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KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()
The length for the internal output buffer is calculated incorrectly, which
can result overflow when a too small buffer is provided.
Fix the bug by allocating internal output with the size of the maximum
length of the cryptographic primitive instead of caller provided size.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/20260531024914.3712130-1-jarkko@kernel.org/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+
Fixes: 00d60fd3b9 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]")
Reported-by: Alessandro Groppo <ale.grpp@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alessandro Groppo <ale.grpp@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -138,28 +138,35 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par
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if (uparams.in_len > info.max_dec_size ||
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uparams.out_len > info.max_enc_size)
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return -EINVAL;
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params->out_len = info.max_enc_size;
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break;
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case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
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if (uparams.in_len > info.max_enc_size ||
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uparams.out_len > info.max_dec_size)
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return -EINVAL;
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params->out_len = info.max_dec_size;
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break;
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case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
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if (uparams.in_len > info.max_data_size ||
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uparams.out_len > info.max_sig_size)
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return -EINVAL;
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params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
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break;
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case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
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if (uparams.in_len > info.max_data_size ||
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uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size)
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return -EINVAL;
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params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
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break;
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default:
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BUG();
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}
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params->in_len = uparams.in_len;
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params->out_len = uparams.out_len; /* Note: same as in2_len */
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return 0;
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}
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