Breno reported significant c2c HITM in a futex hash heavy workload.
It turns out that the hash bucket to private hash table reverse pointer
(futex_hash_bucket::priv) was to blame. Notably when the hash buckets are
heavily contended, the: 'fph = bh->priv;' load in futex_hash() will typically
miss and consequently become quite expensive.
Since this load in particular is quite superfluous, removing it is fairly
straight forward. However, removing it does not in fact achieve anything much.
The pain moves to the next user, notably: futex_hash_put().
Therefore rework the whole private hash refcounting to avoid needing this back
pointer (and removing it). Instead of passing around 'struct futex_hash_bucket
*hb', pass around a new structure that contains it and the related 'struct
futex_private_hash *fph' pointer in tandem.
Funnily this turns out to remove more code than it adds and significantly
improves futex hash performance (as measured by 'perf bench futex hash'):
SKL dual socket 112 threads:
Baseline Patched
shared (16k) 1571857 1641435 + 4.4%
autosize (512) 646390 903371 +39.7%
-b 256 464395 587014 +26.4%
-b 512 715687 995943 +39.2%
-b 1024 995085 1396328 +40.3%
-b 2048 1293114 1668395 +29.0%
-b 4096 2124438 2240228 + 5.5%
Zen3 dual socket 256 threads:
Baseline Patched
shared (16k) 1275840 1381279 + 8.2%
autosize (512) 1252745 1482179 +18.3%
-b 256 856274 955455 +11.5%
-b 512 1267490 1544010 +21.8%
-b 1024 1424013 1625424 +14.1%
-b 2048 1505181 1669342 +10.9%
-b 4096 1465993 1688932 +15.2%
AMD EPYC 9D64 (Zen4, single socket) 176 threads:
Baseline Patched Delta
shared (16k) 1,230,599 1,368,655 +11.2%
autosize (1024) 1,285,440 1,556,946 +21.1%
-b 256 1,341,471 1,520,303 +13.3%
-b 512 1,438,330 1,599,319 +11.2%
-b 1024 1,443,772 1,622,493 +12.4%
-b 2048 1,472,108 1,643,975 +11.7%
-b 4096 1,333,098 1,570,897 +17.8%
Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Tested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260610135510.GB1430057@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
When the FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK mechanism is used for unlocking (PI-)futexes,
then the unlock sequence in user space looks like this:
1) robust_list_set_op_pending(mutex);
2) robust_list_remove(mutex);
lval = gettid();
3) if (atomic_try_cmpxchg(&mutex->lock, lval, 0))
4) robust_list_clear_op_pending();
else
5) sys_futex(OP | FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK, ....);
That still leaves a minimal race window between #3 and #4 where the mutex
could be acquired by some other task, which observes that it is the last
user and:
1) unmaps the mutex memory
2) maps a different file, which ends up covering the same address
When then the original task exits before reaching #5 then the kernel robust
list handling observes the pending op entry and tries to fix up user space.
In case that the newly mapped data contains the TID of the exiting thread
at the address of the mutex/futex the kernel will set the owner died bit in
that memory and therefore corrupt unrelated data.
On X86 this boils down to this simplified assembly sequence:
mov %esi,%eax // Load TID into EAX
xor %ecx,%ecx // Set ECX to 0
#3 lock cmpxchg %ecx,(%rdi) // Try the TID -> 0 transition
.Lstart:
jnz .Lend
#4 movq %rcx,(%rdx) // Clear list_op_pending
.Lend:
If the cmpxchg() succeeds and the task is interrupted before it can clear
list_op_pending in the robust list head (#4) and the task crashes in a
signal handler or gets killed then it ends up in do_exit() and subsequently
in the robust list handling, which then might run into the unmap/map issue
described above.
This is only relevant when user space was interrupted and a signal is
pending. The fix-up has to be done before signal delivery is attempted
because:
1) The signal might be fatal so get_signal() ends up in do_exit()
2) The signal handler might crash or the task is killed before returning
from the handler. At that point the instruction pointer in pt_regs is
not longer the instruction pointer of the initially interrupted unlock
sequence.
The right place to handle this is in __exit_to_user_mode_loop() before
invoking arch_do_signal_or_restart() as this covers obviously both
scenarios.
As this is only relevant when the task was interrupted in user space, this
is tied to RSEQ and the generic entry code as RSEQ keeps track of user
space interrupts unconditionally even if the task does not have a RSEQ
region installed. That makes the decision very lightweight:
if (current->rseq.user_irq && within(regs, csr->unlock_ip_range))
futex_fixup_robust_unlock(regs, csr);
futex_fixup_robust_unlock() then invokes a architecture specific function
to return the pending op pointer or NULL. The function evaluates the
register content to decide whether the pending ops pointer in the robust
list head needs to be cleared.
Assuming the above unlock sequence, then on x86 this decision is the
trivial evaluation of the zero flag:
return regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF ? regs->dx : NULL;
Other architectures might need to do more complex evaluations due to LLSC,
but the approach is valid in general. The size of the pointer is determined
from the matching range struct, which covers both 32-bit and 64-bit builds
including COMPAT.
The unlock sequence is going to be placed in the VDSO so that the kernel
can keep everything synchronized, especially the register usage. The
resulting code sequence for user space is:
if (__vdso_futex_robust_list$SZ_try_unlock(lock, tid, &pending_op) != tid)
err = sys_futex($OP | FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK,....);
Both the VDSO unlock and the kernel side unlock ensure that the pending_op
pointer is always cleared when the lock becomes unlocked.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@igalia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260602090535.773669210@kernel.org
There will be a VDSO function to unlock robust futexes in user space. The
unlock sequence is racy vs. clearing the list_pending_op pointer in the
tasks robust list head. To plug this race the kernel needs to know the
instruction window. As the VDSO is per MM the addresses are stored in
mm_struct::futex.
Architectures which implement support for this have to update these
addresses when the VDSO is (re)mapped and indicate the pending op pointer
size which is matching the IP.
Arguably this could be resolved by chasing mm->context->vdso->image, but
that's architecture specific and requires to touch quite some cache
lines. Having it in mm::futex reduces the cache line impact and avoids
having yet another set of architecture specific functionality.
To support multi size robust list applications (gaming) this provides two
ranges when COMPAT is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@igalia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260602090535.718926819@kernel.org
Unlocking robust non-PI futexes happens in user space with the following
sequence:
1) robust_list_set_op_pending(mutex);
2) robust_list_remove(mutex);
lval = 0;
3) lval = atomic_xchg(lock, lval);
4) if (lval & WAITERS)
5) sys_futex(WAKE,....);
6) robust_list_clear_op_pending();
That opens a window between #3 and #6 where the mutex could be acquired by
some other task which observes that it is the last user and:
A) unmaps the mutex memory
B) maps a different file, which ends up covering the same address
When the original task exits before reaching #6 then the kernel robust list
handling observes the pending op entry and tries to fix up user space.
In case that the newly mapped data contains the TID of the exiting thread
at the address of the mutex/futex the kernel will set the owner died bit in
that memory and therefore corrupting unrelated data.
PI futexes have a similar problem both for the non-contented user space
unlock and the in kernel unlock:
1) robust_list_set_op_pending(mutex);
2) robust_list_remove(mutex);
lval = gettid();
3) if (!atomic_try_cmpxchg(lock, lval, 0))
4) sys_futex(UNLOCK_PI,....);
5) robust_list_clear_op_pending();
Address the first part of the problem where the futexes have waiters and
need to enter the kernel anyway. Add a new FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK flag, which
is valid for the sys_futex() FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI, FUTEX_WAKE, FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET
operations.
This deliberately omits FUTEX_WAKE_OP from this treatment as it's unclear
whether this is needed and there is no usage of it in glibc either to
investigate.
For the futex2 syscall family this needs to be implemented with a new
syscall.
The sys_futex() case [ab]uses the @uaddr2 argument to hand the pointer to
robust_list_head::list_pending_op into the kernel. This argument is only
evaluated when the FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK bit is set and is therefore backward
compatible.
This is an explicit argument to avoid the lookup of the robust list pointer
and retrieving the pending op pointer from there. User space has the
pointer already available so it can just put it into the @uaddr2
argument. Aside of that this allows the usage of multiple robust lists in
the future without any changes to the internal functions as they just operate
on the provided pointer.
This requires a second flag FUTEX_ROBUST_LIST32 which indicates that the
robust list pointer points to an u32 and not to an u64. This is required
for two reasons:
1) sys_futex() has no compat variant
2) The gaming emulators use both both 64-bit and compat 32-bit robust
lists in the same 64-bit application
As a consequence 32-bit applications have to set this flag unconditionally
so they can run on a 64-bit kernel in compat mode unmodified. 32-bit
kernels return an error code when the flag is not set. 64-bit kernels will
happily clear the full 64 bits if user space fails to set it.
In case of FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI this clears the robust list pending op when the
unlock succeeded. In case of errors, the user space value is still locked
by the caller and therefore the above cannot happen.
In case of FUTEX_WAKE* this does the unlock of the futex in the kernel and
clears the robust list pending op when the unlock was successful. If not,
the user space value is still locked and user space has to deal with the
returned error. That means that the unlocking of non-PI robust futexes has
to use the same try_cmpxchg() unlock scheme as PI futexes.
If the clearing of the pending list op fails (fault) then the kernel clears
the registered robust list pointer if it matches to prevent that exit()
will try to handle invalid data. That's a valid paranoid decision because
the robust list head sits usually in the TLS and if the TLS is not longer
accessible then the chance for fixing up the resulting mess is very close
to zero.
The problem of non-contended unlocks still exists and will be addressed
separately.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@igalia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260602090535.670514505@kernel.org
The marker for PI futexes in the robust list is a hardcoded 0x1 which lacks
any sensible form of documentation.
Provide proper defines for the bit and the mask and fix up the usage
sites. Thereby convert the boolean pi argument into a modifier argument,
which allows new modifier bits to be trivially added and conveyed.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Reviewed-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@igalia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260602090535.458758556@kernel.org
Having all these members in mm_struct along with the required #ifdeffery is
annoying, does not allow efficient initializing of the data with
memset() and makes extending it tedious.
Move it into a data structure and fix up all usage sites.
The extra struct for the private hash is intentional to make integration of
other conditional mechanisms easier in terms of initialization and separation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260602090535.407756793@kernel.org
Pull locking updates from Ingo Molnar:
"Mutexes:
- Add killable flavor to guard definitions (Davidlohr Bueso)
- Remove the list_head from struct mutex (Matthew Wilcox)
- Rename mutex_init_lockep() (Davidlohr Bueso)
rwsems:
- Remove the list_head from struct rw_semaphore and
replace it with a single pointer (Matthew Wilcox)
- Fix logic error in rwsem_del_waiter() (Andrei Vagin)
Semaphores:
- Remove the list_head from struct semaphore (Matthew Wilcox)
Jump labels:
- Use ATOMIC_INIT() for initialization of .enabled (Thomas Weißschuh)
- Remove workaround for old compilers in initializations
(Thomas Weißschuh)
Lock context analysis changes and improvements:
- Add context analysis for rwsems (Peter Zijlstra)
- Fix rwlock and spinlock lock context annotations (Bart Van Assche)
- Fix rwlock support in <linux/spinlock_up.h> (Bart Van Assche)
- Add lock context annotations in the spinlock implementation
(Bart Van Assche)
- signal: Fix the lock_task_sighand() annotation (Bart Van Assche)
- ww-mutex: Fix the ww_acquire_ctx function annotations
(Bart Van Assche)
- Add lock context support in do_raw_{read,write}_trylock()
(Bart Van Assche)
- arm64, compiler-context-analysis: Permit alias analysis through
__READ_ONCE() with CONFIG_LTO=y (Marco Elver)
- Add __cond_releases() (Peter Zijlstra)
- Add context analysis for mutexes (Peter Zijlstra)
- Add context analysis for rtmutexes (Peter Zijlstra)
- Convert futexes to compiler context analysis (Peter Zijlstra)
Rust integration updates:
- Add atomic fetch_sub() implementation (Andreas Hindborg)
- Refactor various rust_helper_ methods for expansion (Boqun Feng)
- Add Atomic<*{mut,const} T> support (Boqun Feng)
- Add atomic operation helpers over raw pointers (Boqun Feng)
- Add performance-optimal Flag type for atomic booleans, to avoid
slow byte-sized RMWs on architectures that don't support them.
(FUJITA Tomonori)
- Misc cleanups and fixes (Andreas Hindborg, Boqun Feng, FUJITA
Tomonori)
LTO support updates:
- arm64: Optimize __READ_ONCE() with CONFIG_LTO=y (Marco Elver)
- compiler: Simplify generic RELOC_HIDE() (Marco Elver)
Miscellaneous fixes and cleanups by Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
Thomas Weißschuh, Davidlohr Bueso and Mikhail Gavrilov"
* tag 'locking-core-2026-04-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (39 commits)
compiler: Simplify generic RELOC_HIDE()
locking: Add lock context annotations in the spinlock implementation
locking: Add lock context support in do_raw_{read,write}_trylock()
locking: Fix rwlock support in <linux/spinlock_up.h>
lockdep: Raise default stack trace limits when KASAN is enabled
cleanup: Optimize guards
jump_label: remove workaround for old compilers in initializations
jump_label: use ATOMIC_INIT() for initialization of .enabled
futex: Convert to compiler context analysis
locking/rwsem: Fix logic error in rwsem_del_waiter()
locking/rwsem: Add context analysis
locking/rtmutex: Add context analysis
locking/mutex: Add context analysis
compiler-context-analysys: Add __cond_releases()
locking/mutex: Remove the list_head from struct mutex
locking/semaphore: Remove the list_head from struct semaphore
locking/rwsem: Remove the list_head from struct rw_semaphore
rust: atomic: Update a safety comment in impl of `fetch_add()`
rust: sync: atomic: Update documentation for `fetch_add()`
rust: sync: atomic: Add fetch_sub()
...
During futex_key_to_node_opt() execution, vma->vm_policy is read under
speculative mmap lock and RCU. Concurrently, mbind() may call
vma_replace_policy() which frees the old mempolicy immediately via
kmem_cache_free().
This creates a race where __futex_key_to_node() dereferences a freed
mempolicy pointer, causing a use-after-free read of mpol->mode.
[ 151.412631] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __futex_key_to_node (kernel/futex/core.c:349)
[ 151.414046] Read of size 2 at addr ffff888001c49634 by task e/87
[ 151.415969] Call Trace:
[ 151.416732] __asan_load2 (mm/kasan/generic.c:271)
[ 151.416777] __futex_key_to_node (kernel/futex/core.c:349)
[ 151.416822] get_futex_key (kernel/futex/core.c:374 kernel/futex/core.c:386 kernel/futex/core.c:593)
Fix by adding rcu to __mpol_put().
Fixes: c042c50521 ("futex: Implement FUTEX2_MPOL")
Reported-by: Hao-Yu Yang <naup96721@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Hao-Yu Yang <naup96721@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260324174418.GB1850007@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Pull scoped user access updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Scoped user mode access and related changes:
- Implement the missing u64 user access function on ARM when
CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE=n.
This makes it possible to access a 64bit value in generic code with
[unsafe_]get_user(). All other architectures and ARM variants
provide the relevant accessors already.
- Ensure that ASM GOTO jump label usage in the user mode access
helpers always goes through a local C scope label indirection
inside the helpers.
This is required because compilers are not supporting that a ASM
GOTO target leaves a auto cleanup scope. GCC silently fails to emit
the cleanup invocation and CLANG fails the build.
[ Editor's note: gcc-16 will have fixed the code generation issue
in commit f68fe3ddda4 ("eh: Invoke cleanups/destructors in asm
goto jumps [PR122835]"). But we obviously have to deal with clang
and older versions of gcc, so.. - Linus ]
This provides generic wrapper macros and the conversion of affected
architecture code to use them.
- Scoped user mode access with auto cleanup
Access to user mode memory can be required in hot code paths, but
if it has to be done with user controlled pointers, the access is
shielded with a speculation barrier, so that the CPU cannot
speculate around the address range check. Those speculation
barriers impact performance quite significantly.
This cost can be avoided by "masking" the provided pointer so it is
guaranteed to be in the valid user memory access range and
otherwise to point to a guaranteed unpopulated address space. This
has to be done without branches so it creates an address dependency
for the access, which the CPU cannot speculate ahead.
This results in repeating and error prone programming patterns:
if (can_do_masked_user_access())
from = masked_user_read_access_begin((from));
else if (!user_read_access_begin(from, sizeof(*from)))
return -EFAULT;
unsafe_get_user(val, from, Efault);
user_read_access_end();
return 0;
Efault:
user_read_access_end();
return -EFAULT;
which can be replaced with scopes and automatic cleanup:
scoped_user_read_access(from, Efault)
unsafe_get_user(val, from, Efault);
return 0;
Efault:
return -EFAULT;
- Convert code which implements the above pattern over to
scope_user.*.access(). This also corrects a couple of imbalanced
masked_*_begin() instances which are harmless on most
architectures, but prevent PowerPC from implementing the masking
optimization.
- Add a missing speculation barrier in copy_from_user_iter()"
* tag 'core-uaccess-2025-11-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
lib/strn*,uaccess: Use masked_user_{read/write}_access_begin when required
scm: Convert put_cmsg() to scoped user access
iov_iter: Add missing speculation barrier to copy_from_user_iter()
iov_iter: Convert copy_from_user_iter() to masked user access
select: Convert to scoped user access
x86/futex: Convert to scoped user access
futex: Convert to get/put_user_inline()
uaccess: Provide put/get_user_inline()
uaccess: Provide scoped user access regions
arm64: uaccess: Use unsafe wrappers for ASM GOTO
s390/uaccess: Use unsafe wrappers for ASM GOTO
riscv/uaccess: Use unsafe wrappers for ASM GOTO
powerpc/uaccess: Use unsafe wrappers for ASM GOTO
x86/uaccess: Use unsafe wrappers for ASM GOTO
uaccess: Provide ASM GOTO safe wrappers for unsafe_*_user()
ARM: uaccess: Implement missing __get_user_asm_dword()
Shrikanth noted that the per-cpu reference counter was still some 10%
slower than the old immutable option (which removes the reference
counting entirely).
Further optimize the per-cpu reference counter by:
- switching from RCU to preempt;
- using __this_cpu_*() since we now have preempt disabled;
- switching from smp_load_acquire() to READ_ONCE().
This is all safe because disabling preemption inhibits the RCU grace
period exactly like rcu_read_lock().
Having preemption disabled allows using __this_cpu_*() provided the
only access to the variable is in task context -- which is the case
here.
Furthermore, since we know changing fph->state to FR_ATOMIC demands a
full RCU grace period we can rely on the implied smp_mb() from that to
replace the acquire barrier().
This is very similar to the percpu_down_read_internal() fast-path.
The reason this is significant for PowerPC is that it uses the generic
this_cpu_*() implementation which relies on local_irq_disable() (the
x86 implementation relies on it being a single memop instruction to be
IRQ-safe). Switching to preempt_disable() and __this_cpu*() avoids
this IRQ state swizzling. Also, PowerPC needs LWSYNC for the ACQUIRE
barrier, not having to use explicit barriers safes a bunch.
Combined this reduces the performance gap by half, down to some 5%.
Fixes: 760e6f7bef ("futex: Remove support for IMMUTABLE")
Reported-by: Shrikanth Hegde <sshegde@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Shrikanth Hegde <sshegde@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251106092929.GR4067720@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
To avoid a memory leak via mm_alloc() + mmdrop() the futex cleanup code
has been moved to __mmdrop(). This resulted in a warnings if the futex
hash table has been allocated via vmalloc() the mmdrop() was invoked
from atomic context.
The free path must stay in __mmput() to ensure it is invoked from
preemptible context.
In order to avoid the memory leak, delay the allocation of
mm_struct::mm->futex_ref to futex_hash_allocate(). This works because
neither the per-CPU counter nor the private hash has been allocated and
therefore
- futex_private_hash() callers (such as exit_pi_state_list()) don't
acquire reference if there is no private hash yet. There is also no
reference put.
- Regular callers (futex_hash()) fallback to global hash. No reference
counting here.
The futex_ref member can be allocated in futex_hash_allocate() before
the private hash itself is allocated. This happens either while the
first thread is created or on request. In both cases the process has
just a single thread so there can be either futex operation in progress
or the request to create a private hash.
Move futex_hash_free() back to __mmput();
Move the allocation of mm_struct::futex_ref to futex_hash_allocate().
[ bp: Fold a follow-up fix to prevent a use-after-free:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250830213806.sEKuuGSm@linutronix.de ]
Fixes: e703b7e247 ("futex: Move futex cleanup to __mmdrop()")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250821102721.6deae493@kernel.org/
Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250822141238.PfnkTjFb@linutronix.de
The FH_FLAG_IMMUTABLE flag was meant to avoid the reference counting on
the private hash and so to avoid the performance regression on big
machines.
With the switch to per-CPU counter this is no longer needed. That flag
was never useable on any released kernel.
Remove any support for IMMUTABLE while preserve the flags argument and
enforce it to be zero.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250710110011.384614-5-bigeasy@linutronix.de
The use of rcuref_t for reference counting introduces a performance bottleneck
when accessed concurrently by multiple threads during futex operations.
Replace rcuref_t with special crafted per-CPU reference counters. The
lifetime logic remains the same.
The newly allocate private hash starts in FR_PERCPU state. In this state, each
futex operation that requires the private hash uses a per-CPU counter (an
unsigned int) for incrementing or decrementing the reference count.
When the private hash is about to be replaced, the per-CPU counters are
migrated to a atomic_t counter mm_struct::futex_atomic.
The migration process:
- Waiting for one RCU grace period to ensure all users observe the
current private hash. This can be skipped if a grace period elapsed
since the private hash was assigned.
- futex_private_hash::state is set to FR_ATOMIC, forcing all users to
use mm_struct::futex_atomic for reference counting.
- After a RCU grace period, all users are guaranteed to be using the
atomic counter. The per-CPU counters can now be summed up and added to
the atomic_t counter. If the resulting count is zero, the hash can be
safely replaced. Otherwise, active users still hold a valid reference.
- Once the atomic reference count drops to zero, the next futex
operation will switch to the new private hash.
call_rcu_hurry() is used to speed up transition which otherwise might be
delay with RCU_LAZY. There is nothing wrong with using call_rcu(). The
side effects would be that on auto scaling the new hash is used later
and the SET_SLOTS prctl() will block longer.
[bigeasy: commit description + mm get/ put_async]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250710110011.384614-3-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Once the global hash is requested there is no way back to switch back to
the per-task private hash. This is checked at the begin of the function.
It is possible that two threads simultaneously request the global hash
and both pass the initial check and block later on the
mm::futex_hash_lock. In this case the first thread performs the switch
to the global hash. The second thread will also attempt to switch to the
global hash and while doing so, accessing the nonexisting slot 1 of the
struct futex_private_hash.
The same applies if the hash is made immutable: There is no reference
counting and the hash must not be replaced.
Verify under mm_struct::futex_phash that neither the global hash nor an
immutable hash in use.
Tested-by: "Lai, Yi" <yi1.lai@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: "Lai, Yi" <yi1.lai@linux.intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aDwDw9Aygqo6oAx+@ly-workstation/
Fixes: bd54df5ea7 ("futex: Allow to resize the private local hash")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250610104400.1077266-5-bigeasy@linutronix.de/
Pull more MM updates from Andrew Morton:
- "zram: support algorithm-specific parameters" from Sergey Senozhatsky
adds infrastructure for passing algorithm-specific parameters into
zram. A single parameter `winbits' is implemented at this time.
- "memcg: nmi-safe kmem charging" from Shakeel Butt makes memcg
charging nmi-safe, which is required by BFP, which can operate in NMI
context.
- "Some random fixes and cleanup to shmem" from Kemeng Shi implements
small fixes and cleanups in the shmem code.
- "Skip mm selftests instead when kernel features are not present" from
Zi Yan fixes some issues in the MM selftest code.
- "mm/damon: build-enable essential DAMON components by default" from
SeongJae Park reworks DAMON Kconfig to make it easier to enable
CONFIG_DAMON.
- "sched/numa: add statistics of numa balance task migration" from Libo
Chen adds more info into sysfs and procfs files to improve visibility
into the NUMA balancer's task migration activity.
- "selftests/mm: cow and gup_longterm cleanups" from Mark Brown
provides various updates to some of the MM selftests to make them
play better with the overall containing framework.
* tag 'mm-stable-2025-06-01-14-06' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (43 commits)
mm/khugepaged: clean up refcount check using folio_expected_ref_count()
selftests/mm: fix test result reporting in gup_longterm
selftests/mm: report unique test names for each cow test
selftests/mm: add helper for logging test start and results
selftests/mm: use standard ksft_finished() in cow and gup_longterm
selftests/damon/_damon_sysfs: skip testcases if CONFIG_DAMON_SYSFS is disabled
sched/numa: add statistics of numa balance task
sched/numa: fix task swap by skipping kernel threads
tools/testing: check correct variable in open_procmap()
tools/testing/vma: add missing function stub
mm/gup: update comment explaining why gup_fast() disables IRQs
selftests/mm: two fixes for the pfnmap test
mm/khugepaged: fix race with folio split/free using temporary reference
mm: add CONFIG_PAGE_BLOCK_ORDER to select page block order
mmu_notifiers: remove leftover stub macros
selftests/mm: deduplicate test names in madv_populate
kcov: rust: add flags for KCOV with Rust
mm: rust: make CONFIG_MMU ifdefs more narrow
mmu_gather: move tlb flush for VM_PFNMAP/VM_MIXEDMAP vmas into free_pgtables()
mm/damon/Kconfig: enable CONFIG_DAMON by default
...
Extend the futex2 interface to be aware of mempolicy.
When FUTEX2_MPOL is specified and there is a MPOL_PREFERRED or
home_node specified covering the futex address, use that hash-map.
Notably, in this case the futex will go to the global node hashtable,
even if it is a PRIVATE futex.
When FUTEX2_NUMA|FUTEX2_MPOL is specified and the user specified node
value is FUTEX_NO_NODE, the MPOL lookup (as described above) will be
tried first before reverting to setting node to the local node.
[bigeasy: add CONFIG_FUTEX_MPOL, add MPOL to FUTEX2_VALID_MASK, write
the node only to user if FUTEX_NO_NODE was supplied]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250416162921.513656-18-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Extend the futex2 interface to be numa aware.
When FUTEX2_NUMA is specified for a futex, the user value is extended
to two words (of the same size). The first is the user value we all
know, the second one will be the node to place this futex on.
struct futex_numa_32 {
u32 val;
u32 node;
};
When node is set to ~0, WAIT will set it to the current node_id such
that WAKE knows where to find it. If userspace corrupts the node value
between WAIT and WAKE, the futex will not be found and no wakeup will
happen.
When FUTEX2_NUMA is not set, the node is simply an extension of the
hash, such that traditional futexes are still interleaved over the
nodes.
This is done to avoid having to have a separate !numa hash-table.
[bigeasy: ensure to have at least hashsize of 4 in futex_init(), add
pr_info() for size and allocation information. Cast the naddr math to
void*]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250416162921.513656-17-bigeasy@linutronix.de
My initial testing showed that:
perf bench futex hash
reported less operations/sec with private hash. After using the same
amount of buckets in the private hash as used by the global hash then
the operations/sec were about the same.
This changed once the private hash became resizable. This feature added
an RCU section and reference counting via atomic inc+dec operation into
the hot path.
The reference counting can be avoided if the private hash is made
immutable.
Extend PR_FUTEX_HASH_SET_SLOTS by a fourth argument which denotes if the
private should be made immutable. Once set (to true) the a further
resize is not allowed (same if set to global hash).
Add PR_FUTEX_HASH_GET_IMMUTABLE which returns true if the hash can not
be changed.
Update "perf bench" suite.
For comparison, results of "perf bench futex hash -s":
- Xeon CPU E5-2650, 2 NUMA nodes, total 32 CPUs:
- Before the introducing task local hash
shared Averaged 1.487.148 operations/sec (+- 0,53%), total secs = 10
private Averaged 2.192.405 operations/sec (+- 0,07%), total secs = 10
- With the series
shared Averaged 1.326.342 operations/sec (+- 0,41%), total secs = 10
-b128 Averaged 141.394 operations/sec (+- 1,15%), total secs = 10
-Ib128 Averaged 851.490 operations/sec (+- 0,67%), total secs = 10
-b8192 Averaged 131.321 operations/sec (+- 2,13%), total secs = 10
-Ib8192 Averaged 1.923.077 operations/sec (+- 0,61%), total secs = 10
128 is the default allocation of hash buckets.
8192 was the previous amount of allocated hash buckets.
- Xeon(R) CPU E7-8890 v3, 4 NUMA nodes, total 144 CPUs:
- Before the introducing task local hash
shared Averaged 1.810.936 operations/sec (+- 0,26%), total secs = 20
private Averaged 2.505.801 operations/sec (+- 0,05%), total secs = 20
- With the series
shared Averaged 1.589.002 operations/sec (+- 0,25%), total secs = 20
-b1024 Averaged 42.410 operations/sec (+- 0,20%), total secs = 20
-Ib1024 Averaged 740.638 operations/sec (+- 1,51%), total secs = 20
-b65536 Averaged 48.811 operations/sec (+- 1,35%), total secs = 20
-Ib65536 Averaged 1.963.165 operations/sec (+- 0,18%), total secs = 20
1024 is the default allocation of hash buckets.
65536 was the previous amount of allocated hash buckets.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Shrikanth Hegde <sshegde@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250416162921.513656-16-bigeasy@linutronix.de
The mm_struct::futex_hash_lock guards the futex_hash_bucket assignment/
replacement. The futex_hash_allocate()/ PR_FUTEX_HASH_SET_SLOTS
operation can now be invoked at runtime and resize an already existing
internal private futex_hash_bucket to another size.
The reallocation is based on an idea by Thomas Gleixner: The initial
allocation of struct futex_private_hash sets the reference count
to one. Every user acquires a reference on the local hash before using
it and drops it after it enqueued itself on the hash bucket. There is no
reference held while the task is scheduled out while waiting for the
wake up.
The resize process allocates a new struct futex_private_hash and drops
the initial reference. Synchronized with mm_struct::futex_hash_lock it
is checked if the reference counter for the currently used
mm_struct::futex_phash is marked as DEAD. If so, then all users enqueued
on the current private hash are requeued on the new private hash and the
new private hash is set to mm_struct::futex_phash. Otherwise the newly
allocated private hash is saved as mm_struct::futex_phash_new and the
rehashing and reassigning is delayed to the futex_hash() caller once the
reference counter is marked DEAD.
The replacement is not performed at rcuref_put() time because certain
callers, such as futex_wait_queue(), drop their reference after changing
the task state. This change will be destroyed once the futex_hash_lock
is acquired.
The user can change the number slots with PR_FUTEX_HASH_SET_SLOTS
multiple times. An increase and decrease is allowed and request blocks
until the assignment is done.
The private hash allocated at thread creation is changed from 16 to
16 <= 4 * number_of_threads <= global_hash_size
where number_of_threads can not exceed the number of online CPUs. Should
the user PR_FUTEX_HASH_SET_SLOTS then the auto scaling is disabled.
[peterz: reorganize the code to avoid state tracking and simplify new
object handling, block the user until changes are in effect, allow
increase and decrease of the hash].
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250416162921.513656-15-bigeasy@linutronix.de
The futex hash is system wide and shared by all tasks. Each slot
is hashed based on futex address and the VMA of the thread. Due to
randomized VMAs (and memory allocations) the same logical lock (pointer)
can end up in a different hash bucket on each invocation of the
application. This in turn means that different applications may share a
hash bucket on the first invocation but not on the second and it is not
always clear which applications will be involved. This can result in
high latency's to acquire the futex_hash_bucket::lock especially if the
lock owner is limited to a CPU and can not be effectively PI boosted.
Introduce basic infrastructure for process local hash which is shared by
all threads of process. This hash will only be used for a
PROCESS_PRIVATE FUTEX operation.
The hashmap can be allocated via:
prctl(PR_FUTEX_HASH, PR_FUTEX_HASH_SET_SLOTS, num);
A `num' of 0 means that the global hash is used instead of a private
hash.
Other values for `num' specify the number of slots for the hash and the
number must be power of two, starting with two.
The prctl() returns zero on success. This function can only be used
before a thread is created.
The current status for the private hash can be queried via:
num = prctl(PR_FUTEX_HASH, PR_FUTEX_HASH_GET_SLOTS);
which return the current number of slots. The value 0 means that the
global hash is used. Values greater than 0 indicate the number of slots
that are used. A negative number indicates an error.
For optimisation, for the private hash jhash2() uses only two arguments
the address and the offset. This omits the VMA which is always the same.
[peterz: Use 0 for global hash. A bit shuffling and renaming. ]
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250416162921.513656-13-bigeasy@linutronix.de
futex_lock_pi() and __fixup_pi_state_owner() acquire the
futex_q::lock_ptr without holding a reference assuming the previously
obtained hash bucket and the assigned lock_ptr are still valid. This
isn't the case once the private hash can be resized and becomes invalid
after the reference drop.
Introduce futex_q_lockptr_lock() to lock the hash bucket recorded in
futex_q::lock_ptr. The lock pointer is read in a RCU section to ensure
that it does not go away if the hash bucket has been replaced and the
old pointer has been observed. After locking the pointer needs to be
compared to check if it changed. If so then the hash bucket has been
replaced and the user has been moved to the new one and lock_ptr has
been updated. The lock operation needs to be redone in this case.
The locked hash bucket is not returned.
A special case is an early return in futex_lock_pi() (due to signal or
timeout) and a successful futex_wait_requeue_pi(). In both cases a valid
futex_q::lock_ptr is expected (and its matching hash bucket) but since
the waiter has been removed from the hash this can no longer be
guaranteed. Therefore before the waiter is removed and a reference is
acquired which is later dropped by the waiter to avoid a resize.
Add futex_q_lockptr_lock() and use it.
Acquire an additional reference in requeue_pi_wake_futex() and
futex_unlock_pi() while the futex_q is removed, denote this extra
reference in futex_q::drop_hb_ref and let the waiter drop the reference
in this case.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250416162921.513656-11-bigeasy@linutronix.de
To support runtime resizing of the process private hash, it's required
to not use the obtained hash bucket once the reference count has been
dropped. The reference will be dropped after the unlock of the hash
bucket.
The amount of waiters is decremented after the unlock operation. There
is no requirement that this needs to happen after the unlock. The
increment happens before acquiring the lock to signal early that there
will be a waiter. The waiter can avoid blocking on the lock if it is
known that there will be no waiter.
There is no difference in terms of ordering if the decrement happens
before or after the unlock.
Decrease the waiter count before the unlock operation.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250416162921.513656-10-bigeasy@linutronix.de
The global hash uses futex_hashsize to save the amount of the hash
buckets that have been allocated during system boot. On each
futex_hash() invocation this number is substracted by one to get the
mask. This can be optimized by saving directly the mask avoiding the
substraction on each futex_hash() invocation.
Rename futex_hashsize to futex_hashmask and save the mask of the
allocated hash map.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250226091057.bX8vObR4@linutronix.de
futex_queue() -> __futex_queue() uses 'current' as the task to store in
the struct futex_q->task field. This is fine for synchronous usage of
the futex infrastructure, but it's not always correct when used by
io_uring where the task doing the initial futex_queue() might not be
available later on. This doesn't lead to any issues currently, as the
io_uring side doesn't support PI futexes, but it does leave a
potentially dangling pointer which is never a good idea.
Have futex_queue() take a task_struct argument, and have the regular
callers pass in 'current' for that. Meanwhile io_uring can just pass in
NULL, as the task should never be used off that path. In theory
req->tctx->task could be used here, but there's no point populating it
with a task field that will never be used anyway.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/22484a23-542c-4003-b721-400688a0d055@kernel.dk
Josh Poimboeuf reports that he got a "will-it-scale.per_process_ops 1.9%
improvement" report for his patch that changed __get_user() to use
pointer masking instead of the explicit speculation barrier. However,
that patch doesn't actually work in the general case, because some (very
bad) architecture-specific code actually depends on __get_user() also
working on kernel addresses.
A profile showed that the offending __get_user() was the futex code,
which really should be fixed up to not use that horrid legacy case.
Rewrite futex_get_value_locked() to use the modern user acccess helpers,
and inline it so that the compiler not only avoids the function call for
a few instructions, but can do CSE on the address masking.
It also turns out the x86 futex functions have unnecessary barriers in
other places, so let's fix those up too.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241115230653.hfvzyf3aqqntgp63@jpoimboe/
Reported-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton:
- The series "zram: optimal post-processing target selection" from
Sergey Senozhatsky improves zram's post-processing selection
algorithm. This leads to improved memory savings.
- Wei Yang has gone to town on the mapletree code, contributing several
series which clean up the implementation:
- "refine mas_mab_cp()"
- "Reduce the space to be cleared for maple_big_node"
- "maple_tree: simplify mas_push_node()"
- "Following cleanup after introduce mas_wr_store_type()"
- "refine storing null"
- The series "selftests/mm: hugetlb_fault_after_madv improvements" from
David Hildenbrand fixes this selftest for s390.
- The series "introduce pte_offset_map_{ro|rw}_nolock()" from Qi Zheng
implements some rationaizations and cleanups in the page mapping
code.
- The series "mm: optimize shadow entries removal" from Shakeel Butt
optimizes the file truncation code by speeding up the handling of
shadow entries.
- The series "Remove PageKsm()" from Matthew Wilcox completes the
migration of this flag over to being a folio-based flag.
- The series "Unify hugetlb into arch_get_unmapped_area functions" from
Oscar Salvador implements a bunch of consolidations and cleanups in
the hugetlb code.
- The series "Do not shatter hugezeropage on wp-fault" from Dev Jain
takes away the wp-fault time practice of turning a huge zero page
into small pages. Instead we replace the whole thing with a THP. More
consistent cleaner and potentiall saves a large number of pagefaults.
- The series "percpu: Add a test case and fix for clang" from Andy
Shevchenko enhances and fixes the kernel's built in percpu test code.
- The series "mm/mremap: Remove extra vma tree walk" from Liam Howlett
optimizes mremap() by avoiding doing things which we didn't need to
do.
- The series "Improve the tmpfs large folio read performance" from
Baolin Wang teaches tmpfs to copy data into userspace at the folio
size rather than as individual pages. A 20% speedup was observed.
- The series "mm/damon/vaddr: Fix issue in
damon_va_evenly_split_region()" fro Zheng Yejian fixes DAMON
splitting.
- The series "memcg-v1: fully deprecate charge moving" from Shakeel
Butt removes the long-deprecated memcgv2 charge moving feature.
- The series "fix error handling in mmap_region() and refactor" from
Lorenzo Stoakes cleanup up some of the mmap() error handling and
addresses some potential performance issues.
- The series "x86/module: use large ROX pages for text allocations"
from Mike Rapoport teaches x86 to use large pages for
read-only-execute module text.
- The series "page allocation tag compression" from Suren Baghdasaryan
is followon maintenance work for the new page allocation profiling
feature.
- The series "page->index removals in mm" from Matthew Wilcox remove
most references to page->index in mm/. A slow march towards shrinking
struct page.
- The series "damon/{self,kunit}tests: minor fixups for DAMON debugfs
interface tests" from Andrew Paniakin performs maintenance work for
DAMON's self testing code.
- The series "mm: zswap swap-out of large folios" from Kanchana Sridhar
improves zswap's batching of compression and decompression. It is a
step along the way towards using Intel IAA hardware acceleration for
this zswap operation.
- The series "kasan: migrate the last module test to kunit" from
Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov completes the migration of the KASAN built-in
tests over to the KUnit framework.
- The series "implement lightweight guard pages" from Lorenzo Stoakes
permits userapace to place fault-generating guard pages within a
single VMA, rather than requiring that multiple VMAs be created for
this. Improved efficiencies for userspace memory allocators are
expected.
- The series "memcg: tracepoint for flushing stats" from JP Kobryn uses
tracepoints to provide increased visibility into memcg stats flushing
activity.
- The series "zram: IDLE flag handling fixes" from Sergey Senozhatsky
fixes a zram buglet which potentially affected performance.
- The series "mm: add more kernel parameters to control mTHP" from
Maíra Canal enhances our ability to control/configuremultisize THP
from the kernel boot command line.
- The series "kasan: few improvements on kunit tests" from Sabyrzhan
Tasbolatov has a couple of fixups for the KASAN KUnit tests.
- The series "mm/list_lru: Split list_lru lock into per-cgroup scope"
from Kairui Song optimizes list_lru memory utilization when lockdep
is enabled.
* tag 'mm-stable-2024-11-18-19-27' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (215 commits)
cma: enforce non-zero pageblock_order during cma_init_reserved_mem()
mm/kfence: add a new kunit test test_use_after_free_read_nofault()
zram: fix NULL pointer in comp_algorithm_show()
memcg/hugetlb: add hugeTLB counters to memcg
vmstat: call fold_vm_zone_numa_events() before show per zone NUMA event
mm: mmap_lock: check trace_mmap_lock_$type_enabled() instead of regcount
zram: ZRAM_DEF_COMP should depend on ZRAM
MAINTAINERS/MEMORY MANAGEMENT: add document files for mm
Docs/mm/damon: recommend academic papers to read and/or cite
mm: define general function pXd_init()
kmemleak: iommu/iova: fix transient kmemleak false positive
mm/list_lru: simplify the list_lru walk callback function
mm/list_lru: split the lock to per-cgroup scope
mm/list_lru: simplify reparenting and initial allocation
mm/list_lru: code clean up for reparenting
mm/list_lru: don't export list_lru_add
mm/list_lru: don't pass unnecessary key parameters
kasan: add kunit tests for kmalloc_track_caller, kmalloc_node_track_caller
kasan: change kasan_atomics kunit test as KUNIT_CASE_SLOW
kasan: use EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT to export symbols
...
Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"A rather large update for timekeeping and timers:
- The final step to get rid of auto-rearming posix-timers
posix-timers are currently auto-rearmed by the kernel when the
signal of the timer is ignored so that the timer signal can be
delivered once the corresponding signal is unignored.
This requires to throttle the timer to prevent a DoS by small
intervals and keeps the system pointlessly out of low power states
for no value. This is a long standing non-trivial problem due to
the lock order of posix-timer lock and the sighand lock along with
life time issues as the timer and the sigqueue have different life
time rules.
Cure this by:
- Embedding the sigqueue into the timer struct to have the same
life time rules. Aside of that this also avoids the lookup of
the timer in the signal delivery and rearm path as it's just a
always valid container_of() now.
- Queuing ignored timer signals onto a seperate ignored list.
- Moving queued timer signals onto the ignored list when the
signal is switched to SIG_IGN before it could be delivered.
- Walking the ignored list when SIG_IGN is lifted and requeue the
signals to the actual signal lists. This allows the signal
delivery code to rearm the timer.
This also required to consolidate the signal delivery rules so they
are consistent across all situations. With that all self test
scenarios finally succeed.
- Core infrastructure for VFS multigrain timestamping
This is required to allow the kernel to use coarse grained time
stamps by default and switch to fine grained time stamps when inode
attributes are actively observed via getattr().
These changes have been provided to the VFS tree as well, so that
the VFS specific infrastructure could be built on top.
- Cleanup and consolidation of the sleep() infrastructure
- Move all sleep and timeout functions into one file
- Rework udelay() and ndelay() into proper documented inline
functions and replace the hardcoded magic numbers by proper
defines.
- Rework the fsleep() implementation to take the reality of the
timer wheel granularity on different HZ values into account.
Right now the boundaries are hard coded time ranges which fail
to provide the requested accuracy on different HZ settings.
- Update documentation for all sleep/timeout related functions
and fix up stale documentation links all over the place
- Fixup a few usage sites
- Rework of timekeeping and adjtimex(2) to prepare for multiple PTP
clocks
A system can have multiple PTP clocks which are participating in
seperate and independent PTP clock domains. So far the kernel only
considers the PTP clock which is based on CLOCK TAI relevant as
that's the clock which drives the timekeeping adjustments via the
various user space daemons through adjtimex(2).
The non TAI based clock domains are accessible via the file
descriptor based posix clocks, but their usability is very limited.
They can't be accessed fast as they always go all the way out to
the hardware and they cannot be utilized in the kernel itself.
As Time Sensitive Networking (TSN) gains traction it is required to
provide fast user and kernel space access to these clocks.
The approach taken is to utilize the timekeeping and adjtimex(2)
infrastructure to provide this access in a similar way how the
kernel provides access to clock MONOTONIC, REALTIME etc.
Instead of creating a duplicated infrastructure this rework
converts timekeeping and adjtimex(2) into generic functionality
which operates on pointers to data structures instead of using
static variables.
This allows to provide time accessors and adjtimex(2) functionality
for the independent PTP clocks in a subsequent step.
- Consolidate hrtimer initialization
hrtimers are set up by initializing the data structure and then
seperately setting the callback function for historical reasons.
That's an extra unnecessary step and makes Rust support less
straight forward than it should be.
Provide a new set of hrtimer_setup*() functions and convert the
core code and a few usage sites of the less frequently used
interfaces over.
The bulk of the htimer_init() to hrtimer_setup() conversion is
already prepared and scheduled for the next merge window.
- Drivers:
- Ensure that the global timekeeping clocksource is utilizing the
cluster 0 timer on MIPS multi-cluster systems.
Otherwise CPUs on different clusters use their cluster specific
clocksource which is not guaranteed to be synchronized with
other clusters.
- Mostly boring cleanups, fixes, improvements and code movement"
* tag 'timers-core-2024-11-18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (140 commits)
posix-timers: Fix spurious warning on double enqueue versus do_exit()
clocksource/drivers/arm_arch_timer: Use of_property_present() for non-boolean properties
clocksource/drivers/gpx: Remove redundant casts
clocksource/drivers/timer-ti-dm: Fix child node refcount handling
dt-bindings: timer: actions,owl-timer: convert to YAML
clocksource/drivers/ralink: Add Ralink System Tick Counter driver
clocksource/drivers/mips-gic-timer: Always use cluster 0 counter as clocksource
clocksource/drivers/timer-ti-dm: Don't fail probe if int not found
clocksource/drivers:sp804: Make user selectable
clocksource/drivers/dw_apb: Remove unused dw_apb_clockevent functions
hrtimers: Delete hrtimer_init_on_stack()
alarmtimer: Switch to use hrtimer_setup() and hrtimer_setup_on_stack()
io_uring: Switch to use hrtimer_setup_on_stack()
sched/idle: Switch to use hrtimer_setup_on_stack()
hrtimers: Delete hrtimer_init_sleeper_on_stack()
wait: Switch to use hrtimer_setup_sleeper_on_stack()
timers: Switch to use hrtimer_setup_sleeper_on_stack()
net: pktgen: Switch to use hrtimer_setup_sleeper_on_stack()
futex: Switch to use hrtimer_setup_sleeper_on_stack()
fs/aio: Switch to use hrtimer_setup_sleeper_on_stack()
...
Jiri Slaby reported a futex state inconsistency resulting in -EINVAL during
a lock operation for a PI futex. It requires that the a lock process is
interrupted by a timeout or signal:
T1 Owns the futex in user space.
T2 Tries to acquire the futex in kernel (futex_lock_pi()). Allocates a
pi_state and attaches itself to it.
T2 Times out and removes its rt_waiter from the rt_mutex. Drops the
rtmutex lock and tries to acquire the hash bucket lock to remove
the futex_q. The lock is contended and T2 schedules out.
T1 Unlocks the futex (futex_unlock_pi()). Finds a futex_q but no
rt_waiter. Unlocks the futex (do_uncontended) and makes it available
to user space.
T3 Acquires the futex in user space.
T4 Tries to acquire the futex in kernel (futex_lock_pi()). Finds the
existing futex_q of T2 and tries to attach itself to the existing
pi_state. This (attach_to_pi_state()) fails with -EINVAL because uval
contains the TID of T3 but pi_state points to T1.
It's incorrect to unlock the futex and make it available for user space to
acquire as long as there is still an existing state attached to it in the
kernel.
T1 cannot hand over the futex to T2 because T2 already gave up and started
to clean up and is blocked on the hash bucket lock, so T2's futex_q with
the pi_state pointing to T1 is still queued.
T2 observes the futex_q, but ignores it as there is no waiter on the
corresponding rt_mutex and takes the uncontended path which allows the
subsequent caller of futex_lock_pi() (T4) to observe that stale state.
To prevent this the unlock path must dequeue all futex_q entries which
point to the same pi_state when there is no waiter on the rt mutex. This
requires obviously to make the dequeue conditional in the locking path to
prevent a double dequeue. With that it's guaranteed that user space cannot
observe an uncontended futex which has kernel state attached.
Fixes: fbeb558b0d ("futex/pi: Fix recursive rt_mutex waiter state")
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240118115451.0TkD_ZhB@linutronix.de
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/4611bcf2-44d0-4c34-9b84-17406f881003@kernel.org
On no-MMU, all futexes are treated as private because there is no need
to map a virtual address to physical to match the futex across
processes. This doesn't quite work though, because private futexes
include the current process's mm_struct as part of their key. This makes
it impossible for one process to wake up a shared futex being waited on
in another process.
Fix this bug by excluding the mm_struct from the key. With
a single address space, the futex address is already a unique key.
Fixes: 784bdf3bb6 ("futex: Assume all mappings are private on !MMU systems")
Signed-off-by: Ben Wolsieffer <ben.wolsieffer@hefring.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: André Almeida <andrealmeid@igalia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231019204548.1236437-2-ben.wolsieffer@hefring.com
