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SUNRPC: Reject short RFC 4121 MIC tokens in gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2
gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2() reads the token ID at ptr[0..1], the flags
byte at ptr[2], and padding at ptr[3..7], then passes
ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN and cksum_len to gss_krb5_mic_build_sg().
None of these accesses check read_token->len first.
The minimum safe token size is GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN (16) plus
ctx->krb5e->cksum_len (12-24, depending on the enctype). All callers
accept shorter tokens from the wire:
- gss_unwrap_resp_integ() enforces only an upper bound
(offset + len <= rcv_buf->len) before allocating
mic.data = kmalloc(len) and passing it to gss_verify_mic().
A malicious NFS server can therefore supply a short checksum
opaque, producing a small slab allocation that the Kerberos MIC
verifier reads past.
- gss_validate() enforces only len <= RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE (400)
before passing the wire-supplied length to
gss_validate_seqno_mic(), which constructs a mic xdr_netobj
and calls gss_verify_mic().
- svcauth_gss_verify_header() enforces only
checksum.len >= XDR_UNIT (4 bytes) before dispatching to
gss_verify_mic().
- svcauth_gss_unwrap_integ() checks only that the checksum fits
in gsd->gsd_scratch.
Add a length guard at the top of gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2(), before any
ptr[] access or scatterlist construction. Well-formed MIC tokens from
gss_krb5_get_mic_v2() already have exactly GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN +
cksum_len bytes, so valid traffic is unaffected.
Reported-by: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com>
Fixes: de9c17eb4a ("gss_krb5: add support for new token formats in rfc4121")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260523165237.510204-1-cel@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *message_buffer,
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dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__);
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if (read_token->len < GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + cksum_len)
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return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
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memcpy(&be16_ptr, (char *) ptr, 2);
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if (be16_to_cpu(be16_ptr) != KG2_TOK_MIC)
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return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
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