Files
linux/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c
Eric Biggers dd015b566d fscrypt: Fix key setup in edge case with multiple data unit sizes
The addition of support for customizable data unit sizes introduced an
edge case where a file's contents can be en/decrypted with the wrong
data unit size.  It occurs when there are multiple v2 policies that:

- Have *different* data unit sizes, via the log2_data_unit_size field

- Share the same master_key_identifier, contents_encryption_mode, and
  either FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY,
  FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32, or
  FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64

- Are being used on the same filesystem, which also must be mounted with
  the "inlinecrypt" mount option.

Fortunately this edge case doesn't actually occur in practice.  I just
found it via code review.  But it needs to be fixed regardless.

The bug is caused by the data unit size not being fully considered when
blk_crypto_keys are cached in mk_direct_keys, mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys,
and mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_keys.  They're differentiated only by master key,
encryption mode, and flag.  However, each one actually has a data unit
size too.  Only the first data unit size that is cached is used.

To fix this, start using the data unit size to differentiate the cached
keys.  For several reasons, including avoiding increasing the size of
struct fscrypt_master_key, just replace all three arrays with a single
linked list instead of changing them into two-dimensional arrays.  This
works well when considering that in practice at most 2 entries are used
across all three arrays, so it was already mostly wasted space.

For simplicity, make the list also take over the publish/subscribe of
the prepared key itself.  That is, create separate list nodes for
blk_crypto_keys vs crypto_skciphers, and add nodes to the list only when
their key is actually prepared.  (Note that the legacy
fscrypt_direct_keys table in fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c already works this
way.)  This eliminates the need for the additional memory barriers when
reading and writing the fields of struct fscrypt_prepared_key.

Note that I technically should have included the data unit size in the
HKDF info string as well.  But it's too late to change that.

Fixes: 5b11888471 ("fscrypt: support crypto data unit size less than filesystem block size")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260618180652.52742-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
2026-06-22 12:12:11 -07:00

442 lines
14 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Inline encryption support for fscrypt
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
/*
* With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption
* as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via
* crypto API. See Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst. fscrypt still
* provides the key and IV to use.
*/
#include <linux/blk-crypto.h>
#include <linux/blkdev.h>
#include <linux/buffer_head.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/uio.h>
#include "fscrypt_private.h"
static struct block_device **fscrypt_get_devices(struct super_block *sb,
unsigned int *num_devs)
{
struct block_device **devs;
if (sb->s_cop->get_devices) {
devs = sb->s_cop->get_devices(sb, num_devs);
if (devs)
return devs;
}
devs = kmalloc_obj(*devs);
if (!devs)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
devs[0] = sb->s_bdev;
*num_devs = 1;
return devs;
}
static unsigned int fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci)
{
const struct super_block *sb = ci->ci_inode->i_sb;
unsigned int flags = fscrypt_policy_flags(&ci->ci_policy);
int dun_bits;
if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)
return offsetofend(union fscrypt_iv, nonce);
if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64)
return sizeof(__le64);
if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32)
return sizeof(__le32);
/* Default case: IVs are just the file data unit index */
dun_bits = fscrypt_max_file_dun_bits(sb, ci->ci_data_unit_bits);
return DIV_ROUND_UP(dun_bits, 8);
}
/*
* Log a message when starting to use blk-crypto (native) or blk-crypto-fallback
* for an encryption mode for the first time. This is the blk-crypto
* counterpart to the message logged when starting to use the crypto API for the
* first time. A limitation is that these messages don't convey which specific
* filesystems or files are using each implementation. However, *usually*
* systems use just one implementation per mode, which makes these messages
* helpful for debugging problems where the "wrong" implementation is used.
*/
static void fscrypt_log_blk_crypto_impl(struct fscrypt_mode *mode,
struct block_device **devs,
unsigned int num_devs,
const struct blk_crypto_config *cfg)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < num_devs; i++) {
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION_FALLBACK) ||
blk_crypto_config_supported_natively(devs[i], cfg)) {
if (!xchg(&mode->logged_blk_crypto_native, 1))
pr_info("fscrypt: %s using blk-crypto (native)\n",
mode->friendly_name);
} else if (!xchg(&mode->logged_blk_crypto_fallback, 1)) {
pr_info("fscrypt: %s using blk-crypto-fallback\n",
mode->friendly_name);
}
}
}
/* Enable inline encryption for this file if supported. */
int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
bool is_hw_wrapped_key)
{
const struct inode *inode = ci->ci_inode;
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct blk_crypto_config crypto_cfg;
struct block_device **devs;
unsigned int num_devs;
unsigned int i;
/* The file must need contents encryption, not filenames encryption */
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return 0;
/* The crypto mode must have a blk-crypto counterpart */
if (ci->ci_mode->blk_crypto_mode == BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID)
return 0;
/* The filesystem must be mounted with -o inlinecrypt */
if (!(sb->s_flags & SB_INLINECRYPT))
return 0;
/*
* When a page contains multiple logically contiguous filesystem blocks,
* some filesystem code only calls fscrypt_mergeable_bio() for the first
* block in the page. This is fine for most of fscrypt's IV generation
* strategies, where contiguous blocks imply contiguous IVs. But it
* doesn't work with IV_INO_LBLK_32. For now, simply exclude
* IV_INO_LBLK_32 with blocksize != PAGE_SIZE from inline encryption.
*/
if ((fscrypt_policy_flags(&ci->ci_policy) &
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32) &&
sb->s_blocksize != PAGE_SIZE)
return 0;
/*
* On all the filesystem's block devices, blk-crypto must support the
* crypto configuration that the file would use.
*/
crypto_cfg.crypto_mode = ci->ci_mode->blk_crypto_mode;
crypto_cfg.data_unit_size = 1U << ci->ci_data_unit_bits;
crypto_cfg.dun_bytes = fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(ci);
crypto_cfg.key_type = is_hw_wrapped_key ?
BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_HW_WRAPPED : BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_RAW;
devs = fscrypt_get_devices(sb, &num_devs);
if (IS_ERR(devs))
return PTR_ERR(devs);
for (i = 0; i < num_devs; i++) {
if (!blk_crypto_config_supported(devs[i], &crypto_cfg))
goto out_free_devs;
}
fscrypt_log_blk_crypto_impl(ci->ci_mode, devs, num_devs, &crypto_cfg);
ci->ci_inlinecrypt = true;
out_free_devs:
kfree(devs);
return 0;
}
int fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
const u8 *key_bytes, size_t key_size,
bool is_hw_wrapped,
const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci)
{
const struct inode *inode = ci->ci_inode;
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode = ci->ci_mode->blk_crypto_mode;
enum blk_crypto_key_type key_type = is_hw_wrapped ?
BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_HW_WRAPPED : BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_RAW;
struct blk_crypto_key *blk_key;
struct block_device **devs;
unsigned int num_devs;
unsigned int i;
int err;
blk_key = kmalloc_obj(*blk_key);
if (!blk_key)
return -ENOMEM;
err = blk_crypto_init_key(blk_key, key_bytes, key_size, key_type,
crypto_mode, fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(ci),
1U << ci->ci_data_unit_bits);
if (err) {
fscrypt_err(inode, "error %d initializing blk-crypto key", err);
goto fail;
}
/* Start using blk-crypto on all the filesystem's block devices. */
devs = fscrypt_get_devices(sb, &num_devs);
if (IS_ERR(devs)) {
err = PTR_ERR(devs);
goto fail;
}
for (i = 0; i < num_devs; i++) {
err = blk_crypto_start_using_key(devs[i], blk_key);
if (err)
break;
}
kfree(devs);
if (err) {
fscrypt_err(inode, "error %d starting to use blk-crypto", err);
goto fail;
}
prep_key->blk_key = blk_key;
return 0;
fail:
kfree_sensitive(blk_key);
return err;
}
void fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key(struct super_block *sb,
struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key)
{
struct blk_crypto_key *blk_key = prep_key->blk_key;
struct block_device **devs;
unsigned int num_devs;
unsigned int i;
if (!blk_key)
return;
/* Evict the key from all the filesystem's block devices. */
devs = fscrypt_get_devices(sb, &num_devs);
if (!IS_ERR(devs)) {
for (i = 0; i < num_devs; i++)
blk_crypto_evict_key(devs[i], blk_key);
kfree(devs);
}
kfree_sensitive(blk_key);
}
/*
* Ask the inline encryption hardware to derive the software secret from a
* hardware-wrapped key. Returns -EOPNOTSUPP if hardware-wrapped keys aren't
* supported on this filesystem or hardware.
*/
int fscrypt_derive_sw_secret(struct super_block *sb,
const u8 *wrapped_key, size_t wrapped_key_size,
u8 sw_secret[BLK_CRYPTO_SW_SECRET_SIZE])
{
int err;
/* The filesystem must be mounted with -o inlinecrypt. */
if (!(sb->s_flags & SB_INLINECRYPT)) {
fscrypt_warn(NULL,
"%s: filesystem not mounted with inlinecrypt\n",
sb->s_id);
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
err = blk_crypto_derive_sw_secret(sb->s_bdev, wrapped_key,
wrapped_key_size, sw_secret);
if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
fscrypt_warn(NULL,
"%s: block device doesn't support hardware-wrapped keys\n",
sb->s_id);
return err;
}
bool __fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(const struct inode *inode)
{
return fscrypt_get_inode_info_raw(inode)->ci_inlinecrypt;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto);
static void fscrypt_generate_dun(const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
loff_t pos, u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE])
{
union fscrypt_iv iv;
int i;
fscrypt_generate_iv(&iv, pos >> ci->ci_data_unit_bits, ci);
BUILD_BUG_ON(FSCRYPT_MAX_IV_SIZE > BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE);
memset(dun, 0, BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE);
for (i = 0; i < ci->ci_mode->ivsize/sizeof(dun[0]); i++)
dun[i] = le64_to_cpu(iv.dun[i]);
}
/**
* fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx() - prepare a file contents bio for inline crypto
* @bio: a bio which will eventually be submitted to the file
* @inode: the file's inode
* @pos: the first file position (in bytes) in the I/O
* @gfp_mask: memory allocation flags - these must be a waiting mask so that
* bio_crypt_set_ctx can't fail.
*
* If the contents of the file should be encrypted (or decrypted) with inline
* encryption, then assign the appropriate encryption context to the bio.
*
* Normally the bio should be newly allocated (i.e. no pages added yet), as
* otherwise fscrypt_mergeable_bio() won't work as intended.
*
* The encryption context will be freed automatically when the bio is freed.
*/
void fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx(struct bio *bio, const struct inode *inode,
loff_t pos, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci;
u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
if (!fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(inode))
return;
ci = fscrypt_get_inode_info_raw(inode);
fscrypt_generate_dun(ci, pos, dun);
bio_crypt_set_ctx(bio, ci->ci_enc_key.blk_key, dun, gfp_mask);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx);
/**
* fscrypt_mergeable_bio() - test whether data can be added to a bio
* @bio: the bio being built up
* @inode: the inode for the next part of the I/O
* @pos: the next file position (in bytes) in the I/O
*
* When building a bio which may contain data which should undergo inline
* encryption (or decryption) via fscrypt, filesystems should call this function
* to ensure that the resulting bio contains only contiguous data unit numbers.
* This will return false if the next part of the I/O cannot be merged with the
* bio because either the encryption key would be different or the encryption
* data unit numbers would be discontiguous.
*
* fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx() must have already been called on the bio.
*
* This function isn't required in cases where crypto-mergeability is ensured in
* another way, such as I/O targeting only a single file (and thus a single key)
* combined with fscrypt_limit_io_blocks() to ensure DUN contiguity.
*
* Return: true iff the I/O is mergeable
*/
bool fscrypt_mergeable_bio(struct bio *bio, const struct inode *inode,
loff_t pos)
{
const struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio->bi_crypt_context;
const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci;
u64 next_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
if (!!bc != fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(inode))
return false;
if (!bc)
return true;
ci = fscrypt_get_inode_info_raw(inode);
/*
* Comparing the key pointers is good enough, as all I/O for each key
* uses the same pointer. I.e., there's currently no need to support
* merging requests where the keys are the same but the pointers differ.
*/
if (bc->bc_key != ci->ci_enc_key.blk_key)
return false;
fscrypt_generate_dun(ci, pos, next_dun);
return bio_crypt_dun_is_contiguous(bc, bio->bi_iter.bi_size, next_dun);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_mergeable_bio);
/**
* fscrypt_dio_supported() - check whether DIO (direct I/O) is supported on an
* inode, as far as encryption is concerned
* @inode: the inode in question
*
* Return: %true if there are no encryption constraints that prevent DIO from
* being supported; %false if DIO is unsupported. (Note that in the
* %true case, the filesystem might have other, non-encryption-related
* constraints that prevent DIO from actually being supported. Also, on
* encrypted files the filesystem is still responsible for only allowing
* DIO when requests are filesystem-block-aligned.)
*/
bool fscrypt_dio_supported(struct inode *inode)
{
int err;
/* If the file is unencrypted, no veto from us. */
if (!fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(inode))
return true;
/*
* We only support DIO with inline crypto, not fs-layer crypto.
*
* To determine whether the inode is using inline crypto, we have to set
* up the key if it wasn't already done. This is because in the current
* design of fscrypt, the decision of whether to use inline crypto or
* not isn't made until the inode's encryption key is being set up. In
* the DIO read/write case, the key will always be set up already, since
* the file will be open. But in the case of statx(), the key might not
* be set up yet, as the file might not have been opened yet.
*/
err = fscrypt_require_key(inode);
if (err) {
/*
* Key unavailable or couldn't be set up. This edge case isn't
* worth worrying about; just report that DIO is unsupported.
*/
return false;
}
return fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(inode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_dio_supported);
/**
* fscrypt_limit_io_blocks() - limit I/O blocks to avoid discontiguous DUNs
* @inode: the file on which I/O is being done
* @lblk: the block at which the I/O is being started from
* @nr_blocks: the number of blocks we want to submit starting at @lblk
*
* Determine the limit to the number of blocks that can be submitted in a bio
* targeting @lblk without causing a data unit number (DUN) discontiguity.
*
* This is normally just @nr_blocks, as normally the DUNs just increment along
* with the logical blocks. (Or the file is not encrypted.)
*
* In rare cases, fscrypt can be using an IV generation method that allows the
* DUN to wrap around within logically contiguous blocks, and that wraparound
* will occur. If this happens, a value less than @nr_blocks will be returned
* so that the wraparound doesn't occur in the middle of a bio, which would
* cause encryption/decryption to produce wrong results.
*
* Return: the actual number of blocks that can be submitted
*/
u64 fscrypt_limit_io_blocks(const struct inode *inode, u64 lblk, u64 nr_blocks)
{
const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci;
u32 dun;
if (!fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(inode))
return nr_blocks;
if (nr_blocks <= 1)
return nr_blocks;
ci = fscrypt_get_inode_info_raw(inode);
if (!(fscrypt_policy_flags(&ci->ci_policy) &
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32))
return nr_blocks;
/* With IV_INO_LBLK_32, the DUN can wrap around from U32_MAX to 0. */
dun = ci->ci_hashed_ino + lblk;
return min_t(u64, nr_blocks, (u64)U32_MAX + 1 - dun);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_limit_io_blocks);