Files
linux/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c
Michael Bommarito e3046eeada hwrng: virtio: clamp device-reported used.len at copy_data()
random_recv_done() stores the device-reported used.len directly into
vi->data_avail.  copy_data() then indexes vi->data[] using
vi->data_idx (advanced by previous copy_data() calls) and issues a
memcpy() without re-validating either value against the posted
buffer size sizeof(vi->data) (SMP_CACHE_BYTES bytes, typically 32
or 64).

A malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can set used.len beyond
sizeof(vi->data), steering the memcpy() past the end of the inline
array into adjacent kmalloc-1k slab bytes.  hwrng_fillfn() mixes
those bytes into the guest RNG, and guest root can also observe
them directly via /dev/hwrng.

Concrete impact is inside the guest:

 - Memory-safety / hardening: any virtio-rng backend that
   over-reports used.len causes the driver to read past vi->data
   into unrelated slab contents.  hwrng_fillfn() is a kernel thread
   that runs as soon as the device is probed; no guest userspace
   interaction is required to first-trigger the OOB.

 - Cross-boundary leak (confidential-compute threat model): a
   malicious hypervisor cooperating with a malicious or compromised
   guest root userspace can use /dev/hwrng as a leak channel for
   guest-kernel heap data.  The host sets a large used.len, guest
   root reads /dev/hwrng, and the returned bytes contain guest
   kernel slab contents that were adjacent to vi->data.  In
   practice, confidential-compute guests (SEV-SNP, TDX) usually
   disable virtio-rng entirely, so this path is narrow, but the
   fix is still worth carrying because the underlying
   memory-safety bug contaminates the guest RNG on any host.

KASAN confirms the OOB on a 7.1-rc4 guest whose virtio-rng backend
has been patched to report used.len = 0x10000:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0
  Read of size 64 at addr ffff88800ae0ba20 by task hwrng/52
  Call Trace:
   __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60
   virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0
   hwrng_fillfn+0xb2/0x470
   kthread+0x2cc/0x3a0
  Allocated by task 1:
   probe_common+0xa5/0x660
   virtio_dev_probe+0x549/0xbc0
  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800ae0b800
   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
  The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
   allocated 544-byte region [ffff88800ae0b800, ffff88800ae0ba20)

Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd0 ("net/9p: Fix buffer
overflow in USB transport layer"), which hardened
usb9pfs_rx_complete() against unchecked device-reported length in
the USB 9p transport.

With the clamp at point of use and array_index_nospec() in place,
the same harness boots cleanly: copy_data() returns zero for the
bogus report, the device-supplied bytes after data_idx are
discarded, and the driver issues a fresh request.

Fixes: f7f510ec19 ("virtio: An entropy device, as suggested by hpa.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20260531142251.2792061-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
2026-06-04 01:18:20 -04:00

282 lines
6.1 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* Randomness driver for virtio
* Copyright (C) 2007, 2008 Rusty Russell IBM Corporation
*/
#include <asm/barrier.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/hw_random.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/virtio.h>
#include <linux/virtio_rng.h>
#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
static DEFINE_IDA(rng_index_ida);
struct virtrng_info {
struct hwrng hwrng;
struct virtqueue *vq;
char name[25];
int index;
bool hwrng_register_done;
bool hwrng_removed;
/* data transfer */
struct completion have_data;
unsigned int data_avail;
unsigned int data_idx;
/* minimal size returned by rng_buffer_size() */
__dma_from_device_group_begin();
#if SMP_CACHE_BYTES < 32
u8 data[32];
#else
u8 data[SMP_CACHE_BYTES];
#endif
__dma_from_device_group_end();
};
static void random_recv_done(struct virtqueue *vq)
{
struct virtrng_info *vi = vq->vdev->priv;
unsigned int len;
/* We can get spurious callbacks, e.g. shared IRQs + virtio_pci. */
if (!virtqueue_get_buf(vi->vq, &len))
return;
smp_store_release(&vi->data_avail, len);
complete(&vi->have_data);
}
static void request_entropy(struct virtrng_info *vi)
{
struct scatterlist sg;
reinit_completion(&vi->have_data);
vi->data_idx = 0;
sg_init_one(&sg, vi->data, sizeof(vi->data));
/* There should always be room for one buffer. */
virtqueue_add_inbuf(vi->vq, &sg, 1, vi->data, GFP_KERNEL);
virtqueue_kick(vi->vq);
}
static unsigned int copy_data(struct virtrng_info *vi, void *buf,
unsigned int size)
{
unsigned int idx, avail;
/*
* vi->data_avail was set from the device-reported used.len and
* vi->data_idx was advanced by previous copy_data() calls. A
* malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can drive either past
* sizeof(vi->data). Clamp at point of use and harden the index
* with array_index_nospec() so the memcpy() below cannot be
* steered into adjacent slab memory, including under
* speculation.
*/
avail = min_t(unsigned int, vi->data_avail, sizeof(vi->data));
if (vi->data_idx >= avail) {
vi->data_avail = 0;
request_entropy(vi);
return 0;
}
size = min_t(unsigned int, size, avail - vi->data_idx);
idx = array_index_nospec(vi->data_idx, sizeof(vi->data));
memcpy(buf, vi->data + idx, size);
vi->data_idx += size;
vi->data_avail -= size;
if (vi->data_avail == 0)
request_entropy(vi);
return size;
}
static int virtio_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *buf, size_t size, bool wait)
{
int ret;
struct virtrng_info *vi = (struct virtrng_info *)rng->priv;
unsigned int chunk;
size_t read;
if (vi->hwrng_removed)
return -ENODEV;
read = 0;
/* copy available data */
if (smp_load_acquire(&vi->data_avail)) {
chunk = copy_data(vi, buf, size);
size -= chunk;
read += chunk;
}
if (!wait)
return read;
/* We have already copied available entropy,
* so either size is 0 or data_avail is 0
*/
while (size != 0) {
/* data_avail is 0 but a request is pending */
ret = wait_for_completion_killable(&vi->have_data);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/* if vi->data_avail is 0, we have been interrupted
* by a cleanup, but buffer stays in the queue
*/
if (vi->data_avail == 0)
return read;
chunk = copy_data(vi, buf + read, size);
size -= chunk;
read += chunk;
}
return read;
}
static void virtio_cleanup(struct hwrng *rng)
{
struct virtrng_info *vi = (struct virtrng_info *)rng->priv;
complete(&vi->have_data);
}
static int probe_common(struct virtio_device *vdev)
{
int err, index;
struct virtrng_info *vi = NULL;
vi = kzalloc_obj(struct virtrng_info);
if (!vi)
return -ENOMEM;
vi->index = index = ida_alloc(&rng_index_ida, GFP_KERNEL);
if (index < 0) {
err = index;
goto err_ida;
}
sprintf(vi->name, "virtio_rng.%d", index);
init_completion(&vi->have_data);
vi->hwrng = (struct hwrng) {
.read = virtio_read,
.cleanup = virtio_cleanup,
.priv = (unsigned long)vi,
.name = vi->name,
};
vdev->priv = vi;
/* We expect a single virtqueue. */
vi->vq = virtio_find_single_vq(vdev, random_recv_done, "input");
if (IS_ERR(vi->vq)) {
err = PTR_ERR(vi->vq);
goto err_find;
}
virtio_device_ready(vdev);
/* we always have a pending entropy request */
request_entropy(vi);
return 0;
err_find:
ida_free(&rng_index_ida, index);
err_ida:
kfree(vi);
return err;
}
static void remove_common(struct virtio_device *vdev)
{
struct virtrng_info *vi = vdev->priv;
vi->hwrng_removed = true;
vi->data_avail = 0;
vi->data_idx = 0;
complete(&vi->have_data);
if (vi->hwrng_register_done)
hwrng_unregister(&vi->hwrng);
virtio_reset_device(vdev);
vdev->config->del_vqs(vdev);
ida_free(&rng_index_ida, vi->index);
kfree(vi);
}
static int virtrng_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev)
{
return probe_common(vdev);
}
static void virtrng_remove(struct virtio_device *vdev)
{
remove_common(vdev);
}
static void virtrng_scan(struct virtio_device *vdev)
{
struct virtrng_info *vi = vdev->priv;
int err;
err = hwrng_register(&vi->hwrng);
if (!err)
vi->hwrng_register_done = true;
}
static int virtrng_freeze(struct virtio_device *vdev)
{
remove_common(vdev);
return 0;
}
static int virtrng_restore(struct virtio_device *vdev)
{
int err;
err = probe_common(vdev);
if (!err) {
struct virtrng_info *vi = vdev->priv;
/*
* Set hwrng_removed to ensure that virtio_read()
* does not block waiting for data before the
* registration is complete.
*/
vi->hwrng_removed = true;
err = hwrng_register(&vi->hwrng);
if (!err) {
vi->hwrng_register_done = true;
vi->hwrng_removed = false;
}
}
return err;
}
static const struct virtio_device_id id_table[] = {
{ VIRTIO_ID_RNG, VIRTIO_DEV_ANY_ID },
{ 0 },
};
static struct virtio_driver virtio_rng_driver = {
.driver.name = KBUILD_MODNAME,
.id_table = id_table,
.probe = virtrng_probe,
.remove = virtrng_remove,
.scan = virtrng_scan,
.freeze = pm_sleep_ptr(virtrng_freeze),
.restore = pm_sleep_ptr(virtrng_restore),
};
module_virtio_driver(virtio_rng_driver);
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(virtio, id_table);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Virtio random number driver");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");