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sysctl: Move tainted ctl_table into kernel/panic.c

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Move the ctl_table with the "tainted" proc_name into kernel/panic.c.
With it moves the proc_tainted helper function.

This is part of a greater effort to move ctl tables into their
respective subsystems which will reduce the merge conflicts in
kernel/sysctl.c.

Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <joel.granados@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Joel Granados
2025-05-05 21:20:07 +02:00
parent 79ac8df974
commit 942b296a6c
2 changed files with 50 additions and 49 deletions
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50
kernel/panic.c
View File

@@ -84,6 +84,50 @@ ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(panic_notifier_list);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_notifier_list);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
/*
* Taint values can only be increased
* This means we can safely use a temporary.
*/
static int proc_taint(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct ctl_table t;
unsigned long tmptaint = get_taint();
int err;
if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
t = *table;
t.data = &tmptaint;
err = proc_doulongvec_minmax(&t, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (write) {
int i;
/*
* If we are relying on panic_on_taint not producing
* false positives due to userspace input, bail out
* before setting the requested taint flags.
*/
if (panic_on_taint_nousertaint && (tmptaint & panic_on_taint))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive
* to everyone's atomic.h for this
*/
for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++)
if ((1UL << i) & tmptaint)
add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
return err;
}
static const struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
{
@@ -96,6 +140,12 @@ static const struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = {
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
#endif
{
.procname = "tainted",
.maxlen = sizeof(long),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_taint,
},
{
.procname = "panic",
.data = &panic_timeout,

49
kernel/sysctl.c
View File

@@ -731,49 +731,6 @@ int proc_douintvec(const struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
do_proc_douintvec_conv, NULL);
}
/*
* Taint values can only be increased
* This means we can safely use a temporary.
*/
static int proc_taint(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct ctl_table t;
unsigned long tmptaint = get_taint();
int err;
if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
t = *table;
t.data = &tmptaint;
err = proc_doulongvec_minmax(&t, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (write) {
int i;
/*
* If we are relying on panic_on_taint not producing
* false positives due to userspace input, bail out
* before setting the requested taint flags.
*/
if (panic_on_taint_nousertaint && (tmptaint & panic_on_taint))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive
* to everyone's atomic.h for this
*/
for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++)
if ((1UL << i) & tmptaint)
add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
return err;
}
/**
* struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param - proc_dointvec_minmax() range checking structure
* @min: pointer to minimum allowable value
@@ -1557,12 +1514,6 @@ int proc_do_static_key(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
static const struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
{
.procname = "tainted",
.maxlen = sizeof(long),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_taint,
},
{
.procname = "sysctl_writes_strict",
.data = &sysctl_writes_strict,