Merge branch 'for-next/selftests' into for-next/core

* for-next/selftests:
  tools: Ensure tools copy of linux/filter.h exports the UAPI
  kselftest/arm64: Fix abi test compilation errors
  kselftest/arm64: Don't write to P0 in irritator on SME only systems
  kselftest/arm64: Add testcase for SECCOMP_RET_TRACE orig_x0 bypass
  kselftest/arm64: Add seccomp ptrace x0 bypass test
  kselftest/arm64: fp-ptrace: Fix checks for inactive SVE and SSVE regsets
This commit is contained in:
Will Deacon
2026-08-14 10:16:13 +00:00
7 changed files with 446 additions and 8 deletions

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#define __TOOLS_LINUX_FILTER_H
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <uapi/linux/filter.h>
/* ArgX, context and stack frame pointer register positions. Note,
* Arg1, Arg2, Arg3, etc are used as argument mappings of function

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
hwcap
ptrace
seccomp_ptrace_x0_bypass
seccomp_ret_trace_x0_bypass
syscall-abi
tpidr2

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
# Copyright (C) 2021 ARM Limited
TEST_GEN_PROGS := hwcap ptrace syscall-abi tpidr2
CFLAGS += $(KHDR_INCLUDES) -I$(top_srcdir)/tools/include
TEST_GEN_PROGS := hwcap ptrace syscall-abi tpidr2 seccomp_ptrace_x0_bypass seccomp_ret_trace_x0_bypass
include ../../lib.mk

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Test that seccomp, tracepoints and audit observe the correct syscall
* arguments after a ptracer has modified them at syscall-enter-stop.
*
* On arm64, both the first argument and the return value of a syscall
* are passed in register x0. The original x0 is saved in
* pt_regs::orig_x0 during syscall entry and returned as the first
* argument by syscall_get_arguments(). Because ptrace modifications
* to x0 are not automatically reflected in orig_x0, seccomp, tracepoints
* and audit may see a stale value unless orig_x0 is explicitly
* re-synchronised after a ptrace stop.
*
* This test sets up a seccomp filter that allows write(2, ...) but kills
* the task for any other fd. A ptracer changes the fd argument from 2
* to 1 at the syscall-enter stop. If the orig_x0 re-sync works, seccomp
* sees the modified argument (fd=1) and kills the child with SIGSYS
* (test passes). If orig_x0 is not re-synced, seccomp sees the original
* fd=2, the write succeeds and the child exits normally (test fails,
* vulnerability present).
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include "kselftest.h"
#define EXPECTED_TESTS 1
#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__
#define ARG0_OFFSET (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args))
#else
#define ARG0_OFFSET (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args) + 4)
#endif
static int do_child(void)
{
if (ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0, NULL, NULL))
ksft_exit_fail_perror("PTRACE_TRACEME");
if (raise(SIGSTOP))
ksft_exit_fail_perror("raise(SIGSTOP)");
/*
* Seccomp filter:
* If syscall is not write -> ALLOW
* If syscall is write:
* - If args[0] (fd) == 2 -> ALLOW
* - Otherwise -> KILL
*/
struct sock_filter filter[] = {
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), /* nr */
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, __NR_write, 0, 3),
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS, ARG0_OFFSET), /* args[0] */
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, 2, 1, 0),
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
};
struct sock_fprog prog = {
.len = ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
.filter = filter,
};
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0))
ksft_exit_fail_perror("prctl NO_NEW_PRIVS");
if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog))
ksft_exit_fail_perror("prctl SECCOMP");
/*
* Invoke write(2, ...) while the tracer will change the first
* argument (fd) from 2 to 1 at syscall entry.
*/
syscall(__NR_write, 2, NULL, 0);
_exit(0);
}
static int do_parent(pid_t child)
{
bool bypass = false;
int status;
/* Wait for the initial SIGSTOP */
if (waitpid(child, &status, 0) != child)
ksft_exit_fail_msg("waitpid failed");
if (!WIFSTOPPED(status) || WSTOPSIG(status) != SIGSTOP)
ksft_exit_fail_msg("unexpected stop status");
if (ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, child, 0, PTRACE_O_TRACESYSGOOD | PTRACE_O_EXITKILL))
ksft_exit_fail_perror("PTRACE_SETOPTIONS");
if (ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALL, child, 0, 0))
ksft_exit_fail_perror("PTRACE_SYSCALL");
while (1) {
int sig;
if (waitpid(child, &status, 0) != child)
ksft_exit_fail_msg("waitpid lost child");
if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
/* Child exited normally bypass succeeded */
bypass = true;
break;
}
if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
sig = WTERMSIG(status);
if (sig == SIGSYS)
break;
ksft_exit_fail_msg("child died unexpectedly from signal %d (%s)",
sig, strsignal(sig));
}
if (!WIFSTOPPED(status))
ksft_exit_fail_msg("unexpected wait status");
sig = WSTOPSIG(status);
if (sig == (SIGTRAP | 0x80)) {
struct user_regs_struct regs;
struct iovec iov = {
.iov_base = &regs,
.iov_len = sizeof(regs),
};
if (ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, child, NT_PRSTATUS, &iov))
ksft_exit_fail_perror("PTRACE_GETREGSET");
unsigned long syscall_nr = regs.regs[8];
unsigned long x0 = regs.regs[0];
/* Modify fd from 2 to 1 at write entry */
if (syscall_nr == __NR_write && x0 == 2) {
regs.regs[0] = 1;
if (ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, child, NT_PRSTATUS, &iov))
ksft_exit_fail_perror("PTRACE_SETREGSET");
}
if (ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALL, child, 0, 0))
ksft_exit_fail_perror("PTRACE_SYSCALL");
} else {
/* Forward other signals */
if (ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALL, child, 0, sig))
ksft_exit_fail_perror("PTRACE_SYSCALL");
}
}
/* bypass == true means vulnerability exists -> test fails */
return bypass ? EXIT_FAILURE : EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
int main(void)
{
pid_t child;
ksft_print_header();
ksft_set_plan(EXPECTED_TESTS);
child = fork();
if (child < 0)
ksft_exit_fail_msg("fork failed: %s", strerror(errno));
if (!child)
return do_child();
/*
* do_parent() returns EXIT_SUCCESS if the child was killed by
* SIGSYS (i.e. seccomp correctly saw the modified argument),
* and EXIT_FAILURE if the child exited normally (bypass).
*/
int result = do_parent(child);
ksft_test_result(result == EXIT_SUCCESS, "seccomp_ptrace_x0_bypass\n");
ksft_print_cnts();
return result;
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Test for SECCOMP_RET_TRACE argument modification bypass
* via stale orig_x0 during filter re-evaluation.
*
* On arm64, syscall_get_arguments() reads the first argument from
* regs->orig_x0. When a seccomp filter returns SECCOMP_RET_TRACE,
* ptrace may modify regs->regs[0] while orig_x0 remains unchanged.
* The kernel then re-evaluates the filter; if it sees the stale
* orig_x0, it may incorrectly allow a syscall that the tracer intended
* to block.
*
* This test installs a filter that:
* - TRACEs write() when fd == 2
* - returns ERRNO(EPERM) when fd == 1
* - allows all other syscalls
*
* The child calls write(2, ...). The parent catches the SECCOMP stop,
* changes x0 (fd) from 2 to 1, and resumes the child.
*
* If re-evaluation sees the old fd=2 (stale orig_x0), the filter
* returns TRACE again; because recheck_after_trace is true, the kernel
* allows the syscall to proceed. write(1, ...) succeeds, child exits 0.
* -> test FAIL (bypass detected).
*
* If re-evaluation sees the new fd=1 (synced orig_x0), the filter
* returns ERRNO(EPERM), write fails, child exits 1.
* -> test PASS (no bypass).
*
* No special privileges required beyond CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include "kselftest.h"
#define PTRACE_EVENT_MASK(status) ((status) >> 16)
#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__
#define ARG0_OFFSET (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args))
#else
#define ARG0_OFFSET (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args) + 4)
#endif
static int do_child(void)
{
long ret;
if (ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0, NULL, NULL))
_exit(2);
raise(SIGSTOP); /* synchronize with parent */
/*
* Filter:
* if syscall == write:
* if fd == 2 -> TRACE
* if fd == 1 -> ERRNO(EPERM)
* else -> ALLOW
* else -> ALLOW
*/
struct sock_filter filter[] = {
/* Load syscall number */
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
/* If not write, allow */
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, __NR_write, 0, 5),
/* Load first argument (fd) */
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS, ARG0_OFFSET),
/* fd == 2 ? */
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, 2, 0, 1),
/* Yes: TRACE */
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE),
/* fd == 1 ? */
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, 1, 0, 1),
/* Yes: ERRNO(EPERM) */
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | (EPERM & SECCOMP_RET_DATA)),
/* Other fd: ALLOW */
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
};
struct sock_fprog prog = {
.len = ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
.filter = filter,
};
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0))
_exit(3);
if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog))
_exit(4);
/*
* write(2, ...) triggers TRACE, parent changes fd to 1.
* If re-eval sees fd=1 -> ERRNO -> write fails, ret = -EPERM.
* If re-eval sees fd=2 -> TRACE again -> allowed -> write succeeds.
*/
ret = syscall(__NR_write, 2, "", 0);
_exit(ret == 0 ? 0 : 1);
}
int main(void)
{
struct user_pt_regs regs;
struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = &regs, .iov_len = sizeof(regs) };
pid_t child;
int status;
ksft_print_header();
ksft_set_plan(1);
child = fork();
if (child < 0)
ksft_exit_fail_msg("fork failed: %s", strerror(errno));
if (!child)
return do_child();
/* 1. Wait for initial SIGSTOP */
if (waitpid(child, &status, 0) != child)
ksft_exit_fail_msg("waitpid SIGSTOP");
if (!WIFSTOPPED(status) || WSTOPSIG(status) != SIGSTOP)
ksft_exit_fail_msg("unexpected initial stop");
/* 2. Enable SECCOMP ptrace events */
if (ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, child, 0, PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP))
ksft_exit_fail_msg("PTRACE_SETOPTIONS");
/* 3. Continue child to hit SECCOMP stop */
if (ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child, 0, 0))
ksft_exit_fail_msg("PTRACE_CONT");
/* 4. Wait for SECCOMP stop */
while (1) {
if (waitpid(child, &status, 0) != child)
ksft_exit_fail_msg("waitpid SECCOMP");
if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
ksft_test_result_fail("child exited before SECCOMP stop\n");
goto out;
}
if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
ksft_test_result_fail("child killed unexpectedly\n");
goto out;
}
if (WIFSTOPPED(status) &&
WSTOPSIG(status) == SIGTRAP &&
PTRACE_EVENT_MASK(status) == PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)
break;
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child, 0, WSTOPSIG(status));
}
/* 5. Modify x0 (fd) from 2 to 1 */
if (ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, child, NT_PRSTATUS, &iov))
ksft_exit_fail_perror("GETREGSET");
if (regs.regs[8] != __NR_write || regs.regs[0] != 2) {
ksft_test_result_fail("unexpected regs: syscall=%llu, x0=%llu\n",
regs.regs[8], regs.regs[0]);
goto out;
}
regs.regs[0] = 1;
if (ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, child, NT_PRSTATUS, &iov))
ksft_exit_fail_perror("SETREGSET");
/* 6. Resume child */
if (ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child, 0, 0))
ksft_exit_fail_perror("PTRACE_CONT");
/* 7. Reap child must exit normally */
if (waitpid(child, &status, 0) != child)
ksft_exit_fail_msg("final waitpid");
if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
ksft_test_result_fail("child did not exit normally\n");
goto out;
}
if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
ksft_test_result_pass("seccomp correctly denied modified syscall\n");
else
ksft_test_result_fail("write succeeded, orig_x0 bypass likely\n");
out:
if (child > 0) {
kill(child, SIGKILL);
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
}
ksft_print_cnts();
return ksft_get_fail_cnt() ? EXIT_FAILURE : EXIT_SUCCESS;
}

View File

@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@
/* VL 128..2048 in powers of 2 */
#define MAX_NUM_VLS 5
/* Sentinel for detecting buffer bytes the kernel did not write */
#define REGSET_SENTINEL 0xa5
/*
* FPMR bits we can set without doing feature checks to see if values
* are valid.
@@ -181,6 +184,20 @@ static bool compare_buffer(const char *name, void *out,
return false;
}
static bool buffer_is_filled(const void *buffer, size_t size,
unsigned char value)
{
const unsigned char *bytes = buffer;
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
if (bytes[i] != value)
return false;
}
return true;
}
struct test_config {
int sve_vl_in;
int sve_vl_expected;
@@ -401,6 +418,7 @@ static bool check_ptrace_values_sve(pid_t child, struct test_config *config)
struct user_sve_header *sve;
struct user_fpsimd_state *fpsimd;
struct iovec iov;
size_t buf_size;
int ret, vq;
bool pass = true;
@@ -409,14 +427,16 @@ static bool check_ptrace_values_sve(pid_t child, struct test_config *config)
vq = __sve_vq_from_vl(config->sve_vl_in);
iov.iov_len = SVE_PT_SVE_OFFSET + SVE_PT_SVE_SIZE(vq, SVE_PT_REGS_SVE);
iov.iov_base = malloc(iov.iov_len);
buf_size = SVE_PT_SVE_OFFSET + SVE_PT_SVE_SIZE(vq, SVE_PT_REGS_SVE);
iov.iov_len = buf_size;
iov.iov_base = malloc(buf_size);
if (!iov.iov_base) {
ksft_print_msg("OOM allocating %lu byte SVE buffer\n",
iov.iov_len);
return false;
}
memset(iov.iov_base, REGSET_SENTINEL, buf_size);
ret = ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, child, NT_ARM_SVE, &iov);
if (ret != 0) {
ksft_print_msg("Failed to read initial SVE: %s (%d)\n",
@@ -440,10 +460,16 @@ static bool check_ptrace_values_sve(pid_t child, struct test_config *config)
}
if (svcr_in & SVCR_SM) {
if (sve->size != sizeof(sve)) {
if (sve->size != sizeof(*sve)) {
ksft_print_msg("NT_ARM_SVE reports data with PSTATE.SM\n");
pass = false;
}
if (!buffer_is_filled(iov.iov_base + sizeof(*sve),
buf_size - sizeof(*sve), REGSET_SENTINEL)) {
ksft_print_msg("NT_ARM_SVE wrote beyond its header with PSTATE.SM\n");
pass = false;
}
goto out;
} else {
if (sve->size != SVE_PT_SIZE(vq, sve->flags)) {
ksft_print_msg("Mismatch in SVE header size: %d != %lu\n",
@@ -485,6 +511,7 @@ static bool check_ptrace_values_ssve(pid_t child, struct test_config *config)
struct user_sve_header *sve;
struct user_fpsimd_state *fpsimd;
struct iovec iov;
size_t buf_size;
int ret, vq;
bool pass = true;
@@ -493,14 +520,16 @@ static bool check_ptrace_values_ssve(pid_t child, struct test_config *config)
vq = __sve_vq_from_vl(config->sme_vl_in);
iov.iov_len = SVE_PT_SVE_OFFSET + SVE_PT_SVE_SIZE(vq, SVE_PT_REGS_SVE);
iov.iov_base = malloc(iov.iov_len);
buf_size = SVE_PT_SVE_OFFSET + SVE_PT_SVE_SIZE(vq, SVE_PT_REGS_SVE);
iov.iov_len = buf_size;
iov.iov_base = malloc(buf_size);
if (!iov.iov_base) {
ksft_print_msg("OOM allocating %lu byte SSVE buffer\n",
iov.iov_len);
return false;
}
memset(iov.iov_base, REGSET_SENTINEL, buf_size);
ret = ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, child, NT_ARM_SSVE, &iov);
if (ret != 0) {
ksft_print_msg("Failed to read initial SSVE: %s (%d)\n",
@@ -523,10 +552,16 @@ static bool check_ptrace_values_ssve(pid_t child, struct test_config *config)
}
if (!(svcr_in & SVCR_SM)) {
if (sve->size != sizeof(sve)) {
if (sve->size != sizeof(*sve)) {
ksft_print_msg("NT_ARM_SSVE reports data without PSTATE.SM\n");
pass = false;
}
if (!buffer_is_filled(iov.iov_base + sizeof(*sve),
buf_size - sizeof(*sve), REGSET_SENTINEL)) {
ksft_print_msg("NT_ARM_SSVE wrote beyond its header without PSTATE.SM\n");
pass = false;
}
goto out;
} else {
if (sve->size != SVE_PT_SIZE(vq, sve->flags)) {
ksft_print_msg("Mismatch in SSVE header size: %d != %lu\n",

View File

@@ -298,15 +298,20 @@ function irritator_handler
add x0, x0, #1
str x0, [x2, #ucontext_regs + 8 * 23]
#ifndef SSVE
// Corrupt some random Z-regs
movi v0.8b, #1
movi v9.16b, #2
movi v31.8b, #3
// And P0
ptrue p0.d
#ifndef SSVE
// And FFR
wrffr p15.b
#else
// Enter and exit streaming mode, will reset all of the V, Z, P
// and FFR registers that the system has.
smstart_sm
smstop
#endif
ret