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mm/mseal: simplify and rename VMA gap check
The check_mm_seal() function is doing something general - checking whether a range contains only VMAs (or rather that it does NOT contain any unmapped regions). So rename this function to range_contains_unmapped(). Additionally simplify the logic, we are simply checking whether the last vma->vm_end has either a VMA starting after it or ends before the end parameter. This check is rather dubious, so it is sensible to keep it local to mm/mseal.c as at a later stage it may be removed, and we don't want any other mm code to perform such a check. No functional change intended. [lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com: add comment explaining why we disallow gaps on mseal()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d85b3d55-09dc-43ba-8204-b48267a96751@lucifer.local Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/dd50984eff1e242b5f7f0f070a3360ef760e06b8.1753431105.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Andrew Morton
parent
8b2914162a
commit
530e090964
51
mm/mseal.c
51
mm/mseal.c
@@ -38,31 +38,40 @@ static int mseal_fixup(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
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}
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/*
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* Check for do_mseal:
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* 1> start is part of a valid vma.
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* 2> end is part of a valid vma.
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* 3> No gap (unallocated address) between start and end.
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* 4> map is sealable.
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* mseal() disallows an input range which contain unmapped ranges (VMA holes).
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*
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* It disallows unmapped regions from start to end whether they exist at the
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* start, in the middle, or at the end of the range, or any combination thereof.
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*
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* This is because after sealng a range, there's nothing to stop memory mapping
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* of ranges in the remaining gaps later, meaning that the user might then
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* wrongly consider the entirety of the mseal()'d range to be sealed when it
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* in fact isn't.
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*/
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static int check_mm_seal(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
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/*
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* Does the [start, end) range contain any unmapped memory?
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*
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* We ensure that:
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* - start is part of a valid VMA.
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* - end is part of a valid VMA.
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* - no gap (unallocated memory) exists between start and end.
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*/
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static bool range_contains_unmapped(struct mm_struct *mm,
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unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
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{
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struct vm_area_struct *vma;
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unsigned long nstart = start;
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unsigned long prev_end = start;
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VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, current->mm, start);
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/* going through each vma to check. */
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for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end) {
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if (vma->vm_start > nstart)
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/* unallocated memory found. */
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return -ENOMEM;
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if (vma->vm_start > prev_end)
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return true;
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if (vma->vm_end >= end)
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return 0;
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nstart = vma->vm_end;
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prev_end = vma->vm_end;
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}
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return -ENOMEM;
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return prev_end < end;
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}
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/*
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@@ -184,14 +193,10 @@ int do_mseal(unsigned long start, size_t len_in, unsigned long flags)
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if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
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return -EINTR;
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/*
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* First pass, this helps to avoid
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* partial sealing in case of error in input address range,
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* e.g. ENOMEM error.
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*/
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ret = check_mm_seal(start, end);
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if (ret)
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if (range_contains_unmapped(mm, start, end)) {
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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goto out;
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}
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/*
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* Second pass, this should success, unless there are errors
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