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bpftool_prog_sign() signed only the loader instructions. The metadata blob the loader installs was left to an in-loader hash check, which the kernel now performs at load time over insns || metadata. Sign that same concatenation: pass the metadata blob (gen_loader_opts data) through to bpftool_prog_sign() and feed insns || metadata to CMS_final(). The excl_prog_hash stays a digest of the instructions alone; it binds the metadata map to the loader and is matched against prog->digest by the verifier, independent of what the signature covers. The signed artifact is now plain data: both bytes the signature covers are embedded verbatim in the generated skeleton, so signing and verifying an lskel is an ordinary CMS operation that a signer or auditor can perform (or reproduce) offline, without analyzing loader bytecode to establish what the signature actually attests to. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260708075343.358712-6-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>