This change introduces a mechanism for notifying userspace
applications about changes to IPv6 anycast addresses via netlink. It
includes:
* Addition and deletion of IPv6 anycast addresses are reported using
RTM_NEWANYCAST and RTM_DELANYCAST.
* A new netlink group (RTNLGRP_IPV6_ACADDR) for subscribing to these
notifications.
This enables user space applications(e.g. ip monitor) to efficiently
track anycast addresses through netlink messages, improving metrics
collection and system monitoring. It also unlocks the potential for
advanced anycast management in user space, such as hardware offload
control and fine grained network control.
Cc: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuyang Huang <yuyanghuang@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250107114355.1766086-1-yuyanghuang@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
NT waits can optionally be made "alertable". This is a special channel for
thread wakeup that is mildly similar to SIGIO. A thread has an internal single
bit of "alerted" state, and if a thread is alerted while an alertable wait, the
wait will return a special value, consume the "alerted" state, and will not
consume any of its objects.
Alerts are implemented using events; the user-space NT emulator is expected to
create an internal ntsync event for each thread and pass that event to wait
functions.
Signed-off-by: Elizabeth Figura <zfigura@codeweavers.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241213193511.457338-16-zfigura@codeweavers.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This correspond to the NT syscall NtCreateEvent().
An NT event holds a single bit of state denoting whether it is signaled or
unsignaled.
There are two types of events: manual-reset and automatic-reset. When an
automatic-reset event is acquired via a wait function, its state is reset to
unsignaled. Manual-reset events are not affected by wait functions.
Whether the event is manual-reset, and its initial state, are specified at
creation time.
Signed-off-by: Elizabeth Figura <zfigura@codeweavers.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241213193511.457338-9-zfigura@codeweavers.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This does not correspond to any NT syscall. Rather, when a thread dies, it
should be called by the NT emulator for each mutex, with the TID of the dying
thread.
NT mutexes are robust (in the pthread sense). When an NT thread dies, any
mutexes it owned are immediately released. Acquisition of those mutexes by other
threads will return a special value indicating that the mutex was abandoned,
like EOWNERDEAD returned from pthread_mutex_lock(), and EOWNERDEAD is indeed
used here for that purpose.
Signed-off-by: Elizabeth Figura <zfigura@codeweavers.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241213193511.457338-8-zfigura@codeweavers.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This corresponds to the NT syscall NtCreateMutant().
An NT mutex is recursive, with a 32-bit recursion counter. When acquired via
NtWaitForMultipleObjects(), the recursion counter is incremented by one. The OS
records the thread which acquired it.
The OS records the thread which acquired it. However, in order to keep this
driver self-contained, the owning thread ID is managed by user-space, and passed
as a parameter to all relevant ioctls.
The initial owner and recursion count, if any, are specified when the mutex is
created.
Signed-off-by: Elizabeth Figura <zfigura@codeweavers.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241213193511.457338-6-zfigura@codeweavers.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This is similar to NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ANY, but waits until all of the objects are
simultaneously signaled, and then acquires all of them as a single atomic
operation.
Because acquisition of multiple objects is atomic, some complex locking is
required. We cannot simply spin-lock multiple objects simultaneously, as that
may disable preëmption for a problematically long time.
Instead, modifying any object which may be involved in a wait-all operation takes
a device-wide sleeping mutex, "wait_all_lock", instead of the normal object
spinlock.
Because wait-for-all is a rare operation, in order to optimize wait-for-any,
this lock is only taken when necessary. "all_hint" is used to mark objects which
are involved in a wait-for-all operation, and if an object is not, only its
spinlock is taken.
The locking scheme used here was written by Peter Zijlstra.
Signed-off-by: Elizabeth Figura <zfigura@codeweavers.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241213193511.457338-5-zfigura@codeweavers.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This corresponds to part of the functionality of the NT syscall
NtWaitForMultipleObjects(). Specifically, it implements the behaviour where
the third argument (wait_any) is TRUE, and it does not handle alertable waits.
Those features have been split out into separate patches to ease review.
This patch therefore implements the wait/wake infrastructure which comprises the
core of ntsync's functionality.
NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ANY is a vectored wait function similar to poll(). Unlike
poll(), it "consumes" objects when they are signaled. For semaphores, this means
decreasing one from the internal counter. At most one object can be consumed by
this function.
This wait/wake model is fundamentally different from that used anywhere else in
the kernel, and for that reason ntsync does not use any existing infrastructure,
such as futexes, kernel mutexes or semaphores, or wait_event().
Up to 64 objects can be waited on at once. As soon as one is signaled, the
object with the lowest index is consumed, and that index is returned via the
"index" field.
A timeout is supported. The timeout is passed as a u64 nanosecond value, which
represents absolute time measured against either the MONOTONIC or REALTIME clock
(controlled by the flags argument). If U64_MAX is passed, the ioctl waits
indefinitely.
This ioctl validates that all objects belong to the relevant device. This is not
necessary for any technical reason related to NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ANY, but will be
necessary for NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ALL introduced in the following patch.
Some padding fields are added for alignment and for fields which will be added
in future patches (split out to ease review).
Signed-off-by: Elizabeth Figura <zfigura@codeweavers.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241213193511.457338-4-zfigura@codeweavers.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Sometimes one needs to be able not only to catch PPS signals but to
produce them also. For example, running a distributed simulation,
which requires computers' clock to be synchronized very tightly.
This patch adds PPS generators class in order to have a well-defined
interface for these devices.
Signed-off-by: Rodolfo Giometti <giometti@enneenne.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241108073115.759039-2-giometti@enneenne.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2025-01-07
We've added 7 non-merge commits during the last 32 day(s) which contain
a total of 11 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 103 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) Migrate the test_xdp_meta.sh BPF selftest into test_progs
framework, from Bastien Curutchet.
2) Add ability to configure head/tailroom for netkit devices,
from Daniel Borkmann.
3) Fixes and improvements to the xdp_hw_metadata selftest,
from Song Yoong Siang.
* tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next:
selftests/bpf: Extend netkit tests to validate set {head,tail}room
netkit: Add add netkit {head,tail}room to rt_link.yaml
netkit: Allow for configuring needed_{head,tail}room
selftests/bpf: Migrate test_xdp_meta.sh into xdp_context_test_run.c
selftests/bpf: test_xdp_meta: Rename BPF sections
selftests/bpf: Enable Tx hwtstamp in xdp_hw_metadata
selftests/bpf: Actuate tx_metadata_len in xdp_hw_metadata
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250107130908.143644-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Allow the user to configure needed_{head,tail}room for both netkit
devices. The idea is similar to 163e529200 ("veth: implement
ndo_set_rx_headroom") with the difference that the two parameters
can be specified upon device creation. By default the current behavior
stays as is which is needed_{head,tail}room is 0.
In case of Cilium, for example, the netkit devices are not enslaved
into a bridge or openvswitch device (rather, BPF-based redirection
is used out of tcx), and as such these parameters are not propagated
into the Pod's netns via peer device.
Given Cilium can run in vxlan/geneve tunneling mode (needed_headroom)
and/or be used in combination with WireGuard (needed_{head,tail}room),
allow the Cilium CNI plugin to specify these two upon netkit device
creation.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241220234658.490686-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Pull networking fixes from Jakub Kicinski:
"Including fixes from wireles and netfilter.
Nothing major here. Over the last two weeks we gathered only around
two-thirds of our normal weekly fix count, but delaying sending these
until -rc7 seemed like a really bad idea.
AFAIK we have no bugs under investigation. One or two reverts for
stuff for which we haven't gotten a proper fix will likely come in the
next PR.
Current release - fix to a fix:
- netfilter: nft_set_hash: unaligned atomic read on struct
nft_set_ext
- eth: gve: trigger RX NAPI instead of TX NAPI in gve_xsk_wakeup
Previous releases - regressions:
- net: reenable NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM offload for BIG TCP packets
- mptcp:
- fix sleeping rcvmsg sleeping forever after bad recvbuffer adjust
- fix TCP options overflow
- prevent excessive coalescing on receive, fix throughput
- net: fix memory leak in tcp_conn_request() if map insertion fails
- wifi: cw1200: fix potential NULL dereference after conversion to
GPIO descriptors
- phy: micrel: dynamically control external clock of KSZ PHY, fix
suspend behavior
Previous releases - always broken:
- af_packet: fix VLAN handling with MSG_PEEK
- net: restrict SO_REUSEPORT to inet sockets
- netdev-genl: avoid empty messages in NAPI get
- dsa: microchip: fix set_ageing_time function on KSZ9477 and LAN937X
- eth:
- gve: XDP fixes around transmit, queue wakeup etc.
- ti: icssg-prueth: fix firmware load sequence to prevent time
jump which breaks timesync related operations
Misc:
- netlink: specs: mptcp: add missing attr and improve documentation"
* tag 'net-6.13-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (50 commits)
net: ti: icssg-prueth: Fix clearing of IEP_CMP_CFG registers during iep_init
net: ti: icssg-prueth: Fix firmware load sequence.
mptcp: prevent excessive coalescing on receive
mptcp: don't always assume copied data in mptcp_cleanup_rbuf()
mptcp: fix recvbuffer adjust on sleeping rcvmsg
ila: serialize calls to nf_register_net_hooks()
af_packet: fix vlan_get_protocol_dgram() vs MSG_PEEK
af_packet: fix vlan_get_tci() vs MSG_PEEK
net: wwan: iosm: Properly check for valid exec stage in ipc_mmio_init()
net: restrict SO_REUSEPORT to inet sockets
net: reenable NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM offload for BIG TCP packets
net: sfc: Correct key_len for efx_tc_ct_zone_ht_params
net: wwan: t7xx: Fix FSM command timeout issue
sky2: Add device ID 11ab:4373 for Marvell 88E8075
mptcp: fix TCP options overflow.
net: mv643xx_eth: fix an OF node reference leak
gve: trigger RX NAPI instead of TX NAPI in gve_xsk_wakeup
eth: bcmsysport: fix call balance of priv->clk handling routines
net: llc: reset skb->transport_header
netlink: specs: mptcp: fix missing doc
...
Pull hardening fix from Kees Cook:
- stddef: make __struct_group() UAPI C++-friendly (Alexander Lobakin)
* tag 'hardening-v6.13-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
stddef: make __struct_group() UAPI C++-friendly
Add the ability to pass additional attributes along with read/write.
Application can prepare attibute specific information and pass its
address using the SQE field:
__u64 attr_ptr;
Along with setting a mask indicating attributes being passed:
__u64 attr_type_mask;
Overall 64 attributes are allowed and currently one attribute
'IORING_RW_ATTR_FLAG_PI' is supported.
With PI attribute, userspace can pass following information:
- flags: integrity check flags IO_INTEGRITY_CHK_{GUARD/APPTAG/REFTAG}
- len: length of PI/metadata buffer
- addr: address of metadata buffer
- seed: seed value for reftag remapping
- app_tag: application defined 16b value
Process this information to prepare uio_meta_descriptor and pass it down
using kiocb->private.
PI attribute is supported only for direct IO.
Signed-off-by: Anuj Gupta <anuj20.g@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Kanchan Joshi <joshi.k@samsung.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241128112240.8867-7-anuj20.g@samsung.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
For the most part of the C++ history, it couldn't have type
declarations inside anonymous unions for different reasons. At the
same time, __struct_group() relies on the latters, so when the @TAG
argument is not empty, C++ code doesn't want to build (even under
`extern "C"`):
../linux/include/uapi/linux/pkt_cls.h:25:24: error:
'struct tc_u32_sel::<unnamed union>::tc_u32_sel_hdr,' invalid;
an anonymous union may only have public non-static data members
[-fpermissive]
The safest way to fix this without trying to switch standards (which
is impossible in UAPI anyway) etc., is to disable tag declaration
for that language. This won't break anything since for now it's not
buildable at all.
Use a separate definition for __struct_group() when __cplusplus is
defined to mitigate the error, including the version from tools/.
Fixes: 50d7bd38c3 ("stddef: Introduce struct_group() helper macro")
Reported-by: Christopher Ferris <cferris@google.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/Z1HZpe3WE5As8UAz@google.com
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> # __struct_group_tag()
Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241219135734.2130002-1-aleksander.lobakin@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
The default IPv6 multipath hash policy takes the flow label into account
when calculating a multipath hash and previous patches added a flow
label selector to IPv6 FIB rules.
Allow user space to specify a flow label in route get requests by adding
a new netlink attribute and using its value to populate the "flowlabel"
field in the IPv6 flow info structure prior to a route lookup.
Deny the attribute in RTM_{NEW,DEL}ROUTE requests by checking for it in
rtm_to_fib6_config() and returning an error if present.
A subsequent patch will use this capability to test the new flow label
selector in IPv6 FIB rules.
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Add new FIB rule attributes which will allow user space to match on the
IPv6 flow label with a mask. Temporarily set the type of the attributes
to 'NLA_REJECT' while support is being added in the IPv6 code.
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Like direct file execution (e.g. ./script.sh), indirect file execution
(e.g. sh script.sh) needs to be measured and appraised. Instantiate
the new security_bprm_creds_for_exec() hook to measure and verify the
indirect file's integrity. Unlike direct file execution, indirect file
execution is optionally enforced by the interpreter.
Differentiate kernel and userspace enforced integrity audit messages.
Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212174223.389435-9-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
The new SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE, SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE, and
their *_LOCKED counterparts are designed to be set by processes setting
up an execution environment, such as a user session, a container, or a
security sandbox. Unlike other securebits, these ones can be set by
unprivileged processes. Like seccomp filters or Landlock domains, the
securebits are inherited across processes.
When SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE is set, programs interpreting code should
control executable resources according to execveat(2) + AT_EXECVE_CHECK
(see previous commit).
When SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE is set, a process should deny
execution of user interactive commands (which excludes executable
regular files).
Being able to configure each of these securebits enables system
administrators or owner of image containers to gradually validate the
related changes and to identify potential issues (e.g. with interpreter
or audit logs).
It should be noted that unlike other security bits, the
SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE bits are
dedicated to user space willing to restrict itself. Because of that,
they only make sense in the context of a trusted environment (e.g.
sandbox, container, user session, full system) where the process
changing its behavior (according to these bits) and all its parent
processes are trusted. Otherwise, any parent process could just execute
its own malicious code (interpreting a script or not), or even enforce a
seccomp filter to mask these bits.
Such a secure environment can be achieved with an appropriate access
control (e.g. mount's noexec option, file access rights, LSM policy) and
an enlighten ld.so checking that libraries are allowed for execution
e.g., to protect against illegitimate use of LD_PRELOAD.
Ptrace restrictions according to these securebits would not make sense
because of the processes' trust assumption.
Scripts may need some changes to deal with untrusted data (e.g. stdin,
environment variables), but that is outside the scope of the kernel.
See chromeOS's documentation about script execution control and the
related threat model:
https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/developer-library/guides/security/noexec-shell-scripts/
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212174223.389435-3-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Add a new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2) to check if a file would
be allowed for execution. The main use case is for script interpreters
and dynamic linkers to check execution permission according to the
kernel's security policy. Another use case is to add context to access
logs e.g., which script (instead of interpreter) accessed a file. As
any executable code, scripts could also use this check [1].
This is different from faccessat(2) + X_OK which only checks a subset of
access rights (i.e. inode permission and mount options for regular
files), but not the full context (e.g. all LSM access checks). The main
use case for access(2) is for SUID processes to (partially) check access
on behalf of their caller. The main use case for execveat(2) +
AT_EXECVE_CHECK is to check if a script execution would be allowed,
according to all the different restrictions in place. Because the use
of AT_EXECVE_CHECK follows the exact kernel semantic as for a real
execution, user space gets the same error codes.
An interesting point of using execveat(2) instead of openat2(2) is that
it decouples the check from the enforcement. Indeed, the security check
can be logged (e.g. with audit) without blocking an execution
environment not yet ready to enforce a strict security policy.
LSMs can control or log execution requests with
security_bprm_creds_for_exec(). However, to enforce a consistent and
complete access control (e.g. on binary's dependencies) LSMs should
restrict file executability, or measure executed files, with
security_file_open() by checking file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC.
Because AT_EXECVE_CHECK is dedicated to user space interpreters, it
doesn't make sense for the kernel to parse the checked files, look for
interpreters known to the kernel (e.g. ELF, shebang), and return ENOEXEC
if the format is unknown. Because of that, security_bprm_check() is
never called when AT_EXECVE_CHECK is used.
It should be noted that script interpreters cannot directly use
execveat(2) (without this new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag) because this could
lead to unexpected behaviors e.g., `python script.sh` could lead to Bash
being executed to interpret the script. Unlike the kernel, script
interpreters may just interpret the shebang as a simple comment, which
should not change for backward compatibility reasons.
Because scripts or libraries files might not currently have the
executable permission set, or because we might want specific users to be
allowed to run arbitrary scripts, the following patch provides a dynamic
configuration mechanism with the SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and
SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits.
This is a redesign of the CLIP OS 4's O_MAYEXEC:
f5cb330d6b/1901_open_mayexec.patch
This patch has been used for more than a decade with customized script
interpreters. Some examples can be found here:
https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/search?q=O_MAYEXEC
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Link: https://docs.python.org/3/library/io.html#io.open_code [1]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212174223.389435-2-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Groups can be killed during a reset even though they did nothing wrong.
That usually happens when the FW is put in a bad state by other groups,
resulting in group suspension failures when the reset happens.
If we end up in that situation, flag the group innocent and report
innocence through a new DRM_PANTHOR_GROUP_STATE flag.
Bump the minor driver version to reflect the uAPI change.
Changes in v4:
- Add an entry to the driver version changelog
- Add R-bs
Changes in v3:
- Actually report innocence to userspace
Changes in v2:
- New patch
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Liviu Dudau <liviu.dudau@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20241211080500.2349505-1-boris.brezillon@collabora.com
