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54bf38b27a
usr_len is read from a network-supplied message field (le16_to_cpu) and used to compute data_len = off - usr_len without validating that usr_len <= off. A malicious RDMA client can send usr_len > off causing an integer underflow, resulting in data_len wrapping to a huge size_t value which is then passed to the rdma_ev callback as a memory length, leading to out-of-bounds memory access. Fix by reading and validating usr_len <= off before rtrs_srv_get_ops_ids() in both process_read() and process_write(), ensuring the early return path acquires no reference and has no resource leak. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260608134802.5019-1-aurelien@hackers.camp Reported-by: Aurelien DESBRIERES <aurelien@hackers.camp> Reviewed-by: Md Haris Iqbal <haris.iqbal@ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Aurelien DESBRIERES <aurelien@hackers.camp> Assisted-by: Claude <claude-sonnet-4-6> Acked-by: Md Haris Iqbal <haris.iqbal@ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>