Commit Graph

6724 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
David Kaplan
8b3641dfb6 x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SSB
Attack vector controls for SSB were missed in the initial attack vector series.
The default mitigation for SSB requires user-space opt-in so it is only
relevant for user->user attacks.  Check with attack vector controls when
the command is auto - i.e., no explicit user selection has been done.

Fixes: 2d31d28746 ("x86/bugs: Define attack vectors relevant for each bug")
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250819192200.2003074-5-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-08-27 18:17:12 +02:00
K Prateek Nayak
c2415c407a x86/cpu/topology: Use initial APIC ID from XTOPOLOGY leaf on AMD/HYGON
Prior to the topology parsing rewrite and the switchover to the new parsing
logic for AMD processors in

  c749ce393b ("x86/cpu: Use common topology code for AMD"),

the initial_apicid on these platforms was:

- First initialized to the LocalApicId from CPUID leaf 0x1 EBX[31:24].

- Then overwritten by the ExtendedLocalApicId in CPUID leaf 0xb
  EDX[31:0] on processors that supported topoext.

With the new parsing flow introduced in

  f7fb3b2dd9 ("x86/cpu: Provide an AMD/HYGON specific topology parser"),

parse_8000_001e() now unconditionally overwrites the initial_apicid already
parsed during cpu_parse_topology_ext().

Although this has not been a problem on baremetal platforms, on virtualized AMD
guests that feature more than 255 cores, QEMU zeros out the CPUID leaf
0x8000001e on CPUs with CoreID > 255 to prevent collision of these IDs in
EBX[7:0] which can only represent a maximum of 255 cores [1].

This results in the following FW_BUG being logged when booting a guest
with more than 255 cores:

    [Firmware Bug]: CPU 512: APIC ID mismatch. CPUID: 0x0000 APIC: 0x0200

AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 2: System Programming Pub.
24593 Rev. 3.42 [2] Section 16.12 "x2APIC_ID" mentions the Extended
Enumeration leaf 0xb (Fn0000_000B_EDX[31:0])(which was later superseded by the
extended leaf 0x80000026) provides the full x2APIC ID under all circumstances
unlike the one reported by CPUID leaf 0x8000001e EAX which depends on the mode
in which APIC is configured.

Rely on the APIC ID parsed during cpu_parse_topology_ext() from CPUID leaf
0x80000026 or 0xb and only use the APIC ID from leaf 0x8000001e if
cpu_parse_topology_ext() failed (has_topoext is false).

On platforms that support the 0xb leaf (Zen2 or later, AMD guests on
QEMU) or the extended leaf 0x80000026 (Zen4 or later), the
initial_apicid is now set to the value parsed from EDX[31:0].

On older AMD/Hygon platforms that do not support the 0xb leaf but support the
TOPOEXT extension (families 0x15, 0x16, 0x17[Zen1], and Hygon), retain current
behavior where the initial_apicid is set using the 0x8000001e leaf.

Issue debugged by Naveen N Rao (AMD) <naveen@kernel.org> and Sairaj Kodilkar
<sarunkod@amd.com>.

  [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Fixes: c749ce393b ("x86/cpu: Use common topology code for AMD")
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Naveen N Rao (AMD) <naveen@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/35ac5dfbcaa4b [1]
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537 [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250825075732.10694-2-kprateek.nayak@amd.com
2025-08-27 11:31:11 +02:00
Borislav Petkov (AMD)
fcf8239ad6 x86/microcode/AMD: Handle the case of no BIOS microcode
Machines can be shipped without any microcode in the BIOS. Which means,
the microcode patch revision is 0.

Handle that gracefully.

Fixes: 94838d230a ("x86/microcode/AMD: Use the family,model,stepping encoded in the patch ID")
Reported-by: Vítek Vávra <vit.vavra.kh@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
2025-08-27 10:24:10 +02:00
Suchit Karunakaran
24963ae1b0 x86/cpu/intel: Fix the constant_tsc model check for Pentium 4
Pentium 4's which are INTEL_P4_PRESCOTT (model 0x03) and later have
a constant TSC. This was correctly captured until commit fadb6f569b
("x86/cpu/intel: Limit the non-architectural constant_tsc model checks").

In that commit, an error was introduced while selecting the last P4
model (0x06) as the upper bound. Model 0x06 was transposed to
INTEL_P4_WILLAMETTE, which is just plain wrong. That was presumably a
simple typo, probably just copying and pasting the wrong P4 model.

Fix the constant TSC logic to cover all later P4 models. End at
INTEL_P4_CEDARMILL which accurately corresponds to the last P4 model.

Fixes: fadb6f569b ("x86/cpu/intel: Limit the non-architectural constant_tsc model checks")
Signed-off-by: Suchit Karunakaran <suchitkarunakaran@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250816065126.5000-1-suchitkarunakaran%40gmail.com
2025-08-25 08:23:37 -07:00
Li RongQing
d4932a1b14 x86/bugs: Fix GDS mitigation selecting when mitigation is off
The current GDS mitigation logic incorrectly returns early when the
attack vector mitigation is turned off, which leads to two problems:

1. CPUs without ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL support are incorrectly marked with
   GDS_MITIGATION_OFF when they should be marked as
   GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED.

2. The mitigation state checks and locking verification that follow are
   skipped, which means:
   - fail to detect if the mitigation was locked
   - miss the warning when trying to disable a locked mitigation

Remove the early return to ensure proper mitigation state handling. This
allows:
- Proper mitigation classification for non-ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL CPUs
- Complete mitigation state verification

This also addresses the failed MSR 0x123 write attempt at boot on
non-ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL CPUs:

  unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x123 (tried to write 0x0000000000000010) at rIP: ... (update_gds_msr)
  Call Trace:
   identify_secondary_cpu
   start_secondary
   common_startup_64
   WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:1053 update_gds_msr

  [ bp: Massage, zap superfluous braces. ]

Fixes: 8c7261abcb ("x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for GDS")
Suggested-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250819023356.2012-1-lirongqing@baidu.com
2025-08-19 10:38:04 +02:00
Yazen Ghannam
e9576e0782 x86/CPU/AMD: Ignore invalid reset reason value
The reset reason value may be "all bits set", e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF. This is a
commonly used error response from hardware. This may occur due to a real
hardware issue or when running in a VM.

The user will see all reset reasons reported in this case.

Check for an error response value and return early to avoid decoding
invalid data.

Also, adjust the data variable type to match the hardware register size.

Fixes: ab81310287 ("x86/CPU/AMD: Print the reason for the last reset")
Reported-by: Libing He <libhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250721181155.3536023-1-yazen.ghannam@amd.com
2025-08-18 16:36:59 +02:00
Tianxiang Peng
d8df126349 x86/cpu/hygon: Add missing resctrl_cpu_detect() in bsp_init helper
Since

  923f3a2b48 ("x86/resctrl: Query LLC monitoring properties once during boot")

resctrl_cpu_detect() has been moved from common CPU initialization code to
the vendor-specific BSP init helper, while Hygon didn't put that call in their
code.

This triggers a division by zero fault during early booting stage on our
machines with X86_FEATURE_CQM* supported, where get_rdt_mon_resources() tries
to calculate mon_l3_config with uninitialized boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_occ_scale.

Add the missing resctrl_cpu_detect() in the Hygon BSP init helper.

  [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Fixes: 923f3a2b48 ("x86/resctrl: Query LLC monitoring properties once during boot")
Signed-off-by: Tianxiang Peng <txpeng@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Hui Li <caelli@tencent.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250623093153.3016937-1-txpeng@tencent.com
2025-08-18 12:09:26 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
8d561baae5 Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.17_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:

 - Remove a transitional asm/cpuid.h header which was added only as a
   fallback during cpuid helpers reorg

 - Initialize reserved fields in the SVSM page validation calls
   structure to zero in order to allow for future structure extensions

 - Have the sev-guest driver's buffers used in encryption operations be
   in linear mapping space as the encryption operation can be offloaded
   to an accelerator

 - Have a read-only MSR write when in an AMD SNP guest trap to the
   hypervisor as it is usually done. This makes the guest user
   experience better by simply raising a #GP instead of terminating said
   guest

 - Do not output AVX512 elapsed time for kernel threads because the data
   is wrong and fix a NULL pointer dereferencing in the process

 - Adjust the SRSO mitigation selection to the new attack vectors

* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.17_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/cpuid: Remove transitional <asm/cpuid.h> header
  x86/sev: Ensure SVSM reserved fields in a page validation entry are initialized to zero
  virt: sev-guest: Satisfy linear mapping requirement in get_derived_key()
  x86/sev: Improve handling of writes to intercepted TSC MSRs
  x86/fpu: Fix NULL dereference in avx512_status()
  x86/bugs: Select best SRSO mitigation
2025-08-17 06:53:15 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
20e0d85764 Merge tag 'snp_cache_coherency' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
- Add a mitigation for a cache coherency vulnerability when running an
   SNP guest which makes sure all cache lines belonging to a 4K page are
   evicted after latter has been converted to a guest-private page

[ SNP: Secure Nested Paging - not to be confused with Single Nucleotide
  Polymorphism, which is the more common use of that TLA. I am on a
  mission to write out the more obscure TLAs in order to keep track of
  them.

  Because while math tells us that there are only about 17k different
  combinations of three-letter acronyms using English letters (26^3), I
  am convinced that somehow Intel, AMD and ARM have together figured out
  new mathematics, and have at least a million different TLAs that they
  use.   - Linus ]

* tag 'snp_cache_coherency' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/sev: Evict cache lines during SNP memory validation
2025-08-12 08:19:23 -07:00
David Kaplan
4fa7d880ae x86/bugs: Select best SRSO mitigation
The SRSO bug can theoretically be used to conduct user->user or guest->guest
attacks and requires a mitigation (namely IBPB instead of SBPB on context
switch) for these.  So mark SRSO as being applicable to the user->user and
guest->guest attack vectors.

Additionally, SRSO supports multiple mitigations which mitigate different
potential attack vectors.  Some CPUs are also immune to SRSO from
certain attack vectors (like user->kernel).

Use the specific attack vectors requiring mitigation to select the best
SRSO mitigation to avoid unnecessary performance hits.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250721160310.1804203-1-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-08-11 17:32:36 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
7b306dfa32 x86/sev: Evict cache lines during SNP memory validation
An SNP cache coherency vulnerability requires a cache line eviction
mitigation when validating memory after a page state change to private.
The specific mitigation is to touch the first and last byte of each 4K
page that is being validated. There is no need to perform the mitigation
when performing a page state change to shared and rescinding validation.

CPUID bit Fn8000001F_EBX[31] defines the COHERENCY_SFW_NO CPUID bit
that, when set, indicates that the software mitigation for this
vulnerability is not needed.

Implement the mitigation and invoke it when validating memory (making it
private) and the COHERENCY_SFW_NO bit is not set, indicating the SNP
guest is vulnerable.

Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2025-08-06 19:17:22 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
beace86e61 Merge tag 'mm-stable-2025-07-30-15-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton:
 "As usual, many cleanups. The below blurbiage describes 42 patchsets.
  21 of those are partially or fully cleanup work. "cleans up",
  "cleanup", "maintainability", "rationalizes", etc.

  I never knew the MM code was so dirty.

  "mm: ksm: prevent KSM from breaking merging of new VMAs" (Lorenzo Stoakes)
     addresses an issue with KSM's PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE mode: newly
     mapped VMAs were not eligible for merging with existing adjacent
     VMAs.

  "mm/damon: introduce DAMON_STAT for simple and practical access monitoring" (SeongJae Park)
     adds a new kernel module which simplifies the setup and usage of
     DAMON in production environments.

  "stop passing a writeback_control to swap/shmem writeout" (Christoph Hellwig)
     is a cleanup to the writeback code which removes a couple of
     pointers from struct writeback_control.

  "drivers/base/node.c: optimization and cleanups" (Donet Tom)
     contains largely uncorrelated cleanups to the NUMA node setup and
     management code.

  "mm: userfaultfd: assorted fixes and cleanups" (Tal Zussman)
     does some maintenance work on the userfaultfd code.

  "Readahead tweaks for larger folios" (Ryan Roberts)
     implements some tuneups for pagecache readahead when it is reading
     into order>0 folios.

  "selftests/mm: Tweaks to the cow test" (Mark Brown)
     provides some cleanups and consistency improvements to the
     selftests code.

  "Optimize mremap() for large folios" (Dev Jain)
     does that. A 37% reduction in execution time was measured in a
     memset+mremap+munmap microbenchmark.

  "Remove zero_user()" (Matthew Wilcox)
     expunges zero_user() in favor of the more modern memzero_page().

  "mm/huge_memory: vmf_insert_folio_*() and vmf_insert_pfn_pud() fixes" (David Hildenbrand)
     addresses some warts which David noticed in the huge page code.
     These were not known to be causing any issues at this time.

  "mm/damon: use alloc_migrate_target() for DAMOS_MIGRATE_{HOT,COLD" (SeongJae Park)
     provides some cleanup and consolidation work in DAMON.

  "use vm_flags_t consistently" (Lorenzo Stoakes)
     uses vm_flags_t in places where we were inappropriately using other
     types.

  "mm/memfd: Reserve hugetlb folios before allocation" (Vivek Kasireddy)
     increases the reliability of large page allocation in the memfd
     code.

  "mm: Remove pXX_devmap page table bit and pfn_t type" (Alistair Popple)
     removes several now-unneeded PFN_* flags.

  "mm/damon: decouple sysfs from core" (SeongJae Park)
     implememnts some cleanup and maintainability work in the DAMON
     sysfs layer.

  "madvise cleanup" (Lorenzo Stoakes)
     does quite a lot of cleanup/maintenance work in the madvise() code.

  "madvise anon_name cleanups" (Vlastimil Babka)
     provides additional cleanups on top or Lorenzo's effort.

  "Implement numa node notifier" (Oscar Salvador)
     creates a standalone notifier for NUMA node memory state changes.
     Previously these were lumped under the more general memory
     on/offline notifier.

  "Make MIGRATE_ISOLATE a standalone bit" (Zi Yan)
     cleans up the pageblock isolation code and fixes a potential issue
     which doesn't seem to cause any problems in practice.

  "selftests/damon: add python and drgn based DAMON sysfs functionality tests" (SeongJae Park)
     adds additional drgn- and python-based DAMON selftests which are
     more comprehensive than the existing selftest suite.

  "Misc rework on hugetlb faulting path" (Oscar Salvador)
     fixes a rather obscure deadlock in the hugetlb fault code and
     follows that fix with a series of cleanups.

  "cma: factor out allocation logic from __cma_declare_contiguous_nid" (Mike Rapoport)
     rationalizes and cleans up the highmem-specific code in the CMA
     allocator.

  "mm/migration: rework movable_ops page migration (part 1)" (David Hildenbrand)
     provides cleanups and future-preparedness to the migration code.

  "mm/damon: add trace events for auto-tuned monitoring intervals and DAMOS quota" (SeongJae Park)
     adds some tracepoints to some DAMON auto-tuning code.

  "mm/damon: fix misc bugs in DAMON modules" (SeongJae Park)
     does that.

  "mm/damon: misc cleanups" (SeongJae Park)
     also does what it claims.

  "mm: folio_pte_batch() improvements" (David Hildenbrand)
     cleans up the large folio PTE batching code.

  "mm/damon/vaddr: Allow interleaving in migrate_{hot,cold} actions" (SeongJae Park)
     facilitates dynamic alteration of DAMON's inter-node allocation
     policy.

  "Remove unmap_and_put_page()" (Vishal Moola)
     provides a couple of page->folio conversions.

  "mm: per-node proactive reclaim" (Davidlohr Bueso)
     implements a per-node control of proactive reclaim - beyond the
     current memcg-based implementation.

  "mm/damon: remove damon_callback" (SeongJae Park)
     replaces the damon_callback interface with a more general and
     powerful damon_call()+damos_walk() interface.

  "mm/mremap: permit mremap() move of multiple VMAs" (Lorenzo Stoakes)
     implements a number of mremap cleanups (of course) in preparation
     for adding new mremap() functionality: newly permit the remapping
     of multiple VMAs when the user is specifying MREMAP_FIXED. It still
     excludes some specialized situations where this cannot be performed
     reliably.

  "drop hugetlb_free_pgd_range()" (Anthony Yznaga)
     switches some sparc hugetlb code over to the generic version and
     removes the thus-unneeded hugetlb_free_pgd_range().

  "mm/damon/sysfs: support periodic and automated stats update" (SeongJae Park)
     augments the present userspace-requested update of DAMON sysfs
     monitoring files. Automatic update is now provided, along with a
     tunable to control the update interval.

  "Some randome fixes and cleanups to swapfile" (Kemeng Shi)
     does what is claims.

  "mm: introduce snapshot_page" (Luiz Capitulino and David Hildenbrand)
     provides (and uses) a means by which debug-style functions can grab
     a copy of a pageframe and inspect it locklessly without tripping
     over the races inherent in operating on the live pageframe
     directly.

  "use per-vma locks for /proc/pid/maps reads" (Suren Baghdasaryan)
     addresses the large contention issues which can be triggered by
     reads from that procfs file. Latencies are reduced by more than
     half in some situations. The series also introduces several new
     selftests for the /proc/pid/maps interface.

  "__folio_split() clean up" (Zi Yan)
     cleans up __folio_split()!

  "Optimize mprotect() for large folios" (Dev Jain)
     provides some quite large (>3x) speedups to mprotect() when dealing
     with large folios.

  "selftests/mm: reuse FORCE_READ to replace "asm volatile("" : "+r" (XXX));" and some cleanup" (wang lian)
     does some cleanup work in the selftests code.

  "tools/testing: expand mremap testing" (Lorenzo Stoakes)
     extends the mremap() selftest in several ways, including adding
     more checking of Lorenzo's recently added "permit mremap() move of
     multiple VMAs" feature.

  "selftests/damon/sysfs.py: test all parameters" (SeongJae Park)
     extends the DAMON sysfs interface selftest so that it tests all
     possible user-requested parameters. Rather than the present minimal
     subset"

* tag 'mm-stable-2025-07-30-15-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (370 commits)
  MAINTAINERS: add missing headers to mempory policy & migration section
  MAINTAINERS: add missing file to cgroup section
  MAINTAINERS: add MM MISC section, add missing files to MISC and CORE
  MAINTAINERS: add missing zsmalloc file
  MAINTAINERS: add missing files to page alloc section
  MAINTAINERS: add missing shrinker files
  MAINTAINERS: move memremap.[ch] to hotplug section
  MAINTAINERS: add missing mm_slot.h file THP section
  MAINTAINERS: add missing interval_tree.c to memory mapping section
  MAINTAINERS: add missing percpu-internal.h file to per-cpu section
  mm/page_alloc: remove trace_mm_alloc_contig_migrate_range_info()
  selftests/damon: introduce _common.sh to host shared function
  selftests/damon/sysfs.py: test runtime reduction of DAMON parameters
  selftests/damon/sysfs.py: test non-default parameters runtime commit
  selftests/damon/sysfs.py: generalize DAMON context commit assertion
  selftests/damon/sysfs.py: generalize monitoring attributes commit assertion
  selftests/damon/sysfs.py: generalize DAMOS schemes commit assertion
  selftests/damon/sysfs.py: test DAMOS filters commitment
  selftests/damon/sysfs.py: generalize DAMOS scheme commit assertion
  selftests/damon/sysfs.py: test DAMOS destinations commitment
  ...
2025-07-31 14:57:54 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
4dd39ddeb6 Merge tag 'x86-cpu-2025-07-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cpu update from Ingo Molnar:
 "Add user-space CPUID faulting support for AMD CPUs"

* tag 'x86-cpu-2025-07-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/CPU/AMD: Add CPUID faulting support
2025-07-29 19:22:21 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
56d5e32929 Merge tag 'x86-boot-2025-07-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 boot updates from Ingo Molnar:

 - Implement support for embedding EFI SBAT data (Secure Boot Advanced
   Targeting: a secure boot image revocation facility) on x86 (Vitaly
   Kuznetsov)

 - Move the efi_enter_virtual_mode() initialization call from the
   generic init code to x86 init code (Alexander Shishkin)

* tag 'x86-boot-2025-07-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/efi: Implement support for embedding SBAT data for x86
  x86/efi: Move runtime service initialization to arch/x86
2025-07-29 18:58:22 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
01fce21e1a Merge tag 'x86_microcode_for_v6.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 microcode loader update from Borislav Petkov:

 - Switch the microcode loader from using the fake platform device to
   the new simple faux bus

* tag 'x86_microcode_for_v6.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/microcode: Move away from using a fake platform device
2025-07-29 17:16:26 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
04d29e3609 Merge tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 CPU mitigation updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Untangle the Retbleed from the ITS mitigation on Intel. Allow for ITS
   to enable stuffing independently from Retbleed, do some cleanups to
   simplify and streamline the code

 - Simplify SRSO and make mitigation types selection more versatile
   depending on the Retbleed mitigation selection. Simplify code some

 - Add the second part of the attack vector controls which provide a lot
   friendlier user interface to the speculation mitigations than
   selecting each one by one as it is now.

   Instead, the selection of whole attack vectors which are relevant to
   the system in use can be done and protection against only those
   vectors is enabled, thus giving back some performance to the users

* tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (31 commits)
  x86/bugs: Print enabled attack vectors
  x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TSA
  x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for PTI
  x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for ITS
  x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRSO
  x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for L1TF
  x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2
  x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for BHI
  x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user
  x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed
  x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1
  x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for GDS
  x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRBDS
  x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for RFDS
  x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MMIO
  x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TAA
  x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MDS
  x86/bugs: Define attack vectors relevant for each bug
  x86/Kconfig: Add arch attack vector support
  cpu: Define attack vectors
  ...
2025-07-29 16:34:45 -07:00
Ingo Molnar
5bf2f5119b Merge tag 'v6.16' into x86/cpu, to resolve conflict
Resolve overlapping context conflict between this upstream fix:

  d8010d4ba4 ("x86/bugs: Add a Transient Scheduler Attacks mitigation")

And this pending commit in tip:x86/cpu:

  65f55a3017 ("x86/CPU/AMD: Add CPUID faulting support")

  Conflicts:
	arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2025-07-28 07:17:38 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
5d5d62298b Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.16_rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:

 - Update Kirill's email address

 - Allow hugetlb PMD sharing only on 64-bit as it doesn't make a whole
   lotta sense on 32-bit

 - Add fixes for a misconfigured AMD Zen2 client which wasn't even
   supposed to run Linux

* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.16_rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  MAINTAINERS: Update Kirill Shutemov's email address for TDX
  x86/mm: Disable hugetlb page table sharing on 32-bit
  x86/CPU/AMD: Disable INVLPGB on Zen2
  x86/rdrand: Disable RDSEED on AMD Cyan Skillfish
2025-07-13 10:41:19 -07:00
David Kaplan
a026dc61cf x86/bugs: Print enabled attack vectors
Print the status of enabled attack vectors and SMT mitigation status in the
boot log for easier reporting and debugging.  This information will also be
available through sysfs.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-21-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11 17:56:41 +02:00
David Kaplan
6b21d2f0dc x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TSA
Use attack vector controls to determine which TSA mitigation to use.

  [ bp: Simplify the condition in the select function for better
    readability. ]

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250709155844.3279471-1-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11 17:56:41 +02:00
David Kaplan
0cdd2c4f35 x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for ITS
Use attack vector controls to determine if ITS mitigation is required.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-19-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11 17:56:41 +02:00
David Kaplan
eda718fde6 x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRSO
Use attack vector controls to determine if SRSO mitigation is required.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-18-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11 17:56:41 +02:00
David Kaplan
2f970a5269 x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for L1TF
Use attack vector controls to determine if L1TF mitigation is required.

Disable SMT if cross-thread protection is desired.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-17-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11 17:56:41 +02:00
David Kaplan
fdf99228e2 x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2
Use attack vector controls to determine if spectre_v2 mitigation is
required.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-16-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11 17:56:41 +02:00
David Kaplan
ddcd4d3cb3 x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for BHI
Use attack vector controls to determine if BHI mitigation is required.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-15-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11 17:56:41 +02:00
David Kaplan
07a659edcf x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user
Use attack vector controls to determine if spectre_v2_user mitigation is
required.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-14-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11 17:56:41 +02:00
David Kaplan
9687eb2399 x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed
Use attack vector controls to determine if retbleed mitigation is
required.

Disable SMT if cross-thread protection is desired and STIBP is not
available.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-13-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11 17:56:41 +02:00
David Kaplan
19a5f3ea43 x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1
Use attack vector controls to determine if spectre_v1 mitigation is
required.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-12-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11 17:56:41 +02:00
David Kaplan
8c7261abcb x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for GDS
Use attack vector controls to determine if GDS mitigation is required.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-11-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11 17:56:41 +02:00
David Kaplan
71dc301c26 x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRBDS
Use attack vector controls to determine if SRBDS mitigation is required.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-10-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11 17:56:40 +02:00
David Kaplan
54b53dca65 x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for RFDS
Use attack vector controls to determine if RFDS mitigation is required.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-9-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11 17:56:40 +02:00
David Kaplan
de6f0921ba x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MMIO
Use attack vectors controls to determine if MMIO mitigation is required.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-8-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11 17:56:40 +02:00
David Kaplan
736565d4ed x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TAA
Use attack vector controls to determine if TAA mitigation is required.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-7-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11 17:56:40 +02:00
David Kaplan
e3a88d4c06 x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MDS
Use attack vector controls to determine if MDS mitigation is required.
The global mitigations=off command now simply disables all attack vectors
so explicit checking of mitigations=off is no longer needed.

If cross-thread attack mitigations are required, disable SMT.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-6-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11 17:56:40 +02:00
David Kaplan
2d31d28746 x86/bugs: Define attack vectors relevant for each bug
Add a function which defines which vulnerabilities should be mitigated
based on the selected attack vector controls.  The selections here are
based on the individual characteristics of each vulnerability.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-5-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11 17:56:40 +02:00
Lorenzo Stoakes
d75fa3c947 mm: update architecture and driver code to use vm_flags_t
In future we intend to change the vm_flags_t type, so it isn't correct for
architecture and driver code to assume it is unsigned long.  Correct this
assumption across the board.

Overall, this patch does not introduce any functional change.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b6eb1894abc5555ece80bb08af5c022ef780c8bc.1750274467.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>	[arm64]
Acked-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2025-07-09 22:42:14 -07:00
Borislav Petkov (AMD)
fde494e905 Merge tag 'tsa_x86_bugs_for_6.16' into tip-x86-bugs
Pick up TSA changes from mainline so that attack vectors work can
continue ontop.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
2025-07-09 18:16:53 +02:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman
9b355cdb63 x86/microcode: Move away from using a fake platform device
Downloading firmware needs a device to hang off of, and so a platform device
seemed like the simplest way to do this.  Now that we have a faux device
interface, use that instead as this "microcode device" is not anything
resembling a platform device at all.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/2025070121-omission-small-9308@gregkh
2025-07-09 13:12:08 +02:00
Mikhail Paulyshka
a74bb5f202 x86/CPU/AMD: Disable INVLPGB on Zen2
AMD Cyan Skillfish (Family 17h, Model 47h, Stepping 0h) has an issue
that causes system oopses and panics when performing TLB flush using
INVLPGB.

However, the problem is that that machine has misconfigured CPUID and
should not report the INVLPGB bit in the first place. So zap the
kernel's representation of the flag so that nothing gets confused.

  [ bp: Massage. ]

Fixes: 767ae437a3 ("x86/mm: Add INVLPGB feature and Kconfig entry")
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Paulyshka <me@mixaill.net>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1ebe845b-322b-4929-9093-b41074e9e939@mixaill.net
2025-07-08 21:34:01 +02:00
Mikhail Paulyshka
5b937a1ed6 x86/rdrand: Disable RDSEED on AMD Cyan Skillfish
AMD Cyan Skillfish (Family 17h, Model 47h, Stepping 0h) has an error that
causes RDSEED to always return 0xffffffff, while RDRAND works correctly.

Mask the RDSEED cap for this CPU so that both /proc/cpuinfo and direct CPUID
read report RDSEED as unavailable.

  [ bp: Move to amd.c, massage. ]

Signed-off-by: Mikhail Paulyshka <me@mixaill.net>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250524145319.209075-1-me@mixaill.net
2025-07-08 21:33:26 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
6e9128ff9d Merge tag 'tsa_x86_bugs_for_6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull CPU speculation fixes from Borislav Petkov:
 "Add the mitigation logic for Transient Scheduler Attacks (TSA)

  TSA are new aspeculative side channel attacks related to the execution
  timing of instructions under specific microarchitectural conditions.
  In some cases, an attacker may be able to use this timing information
  to infer data from other contexts, resulting in information leakage.

  Add the usual controls of the mitigation and integrate it into the
  existing speculation bugs infrastructure in the kernel"

* tag 'tsa_x86_bugs_for_6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/process: Move the buffer clearing before MONITOR
  x86/microcode/AMD: Add TSA microcode SHAs
  KVM: SVM: Advertise TSA CPUID bits to guests
  x86/bugs: Add a Transient Scheduler Attacks mitigation
  x86/bugs: Rename MDS machinery to something more generic
2025-07-07 17:08:36 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
bdde3141ce Merge tag 'ras_urgent_for_v6.16_rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull RAS fixes from Borislav Petkov:

 - Do not remove the MCE sysfs hierarchy if thresholding sysfs nodes
   init fails due to new/unknown banks present, which in itself is not
   fatal anyway; add default names for new banks

 - Make sure MCE polling settings are honored after CMCI storms

 - Make sure MCE threshold limit is reset after the thresholding
   interrupt has been serviced

 - Clean up properly and disable CMCI banks on shutdown so that a
   second/kexec-ed kernel can rediscover those banks again

* tag 'ras_urgent_for_v6.16_rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/mce: Make sure CMCI banks are cleared during shutdown on Intel
  x86/mce/amd: Fix threshold limit reset
  x86/mce/amd: Add default names for MCA banks and blocks
  x86/mce: Ensure user polling settings are honored when restarting timer
  x86/mce: Don't remove sysfs if thresholding sysfs init fails
2025-07-06 09:17:48 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
df46426745 Merge tag 'platform-drivers-x86-v6.16-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pdx86/platform-drivers-x86
Pull x86 platform drivers fixes from Ilpo Järvinen:
 "Mostly a few lines fixed here and there except amd/isp4 which improves
  swnodes relationships but that is a new driver not in any stable
  kernels yet. The think-lmi driver changes also look relatively large
  but there are just many fixes to it.

  The i2c/piix4 change is a effectively a revert of the commit
  7e173eb82a ("i2c: piix4: Make CONFIG_I2C_PIIX4 dependent on
  CONFIG_X86") but that required moving the header out from arch/x86
  under include/linux/platform_data/

  Summary:

   - amd/isp4: Improve swnode graph (new driver exception)

   - asus-nb-wmi: Use duo keyboard quirk for Zenbook Duo UX8406CA

   - dell-lis3lv02d: Add Latitude 5500 accelerometer address

   - dell-wmi-sysman: Fix WMI data block retrieval and class dev unreg

   - hp-bioscfg: Fix class device unregistration

   - i2c: piix4: Re-enable on non-x86 + move FCH header under platform_data/

   - intel/hid: Wildcat Lake support

   - mellanox:
      - mlxbf-pmc: Fix duplicate event ID
      - mlxbf-tmfifo: Fix vring_desc.len assignment
      - mlxreg-lc: Fix bit-not-set logic check
      - nvsw-sn2201: Fix bus number in error message & spelling errors

   - portwell-ec: Move watchdog device under correct platform hierarchy

   - think-lmi: Error handling fixes (sysfs, kset, kobject, class dev unreg)

   - thinkpad_acpi: Handle HKEY 0x1402 event (2025 Thinkpads)

   - wmi: Fix WMI event enablement"

* tag 'platform-drivers-x86-v6.16-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pdx86/platform-drivers-x86: (22 commits)
  platform/x86: think-lmi: Fix sysfs group cleanup
  platform/x86: think-lmi: Fix kobject cleanup
  platform/x86: think-lmi: Create ksets consecutively
  platform/mellanox: mlxreg-lc: Fix logic error in power state check
  i2c: Re-enable piix4 driver on non-x86
  Move FCH header to a location accessible by all archs
  platform/x86/intel/hid: Add Wildcat Lake support
  platform/x86: dell-wmi-sysman: Fix class device unregistration
  platform/x86: think-lmi: Fix class device unregistration
  platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: Fix class device unregistration
  platform/x86: Update swnode graph for amd isp4
  platform/x86: dell-wmi-sysman: Fix WMI data block retrieval in sysfs callbacks
  platform/x86: wmi: Update documentation of WCxx/WExx ACPI methods
  platform/x86: wmi: Fix WMI event enablement
  platform/mellanox: nvsw-sn2201: Fix bus number in adapter error message
  platform/mellanox: Fix spelling and comment clarity in Mellanox drivers
  platform/mellanox: mlxbf-pmc: Fix duplicate event ID for CACHE_DATA1
  platform/x86: thinkpad_acpi: handle HKEY 0x1402 event
  platform/x86: asus-nb-wmi: add DMI quirk for ASUS Zenbook Duo UX8406CA
  platform/x86: dell-lis3lv02d: Add Latitude 5500
  ...
2025-07-04 10:05:31 -07:00
Mario Limonciello
b1c26e0595 Move FCH header to a location accessible by all archs
A new header fch.h was created to store registers used by different AMD
drivers.  This header was included by i2c-piix4 in
commit 624b0d5696 ("i2c: piix4, x86/platform: Move the SB800 PIIX4 FCH
definitions to <asm/amd/fch.h>"). To prevent compile failures on non-x86
archs i2c-piix4 was set to only compile on x86 by commit 7e173eb82a
("i2c: piix4: Make CONFIG_I2C_PIIX4 dependent on CONFIG_X86").
This was not a good decision because loongarch and mips both actually
support i2c-piix4 and set it enabled in the defconfig.

Move the header to a location accessible by all architectures.

Fixes: 624b0d5696 ("i2c: piix4, x86/platform: Move the SB800 PIIX4 FCH definitions to <asm/amd/fch.h>")
Suggested-by: Hans de Goede <hansg@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hansg@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610205817.3912944-1-superm1@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
2025-06-30 13:42:11 +03:00
JP Kobryn
30ad231a50 x86/mce: Make sure CMCI banks are cleared during shutdown on Intel
CMCI banks are not cleared during shutdown on Intel CPUs. As a side effect,
when a kexec is performed, CPUs coming back online are unable to
rediscover/claim these occupied banks which breaks MCE reporting.

Clear the CPU ownership during shutdown via cmci_clear() so the banks can
be reclaimed and MCE reporting will become functional once more.

  [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Reported-by: Aijay Adams <aijay@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: JP Kobryn <inwardvessel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250627174935.95194-1-inwardvessel@gmail.com
2025-06-28 12:45:48 +02:00
Yazen Ghannam
5f6e3b7206 x86/mce/amd: Fix threshold limit reset
The MCA threshold limit must be reset after servicing the interrupt.

Currently, the restart function doesn't have an explicit check for this.  It
makes some assumptions based on the current limit and what's in the registers.
These assumptions don't always hold, so the limit won't be reset in some
cases.

Make the reset condition explicit. Either an interrupt/overflow has occurred
or the bank is being initialized.

Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250624-wip-mca-updates-v4-4-236dd74f645f@amd.com
2025-06-27 13:16:23 +02:00
Yazen Ghannam
d66e1e90b1 x86/mce/amd: Add default names for MCA banks and blocks
Ensure that sysfs init doesn't fail for new/unrecognized bank types or if
a bank has additional blocks available.

Most MCA banks have a single thresholding block, so the block takes the same
name as the bank.

Unified Memory Controllers (UMCs) are a special case where there are two
blocks and each has a unique name.

However, the microarchitecture allows for five blocks. Any new MCA bank types
with more than one block will be missing names for the extra blocks. The MCE
sysfs will fail to initialize in this case.

Fixes: 87a6d4091b ("x86/mce/AMD: Update sysfs bank names for SMCA systems")
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250624-wip-mca-updates-v4-3-236dd74f645f@amd.com
2025-06-27 13:13:36 +02:00
Yazen Ghannam
00c092de6f x86/mce: Ensure user polling settings are honored when restarting timer
Users can disable MCA polling by setting the "ignore_ce" parameter or by
setting "check_interval=0". This tells the kernel to *not* start the MCE
timer on a CPU.

If the user did not disable CMCI, then storms can occur. When these
happen, the MCE timer will be started with a fixed interval. After the
storm subsides, the timer's next interval is set to check_interval.

This disregards the user's input through "ignore_ce" and
"check_interval". Furthermore, if "check_interval=0", then the new timer
will run faster than expected.

Create a new helper to check these conditions and use it when a CMCI
storm ends.

  [ bp: Massage. ]

Fixes: 7eae17c4ad ("x86/mce: Add per-bank CMCI storm mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250624-wip-mca-updates-v4-2-236dd74f645f@amd.com
2025-06-27 12:41:44 +02:00
Yazen Ghannam
4c113a5b28 x86/mce: Don't remove sysfs if thresholding sysfs init fails
Currently, the MCE subsystem sysfs interface will be removed if the
thresholding sysfs interface fails to be created. A common failure is due to
new MCA bank types that are not recognized and don't have a short name set.

The MCA thresholding feature is optional and should not break the common MCE
sysfs interface. Also, new MCA bank types are occasionally introduced, and
updates will be needed to recognize them. But likewise, this should not break
the common sysfs interface.

Keep the MCE sysfs interface regardless of the status of the thresholding
sysfs interface.

Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250624-wip-mca-updates-v4-1-236dd74f645f@amd.com
2025-06-26 17:28:13 +02:00
David Kaplan
98b5dab4d2 x86/bugs: Clean up SRSO microcode handling
SRSO microcode only exists for Zen3/Zen4 CPUs.  For those CPUs, the microcode
is required for any mitigation other than Safe-RET to be effective.  Safe-RET
can still protect user->kernel and guest->host attacks without microcode.

Clarify this in the code and ensure that SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED is
selected for any mitigation besides Safe-RET if the required microcode isn't
present.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250625155805.600376-4-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-06-26 13:32:31 +02:00