callback once per (memcg, NUMA node) tuple. For btrfs that callback reaches percpu_counter_sum_positive() on fs_info->evictable_extent_maps, which takes the percpu_counter's raw spinlock with IRQs disabled and walks every online CPU. With hundreds of memcgs driving reclaim on a host with dozens of CPUs, this counter lock becomes a global serialization point: profiles show CPU pinned in the spin_lock_irqsave acquire under __percpu_counter_sum, with cross-CPU IPIs hitting csd_lock_wait_toolong while waiting for spinning vCPUs. The shrinker count is advisory -- super_cache_count() already notes "counts can change between super_cache_count and super_cache_scan, so we really don't need locks here." Use percpu_counter_read_positive(), which is lockless. Worst-case skew is bounded by batch * num_online_cpus (a few thousand), negligible compared to the millions of extent maps a busy filesystem accumulates and well within the noise that the shrinker already tolerates. Tested-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Ben Maurer <bmaurer@meta.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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79bdd88463 |
btrfs: switch local indicator variables to bools
For all local indicator variables do simple switch to bool, done on all files. Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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18a8071177 |
btrfs: send: pass bool for pending_move and refs_processed parameters
We're passing simple indicators as int, switch them to bool types. Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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422ccdfe22 |
btrfs: use shifts for sectorsize and nodesize
Convert more multiplications of sectorsize or nodesize to use the shifts. The remaining cases are multiplications by constants that compiler can optimize by itself, and in tests. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
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532085d00e |
btrfs: fix deadlock cloning inline extent when using flushoncommit
In commit |
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23fd95663b |
btrfs: allocate eb-attached btree pages as movable
Extent buffer pages allocated by alloc_extent_buffer() are attached to
btree_inode->i_mapping (the buffer_tree path), reach the LRU, and are
served by the btree_migrate_folio aops in fs/btrfs/disk-io.c. They are
migratable in practice once their owning extent buffer hits refs == 1,
which happens naturally. The buddy allocator classifies them by GFP,
however, and bare GFP_NOFS lands them in MIGRATE_UNMOVABLE pageblocks.
The result: every btree_inode page we read in pins an unmovable pageblock
from the page-superblock allocator's perspective, even though the page
itself can be moved.
Have each caller of btrfs_alloc_page_array, btrfs_alloc_folio_array,
and alloc_eb_folio_array pass in the full GFP mask directly, instead
of having the functions calculate it from boolean flags.
The alloc_extent_buffer call site passes GFP_NOFS | __GFP_NOFAIL |
__GFP_MOVABLE. All other call sites pass plain GFP_NOFS.
Three categories of caller stay on bare GFP_NOFS, deliberately:
- alloc_dummy_extent_buffer / btrfs_clone_extent_buffer: the
resulting eb is EXTENT_BUFFER_UNMAPPED, folio->mapping stays NULL,
the folios never enter LRU, never get migrate_folio aops. Tagging
them __GFP_MOVABLE would violate the page allocator's migrability
contract and they would defeat compaction in MOVABLE pageblocks
where isolate_migratepages_block skips non-LRU non-movable_ops
pages outright.
- btrfs_alloc_page_array callers in fs/btrfs/raid56.c (stripe
pages), fs/btrfs/inode.c (encoded reads), fs/btrfs/ioctl.c (io_uring
encoded reads), fs/btrfs/relocation.c (relocation buffers): same
contract violation. raid56 stripe_pages additionally persist in
the stripe cache (RBIO_CACHE_SIZE=1024) well beyond a single I/O,
so they are not transient enough to hand-wave the contract.
- btrfs_alloc_folio_array caller in fs/btrfs/scrub.c (stripe
folios): same -- stripe->folios[] are private buffers freed via
folio_put in release_scrub_stripe.
This change targets the dominant fragmentation source observed on the
page-superblock series: ~28 GB of btree_inode pages parked across
many tainted superpageblocks on a 250 GB test system with btrfs root,
preventing 1 GiB hugepage allocation from those regions. With the
movable hint, those pages now land in MOVABLE pageblocks where the
existing background defragger drains them through the standard
PB_has_movable gate, no LRU-sample fallback needed.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|