Files
linux/fs/file_table.c
Paul Moore 6af36aeb14 lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks
Stacked filesystems such as overlayfs do not currently provide the
necessary mechanisms for LSMs to properly enforce access controls on the
mmap() and mprotect() operations.  In order to resolve this gap, a LSM
security blob is being added to the backing_file struct and the following
new LSM hooks are being created:

 security_backing_file_alloc()
 security_backing_file_free()
 security_mmap_backing_file()

The first two hooks are to manage the lifecycle of the LSM security blob
in the backing_file struct, while the third provides a new mmap() access
control point for the underlying backing file.  It is also expected that
LSMs will likely want to update their security_file_mprotect() callback
to address issues with their mprotect() controls, but that does not
require a change to the security_file_mprotect() LSM hook.

There are a three other small changes to support these new LSM hooks:
* Pass the user file associated with a backing file down to
alloc_empty_backing_file() so it can be included in the
security_backing_file_alloc() hook.
* Add getter and setter functions for the backing_file struct LSM blob
as the backing_file struct remains private to fs/file_table.c.
* Constify the file struct field in the LSM common_audit_data struct to
better support LSMs that need to pass a const file struct pointer into
the common LSM audit code.

Thanks to Arnd Bergmann for identifying the missing EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL()
and supplying a fixup.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-erofs@lists.ozlabs.org
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2026-04-03 16:53:50 -04:00

659 lines
16 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* linux/fs/file_table.c
*
* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
* Copyright (C) 1997 David S. Miller (davem@caip.rutgers.edu)
*/
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/filelock.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/eventpoll.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/cdev.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/percpu_counter.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/task_work.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include "internal.h"
/* sysctl tunables... */
static struct files_stat_struct files_stat = {
.max_files = NR_FILE
};
/* SLAB cache for file structures */
static struct kmem_cache *filp_cachep __ro_after_init;
static struct kmem_cache *bfilp_cachep __ro_after_init;
static struct percpu_counter nr_files __cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
/* Container for backing file with optional user path */
struct backing_file {
struct file file;
union {
struct path user_path;
freeptr_t bf_freeptr;
};
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
void *security;
#endif
};
#define backing_file(f) container_of(f, struct backing_file, file)
const struct path *backing_file_user_path(const struct file *f)
{
return &backing_file(f)->user_path;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(backing_file_user_path);
void backing_file_set_user_path(struct file *f, const struct path *path)
{
backing_file(f)->user_path = *path;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(backing_file_set_user_path);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
void *backing_file_security(const struct file *f)
{
return backing_file(f)->security;
}
void backing_file_set_security(struct file *f, void *security)
{
backing_file(f)->security = security;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
static inline void backing_file_free(struct backing_file *ff)
{
security_backing_file_free(&ff->file);
path_put(&ff->user_path);
kmem_cache_free(bfilp_cachep, ff);
}
static inline void file_free(struct file *f)
{
security_file_free(f);
if (likely(!(f->f_mode & FMODE_NOACCOUNT)))
percpu_counter_dec(&nr_files);
put_cred(f->f_cred);
if (unlikely(f->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING)) {
backing_file_free(backing_file(f));
} else {
kmem_cache_free(filp_cachep, f);
}
}
/*
* Return the total number of open files in the system
*/
static long get_nr_files(void)
{
return percpu_counter_read_positive(&nr_files);
}
/*
* Return the maximum number of open files in the system
*/
unsigned long get_max_files(void)
{
return files_stat.max_files;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_max_files);
#if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) && defined(CONFIG_PROC_FS)
/*
* Handle nr_files sysctl
*/
static int proc_nr_files(const struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
files_stat.nr_files = percpu_counter_sum_positive(&nr_files);
return proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}
static const struct ctl_table fs_stat_sysctls[] = {
{
.procname = "file-nr",
.data = &files_stat,
.maxlen = sizeof(files_stat),
.mode = 0444,
.proc_handler = proc_nr_files,
},
{
.procname = "file-max",
.data = &files_stat.max_files,
.maxlen = sizeof(files_stat.max_files),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_LONG_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_LONG_MAX,
},
{
.procname = "nr_open",
.data = &sysctl_nr_open,
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &sysctl_nr_open_min,
.extra2 = &sysctl_nr_open_max,
},
};
static int __init init_fs_stat_sysctls(void)
{
register_sysctl_init("fs", fs_stat_sysctls);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC)) {
struct ctl_table_header *hdr;
hdr = register_sysctl_mount_point("fs/binfmt_misc");
kmemleak_not_leak(hdr);
}
return 0;
}
fs_initcall(init_fs_stat_sysctls);
#endif
static int init_file(struct file *f, int flags, const struct cred *cred)
{
int error;
f->f_cred = get_cred(cred);
error = security_file_alloc(f);
if (unlikely(error)) {
put_cred(f->f_cred);
return error;
}
spin_lock_init(&f->f_lock);
/*
* Note that f_pos_lock is only used for files raising
* FMODE_ATOMIC_POS and directories. Other files such as pipes
* don't need it and since f_pos_lock is in a union may reuse
* the space for other purposes. They are expected to initialize
* the respective member when opening the file.
*/
mutex_init(&f->f_pos_lock);
memset(&f->__f_path, 0, sizeof(f->f_path));
memset(&f->f_ra, 0, sizeof(f->f_ra));
f->f_flags = flags;
f->f_mode = OPEN_FMODE(flags);
/*
* Disable permission and pre-content events for all files by default.
* They may be enabled later by fsnotify_open_perm_and_set_mode().
*/
file_set_fsnotify_mode(f, FMODE_NONOTIFY_PERM);
f->f_op = NULL;
f->f_mapping = NULL;
f->private_data = NULL;
f->f_inode = NULL;
f->f_owner = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_EPOLL
f->f_ep = NULL;
#endif
f->f_iocb_flags = 0;
f->f_pos = 0;
f->f_wb_err = 0;
f->f_sb_err = 0;
/*
* We're SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU so initialize f_ref last. While
* fget-rcu pattern users need to be able to handle spurious
* refcount bumps we should reinitialize the reused file first.
*/
file_ref_init(&f->f_ref, 1);
return 0;
}
/* Find an unused file structure and return a pointer to it.
* Returns an error pointer if some error happend e.g. we over file
* structures limit, run out of memory or operation is not permitted.
*
* Be very careful using this. You are responsible for
* getting write access to any mount that you might assign
* to this filp, if it is opened for write. If this is not
* done, you will imbalance int the mount's writer count
* and a warning at __fput() time.
*/
struct file *alloc_empty_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred)
{
static long old_max;
struct file *f;
int error;
/*
* Privileged users can go above max_files
*/
if (unlikely(get_nr_files() >= files_stat.max_files) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
/*
* percpu_counters are inaccurate. Do an expensive check before
* we go and fail.
*/
if (percpu_counter_sum_positive(&nr_files) >= files_stat.max_files)
goto over;
}
f = kmem_cache_alloc(filp_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!f))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
error = init_file(f, flags, cred);
if (unlikely(error)) {
kmem_cache_free(filp_cachep, f);
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
percpu_counter_inc(&nr_files);
return f;
over:
/* Ran out of filps - report that */
if (get_nr_files() > old_max) {
pr_info("VFS: file-max limit %lu reached\n", get_max_files());
old_max = get_nr_files();
}
return ERR_PTR(-ENFILE);
}
/*
* Variant of alloc_empty_file() that doesn't check and modify nr_files.
*
* This is only for kernel internal use, and the allocate file must not be
* installed into file tables or such.
*/
struct file *alloc_empty_file_noaccount(int flags, const struct cred *cred)
{
struct file *f;
int error;
f = kmem_cache_alloc(filp_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!f))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
error = init_file(f, flags, cred);
if (unlikely(error)) {
kmem_cache_free(filp_cachep, f);
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
f->f_mode |= FMODE_NOACCOUNT;
return f;
}
static int init_backing_file(struct backing_file *ff,
const struct file *user_file)
{
memset(&ff->user_path, 0, sizeof(ff->user_path));
backing_file_set_security(&ff->file, NULL);
return security_backing_file_alloc(&ff->file, user_file);
}
/*
* Variant of alloc_empty_file() that allocates a backing_file container
* and doesn't check and modify nr_files.
*
* This is only for kernel internal use, and the allocate file must not be
* installed into file tables or such.
*/
struct file *alloc_empty_backing_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred,
const struct file *user_file)
{
struct backing_file *ff;
int error;
ff = kmem_cache_alloc(bfilp_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!ff))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
error = init_file(&ff->file, flags, cred);
if (unlikely(error)) {
kmem_cache_free(bfilp_cachep, ff);
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
/* The f_mode flags must be set before fput(). */
ff->file.f_mode |= FMODE_BACKING | FMODE_NOACCOUNT;
error = init_backing_file(ff, user_file);
if (unlikely(error)) {
fput(&ff->file);
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
return &ff->file;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(alloc_empty_backing_file);
/**
* file_init_path - initialize a 'struct file' based on path
*
* @file: the file to set up
* @path: the (dentry, vfsmount) pair for the new file
* @fop: the 'struct file_operations' for the new file
*/
static void file_init_path(struct file *file, const struct path *path,
const struct file_operations *fop)
{
file->__f_path = *path;
file->f_inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
file->f_mapping = path->dentry->d_inode->i_mapping;
file->f_wb_err = filemap_sample_wb_err(file->f_mapping);
file->f_sb_err = file_sample_sb_err(file);
if (fop->llseek)
file->f_mode |= FMODE_LSEEK;
if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) &&
likely(fop->read || fop->read_iter))
file->f_mode |= FMODE_CAN_READ;
if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) &&
likely(fop->write || fop->write_iter))
file->f_mode |= FMODE_CAN_WRITE;
file->f_iocb_flags = iocb_flags(file);
file->f_mode |= FMODE_OPENED;
file->f_op = fop;
if ((file->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
i_readcount_inc(path->dentry->d_inode);
}
/**
* alloc_file - allocate and initialize a 'struct file'
*
* @path: the (dentry, vfsmount) pair for the new file
* @flags: O_... flags with which the new file will be opened
* @fop: the 'struct file_operations' for the new file
*/
static struct file *alloc_file(const struct path *path, int flags,
const struct file_operations *fop)
{
struct file *file;
file = alloc_empty_file(flags, current_cred());
if (!IS_ERR(file))
file_init_path(file, path, fop);
return file;
}
static inline int alloc_path_pseudo(const char *name, struct inode *inode,
struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path)
{
path->dentry = d_alloc_pseudo(mnt->mnt_sb, &QSTR(name));
if (!path->dentry)
return -ENOMEM;
path->mnt = mntget(mnt);
d_instantiate(path->dentry, inode);
return 0;
}
struct file *alloc_file_pseudo(struct inode *inode, struct vfsmount *mnt,
const char *name, int flags,
const struct file_operations *fops)
{
int ret;
struct path path;
struct file *file;
ret = alloc_path_pseudo(name, inode, mnt, &path);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
file = alloc_file(&path, flags, fops);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
ihold(inode);
path_put(&path);
return file;
}
/*
* Disable all fsnotify events for pseudo files by default.
* They may be enabled by caller with file_set_fsnotify_mode().
*/
file_set_fsnotify_mode(file, FMODE_NONOTIFY);
return file;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(alloc_file_pseudo);
struct file *alloc_file_pseudo_noaccount(struct inode *inode,
struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *name,
int flags,
const struct file_operations *fops)
{
int ret;
struct path path;
struct file *file;
ret = alloc_path_pseudo(name, inode, mnt, &path);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
file = alloc_empty_file_noaccount(flags, current_cred());
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
ihold(inode);
path_put(&path);
return file;
}
file_init_path(file, &path, fops);
/*
* Disable all fsnotify events for pseudo files by default.
* They may be enabled by caller with file_set_fsnotify_mode().
*/
file_set_fsnotify_mode(file, FMODE_NONOTIFY);
return file;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(alloc_file_pseudo_noaccount);
struct file *alloc_file_clone(struct file *base, int flags,
const struct file_operations *fops)
{
struct file *f;
f = alloc_file(&base->f_path, flags, fops);
if (!IS_ERR(f)) {
path_get(&f->f_path);
f->f_mapping = base->f_mapping;
}
return f;
}
/* the real guts of fput() - releasing the last reference to file
*/
static void __fput(struct file *file)
{
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_path.mnt;
struct inode *inode = file->f_inode;
fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_OPENED)))
goto out;
might_sleep();
fsnotify_close(file);
/*
* The function eventpoll_release() should be the first called
* in the file cleanup chain.
*/
eventpoll_release(file);
locks_remove_file(file);
security_file_release(file);
if (unlikely(file->f_flags & FASYNC)) {
if (file->f_op->fasync)
file->f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0);
}
if (file->f_op->release)
file->f_op->release(inode, file);
if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL &&
!(mode & FMODE_PATH))) {
cdev_put(inode->i_cdev);
}
fops_put(file->f_op);
file_f_owner_release(file);
put_file_access(file);
dput(dentry);
if (unlikely(mode & FMODE_NEED_UNMOUNT))
dissolve_on_fput(mnt);
mntput(mnt);
out:
file_free(file);
}
static LLIST_HEAD(delayed_fput_list);
static void delayed_fput(struct work_struct *unused)
{
struct llist_node *node = llist_del_all(&delayed_fput_list);
struct file *f, *t;
llist_for_each_entry_safe(f, t, node, f_llist)
__fput(f);
}
static void ____fput(struct callback_head *work)
{
__fput(container_of(work, struct file, f_task_work));
}
static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(delayed_fput_work, delayed_fput);
/*
* If kernel thread really needs to have the final fput() it has done
* to complete, call this. The only user right now is the boot - we
* *do* need to make sure our writes to binaries on initramfs has
* not left us with opened struct file waiting for __fput() - execve()
* won't work without that. Please, don't add more callers without
* very good reasons; in particular, never call that with locks
* held and never call that from a thread that might need to do
* some work on any kind of umount.
*/
void flush_delayed_fput(void)
{
delayed_fput(NULL);
flush_delayed_work(&delayed_fput_work);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(flush_delayed_fput);
static void __fput_deferred(struct file *file)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & (FMODE_BACKING | FMODE_OPENED)))) {
file_free(file);
return;
}
if (likely(!in_interrupt() && !(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD))) {
init_task_work(&file->f_task_work, ____fput);
if (!task_work_add(task, &file->f_task_work, TWA_RESUME))
return;
/*
* After this task has run exit_task_work(),
* task_work_add() will fail. Fall through to delayed
* fput to avoid leaking *file.
*/
}
if (llist_add(&file->f_llist, &delayed_fput_list))
schedule_delayed_work(&delayed_fput_work, 1);
}
void fput(struct file *file)
{
if (unlikely(file_ref_put(&file->f_ref)))
__fput_deferred(file);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fput);
/*
* synchronous analog of fput(); for kernel threads that might be needed
* in some umount() (and thus can't use flush_delayed_fput() without
* risking deadlocks), need to wait for completion of __fput() and know
* for this specific struct file it won't involve anything that would
* need them. Use only if you really need it - at the very least,
* don't blindly convert fput() by kernel thread to that.
*/
void __fput_sync(struct file *file)
{
if (file_ref_put(&file->f_ref))
__fput(file);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__fput_sync);
/*
* Equivalent to __fput_sync(), but optimized for being called with the last
* reference.
*
* See file_ref_put_close() for details.
*/
void fput_close_sync(struct file *file)
{
if (likely(file_ref_put_close(&file->f_ref)))
__fput(file);
}
/*
* Equivalent to fput(), but optimized for being called with the last
* reference.
*
* See file_ref_put_close() for details.
*/
void fput_close(struct file *file)
{
if (file_ref_put_close(&file->f_ref))
__fput_deferred(file);
}
void __init files_init(void)
{
struct kmem_cache_args args = {
.use_freeptr_offset = true,
.freeptr_offset = offsetof(struct file, f_freeptr),
};
filp_cachep = kmem_cache_create("filp", sizeof(struct file), &args,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC |
SLAB_ACCOUNT | SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU);
args.freeptr_offset = offsetof(struct backing_file, bf_freeptr);
bfilp_cachep = kmem_cache_create("bfilp", sizeof(struct backing_file),
&args, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC |
SLAB_ACCOUNT | SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU);
percpu_counter_init(&nr_files, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
}
/*
* One file with associated inode and dcache is very roughly 1K. Per default
* do not use more than 10% of our memory for files.
*/
void __init files_maxfiles_init(void)
{
unsigned long n;
unsigned long nr_pages = totalram_pages();
unsigned long memreserve = (nr_pages - nr_free_pages()) * 3/2;
memreserve = min(memreserve, nr_pages - 1);
n = ((nr_pages - memreserve) * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024)) / 10;
files_stat.max_files = max_t(unsigned long, n, NR_FILE);
}