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a58383fa45
blkdev_pr_read_keys() takes num_keys from userspace and uses it to
calculate the allocation size for keys_info via struct_size(). While
there is a check for SIZE_MAX (integer overflow), there is no upper
bound validation on the allocation size itself.
A malicious or buggy userspace can pass a large num_keys value that
doesn't trigger overflow but still results in an excessive allocation
attempt, causing a warning in the page allocator when the order exceeds
MAX_PAGE_ORDER.
Fix this by introducing PR_KEYS_MAX to limit the number of keys to
a sane value. This makes the SIZE_MAX check redundant, so remove it.
Also switch to kvzalloc/kvfree to handle larger allocations gracefully.
Fixes: 22a1ffea5f ("block: add IOC_PR_READ_KEYS ioctl")
Tested-by: syzbot+660d079d90f8a1baf54d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+660d079d90f8a1baf54d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=660d079d90f8a1baf54d
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251212013510.3576091-1-kartikey406@gmail.com/T/ [v1]
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>