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smb: client: fix ALIGN() overflow in symlink_data() error context loop
The check added by commit7d9a7f1f96("smb/client: fix possible infinite loop and oob read in symlink_data()") compared the post-ALIGN length against the remaining buffer, but ALIGN() itself can overflow: for ErrorDataLength near UINT32_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9), ALIGN(x, 8) wraps to 0, so the subsequent bounds check passes, and the loop advances by zero bytes leaving 'p' pointing into stale data. Fix by checking the raw ErrorDataLength against the remaining space before applying ALIGN(), then checking again after. Since raw_len is bounded by the buffer, raw_len + 7 cannot overflow, so the second check is an exact post-alignment bounds guard. Fixes:76894f3e2f("cifs: improve symlink handling for smb2+") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>
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committed by
Paulo Alcantara
parent
3fffaa8a64
commit
62656b024e
@@ -61,7 +61,10 @@ static struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp *symlink_data(const struct kvec *iov)
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cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: skipping unhandled error context: 0x%x\n",
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__func__, le32_to_cpu(p->ErrorId));
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len = ALIGN(le32_to_cpu(p->ErrorDataLength), 8);
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len = le32_to_cpu(p->ErrorDataLength);
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if (len > end - ((u8 *)p + sizeof(*p)))
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return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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len = ALIGN(len, 8);
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if (len > end - ((u8 *)p + sizeof(*p)))
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return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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