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Merge branch 'bpf: Fix out-of-bound issue when jit-ing bpf_pseudo_func'
Martin KaFai says: ==================== This set fixes an out-of-bound access issue when jit-ing the bpf_pseudo_func insn (i.e. ld_imm64 with src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) ==================== Reported-by: Yonatan Komornik <yoniko@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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@@ -484,6 +484,12 @@ bpf_ctx_record_field_size(struct bpf_insn_access_aux *aux, u32 size)
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aux->ctx_field_size = size;
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}
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static inline bool bpf_pseudo_func(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
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{
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return insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW) &&
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insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC;
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}
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struct bpf_prog_ops {
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int (*test_run)(struct bpf_prog *prog, const union bpf_attr *kattr,
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union bpf_attr __user *uattr);
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@@ -390,6 +390,13 @@ static int bpf_adj_branches(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 pos, s32 end_old,
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i = end_new;
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insn = prog->insnsi + end_old;
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}
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if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
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ret = bpf_adj_delta_to_imm(insn, pos, end_old,
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end_new, i, probe_pass);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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continue;
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}
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code = insn->code;
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if ((BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP &&
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BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32) ||
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@@ -240,12 +240,6 @@ static bool bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
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insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL;
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}
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static bool bpf_pseudo_func(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
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{
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return insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW) &&
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insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC;
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}
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struct bpf_call_arg_meta {
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struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
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bool raw_mode;
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@@ -1960,16 +1954,10 @@ static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
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return -EPERM;
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}
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if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
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if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn) || bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
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ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1);
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if (ret >= 0)
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/* remember subprog */
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insn[1].imm = ret;
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} else if (bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) {
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ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1);
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} else {
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else
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ret = add_kfunc_call(env, insn->imm, insn->off);
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}
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if (ret < 0)
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return ret;
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@@ -9387,7 +9375,8 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
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if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) {
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struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
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u32 subprogno = insn[1].imm;
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u32 subprogno = find_subprog(env,
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env->insn_idx + insn->imm + 1);
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if (!aux->func_info) {
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verbose(env, "missing btf func_info\n");
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@@ -12557,14 +12546,9 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
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return 0;
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for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
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if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
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env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm;
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/* subprog is encoded in insn[1].imm */
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if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
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continue;
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}
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if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
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continue;
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/* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but
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* need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is
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* propagated in any case.
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@@ -12585,6 +12569,12 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
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env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm;
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/* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */
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insn->imm = 1;
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if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn))
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/* jit (e.g. x86_64) may emit fewer instructions
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* if it learns a u32 imm is the same as a u64 imm.
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* Force a non zero here.
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*/
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insn[1].imm = 1;
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}
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err = bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(prog);
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@@ -12669,7 +12659,7 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
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insn = func[i]->insnsi;
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for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) {
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if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
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subprog = insn[1].imm;
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subprog = insn->off;
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insn[0].imm = (u32)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func;
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insn[1].imm = ((u64)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func) >> 32;
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continue;
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@@ -12720,7 +12710,8 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
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for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
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if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
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insn[0].imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
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insn[1].imm = find_subprog(env, i + insn[0].imm + 1);
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insn[1].imm = insn->off;
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insn->off = 0;
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continue;
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}
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if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
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@@ -23,6 +23,16 @@ struct callback_ctx {
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int output;
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};
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const volatile int bypass_unused = 1;
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static __u64
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unused_subprog(struct bpf_map *map, __u32 *key, __u64 *val,
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struct callback_ctx *data)
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{
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data->output = 0;
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return 1;
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}
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static __u64
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check_array_elem(struct bpf_map *map, __u32 *key, __u64 *val,
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struct callback_ctx *data)
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@@ -54,6 +64,8 @@ int test_pkt_access(struct __sk_buff *skb)
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data.output = 0;
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bpf_for_each_map_elem(&arraymap, check_array_elem, &data, 0);
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if (!bypass_unused)
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bpf_for_each_map_elem(&arraymap, unused_subprog, &data, 0);
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arraymap_output = data.output;
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bpf_for_each_map_elem(&percpu_map, check_percpu_elem, (void *)0, 0);
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