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bpf: Reject negative const offsets for buffer pointers
The verifier rejects variable offsets for PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER and PTR_TO_BUF accesses, but it currently accepts a constant negative offset produced by pointer arithmetic. Commit022ac07508("bpf: use reg->var_off instead of reg->off for pointers") moved constant pointer offsets from reg->off to reg->var_off. However, __check_buffer_access() continued to check only the instruction offset. An access with reg->var_off equal to -8 and an instruction offset of zero therefore passes verification. For writable raw tracepoints, the access end is also calculated from the unsigned reg->var_off.value. An eight-byte access starting at -8 wraps the calculated end to zero, allowing the program to load and attach without increasing max_tp_access. After ensuring that reg->var_off is constant, calculate the effective access start using signed arithmetic and reject it when it is negative. Use the validated start to calculate the access end for both PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER and PTR_TO_BUF. Fixes:022ac07508("bpf: use reg->var_off instead of reg->off for pointers") Signed-off-by: Sun Jian <sun.jian.kdev@gmail.com> Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.2.0 Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714093846.18159-2-sun.jian.kdev@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Eduard Zingerman
parent
2d8af4e633
commit
fd4cfa8c8f
@@ -5326,14 +5326,11 @@ static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
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static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
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const char *buf_info,
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const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
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argno_t argno, int off, int size)
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argno_t argno, int off, int size,
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u32 *access_end)
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{
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if (off < 0) {
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verbose(env,
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"%s invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n",
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reg_arg_name(env, argno), buf_info, off, size);
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return -EACCES;
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}
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s64 start;
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if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
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char tn_buf[48];
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@@ -5344,6 +5341,15 @@ static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
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return -EACCES;
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}
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start = (s64)reg->var_off.value + off;
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if (start < 0) {
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verbose(env,
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"%s invalid negative %s buffer offset: off=%d, var_off=%lld\n",
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reg_arg_name(env, argno), buf_info, off, (s64)reg->var_off.value);
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return -EACCES;
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}
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*access_end = start + size;
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return 0;
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}
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@@ -5351,14 +5357,14 @@ static int check_tp_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
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const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
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argno_t argno, int off, int size)
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{
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u32 access_end;
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int err;
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err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, argno, off, size);
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err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, argno, off, size, &access_end);
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if (err)
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return err;
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env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = max(reg->var_off.value + off + size,
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env->prog->aux->max_tp_access);
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env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = max(access_end, env->prog->aux->max_tp_access);
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return 0;
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}
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@@ -5370,13 +5376,14 @@ static int check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
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u32 *max_access)
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{
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const char *buf_info = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type) ? "rdonly" : "rdwr";
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u32 access_end;
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int err;
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err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, argno, off, size);
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err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, argno, off, size, &access_end);
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if (err)
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return err;
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*max_access = max(reg->var_off.value + off + size, *max_access);
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*max_access = max(access_end, *max_access);
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return 0;
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}
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