HID: ft260: validate i2c input report length

Add two checks to ft260_raw_event() to prevent out-of-bounds reads
from malicious or malfunctioning devices:

First, reject reports shorter than the 2-byte header (report ID +
length fields). Without this, even accessing xfer->length on a
1-byte report is an OOB read.

Second, validate xfer->length against the actual data capacity of
the received HID report. Each I2C data report ID (0xD0 through
0xDE) defines a different report size in the HID descriptor, so the
available payload varies per report. A corrupted length field could
cause memcpy to read beyond the report buffer.

Reported-by: Sebastián Josué Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
This commit is contained in:
Michael Zaidman
2026-04-11 09:24:37 +03:00
committed by Jiri Kosina
parent 278dd04879
commit 80c4bbb2b3

View File

@@ -1068,10 +1068,22 @@ static int ft260_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev, struct hid_report *report,
struct ft260_device *dev = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct ft260_i2c_input_report *xfer = (void *)data;
if (size < offsetof(struct ft260_i2c_input_report, data)) {
hid_err(hdev, "short report %d\n", size);
return -1;
}
if (xfer->report >= FT260_I2C_REPORT_MIN &&
xfer->report <= FT260_I2C_REPORT_MAX) {
ft260_dbg("i2c resp: rep %#02x len %d\n", xfer->report,
xfer->length);
ft260_dbg("i2c resp: rep %#02x len %d size %d\n",
xfer->report, xfer->length, size);
if (xfer->length > size -
offsetof(struct ft260_i2c_input_report, data)) {
hid_err(hdev, "report %#02x: length %d exceeds HID report size\n",
xfer->report, xfer->length);
return -1;
}
if ((dev->read_buf == NULL) ||
(xfer->length > dev->read_len - dev->read_idx)) {