Files
linux/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_config.c
Michael Bommarito d6a6aa81ea ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg()
ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size for each
response type by adding (or multiplying) attacker-controlled fields
from the daemon response to a fixed struct size in unsigned int
arithmetic.  Three cases can overflow:

  KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST:
      msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp->payload_sz;
  KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST:
      msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) +
               resp->payload_sz;
  KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT:
      msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_login_response_ext) +
               resp->ngroups * sizeof(gid_t);

resp->payload_sz is __u32 and resp->ngroups is __s32.  Each addition
can wrap in unsigned int; the multiplication by sizeof(gid_t) mixes
signed and size_t, so a negative ngroups is converted to SIZE_MAX
before the multiply.  A wrapped value of msg_sz that happens to
equal entry->msg_sz bypasses the size check on the next line, and
downstream consumers (smb2pdu.c:6742 memcpy using rpc_resp->payload_sz,
kmemdup in ksmbd_alloc_user using resp_ext->ngroups) then trust the
unverified length.

Use check_add_overflow() on the RPC_REQUEST and SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST
paths to detect integer overflow without constraining functional
payload size; userspace ksmbd-tools grows NDR responses in 4096-byte
chunks for calls like NetShareEnumAll, so a hard transport cap is
unworkable on the response side.  For LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT, reject
resp->ngroups outside the signed [0, NGROUPS_MAX] range up front and
report the error from ipc_validate_msg() so it fires at the IPC
boundary; with that bound the subsequent multiplication and addition
stay well below UINT_MAX.  The now-redundant ngroups check and
pr_err in ksmbd_alloc_user() are removed.

This is the response-side analogue of aab98e2dbd ("ksmbd: fix
integer overflows on 32 bit systems"), which hardened the request
side.

Fixes: 0626e6641f ("cifsd: add server handler for central processing and tranport layers")
Fixes: a77e0e02af ("ksmbd: add support for supplementary groups")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2026-04-18 12:19:59 -05:00

101 lines
2.1 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* Copyright (C) 2018 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
*/
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include "user_config.h"
#include "../transport_ipc.h"
struct ksmbd_user *ksmbd_login_user(const char *account)
{
struct ksmbd_login_response *resp;
struct ksmbd_login_response_ext *resp_ext = NULL;
struct ksmbd_user *user = NULL;
resp = ksmbd_ipc_login_request(account);
if (!resp)
return NULL;
if (!(resp->status & KSMBD_USER_FLAG_OK))
goto out;
if (resp->status & KSMBD_USER_FLAG_EXTENSION)
resp_ext = ksmbd_ipc_login_request_ext(account);
user = ksmbd_alloc_user(resp, resp_ext);
out:
kvfree(resp);
return user;
}
struct ksmbd_user *ksmbd_alloc_user(struct ksmbd_login_response *resp,
struct ksmbd_login_response_ext *resp_ext)
{
struct ksmbd_user *user;
user = kmalloc_obj(struct ksmbd_user, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);
if (!user)
return NULL;
user->name = kstrdup(resp->account, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);
user->flags = resp->status;
user->gid = resp->gid;
user->uid = resp->uid;
user->passkey_sz = resp->hash_sz;
user->passkey = kmalloc(resp->hash_sz, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);
if (user->passkey)
memcpy(user->passkey, resp->hash, resp->hash_sz);
user->ngroups = 0;
user->sgid = NULL;
if (!user->name || !user->passkey)
goto err_free;
if (resp_ext) {
user->sgid = kmemdup(resp_ext->____payload,
resp_ext->ngroups * sizeof(gid_t),
KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);
if (!user->sgid)
goto err_free;
user->ngroups = resp_ext->ngroups;
ksmbd_debug(SMB, "supplementary groups : %d\n", user->ngroups);
}
return user;
err_free:
kfree(user->name);
kfree(user->passkey);
kfree(user);
return NULL;
}
void ksmbd_free_user(struct ksmbd_user *user)
{
ksmbd_ipc_logout_request(user->name, user->flags);
kfree(user->sgid);
kfree(user->name);
kfree(user->passkey);
kfree(user);
}
bool ksmbd_anonymous_user(struct ksmbd_user *user)
{
return user->name[0] == '\0';
}
bool ksmbd_compare_user(struct ksmbd_user *u1, struct ksmbd_user *u2)
{
if (strcmp(u1->name, u2->name))
return false;
if (memcmp(u1->passkey, u2->passkey, u1->passkey_sz))
return false;
return true;
}