Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2026-06-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor

Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen: "Another round of bug fixing and some code cleanups, there are no new features. The biggest thing to note is Georgia is being added to help co-maintain apparmor. Cleanups: - replace get_zeroed_page() with kzalloc() - remove unnecessary goto and associated label - change fn_label_build() to return err on failure instead of NULL or err - free rawdata as soon as possible - use explicit instead of implicit flex array in rawdata_f_data - use __label_make_stale in __aa_proxy_redirect - return correct error by propagate -ENOMEM correctly in unpack_table - aa_label_alloc use aa_label_free on alloc failure - add a conditional version of get_newest_label Bug Fixes: - mediate the implicit connect of TCP fast open sendmsg - fix C23ism of label immediately before a declaration - fix kernel-doc warnings - fix spelling mistakes - fix use-after-free in rawdata dedup loop - Fix inverted comparison in cache_hold_inc() - fix uninitialized pointer passed to audit_log_untrustedstring() - don't audit files pointing to aa_null.dentry - put secmark label after secid lookup - fix aa_getprocattr free procattr leak on format failure - release exe file resources on path failure - fail policy unpack on accept2 allocation failure - Fix return in ns_mkdir_op - remove or add symlinks to rawdata according to export_binary - fix NULL pointer dereference in unpack_pdb - fix potential UAF in aa_replace_profiles - grab ns lock and refresh when looking up changehat child profiles - enable differential encoding - check label build before no_new_privs test - conditionally compile get_loaddata_common_ref() - fix unix socket mediation cache update, and leak" * tag 'apparmor-pr-2026-06-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (35 commits) apparmor: advertise the tcp fast open fix is applied apparmor: mediate the implicit connect of TCP fast open sendmsg apparmor: fix label can not be immediately before a declaration apparmor: fix kernel-doc warnings apparmor: replace get_zeroed_page() with kzalloc() security: apparmor: fix two spelling mistakes apparmor: fix use-after-free in rawdata dedup loop apparmor: Fix inverted comparison in cache_hold_inc() apparmor: fix uninitialised pointer passed to audit_log_untrustedstring() apparmor: don't audit files pointing to aa_null.dentry apparmor: put secmark label after secid lookup apparmor: aa_getprocattr free procattr leak on format failure apparmor: remove unnecessary goto and associated label apparmor: release exe file resources on path failure apparmor: fail policy unpack on accept2 allocation failure apparmor: Fix return in ns_mkdir_op apparmor: remove or add symlinks to rawdata according to export_binary apparmor: fix NULL pointer dereference in unpack_pdb apparmor: make fn_label_build() capable of handling not supported apparmor: change fn_label_build() call to not return NULL ...
2026-07-22 03:27:30 -04:00 · 2026-06-24 12:33:40 -07:00
parent e161101787 2f6701a5ce
commit 6535a84bfd
18 changed files with 365 additions and 150 deletions
--- a/1
+++ b/1
@@ -1987,6 +1987,7 @@ F:	include/uapi/linux/apm_bios.h
 APPARMOR SECURITY MODULE
 M:	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 M:	John Johansen <john@apparmor.net>
+M:	Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
 L:	apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com (moderated for non-subscribers)
 S:	Supported
 W:	apparmor.net
--- a/security/apparmor/af_unix.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/af_unix.c
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ static int unix_peer_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
 					  peer_label, &ad));
 }

-/**
+/*
 *
 * Requires: lock held on both @sk and @peer_sk
 *           called by unix_stream_connect, unix_may_send
@@ -674,9 +674,11 @@ static void update_sk_ctx(struct sock *sk, struct aa_label *label,
 		old = rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->peer, lockdep_is_held(&unix_sk(sk)->lock));

 		if (old == plabel) {
-			rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate, plabel);
+			rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate,
+					   aa_get_label(plabel));
 		} else if (aa_label_is_subset(plabel, old)) {
-			rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate, plabel);
+			rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate,
+					   aa_get_label(plabel));
 			rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer, aa_get_label(plabel));
 			aa_put_label(old);
 		} /* else race or a subset - don't update */
@@ -748,42 +750,47 @@ int aa_unix_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
 	if (!peer_sk)
 		goto out;

-	peer_addr = aa_sunaddr(unix_sk(peer_sk), &peer_addrlen);
+	if (!is_sk_fs) {
+		bool is_peer_fs = is_unix_fs(peer_sk);

-	struct path peer_path;
+		peer_addr = aa_sunaddr(unix_sk(peer_sk), &peer_addrlen);
+		if (is_peer_fs) {
+			struct path peer_path;

-	peer_path = unix_sk(peer_sk)->path;
-	if (!is_sk_fs && is_unix_fs(peer_sk)) {
-		last_error(error,
-			   unix_fs_perm(op, request, subj_cred, label,
-					is_unix_fs(peer_sk) ? &peer_path : NULL));
-	} else if (!is_sk_fs) {
-		struct aa_label *plabel;
-		struct aa_sk_ctx *pctx = aa_sock(peer_sk);
+			unix_state_lock(peer_sk);
+			peer_path = unix_sk(peer_sk)->path;
+			if (peer_path.dentry)
+				path_get(&peer_path);
+			unix_state_unlock(peer_sk);

-		rcu_read_lock();
-		plabel = aa_get_label_rcu(&pctx->label);
-		rcu_read_unlock();
-		/* no fs check of aa_unix_peer_perm because conditions above
-		 * ensure they will never be done
-		 */
-		last_error(error,
-			xcheck(unix_peer_perm(subj_cred, label, op,
+			last_error(error,
+				   unix_fs_perm(op, request, subj_cred, label,
+						&peer_path));
+			if (peer_path.dentry)
+				path_put(&peer_path);
+		} else {
+			struct aa_sk_ctx *pctx = aa_sock(peer_sk);
+
+			rcu_read_lock();
+			plabel = aa_get_newest_label(pctx->label);
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			/* no fs check of aa_unix_peer_perm because conditions
+			 * above ensure they will never be done
+			 */
+			last_error(error,
+				xcheck(unix_peer_perm(subj_cred, label, op,
 					      MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, sock->sk,
 					      is_sk_fs ? &path : NULL,
 					      peer_addr, peer_addrlen,
-					      is_unix_fs(peer_sk) ?
-							&peer_path : NULL,
-					      plabel),
-			       unix_peer_perm(file->f_cred, plabel, op,
+					      NULL, plabel),
+				       unix_peer_perm(file->f_cred, plabel, op,
 					      MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, peer_sk,
-					      is_unix_fs(peer_sk) ?
-							&peer_path : NULL,
-					      addr, addrlen,
+					      NULL, addr, addrlen,
 					      is_sk_fs ? &path : NULL,
 					      label)));
-		if (!error && !__aa_subj_label_is_cached(plabel, label))
-			update_peer_ctx(peer_sk, pctx, label);
+			if (!error && !__aa_subj_label_is_cached(plabel, label))
+				update_peer_ctx(peer_sk, pctx, label);
+		}
 	}
 	sock_put(peer_sk);

--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 */

 #include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
@@ -71,10 +72,10 @@

 struct rawdata_f_data {
 	struct aa_loaddata *loaddata;
+	DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(char, data);
 };

 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
-#define RAWDATA_F_DATA_BUF(p) (char *)(p + 1)

 static void rawdata_f_data_free(struct rawdata_f_data *private)
 {
@@ -174,6 +175,7 @@ static struct aa_proxy *get_proxy_common_ref(struct aa_common_ref *ref)
 	return NULL;
 }

+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
 static struct aa_loaddata *get_loaddata_common_ref(struct aa_common_ref *ref)
 {
 	if (ref)
@@ -181,6 +183,7 @@ static struct aa_loaddata *get_loaddata_common_ref(struct aa_common_ref *ref)
 						      count));
 	return NULL;
 }
+#endif

 static void aa_put_common_ref(struct aa_common_ref *ref)
 {
@@ -904,7 +907,7 @@ static void multi_transaction_kref(struct kref *kref)
 	struct multi_transaction *t;

 	t = container_of(kref, struct multi_transaction, count);
-	free_page((unsigned long) t);
+	kfree(t);
 }

 static struct multi_transaction *
@@ -947,7 +950,7 @@ static struct multi_transaction *multi_transaction_new(struct file *file,
 	if (size > MULTI_TRANSACTION_LIMIT - 1)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EFBIG);

-	t = (struct multi_transaction *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	t = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!t)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	kref_init(&t->count);
@@ -1434,7 +1437,7 @@ static ssize_t rawdata_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t size,
 	struct rawdata_f_data *private = file->private_data;

 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, ppos,
-				       RAWDATA_F_DATA_BUF(private),
+				       private->data,
 				       private->loaddata->size);
 }

@@ -1467,8 +1470,7 @@ static int rawdata_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 	private->loaddata = loaddata;

 	error = decompress_zstd(loaddata->data, loaddata->compressed_size,
-				RAWDATA_F_DATA_BUF(private),
-				loaddata->size);
+				private->data, loaddata->size);
 	if (error)
 		goto fail_decompress;

@@ -1756,6 +1758,80 @@ static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_abi_iops = {
 static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_data_iops = {
 	.get_link	= rawdata_get_link_data,
 };
+
+/*
+ * Requires: @profile->ns->lock held
+ */
+void __aa_remove_rawdata_symlink_dents(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	aafs_remove(profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH]);
+	profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH] = NULL;
+	aafs_remove(profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI]);
+	profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI] = NULL;
+	aafs_remove(profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA]);
+	profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA] = NULL;
+}
+
+static inline int create_symlink_dent(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				      const char *name,
+				      enum aafs_prof_type type,
+				      const struct inode_operations *iops)
+{
+	struct dentry *dent = NULL;
+	struct dentry *dir = prof_dir(profile);
+
+	if (profile->dents[type])
+		return 0;
+
+	dent = aafs_create(name, S_IFLNK | 0444, dir,
+			   &profile->label.proxy->count, NULL, NULL, iops);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		return PTR_ERR(dent);
+
+	profile->dents[type] = dent;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Requires: @profile->ns->lock held
+ */
+int __aa_create_rawdata_symlink_dents(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!profile ||
+	    (profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH] &&
+	     profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI] &&
+	     profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA]))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!profile->rawdata)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (aa_g_hash_policy) {
+		error = create_symlink_dent(profile, "raw_sha256",
+					    AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH,
+					    &rawdata_link_sha256_iops);
+		if (error)
+			return error;
+	}
+
+	error = create_symlink_dent(profile, "raw_abi",
+				    AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI,
+				    &rawdata_link_abi_iops);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+
+	error = create_symlink_dent(profile, "raw_data",
+				    AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA,
+				    &rawdata_link_data_iops);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */

 /*
@@ -1831,31 +1907,9 @@ int __aafs_profile_mkdir(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *parent)
 		profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_HASH] = dent;
 	}

-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
-	if (profile->rawdata) {
-		if (aa_g_hash_policy) {
-			dent = aafs_create("raw_sha256", S_IFLNK | 0444, dir,
-					   &profile->label.proxy->count, NULL,
-					   NULL, &rawdata_link_sha256_iops);
-			if (IS_ERR(dent))
-				goto fail;
-			profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH] = dent;
-		}
-		dent = aafs_create("raw_abi", S_IFLNK | 0444, dir,
-				   &profile->label.proxy->count, NULL, NULL,
-				   &rawdata_link_abi_iops);
-		if (IS_ERR(dent))
-			goto fail;
-		profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI] = dent;
-
-		dent = aafs_create("raw_data", S_IFLNK | 0444, dir,
-				   &profile->label.proxy->count, NULL, NULL,
-				   &rawdata_link_data_iops);
-		if (IS_ERR(dent))
-			goto fail;
-		profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA] = dent;
-	}
-#endif /*CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */
+	error = __aa_create_rawdata_symlink_dents(profile);
+	if (error)
+		goto fail2;

 	list_for_each_entry(child, &profile->base.profiles, base.list) {
 		error = __aafs_profile_mkdir(child, prof_child_dir(profile));
@@ -1922,7 +1976,7 @@ static struct dentry *ns_mkdir_op(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
 	mutex_unlock(&parent->lock);
 	aa_put_ns(parent);

-	return ERR_PTR(error);
+	return error ? ERR_PTR(error) : NULL;
 }

 static int ns_rmdir_op(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
@@ -2422,6 +2476,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_versions[] = {
 static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_policy[] = {
 	AA_SFS_DIR("versions",			aa_sfs_entry_versions),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("set_load",		1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("diff-encode",		1),
 	/* number of out of band transitions supported */
 	AA_SFS_FILE_U64("outofband",		MAX_OOB_SUPPORTED),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_U64("permstable32_version",	3),
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
@@ -135,7 +136,7 @@ static int label_compound_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	struct label_it i;
 	struct path_cond cond = { };

-	/* find first subcomponent that is in view and going to be interated with */
+	/* find first subcomponent that is in view and going to be interacted with */
 	label_for_each(i, label, tp) {
 		if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, inview))
 			continue;
@@ -863,6 +864,15 @@ static int profile_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred,
 }

 /* ensure none ns domain transitions are correctly applied with onexec */
+static struct aa_label *label_merge_wrap(struct aa_label *a, struct aa_label *b,
+					 gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = aa_label_merge(a, b, gfp);
+
+	if (!label)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	return label;
+}

 static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred,
 				      struct aa_label *label,
@@ -890,12 +900,13 @@ static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred,
 		return ERR_PTR(error);

 	new = fn_label_build_in_scope(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
-			stack ? aa_label_merge(&profile->label, onexec,
-					       GFP_KERNEL)
+			stack ? label_merge_wrap(&profile->label, onexec,
+						 GFP_KERNEL)
 			      : aa_get_newest_label(onexec),
 			profile_transition(subj_cred, profile, bprm,
 					   buffer, cond, unsafe));
-	if (new)
+	AA_BUG(!new);
+	if (!IS_ERR(new))
 		return new;

 	/* TODO: get rid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID */
@@ -904,7 +915,8 @@ static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred,
 				      OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC,
 				      AA_MAY_ONEXEC, bprm->filename, NULL,
 				      onexec, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
-				      "failed to build target label", -ENOMEM));
+				      "failed to build target label",
+				      PTR_ERR(new)));
 	return ERR_PTR(error);
 }

@@ -967,14 +979,10 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 				profile_transition(subj_cred, profile, bprm,
 						   buffer,
 						   &cond, &unsafe));
-
 	AA_BUG(!new);
 	if (IS_ERR(new)) {
 		error = PTR_ERR(new);
 		goto done;
-	} else if (!new) {
-		error = -ENOMEM;
-		goto done;
 	}

 	/* Policy has specified a domain transitions. If no_new_privs and
@@ -1109,6 +1117,7 @@ static struct aa_label *change_hat(const struct cred *subj_cred,
 				   int count, int flags)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile, *root, *hat = NULL;
+	struct aa_ns *ns, *new_ns;
 	struct aa_label *new;
 	struct label_it it;
 	bool sibling = false;
@@ -1119,6 +1128,32 @@ static struct aa_label *change_hat(const struct cred *subj_cred,
 	AA_BUG(!hats);
 	AA_BUG(count < 1);

+	/*
+	 * Acquire the newest label and then hold the lock until we choose a
+	 * hat, so that profile replacement doesn't atomically truncate the
+	 * list of potential hats. Because we are getting the namespaces from
+	 * the profiles and label, we can rely on the namespaces being live
+	 * and avoid incrementing their refcounts while grabbing the lock.
+	 */
+	label = aa_get_label(label);
+	ns = labels_ns(label);
+
+retry:
+	mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level);
+	if (label_is_stale(label)) {
+		new = aa_get_newest_label(label);
+		new_ns = labels_ns(new);
+		if (new_ns != ns) {
+			aa_put_label(new);
+			mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+			ns = new_ns;
+			label = new;
+			goto retry;
+		}
+		aa_put_label(label);
+		label = new;
+	}
+
 	if (PROFILE_IS_HAT(labels_profile(label)))
 		sibling = true;

@@ -1127,7 +1162,7 @@ static struct aa_label *change_hat(const struct cred *subj_cred,
 		name = hats[i];
 		label_for_each_in_scope(it, labels_ns(label), label, profile) {
 			if (sibling && PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile)) {
-				root = aa_get_profile_rcu(&profile->parent);
+				root = aa_get_profile(profile->parent);
 			} else if (!sibling && !PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile)) {
 				root = aa_get_profile(profile);
 			} else {	/* conflicting change type */
@@ -1187,6 +1222,7 @@ static struct aa_label *change_hat(const struct cred *subj_cred,
 				      GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error);
 		}
 	}
+	mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
 	return ERR_PTR(error);

 build:
@@ -1194,11 +1230,9 @@ static struct aa_label *change_hat(const struct cred *subj_cred,
 				   build_change_hat(subj_cred, profile, name,
 						    sibling),
 				   aa_get_label(&profile->label));
-	if (!new) {
-		info = "label build failed";
-		error = -ENOMEM;
-		goto fail;
-	} /* else if (IS_ERR) build_change_hat has logged error so return new */
+	mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+	AA_BUG(!new);
+	/* return new label or error ptr */

 	return new;
 }
@@ -1527,6 +1561,9 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
 		new = fn_label_build_in_scope(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
 					   aa_get_label(target),
 					   aa_get_label(&profile->label));
+		AA_BUG(!new);
+		if (IS_ERR(new))
+			goto build_fail;
 		/*
 		 * no new privs prevents domain transitions that would
 		 * reduce restrictions.
@@ -1545,27 +1582,29 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
 		/* only transition profiles in the current ns */
 		if (stack)
 			new = aa_label_merge(label, target, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(new)) {
-			info = "failed to build target label";
-			if (!new)
-				error = -ENOMEM;
-			else
-				error = PTR_ERR(new);
-			new = NULL;
-			perms.allow = 0;
-			goto audit;
-		}
+		if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(new))
+			goto build_fail;
 		error = aa_replace_current_label(new);
 	} else {
-		if (new) {
-			aa_put_label(new);
-			new = NULL;
-		}
+		/* new will be recomputed so at exec time. So discard */
+		aa_put_label(new);
+		new = NULL;

 		/* full transition will be built in exec path */
 		aa_set_current_onexec(target, stack);
 	}

+	goto audit;
+
+build_fail:
+	info = "failed to build target label";
+	if (!new)
+		error = -ENOMEM;
+	else
+		error = PTR_ERR(new);
+	new = NULL;
+	perms.allow = 0;
+
 audit:
 	error = fn_for_each_in_scope(label, profile,
 			aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -157,10 +157,10 @@ static int path_name(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,

 	/* don't reaudit files closed during inheritance */
 	if (unlikely(path->dentry == aa_null.dentry))
-		error = -EACCES;
-	else
-		error = aa_path_name(path, flags, buffer, name, &info,
-				     labels_profile(label)->disconnected);
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	error = aa_path_name(path, flags, buffer, name, &info,
+			     labels_profile(label)->disconnected);
 	if (error) {
 		fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
 			aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ static int profile_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
 			     struct path_cond *cond, int flags,
 			     struct aa_perms *perms)
 {
-	const char *name;
+	const char *name = NULL;
 	int error;

 	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ static int profile_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred,
 			     struct path_cond *cond)
 {
 	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
-	const char *lname, *tname = NULL;
+	const char *lname = NULL, *tname = NULL;
 	struct aa_perms lperms = {}, perms;
 	const char *info = NULL;
 	u32 request = AA_MAY_LINK;
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
@@ -120,6 +120,8 @@ struct aa_loaddata;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
 void __aa_fs_remove_rawdata(struct aa_loaddata *rawdata);
 int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_loaddata *rawdata);
+void __aa_remove_rawdata_symlink_dents(struct aa_profile *profile);
+int __aa_create_rawdata_symlink_dents(struct aa_profile *profile);
 #else
 static inline void __aa_fs_remove_rawdata(struct aa_loaddata *rawdata)
 {
@@ -131,6 +133,16 @@ static inline int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_ns *ns,
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static inline void __aa_remove_rawdata_symlink_dents(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	/* empty stub */
+}
+
+static inline int __aa_create_rawdata_symlink_dents(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */

 #endif /* __AA_APPARMORFS_H */
--- a/security/apparmor/include/label.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/label.h
@@ -423,6 +423,38 @@ static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_newest_label(struct aa_label *l)
 	return aa_get_label(l);
 }

+/**
+ * aa_get_newest_label_condref - find the newest version of @l
+ * @l: the label to check for newer versions of
+ * @needput: returns whether the reference needs put
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted newest version of @l taking into account
+ *          replacement, renames and removals
+ *          return @l.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_newest_label_condref(struct aa_label *l,
+							   bool *needput)
+{
+	if (l && unlikely(label_is_stale(l))) {
+		struct aa_label *tmp;
+
+		AA_BUG(!l->proxy);
+		AA_BUG(!l->proxy->label);
+		/* BUG: only way this can happen is @l ref count and its
+		 * replacement count have gone to 0 and are on their way
+		 * to destruction. ie. we have a refcounting error
+		 */
+		tmp = aa_get_label_rcu(&l->proxy->label);
+		AA_BUG(!tmp);
+
+		*needput = true;
+		return tmp;
+	}
+
+	*needput = false;
+	return l;
+}
+
 static inline void aa_put_label(struct aa_label *l)
 {
 	if (l)
--- a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h
@@ -281,15 +281,15 @@ void aa_policy_destroy(struct aa_policy *policy);
 * @FN: fn to call for each profile transition. @P is set to the profile
 *
 * Returns: new label on success
+ *	    NULL if all callbacks decline to specify a transition
 *          ERR_PTR if build @FN fails
- *          NULL if label_build fails due to low memory conditions
 *
- * @FN must return a label or ERR_PTR on failure. NULL is not allowed
+ * @FN must return a label or ERR_PTR on failure.
 */
 #define fn_label_build(L, P, GFP, FN)					\
 ({									\
 	__label__ __do_cleanup, __done;					\
-	struct aa_label *__new_;					\
+	struct aa_label *__new_ = NULL;					\
 									\
 	if ((L)->size > 1) {						\
 		/* TODO: add cache of transitions already done */	\
@@ -298,17 +298,21 @@ void aa_policy_destroy(struct aa_policy *policy);
 		DEFINE_VEC(label, __lvec);				\
 		DEFINE_VEC(profile, __pvec);				\
 		if (vec_setup(label, __lvec, (L)->size, (GFP)))	{	\
-			__new_ = NULL;					\
+			__new_ = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);			\
 			goto __done;					\
 		}							\
 		__j = 0;						\
 		label_for_each(__i, (L), (P)) {				\
 			__new_ = (FN);					\
-			AA_BUG(!__new_);				\
+			if (!__new_)					\
+				continue;				\
 			if (IS_ERR(__new_))				\
 				goto __do_cleanup;			\
 			__lvec[__j++] = __new_;				\
 		}							\
+		if (__j == 0)						\
+			/* no components adding to build */		\
+			goto __do_cleanup;				\
 		for (__j = __count = 0; __j < (L)->size; __j++)		\
 			__count += __lvec[__j]->size;			\
 		if (!vec_setup(profile, __pvec, __count, (GFP))) {	\
@@ -320,14 +324,13 @@ void aa_policy_destroy(struct aa_policy *policy);
 			if (__count > 1) {				\
 				__new_ = aa_vec_find_or_create_label(__pvec,\
 						     __count, (GFP));	\
-				/* only fails if out of Mem */		\
 				if (!__new_)				\
-					__new_ = NULL;			\
+					__new_ = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);	\
 			} else						\
 				__new_ = aa_get_label(&__pvec[0]->label); \
 			vec_cleanup(profile, __pvec, __count);		\
 		} else							\
-			__new_ = NULL;					\
+			__new_ = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);			\
 __do_cleanup:								\
 		vec_cleanup(label, __lvec, (L)->size);			\
 	} else {							\
@@ -335,7 +338,7 @@ __do_cleanup:								\
 		__new_ = (FN);						\
 	}								\
 __done:									\
-	if (!__new_)							\
+	if (PTR_ERR(__new_))						\
 		AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_LABEL, "label build failed\n");		\
 	(__new_);							\
 })
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ struct aa_loaddata {
 int aa_unpack(struct aa_loaddata *udata, struct list_head *lh, const char **ns);

 /**
- * aa_get_loaddata - get a reference count from a counted data reference
+ * aa_get_i_loaddata - get a reference count from a counted data reference
 * @data: reference to get a count on
 *
 * Returns: pointer to reference
@@ -163,6 +163,25 @@ aa_get_profile_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data)
 	return data;
 }

+/**
+ * aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0 - get a profile reference count if not zero
+ * @data: reference to get a count on
+ *
+ * Like aa_get_profile_loaddata(), but safe to call on an entry that may
+ * be on a list (e.g. ns->rawdata_list) where the last pcount has already
+ * dropped and the deferred cleanup has not yet run.
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to reference, or %NULL if @data is NULL or its
+ *          profile refcount has already reached zero.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_loaddata *
+aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0(struct aa_loaddata *data)
+{
+	if (data && kref_get_unless_zero(&data->pcount))
+		return data;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 void __aa_loaddata_update(struct aa_loaddata *data, long revision);
 bool aa_rawdata_eq(struct aa_loaddata *l, struct aa_loaddata *r);
 void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref);
--- a/security/apparmor/label.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/label.c
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ void __aa_proxy_redirect(struct aa_label *orig, struct aa_label *new)
 	tmp = rcu_dereference_protected(orig->proxy->label,
 					&labels_ns(orig)->lock);
 	rcu_assign_pointer(orig->proxy->label, aa_get_label(new));
-	orig->flags |= FLAG_STALE;
+	__label_make_stale(orig);
 	aa_put_label(tmp);
 }

@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_alloc(int size, struct aa_proxy *proxy, gfp_t gfp)
 	return new;

 fail:
-	kfree(new);
+	aa_label_free(new);

 	return NULL;
 }
@@ -1176,22 +1176,21 @@ static struct aa_label *__label_find_merge(struct aa_labelset *ls,
 struct aa_label *aa_label_find_merge(struct aa_label *a, struct aa_label *b)
 {
 	struct aa_labelset *ls;
-	struct aa_label *label, *ar = NULL, *br = NULL;
+	struct aa_label *label;
 	unsigned long flags;
+	bool a_needput, b_needput;

 	AA_BUG(!a);
 	AA_BUG(!b);

-	if (label_is_stale(a))
-		a = ar = aa_get_newest_label(a);
-	if (label_is_stale(b))
-		b = br = aa_get_newest_label(b);
+	a = aa_get_newest_label_condref(a, &a_needput);
+	b = aa_get_newest_label_condref(b, &b_needput);
 	ls = labelset_of_merge(a, b);
 	read_lock_irqsave(&ls->lock, flags);
 	label = __label_find_merge(ls, a, b);
 	read_unlock_irqrestore(&ls->lock, flags);
-	aa_put_label(ar);
-	aa_put_label(br);
+	aa_put_label_condref(a, a_needput);
+	aa_put_label_condref(b, b_needput);

 	return label;
 }
@@ -1228,9 +1227,10 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_merge(struct aa_label *a, struct aa_label *b,

 	if (!label) {
 		struct aa_label *new;
+		bool a_needput, b_needput;

-		a = aa_get_newest_label(a);
-		b = aa_get_newest_label(b);
+		a = aa_get_newest_label_condref(a, &a_needput);
+		b = aa_get_newest_label_condref(b, &b_needput);

 		/* could use label_merge_len(a, b), but requires double
 		 * comparison for small savings
@@ -1242,8 +1242,8 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_merge(struct aa_label *a, struct aa_label *b,
 		label = label_merge_insert(new, a, b);
 		label_free_or_put_new(label, new);
 out:
-		aa_put_label(a);
-		aa_put_label(b);
+		aa_put_label_condref(a, a_needput);
+		aa_put_label_condref(b, b_needput);
 	}

 	return label;
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1422,7 +1422,21 @@ static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
 static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
 				   struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 {
-	return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
+	int error = aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
+
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	/* TCP fast open carries connect() semantics in sendmsg(); mediate
+	 * the implicit connect so it cannot bypass the connect permission.
+	 */
+	if ((msg->msg_flags & MSG_FASTOPEN) && msg->msg_name &&
+	    (sk_is_tcp(sock->sk) ||
+	     (sk_is_inet(sock->sk) && sock->sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM &&
+	      sock->sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP)))
+		error = aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk);
+
+	return error;
 }

 static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
@@ -1493,7 +1507,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
 *
 * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held
 *
- * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram()
+ * don't want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram()
 * to deny an incoming connection  socket_sock_rcv_skb()
 */
 static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -2129,7 +2143,7 @@ static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
 */
 static void cache_hold_inc(unsigned int *hold)
 {
-	if (*hold > MAX_HOLD_COUNT)
+	if (*hold < MAX_HOLD_COUNT)
 		(*hold)++;
 }

--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -27,13 +27,13 @@
 * @blob: data to unpack (NOT NULL)
 * @bsize: size of blob
 *
- * Returns: pointer to table else NULL on failure
+ * Returns: pointer to table else ERR_PTR on failure
 *
 * NOTE: must be freed by kvfree (not kfree)
 */
 static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
 {
-	struct table_header *table = NULL;
+	struct table_header *table = ERR_PTR(-EPROTO);
 	struct table_header th;
 	size_t tsize;

@@ -74,20 +74,21 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
 		else if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA32)
 			UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen,
 				     u32, __be32, get_unaligned_be32);
-		else
-			goto fail;
+		else {
+			kvfree(table);
+			table = ERR_PTR(-EPROTO);
+			goto out;
+		}
 		/* if table was vmalloced make sure the page tables are synced
 		 * before it is used, as it goes live to all cpus.
 		 */
 		if (is_vmalloc_addr(table))
 			vm_unmap_aliases();
-	}
+	} else
+		table = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);

 out:
 	return table;
-fail:
-	kvfree(table);
-	return NULL;
 }

 /**
@@ -359,8 +360,11 @@ struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags)

 	while (size > 0) {
 		table = unpack_table(data, size);
-		if (!table)
+		if (IS_ERR(table)) {
+			error = PTR_ERR(table);
+			table = NULL;
 			goto fail;
+		}

 		switch (table->td_id) {
 		case YYTD_ID_ACCEPT:
--- a/security/apparmor/mount.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
@@ -735,17 +735,11 @@ int aa_pivotroot(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
 			build_pivotroot(subj_cred, profile, new_path,
 					new_buffer,
 					old_path, old_buffer));
-	if (!target) {
-		info = "label build failed";
-		error = -ENOMEM;
-		goto fail;
-	} else if (!IS_ERR(target)) {
+	AA_BUG(!target);
+	if (!IS_ERR(target)) {
 		error = aa_replace_current_label(target);
-		if (error) {
-			/* TODO: audit target */
-			aa_put_label(target);
-			goto out;
-		}
+		if (error)
+			goto fail;
 		aa_put_label(target);
 	} else
 		/* already audited error */
@@ -763,7 +757,8 @@ int aa_pivotroot(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
 				    NULL /*new_name */,
 				    NULL /* old_name */,
 				    NULL, NULL,
-				    0, NULL, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &nullperms, info,
+				    0, target->hname, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &nullperms, info,
 				    error));
+	aa_put_label(target);
 	goto out;
 }
--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -22,12 +22,14 @@

 struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",	AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("tcp-fast-open",		1),
 	{ }
 };

 struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_networkv9[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",	AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("af_unix",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("tcp-fast-open",		1),
 	{ }
 };

@@ -354,6 +356,7 @@ static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark)
 		return PTR_ERR(label);

 	secmark->secid = label->secid;
+	aa_put_label(label);

 	return 0;
 }
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -232,6 +232,13 @@ static void __remove_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	aa_label_remove(&profile->label);
 	__aafs_profile_rmdir(profile);
 	__list_remove_profile(profile);
+	/* rawdata is only ever referenced by fs lookup, that is no
+	 * longer possible here, so put the reference to it. This will
+	 * enable the rawdata to be freed if for some reason the profile
+	 * is pinned and going to live for a while.
+	 */
+	aa_put_profile_loaddata(profile->rawdata);
+	profile->rawdata = NULL;
 }

 /**
@@ -1223,8 +1230,12 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label,
 			if (aa_rawdata_eq(rawdata_ent, udata)) {
 				struct aa_loaddata *tmp;

-				tmp = aa_get_profile_loaddata(rawdata_ent);
-				/* check we didn't fail the race */
+				/*
+				 * Entries remain on rawdata_list with
+				 * pcount == 0 until do_ploaddata_rmfs()
+				 * runs; only take a live profile ref.
+				 */
+				tmp = aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0(rawdata_ent);
 				if (tmp) {
 					aa_put_profile_loaddata(udata);
 					udata = tmp;
@@ -1342,6 +1353,16 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label,
 			goto skip;
 		}

+		if (!aa_g_export_binary) {
+			if (ent->old && ent->old->rawdata &&
+			    ent->old->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR]) {
+				/* remove rawdata symlinks because the symlink
+				 * target will be removed
+				 */
+				__aa_remove_rawdata_symlink_dents(ent->old);
+			}
+		}
+
 		/*
 		 * TODO: finer dedup based on profile range in data. Load set
 		 * can differ but profile may remain unchanged
@@ -1352,6 +1373,11 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label,
 		if (ent->old) {
 			share_name(ent->old, ent->new);
 			__replace_profile(ent->old, ent->new);
+			if (aa_g_export_binary) {
+				/* recreate rawdata symlinks */
+				if (!ent->old->rawdata)
+					__aa_create_rawdata_symlink_dents(ent->new);
+			}
 		} else {
 			struct list_head *lh;

@@ -1372,12 +1398,15 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label,

 out:
 	aa_put_ns(ns);
+
+	ssize_t udata_sz = udata->size;
+
 	aa_put_profile_loaddata(udata);
 	kfree(ns_name);

 	if (error)
 		return error;
-	return udata->size;
+	return udata_sz;

 fail_lock:
 	mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@ static int unpack_pdb(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_policydb **policy,
 	}

 	/* accept2 is in some cases being allocated, even with perms */
-	if (pdb->perms && !pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]) {
+	if (pdb->dfa && pdb->perms && !pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]) {
 		/* add dfa flags table missing in v2 */
 		u32 noents = pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen;
 		u16 tdflags = pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_flags;
@@ -1054,7 +1054,8 @@ static int unpack_pdb(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_policydb **policy,
 		pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2] = kvzalloc(tsize, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]) {
 			*info = "failed to alloc dfa flags table";
-			goto out;
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto fail;
 		}
 		pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_lolen = noents;
 		pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_flags = tdflags;
@@ -1079,7 +1080,6 @@ static int unpack_pdb(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_policydb **policy,
 	 * - move free of unneeded trans table here, has to be done
 	 *   after perm mapping.
 	 */
-out:
 	*policy = pdb;
 	return 0;

--- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline)
 				FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
 				FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
 	if (len < 0) {
+		kfree(*string);
+		*string = NULL;
 		aa_put_ns(current_ns);
 		return len;
 	}
--- a/security/apparmor/task.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/task.c
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static const char *get_current_exe_path(char *buffer, int buffer_size)
 	path_get(&p);

 	if (aa_path_name(&p, FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS, buffer, &path_str, NULL, NULL))
-		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		path_str = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);

 	fput(exe_file);
 	path_put(&p);