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lib/crypto: aesgcm: Don't disable IRQs during AES block encryption

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aes_encrypt() now uses AES instructions when available instead of always
using table-based code.  AES instructions are constant-time and don't
benefit from disabling IRQs as a constant-time hardening measure.

In fact, on two architectures (arm and riscv) disabling IRQs is
counterproductive because it prevents the AES instructions from being
used.  (See the may_use_simd() implementation on those architectures.)

Therefore, let's remove the IRQ disabling/enabling and leave the choice
of constant-time hardening measures to the AES library code.

Note that currently the arm table-based AES code (which runs on arm
kernels that don't have ARMv8 CE) disables IRQs, while the generic
table-based AES code does not.  So this does technically regress in
constant-time hardening when that generic code is used.  But as
discussed in commit a22fd0e3c4 ("lib/crypto: aes: Introduce improved
AES library") I think just leaving IRQs enabled is the right choice.
Disabling them is slow and can cause problems, and AES instructions
(which modern CPUs have) solve the problem in a much better way anyway.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260331024430.51755-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Eric Biggers
2026-03-30 19:44:30 -07:00
parent 1aa82df3eb
commit 8f45af945f
1 changed files with 3 additions and 22 deletions
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25
lib/crypto/aesgcm.c
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@@ -9,25 +9,6 @@
#include <crypto/utils.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/irqflags.h>
static void aesgcm_encrypt_block(const struct aes_enckey *key, void *dst,
const void *src)
{
unsigned long flags;
/*
* In AES-GCM, both the GHASH key derivation and the CTR mode
* encryption operate on known plaintext, making them susceptible to
* timing attacks on the encryption key. The AES library already
* mitigates this risk to some extent by pulling the entire S-box into
* the caches before doing any substitutions, but this strategy is more
* effective when running with interrupts disabled.
*/
local_irq_save(flags);
aes_encrypt(key, dst, src);
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
/**
* aesgcm_expandkey - Expands the AES and GHASH keys for the AES-GCM key
@@ -53,7 +34,7 @@ int aesgcm_expandkey(struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *key,
return ret;
ctx->authsize = authsize;
aesgcm_encrypt_block(&ctx->aes_key, h, h);
aes_encrypt(&ctx->aes_key, h, h);
ghash_preparekey(&ctx->ghash_key, h);
memzero_explicit(h, sizeof(h));
return 0;
@@ -98,7 +79,7 @@ static void aesgcm_mac(const struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *src, int src_len,
ghash_final(&ghash, ghash_out);
ctr[3] = cpu_to_be32(1);
aesgcm_encrypt_block(&ctx->aes_key, enc_ctr, ctr);
aes_encrypt(&ctx->aes_key, enc_ctr, (const u8 *)ctr);
crypto_xor_cpy(authtag, ghash_out, enc_ctr, ctx->authsize);
memzero_explicit(ghash_out, sizeof(ghash_out));
@@ -120,7 +101,7 @@ static void aesgcm_crypt(const struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
* len', this cannot happen, so no explicit test is necessary.
*/
ctr[3] = cpu_to_be32(n++);
aesgcm_encrypt_block(&ctx->aes_key, buf, ctr);
aes_encrypt(&ctx->aes_key, buf, (const u8 *)ctr);
crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, buf, min(len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE));
dst += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;