Files
linux/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
Linus Torvalds 9c87e61e3c Merge tag 'bpf-next-7.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Pull bpf updates from Alexei Starovoitov:
 "Major changes:

   - Recover from BPF arena page faults using a scratch page and add
     ptep_try_set() for lockless empty-slot installs on x86 and arm64.

     This allows BPF kfuncs to access arena pointers directly.

     The 'arena_direct_access' stable branch was created for this work
     and was pulled into sched-ext and bpf-next trees (Tejun Heo, Kumar
     Kartikeya Dwivedi)

   - Lift old restriction and support 6+ arguments in BPF programs and
     kfuncs on x86 and arm64 (Yonghong Song, Puranjay Mohan)

  Other features and fixes:

   - Add 24-bit BTF vlen and reclaim unused bits in the BTF UAPI to ease
     addition of new BTF kinds (Alan Maguire)

   - Raise the maximum BPF call chain depth from 8 to 16 frames (Alexei
     Starovoitov)

   - Refactor object relationship tracking in the verifier and fix a
     dynptr use-after-free bug (Amery Hung)

   - Harden the signed program loader and reject exclusive maps as inner
     maps (Daniel Borkmann)

   - Replace the verifier min/max bounds fields with a circular number
     (cnum) representation and improve 32->64 bit range refinements
     (Eduard Zingerman)

   - Introduce the arena library and runtime (libarena) with a buddy
     allocator, rbtree and SPMC queue data structures, ASAN support and
     a parallel test harness. Allow subprograms to return arena pointers
     and switch to a BTF type-tag based __arena annotation (Emil
     Tsalapatis)

   - Cache build IDs in the sleepable stackmap path and avoid faultable
     build ID reads under mm locks (Ihor Solodrai)

   - Introduce the tracing_multi link to attach a single BPF program to
     many kernel functions at once. Allow specifying the uprobe_multi
     target via FD (Jiri Olsa)

   - Extend the bpf_list family of kfuncs with bpf_list_add/del(), and
     bpf_list_is_first/is_last/empty() (Kaitao Cheng)

   - Extend the BPF syscall with common attributes support for
     prog_load, btf_load and map_create (Leon Hwang)

   - Wrap rhashtable as BPF map (Mykyta Yatsenko, Herbert Xu)

   - Add sleepable support for tracepoint programs and fix deadlocks in
     LRU map due to NMI reentry (Mykyta Yatsenko)

   - Fix OOB access in bpf_flow_keys, fix nullness analysis of inner
     arrays, enforce write checks for global subprograms (Nuoqi Gui)

   - Report the maximum combined stack depth and print a breakdown of
     instructions processed per subprogram (Paul Chaignon)

   - Add an XDP load-balancer benchmark and arm64 JIT support for stack
     arguments (Puranjay Mohan)

   - Add kfuncs to traverse over wakeup_sources (Samuel Wu)

   - Allow sleepable BPF programs to use LPM trie maps directly (Vlad
     Poenaru)

   - Many more fixes and cleanups across the verifier, BTF, sockmap,
     devmap, bpffs, security hooks, s390/riscv/loongarch JITs,
     rqspinlock, libbpf, bpftool, selftests"

* tag 'bpf-next-7.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (336 commits)
  selftests/bpf: Work around llvm stack overflow in crypto progs
  selftests/bpf: add test for bpf_msg_pop_data() overflow
  bpf, sockmap: fix integer overflow in bpf_msg_pop_data() bounds check
  sockmap: Fix use-after-free in udp_bpf_recvmsg()
  bpf, sockmap: keep sk_msg copy state in sync
  bpf, sockmap: Fix wrong rsge offset in bpf_msg_push_data()
  bpf, sockmap: reject overflowing copy + len in bpf_msg_push_data()
  selftsets/bpf: Retry map update on helper_fill_hashmap()
  selftests/bpf: Add test for sleepable lsm_cgroup rejection
  selftests/bpf: Add test to verify the fix for bpf_setsockopt() helper
  bpf: Fix bpf_get/setsockopt to tos for ipv4-mapped ipv6 socket
  selftests/bpf: Avoid static LLVM linking for cross builds
  selftests/bpf: Use common CFLAGS for urandom_read
  selftests/bpf: Initialize operation name before use
  tools/bpf: build: Append extra cflags
  libbpf: Initialize CFLAGS before including Makefile.include
  bpftool: Append extra host flags
  bpftool: Avoid adding EXTRA_CFLAGS to HOST_CFLAGS
  bpftool: Pass host flags to bootstrap libbpf
  selftests/bpf: correct CONFIG_PPC64 macro name in comment
  ...
2026-06-17 09:18:14 +01:00

440 lines
13 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/* Copyright (c) 2024 Google LLC. */
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
#include <linux/btf.h>
#include <linux/btf_ids.h>
#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/kernfs.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();
/**
* bpf_get_task_exe_file - get a reference on the exe_file struct file member of
* the mm_struct that is nested within the supplied
* task_struct
* @task: task_struct of which the nested mm_struct exe_file member to get a
* reference on
*
* Get a reference on the exe_file struct file member field of the mm_struct
* nested within the supplied *task*. The referenced file pointer acquired by
* this BPF kfunc must be released using bpf_put_file(). Failing to call
* bpf_put_file() on the returned referenced struct file pointer that has been
* acquired by this BPF kfunc will result in the BPF program being rejected by
* the BPF verifier.
*
* This BPF kfunc may only be called from BPF LSM programs.
*
* Internally, this BPF kfunc leans on get_task_exe_file(), such that calling
* bpf_get_task_exe_file() would be analogous to calling get_task_exe_file()
* directly in kernel context.
*
* Return: A referenced struct file pointer to the exe_file member of the
* mm_struct that is nested within the supplied *task*. On error, NULL is
* returned.
*/
__bpf_kfunc struct file *bpf_get_task_exe_file(struct task_struct *task)
{
return get_task_exe_file(task);
}
/**
* bpf_put_file - put a reference on the supplied file
* @file: file to put a reference on
*
* Put a reference on the supplied *file*. Only referenced file pointers may be
* passed to this BPF kfunc. Attempting to pass an unreferenced file pointer, or
* any other arbitrary pointer for that matter, will result in the BPF program
* being rejected by the BPF verifier.
*
* This BPF kfunc may only be called from BPF LSM programs.
*/
__bpf_kfunc void bpf_put_file(struct file *file)
{
fput(file);
}
/**
* bpf_path_d_path - resolve the pathname for the supplied path
* @path: path to resolve the pathname for
* @buf: buffer to return the resolved pathname in
* @buf__sz: length of the supplied buffer
*
* Resolve the pathname for the supplied *path* and store it in *buf*. This BPF
* kfunc is the safer variant of the legacy bpf_d_path() helper and should be
* used in place of bpf_d_path() whenever possible.
*
* This BPF kfunc may only be called from BPF LSM programs.
*
* Return: A positive integer corresponding to the length of the resolved
* pathname in *buf*, including the NUL termination character. On error, a
* negative integer is returned.
*/
__bpf_kfunc int bpf_path_d_path(const struct path *path, char *buf, size_t buf__sz)
{
int len;
char *ret;
if (!buf__sz)
return -EINVAL;
ret = d_path(path, buf, buf__sz);
if (IS_ERR(ret))
return PTR_ERR(ret);
len = buf + buf__sz - ret;
memmove(buf, ret, len);
return len;
}
static bool match_security_bpf_prefix(const char *name__str)
{
return !strncmp(name__str, XATTR_NAME_BPF_LSM, XATTR_NAME_BPF_LSM_LEN);
}
static int bpf_xattr_read_permission(const char *name, struct inode *inode)
{
if (!inode)
return -EINVAL;
/* Allow reading xattr with user. and security.bpf. prefix */
if (strncmp(name, XATTR_USER_PREFIX, XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN) &&
!match_security_bpf_prefix(name))
return -EPERM;
return inode_permission(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, MAY_READ);
}
/**
* bpf_get_dentry_xattr - get xattr of a dentry
* @dentry: dentry to get xattr from
* @name__str: name of the xattr
* @value_p: output buffer of the xattr value
*
* Get xattr *name__str* of *dentry* and store the output in *value_ptr*.
*
* For security reasons, only *name__str* with prefixes "user." or
* "security.bpf." are allowed.
*
* Return: length of the xattr value on success, a negative value on error.
*/
__bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__str,
struct bpf_dynptr *value_p)
{
struct bpf_dynptr_kern *value_ptr = (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)value_p;
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
u32 value_len;
void *value;
int ret;
value_len = __bpf_dynptr_size(value_ptr);
value = __bpf_dynptr_data_rw(value_ptr, value_len);
if (!value)
return -EINVAL;
ret = bpf_xattr_read_permission(name__str, inode);
if (ret)
return ret;
return __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, name__str, value, value_len);
}
/**
* bpf_get_file_xattr - get xattr of a file
* @file: file to get xattr from
* @name__str: name of the xattr
* @value_p: output buffer of the xattr value
*
* Get xattr *name__str* of *file* and store the output in *value_ptr*.
*
* For security reasons, only *name__str* with prefixes "user." or
* "security.bpf." are allowed.
*
* Return: length of the xattr value on success, a negative value on error.
*/
__bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name__str,
struct bpf_dynptr *value_p)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
dentry = file_dentry(file);
return bpf_get_dentry_xattr(dentry, name__str, value_p);
}
__bpf_kfunc_end_defs();
static int bpf_xattr_write_permission(const char *name, struct inode *inode)
{
if (!inode)
return -EINVAL;
/* Only allow setting and removing security.bpf. xattrs */
if (!match_security_bpf_prefix(name))
return -EPERM;
return inode_permission(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, MAY_WRITE);
}
/**
* bpf_set_dentry_xattr_locked - set a xattr of a dentry
* @dentry: dentry to get xattr from
* @name__str: name of the xattr
* @value_p: xattr value
* @flags: flags to pass into filesystem operations
*
* Set xattr *name__str* of *dentry* to the value in *value_ptr*.
*
* For security reasons, only *name__str* with prefix "security.bpf."
* is allowed.
*
* The caller already locked dentry->d_inode.
*
* Return: 0 on success, a negative value on error.
*/
int bpf_set_dentry_xattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__str,
const struct bpf_dynptr *value_p, int flags)
{
const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *value_ptr = (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)value_p;
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
const void *value;
u32 value_len;
int ret;
value_len = __bpf_dynptr_size(value_ptr);
value = __bpf_dynptr_data(value_ptr, value_len);
if (!value)
return -EINVAL;
ret = bpf_xattr_write_permission(name__str, inode);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = __vfs_setxattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, inode, name__str,
value, value_len, flags);
if (!ret) {
fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
/* This xattr is set by BPF LSM, so we do not call
* security_inode_post_setxattr. Otherwise, we would
* risk deadlocks by calling back to the same kfunc.
*
* This is the same as security_inode_setsecurity().
*/
}
return ret;
}
/**
* bpf_remove_dentry_xattr_locked - remove a xattr of a dentry
* @dentry: dentry to get xattr from
* @name__str: name of the xattr
*
* Rmove xattr *name__str* of *dentry*.
*
* For security reasons, only *name__str* with prefix "security.bpf."
* is allowed.
*
* The caller already locked dentry->d_inode.
*
* Return: 0 on success, a negative value on error.
*/
int bpf_remove_dentry_xattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__str)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
int ret;
ret = bpf_xattr_write_permission(name__str, inode);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = __vfs_removexattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, name__str);
if (!ret) {
fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
/* This xattr is removed by BPF LSM, so we do not call
* security_inode_post_removexattr. Otherwise, we would
* risk deadlocks by calling back to the same kfunc.
*/
}
return ret;
}
__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();
/**
* bpf_set_dentry_xattr - set a xattr of a dentry
* @dentry: dentry to get xattr from
* @name__str: name of the xattr
* @value_p: xattr value
* @flags: flags to pass into filesystem operations
*
* Set xattr *name__str* of *dentry* to the value in *value_ptr*.
*
* For security reasons, only *name__str* with prefix "security.bpf."
* is allowed.
*
* The caller has not locked dentry->d_inode.
*
* Return: 0 on success, a negative value on error.
*/
__bpf_kfunc int bpf_set_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__str,
const struct bpf_dynptr *value_p, int flags)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
int ret;
if (!inode)
return -EINVAL;
inode_lock(inode);
ret = bpf_set_dentry_xattr_locked(dentry, name__str, value_p, flags);
inode_unlock(inode);
return ret;
}
/**
* bpf_remove_dentry_xattr - remove a xattr of a dentry
* @dentry: dentry to get xattr from
* @name__str: name of the xattr
*
* Rmove xattr *name__str* of *dentry*.
*
* For security reasons, only *name__str* with prefix "security.bpf."
* is allowed.
*
* The caller has not locked dentry->d_inode.
*
* Return: 0 on success, a negative value on error.
*/
__bpf_kfunc int bpf_remove_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__str)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
int ret;
if (!inode)
return -EINVAL;
inode_lock(inode);
ret = bpf_remove_dentry_xattr_locked(dentry, name__str);
inode_unlock(inode);
return ret;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
/**
* bpf_cgroup_read_xattr - read xattr of a cgroup's node in cgroupfs
* @cgroup: cgroup to get xattr from
* @name__str: name of the xattr
* @value_p: output buffer of the xattr value
*
* Get xattr *name__str* of *cgroup* and store the output in *value_ptr*.
*
* For security reasons, only *name__str* with prefix "user." is allowed.
*
* Return: length of the xattr value on success, a negative value on error.
*/
__bpf_kfunc int bpf_cgroup_read_xattr(struct cgroup *cgroup, const char *name__str,
struct bpf_dynptr *value_p)
{
struct bpf_dynptr_kern *value_ptr = (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)value_p;
u32 value_len;
void *value;
/* Only allow reading "user.*" xattrs */
if (strncmp(name__str, XATTR_USER_PREFIX, XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
return -EPERM;
value_len = __bpf_dynptr_size(value_ptr);
value = __bpf_dynptr_data_rw(value_ptr, value_len);
if (!value)
return -EINVAL;
return kernfs_xattr_get(cgroup->kn, name__str, value, value_len);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_CGROUPS */
/**
* bpf_real_inode - get the real inode backing a dentry
* @dentry: dentry to resolve
*
* If the dentry is on a union/overlay filesystem, return the underlying, real
* inode that hosts the data. Otherwise return the inode attached to the
* dentry itself.
*
* Return: The real inode backing the dentry, or NULL for a negative dentry.
*/
__bpf_kfunc struct inode *bpf_real_inode(struct dentry *dentry)
{
return d_real_inode(dentry);
}
__bpf_kfunc_end_defs();
BTF_KFUNCS_START(bpf_fs_kfunc_set_ids)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_get_task_exe_file, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_RET_NULL)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_put_file, KF_RELEASE)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_path_d_path)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_get_dentry_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_get_file_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_set_dentry_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_remove_dentry_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_real_inode, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_RET_NULL)
BTF_KFUNCS_END(bpf_fs_kfunc_set_ids)
static int bpf_fs_kfuncs_filter(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 kfunc_id)
{
if (!btf_id_set8_contains(&bpf_fs_kfunc_set_ids, kfunc_id) ||
prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM)
return 0;
return -EACCES;
}
/* bpf_[set|remove]_dentry_xattr.* hooks have KF_SLEEPABLE, so they are only
* available to sleepable hooks with dentry arguments.
*
* Setting and removing xattr requires exclusive lock on dentry->d_inode.
* Some hooks already locked d_inode, while some hooks have not locked
* d_inode. Therefore, we need different kfuncs for different hooks.
* Specifically, hooks in the following list (d_inode_locked_hooks)
* should call bpf_[set|remove]_dentry_xattr_locked; while other hooks
* should call bpf_[set|remove]_dentry_xattr.
*/
BTF_SET_START(d_inode_locked_hooks)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_post_removexattr)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_post_setattr)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_post_setxattr)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_removexattr)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_rmdir)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_setattr)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_setxattr)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_unlink)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_path_unlink)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_path_rmdir)
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
BTF_SET_END(d_inode_locked_hooks)
bool bpf_lsm_has_d_inode_locked(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
return btf_id_set_contains(&d_inode_locked_hooks, prog->aux->attach_btf_id);
}
static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_fs_kfunc_set = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.set = &bpf_fs_kfunc_set_ids,
.filter = bpf_fs_kfuncs_filter,
};
static int __init bpf_fs_kfuncs_init(void)
{
return register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, &bpf_fs_kfunc_set);
}
late_initcall(bpf_fs_kfuncs_init);