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When a BPF sock_ops program accesses ctx fields with dst_reg == src_reg, the SOCK_OPS_GET_SK() and SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() macros fail to zero the destination register in the !fullsock / !locked_tcp_sock path. Both macros borrow a temporary register to check is_fullsock / is_locked_tcp_sock when dst_reg == src_reg, because dst_reg holds the ctx pointer. When the check is false (e.g., TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV state with a request_sock), dst_reg should be zeroed but is not, leaving the stale ctx pointer: - SOCK_OPS_GET_SK: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer, passes NULL checks as PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, and can be used as a bogus socket pointer, leading to stack-out-of-bounds access in helpers like bpf_skc_to_tcp6_sock(). - SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer which the verifier believes is a SCALAR_VALUE, leaking a kernel pointer. Fix both macros by: - Changing JMP_A(1) to JMP_A(2) in the fullsock path to skip the added instruction. - Adding BPF_MOV64_IMM(si->dst_reg, 0) after the temp register restore in the !fullsock path, placed after the restore because dst_reg == src_reg means we need src_reg intact to read ctx->temp. Fixes:fd09af0107("bpf: sock_ops ctx access may stomp registers in corner case") Fixes:84f44df664("bpf: sock_ops sk access may stomp registers when dst_reg = src_reg") Reported-by: Quan Sun <2022090917019@std.uestc.edu.cn> Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <dddddd@hust.edu.cn> Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210@hust.edu.cn> Reported-by: Dongliang Mu <dzm91@hust.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/6fe1243e-149b-4d3b-99c7-fcc9e2f75787@std.uestc.edu.cn/T/#u Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260407022720.162151-2-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>