Pull landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün:
- extend Landlock to enforce restrictions on a whole process, similarly
to the seccomp's TSYNC flag
- refactor data structures to simplify code and improve performance
- add documentation to cover missing parts
* tag 'landlock-7.0-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
mailmap: Add entry for Mickaël Salaün
landlock: Transpose the layer masks data structure
landlock: Add access_mask_subset() helper
selftests/landlock: Add filesystem access benchmark
landlock: Document audit blocker field format
landlock: Add errata documentation section
landlock: Add backwards compatibility for restrict flags
landlock: Refactor TCP socket type check
landlock: Minor reword of docs for TCP access rights
landlock: Document LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC
selftests/landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC tests
landlock: Multithreading support for landlock_restrict_self()
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Just two bug fixes: IMA's detecting scripts (bprm_creds_for_exec), and
calculating the EVM HMAC"
* tag 'integrity-v7.0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
evm: Use ordered xattrs list to calculate HMAC in evm_init_hmac()
ima: Fix stack-out-of-bounds in is_bprm_creds_for_exec()
Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"Two improvements to the code for setting the CIPSO Domain Of
Interpretation (DOI), a seldom used feature, and a formatting change"
* tag 'Smack-for-7.0' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
smack: /smack/doi: accept previously used values
smack: /smack/doi must be > 0
security: smack: fix indentation in smack_access.c
Pull powerpc updates for 7.0
- Implement masked user access
- Add bpf support for internal only per-CPU instructions and inline the
bpf_get_smp_processor_id() and bpf_get_current_task() functions
- Fix pSeries MSI-X allocation failure when quota is exceeded
- Fix recursive pci_lock_rescan_remove locking in EEH event handling
- Support tailcalls with subprogs & BPF exceptions on 64bit
- Extend "trusted" keys to support the PowerVM Key Wrapping Module
(PKWM)
Thanks to Abhishek Dubey, Christophe Leroy, Gaurav Batra, Guangshuo Li,
Jarkko Sakkinen, Mahesh Salgaonkar, Mimi Zohar, Miquel Sabaté Solà, Nam
Cao, Narayana Murty N, Nayna Jain, Nilay Shroff, Puranjay Mohan, Saket
Kumar Bhaskar, Sourabh Jain, Srish Srinivasan, and Venkat Rao Bagalkote.
* tag 'powerpc-7.0-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (27 commits)
powerpc/pseries: plpks: export plpks_wrapping_is_supported
docs: trusted-encryped: add PKWM as a new trust source
keys/trusted_keys: establish PKWM as a trusted source
pseries/plpks: add HCALLs for PowerVM Key Wrapping Module
pseries/plpks: expose PowerVM wrapping features via the sysfs
powerpc/pseries: move the PLPKS config inside its own sysfs directory
pseries/plpks: fix kernel-doc comment inconsistencies
powerpc/smp: Add check for kcalloc() failure in parse_thread_groups()
powerpc: kgdb: Remove OUTBUFMAX constant
powerpc64/bpf: Additional NVR handling for bpf_throw
powerpc64/bpf: Support exceptions
powerpc64/bpf: Add arch_bpf_stack_walk() for BPF JIT
powerpc64/bpf: Avoid tailcall restore from trampoline
powerpc64/bpf: Support tailcalls with subprogs
powerpc64/bpf: Moving tail_call_cnt to bottom of frame
powerpc/eeh: fix recursive pci_lock_rescan_remove locking in EEH event handling
powerpc/pseries: Fix MSI-X allocation failure when quota is exceeded
powerpc/iommu: bypass DMA APIs for coherent allocations for pre-mapped memory
powerpc64/bpf: Inline bpf_get_smp_processor_id() and bpf_get_current_task/_btf()
powerpc64/bpf: Support internal-only MOV instruction to resolve per-CPU addrs
...
Pull SoC driver updates from Arnd Bergmann:
"There are are a number of to firmware drivers, in particular the TEE
subsystem:
- a bus callback for TEE firmware that device drivers can register to
- sysfs support for tee firmware information
- minor updates to platform specific TEE drivers for AMD, NXP,
Qualcomm and the generic optee driver
- ARM SCMI firmware refactoring to improve the protocol discover
among other fixes and cleanups
- ARM FF-A firmware interoperability improvements
The reset controller and memory controller subsystems gain support for
additional hardware platforms from Mediatek, Renesas, NXP, Canaan and
SpacemiT.
Most of the other changes are for random drivers/soc code. Among a
number of cleanups and newly added hardware support, including:
- Mediatek MT8196 DVFS power management and mailbox support
- Qualcomm SCM firmware and MDT loader refactoring, as part of the
new Glymur platform support.
- NXP i.MX9 System Manager firmware support for accessing the syslog
- Minor updates for TI, Renesas, Samsung, Apple, Marvell and AMD
SoCs"
* tag 'soc-drivers-7.0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/soc/soc: (171 commits)
bus: fsl-mc: fix an error handling in fsl_mc_device_add()
reset: spacemit: Add SpacemiT K3 reset driver
reset: spacemit: Extract common K1 reset code
reset: Create subdirectory for SpacemiT drivers
dt-bindings: soc: spacemit: Add K3 reset support and IDs
reset: canaan: k230: drop OF dependency and enable by default
reset: rzg2l-usbphy-ctrl: Add suspend/resume support
reset: rzg2l-usbphy-ctrl: Propagate the return value of regmap_field_update_bits()
reset: gpio: check the return value of gpiod_set_value_cansleep()
reset: imx8mp-audiomix: Support i.MX8ULP SIM LPAV
reset: imx8mp-audiomix: Extend the driver usage
reset: imx8mp-audiomix: Switch to using regmap API
reset: imx8mp-audiomix: Drop unneeded macros
soc: fsl: qe: qe_ports_ic: Consolidate chained IRQ handler install/remove
soc: mediatek: mtk-cmdq: Add mminfra_offset adjustment for DRAM addresses
soc: mediatek: mtk-cmdq: Extend cmdq_pkt_write API for SoCs without subsys ID
soc: mediatek: mtk-cmdq: Add pa_base parsing for hardware without subsys ID support
soc: mediatek: mtk-cmdq: Add cmdq_get_mbox_priv() in cmdq_pkt_create()
mailbox: mtk-cmdq: Add driver data to support for MT8196
mailbox: mtk-cmdq: Add mminfra_offset configuration for DRAM transaction
...
Pull locking updates from Ingo Molnar:
"Lock debugging:
- Implement compiler-driven static analysis locking context checking,
using the upcoming Clang 22 compiler's context analysis features
(Marco Elver)
We removed Sparse context analysis support, because prior to
removal even a defconfig kernel produced 1,700+ context tracking
Sparse warnings, the overwhelming majority of which are false
positives. On an allmodconfig kernel the number of false positive
context tracking Sparse warnings grows to over 5,200... On the plus
side of the balance actual locking bugs found by Sparse context
analysis is also rather ... sparse: I found only 3 such commits in
the last 3 years. So the rate of false positives and the
maintenance overhead is rather high and there appears to be no
active policy in place to achieve a zero-warnings baseline to move
the annotations & fixers to developers who introduce new code.
Clang context analysis is more complete and more aggressive in
trying to find bugs, at least in principle. Plus it has a different
model to enabling it: it's enabled subsystem by subsystem, which
results in zero warnings on all relevant kernel builds (as far as
our testing managed to cover it). Which allowed us to enable it by
default, similar to other compiler warnings, with the expectation
that there are no warnings going forward. This enforces a
zero-warnings baseline on clang-22+ builds (Which are still limited
in distribution, admittedly)
Hopefully the Clang approach can lead to a more maintainable
zero-warnings status quo and policy, with more and more subsystems
and drivers enabling the feature. Context tracking can be enabled
for all kernel code via WARN_CONTEXT_ANALYSIS_ALL=y (default
disabled), but this will generate a lot of false positives.
( Having said that, Sparse support could still be added back,
if anyone is interested - the removal patch is still
relatively straightforward to revert at this stage. )
Rust integration updates: (Alice Ryhl, Fujita Tomonori, Boqun Feng)
- Add support for Atomic<i8/i16/bool> and replace most Rust native
AtomicBool usages with Atomic<bool>
- Clean up LockClassKey and improve its documentation
- Add missing Send and Sync trait implementation for SetOnce
- Make ARef Unpin as it is supposed to be
- Add __rust_helper to a few Rust helpers as a preparation for
helper LTO
- Inline various lock related functions to avoid additional function
calls
WW mutexes:
- Extend ww_mutex tests and other test-ww_mutex updates (John
Stultz)
Misc fixes and cleanups:
- rcu: Mark lockdep_assert_rcu_helper() __always_inline (Arnd
Bergmann)
- locking/local_lock: Include more missing headers (Peter Zijlstra)
- seqlock: fix scoped_seqlock_read kernel-doc (Randy Dunlap)
- rust: sync: Replace `kernel::c_str!` with C-Strings (Tamir
Duberstein)"
* tag 'locking-core-2026-02-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (90 commits)
locking/rwlock: Fix write_trylock_irqsave() with CONFIG_INLINE_WRITE_TRYLOCK
rcu: Mark lockdep_assert_rcu_helper() __always_inline
compiler-context-analysis: Remove __assume_ctx_lock from initializers
tomoyo: Use scoped init guard
crypto: Use scoped init guard
kcov: Use scoped init guard
compiler-context-analysis: Introduce scoped init guards
cleanup: Make __DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD handle commas in initializers
seqlock: fix scoped_seqlock_read kernel-doc
tools: Update context analysis macros in compiler_types.h
rust: sync: Replace `kernel::c_str!` with C-Strings
rust: sync: Inline various lock related methods
rust: helpers: Move #define __rust_helper out of atomic.c
rust: wait: Add __rust_helper to helpers
rust: time: Add __rust_helper to helpers
rust: task: Add __rust_helper to helpers
rust: sync: Add __rust_helper to helpers
rust: refcount: Add __rust_helper to helpers
rust: rcu: Add __rust_helper to helpers
rust: processor: Add __rust_helper to helpers
...
Pull keys update from David Howells:
"This adds support for ML-DSA signatures in X.509 certificates and
PKCS#7/CMS messages, thereby allowing this algorithm to be used for
signing modules, kexec'able binaries, wifi regulatory data, etc..
This requires OpenSSL-3.5 at a minimum and preferably OpenSSL-4 (so
that it can avoid the use of CMS signedAttrs - but that version is not
cut yet). certs/Kconfig does a check to hide the signing options if
OpenSSL does not list the algorithm as being available"
* tag 'keys-next-20260206' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
pkcs7: Change a pr_warn() to pr_warn_once()
pkcs7: Allow authenticatedAttributes for ML-DSA
modsign: Enable ML-DSA module signing
pkcs7, x509: Add ML-DSA support
pkcs7: Allow the signing algo to do whatever digestion it wants itself
pkcs7, x509: Rename ->digest to ->m
x509: Separately calculate sha256 for blacklist
crypto: Add ML-DSA crypto_sig support
The layer masks data structure tracks the requested but unfulfilled
access rights during an operation's security check. It stores one bit
for each combination of access right and layer index. If the bit is
set, that access right is not granted (yet) in the given layer and we
have to traverse the path further upwards to grant it.
Previously, the layer masks were stored as arrays mapping from access
right indices to layer_mask_t. The layer_mask_t value then indicates
all layers in which the given access right is still (tentatively)
denied.
This patch introduces struct layer_access_masks instead: This struct
contains an array with the access_mask_t of each (tentatively) denied
access right in that layer.
The hypothesis of this patch is that this simplifies the code enough
so that the resulting code will run faster:
* We can use bitwise operations in multiple places where we previously
looped over bits individually with macros. (Should require less
branch speculation and lends itself to better loop unrolling.)
* Code is ~75 lines smaller.
Other noteworthy changes:
* In no_more_access(), call a new helper function may_refer(), which
only solves the asymmetric case. Previously, the code interleaved
the checks for the two symmetric cases in RENAME_EXCHANGE. It feels
that the code is clearer when renames without RENAME_EXCHANGE are
more obviously the normal case.
Tradeoffs:
This change improves performance, at a slight size increase to the
layer masks data structure.
This fixes the size of the data structure at 32 bytes for all types of
access rights. (64, once we introduce a 17th filesystem access right).
For filesystem access rights, at the moment, the data structure has
the same size as before, but once we introduce the 17th filesystem
access right, it will double in size (from 32 to 64 bytes), as
access_mask_t grows from 16 to 32 bit [1].
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260120.haeCh4li9Vae@digikod.net/ [1]
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260206151154.97915-5-gnoack3000@gmail.com
[mic: Cosmetic fixes, moved struct layer_access_masks definition]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add support for SELinux based access control of BPF tokens
We worked with the BPF devs to add the necessary LSM hooks when the
BPF token code was first introduced, but it took us a bit longer to
add the SELinux wiring and support.
In order to preserve existing token-unaware SELinux policies, the new
code is gated by the new "bpf_token_perms" policy capability.
Additional details regarding the new permissions, and behaviors can
be found in the associated commit.
- Remove a BUG() from the SELinux capability code
We now perform a similar check during compile time so we can safely
remove the BUG() call.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20260203' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: drop the BUG() in cred_has_capability()
selinux: fix a capabilities parsing typo in selinux_bpf_token_capable()
selinux: add support for BPF token access control
selinux: move the selinux_blob_sizes struct
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Unify the security_inode_listsecurity() calls in NFSv4
While looking at security_inode_listsecurity() with an eye towards
improving the interface, we realized that the NFSv4 code was making
multiple calls to the LSM hook that could be consolidated into one.
- Mark the LSM static branch keys as static - this helps resolve some
sparse warnings
- Add __rust_helper annotations to the LSM and cred wrapper functions
- Remove the unsused set_security_override_from_ctx() function
- Minor fixes to some of the LSM kdoc comment blocks
* tag 'lsm-pr-20260203' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lsm: make keys for static branch static
cred: remove unused set_security_override_from_ctx()
rust: security: add __rust_helper to helpers
rust: cred: add __rust_helper to helpers
nfs: unify security_inode_listsecurity() calls
lsm: fix kernel-doc struct member names
Add errata section with code examples for querying errata and a warning
that most applications should not check errata. Use kernel-doc directives
to include errata descriptions from the header files instead of manual
links.
Also enhance existing DOC sections in security/landlock/errata/abi-*.h
files with Impact sections, and update the code comment in syscalls.c
to remind developers to update errata documentation when applicable.
This addresses the gap where the kernel implements errata tracking
but provides no user-facing documentation on how to use it, while
improving the existing technical documentation in-place rather than
duplicating it.
Signed-off-by: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260128031814.2945394-3-samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com
[mic: Cosmetic fix]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Move the socket type check earlier, so that we will later be able to add
elseifs for other types. Ordering of checks (socket is of a type we
enforce restrictions on) / (current creds have Landlock restrictions)
should not change anything.
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Buffet <matthieu@buffet.re>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251212163704.142301-3-matthieu@buffet.re
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Introduce the LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC flag. With this flag, a
given Landlock ruleset is applied to all threads of the calling
process, instead of only the current one.
Without this flag, multithreaded userspace programs currently resort
to using the nptl(7)/libpsx hack for multithreaded policy enforcement,
which is also used by libcap and for setuid(2). Using this
userspace-based scheme, the threads of a process enforce the same
Landlock policy, but the resulting Landlock domains are still
separate. The domains being separate causes multiple problems:
* When using Landlock's "scoped" access rights, the domain identity is
used to determine whether an operation is permitted. As a result,
when using LANLDOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL, signaling between sibling threads
stops working. This is a problem for programming languages and
frameworks which are inherently multithreaded (e.g. Go).
* In audit logging, the domains of separate threads in a process will
get logged with different domain IDs, even when they are based on
the same ruleset FD, which might confuse users.
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251127115136.3064948-2-gnoack@google.com
[mic: Fix restrict_self_flags test, clean up Makefile, allign comments,
reduce local variable scope, add missing includes]
Closes: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/2
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
The wrapping key does not exist by default and is generated by the
hypervisor as a part of PKWM initialization. This key is then persisted by
the hypervisor and is used to wrap trusted keys. These are variable length
symmetric keys, which in the case of PowerVM Key Wrapping Module (PKWM) are
generated using the kernel RNG. PKWM can be used as a trust source through
the following example keyctl commands:
keyctl add trusted my_trusted_key "new 32" @u
Use the wrap_flags command option to set the secure boot requirement for
the wrapping request through the following keyctl commands
case1: no secure boot requirement. (default)
keyctl usage: keyctl add trusted my_trusted_key "new 32" @u
OR
keyctl add trusted my_trusted_key "new 32 wrap_flags=0x00" @u
case2: secure boot required to in either audit or enforce mode. set bit 0
keyctl usage: keyctl add trusted my_trusted_key "new 32 wrap_flags=0x01" @u
case3: secure boot required to be in enforce mode. set bit 1
keyctl usage: keyctl add trusted my_trusted_key "new 32 wrap_flags=0x02" @u
NOTE:
-> Setting the secure boot requirement is NOT a must.
-> Only either of the secure boot requirement options should be set. Not
both.
-> All the other bits are required to be not set.
-> Set the kernel parameter trusted.source=pkwm to choose PKWM as the
backend for trusted keys implementation.
-> CONFIG_PSERIES_PLPKS must be enabled to build PKWM.
Add PKWM, which is a combination of IBM PowerVM and Power LPAR Platform
KeyStore, as a new trust source for trusted keys.
Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260127145228.48320-6-ssrish@linux.ibm.com
While reworking the LSM initialization code the
/proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr handler was inadvertently caught up in the
change and the procfs entry wasn't setup when CONFIG_SECURITY was not
selected at kernel build time. This patch restores the previous behavior
and ensures that the procfs entry is setup regardless of the
CONFIG_SECURITY state.
Future work will improve upon this, likely by moving the procfs handler
into the mm subsystem, but this patch should resolve the immediate
regression.
Fixes: 4ab5efcc28 ("lsm: consolidate all of the LSM framework initcalls")
Reported-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Convert lock initialization to scoped guarded initialization where
lock-guarded members are initialized in the same scope.
This ensures the context analysis treats the context as active during member
initialization. This is required to avoid errors once implicit context
assertion is removed.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260119094029.1344361-6-elver@google.com
TPM2_Unseal[1] expects the handle of a loaded data object, and not the
handle of the parent key. But the tpm2_unseal_cmd provides the parent
keyhandle instead of blob_handle for the session HMAC calculation. This
causes unseal to fail.
Fix this by passing blob_handle to tpm_buf_append_name().
References:
[1] trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
Trusted-Platform-Module-2.0-Library-Part-3-Version-184_pub.pdf
Fixes: 6e9722e9a7 ("tpm2-sessions: Fix out of range indexing in name_size")
Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Commit 8e5d9f916a ("smack: deduplicate xattr setting in
smack_inode_init_security()") introduced xattr_dupval() to simplify setting
the xattrs to be provided by the SMACK LSM on inode creation, in the
smack_inode_init_security().
Unfortunately, moving lsm_get_xattr_slot() caused the SMACK64TRANSMUTE
xattr be added in the array of new xattrs before SMACK64. This causes the
HMAC of xattrs calculated by evm_init_hmac() for new files to diverge from
the one calculated by both evm_calc_hmac_or_hash() and evmctl.
evm_init_hmac() calculates the HMAC of the xattrs of new files based on the
order LSMs provide them, while evm_calc_hmac_or_hash() and evmctl calculate
the HMAC based on an ordered xattrs list.
Fix the issue by making evm_init_hmac() calculate the HMAC of new files
based on the ordered xattrs list too.
Fixes: 8e5d9f916a ("smack: deduplicate xattr setting in smack_inode_init_security()")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Pull landlock fixes from Mickaël Salaün:
"This fixes TCP handling, tests, documentation, non-audit elided code,
and minor cosmetic changes"
* tag 'landlock-6.19-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
landlock: Clarify documentation for the IOCTL access right
selftests/landlock: Properly close a file descriptor
landlock: Improve the comment for domain_is_scoped
selftests/landlock: Use scoped_base_variants.h for ptrace_test
selftests/landlock: Fix missing semicolon
selftests/landlock: Fix typo in fs_test
landlock: Optimize stack usage when !CONFIG_AUDIT
landlock: Fix spelling
landlock: Clean up hook_ptrace_access_check()
landlock: Improve erratum documentation
landlock: Remove useless include
landlock: Fix wrong type usage
selftests/landlock: NULL-terminate unix pathname addresses
selftests/landlock: Remove invalid unix socket bind()
selftests/landlock: Add missing connect(minimal AF_UNSPEC) test
selftests/landlock: Fix TCP bind(AF_UNSPEC) test case
landlock: Fix TCP handling of short AF_UNSPEC addresses
landlock: Fix formatting
With the compile time check located immediately above the
cred_has_capability() function ensuring that we will notice if the
capability set grows beyond 63 capabilities, we can safely remove
the BUG() call from the cred_has_capability().
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
There was a typo, likely a cut-n-paste bug, where we were checking for
SECCLASS_CAPABILITY instead of SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2.
Fixes: 5473a722f7 ("selinux: add support for BPF token access control")
Reported-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
BPF token support was introduced to allow a privileged process to delegate
limited BPF functionality—such as map creation and program loading—to
an unprivileged process:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20231130185229.2688956-1-andrii@kernel.org/
This patch adds SELinux support for controlling BPF token access. With
this change, SELinux policies can now enforce constraints on BPF token
usage based on both the delegating (privileged) process and the recipient
(unprivileged) process.
Supported operations currently include:
- map_create
- prog_load
High-level workflow:
1. An unprivileged process creates a VFS context via `fsopen()` and
obtains a file descriptor.
2. This descriptor is passed to a privileged process, which configures
BPF token delegation options and mounts a BPF filesystem.
3. SELinux records the `creator_sid` of the privileged process during
mount setup.
4. The unprivileged process then uses this BPF fs mount to create a
token and attach it to subsequent BPF syscalls.
5. During verification of `map_create` and `prog_load`, SELinux uses
`creator_sid` and the current SID to check policy permissions via:
avc_has_perm(creator_sid, current_sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
BPF__MAP_CREATE, NULL);
The implementation introduces two new permissions:
- map_create_as
- prog_load_as
At token creation time, SELinux verifies that the current process has the
appropriate `*_as` permission (depending on the `allowed_cmds` value in
the bpf_token) to act on behalf of the `creator_sid`.
Example SELinux policy:
allow test_bpf_t self:bpf {
map_create map_read map_write prog_load prog_run
map_create_as prog_load_as
};
Additionally, a new policy capability bpf_token_perms is added to ensure
backward compatibility. If disabled, previous behavior ((checks based on
current process SID)) is preserved.
Signed-off-by: Eric Suen <ericsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Durning <danieldurning.work@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Durning <danieldurning.work@gmail.com>
[PM: merge fuzz, subject tweaks, whitespace tweaks, line length tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Move the selinux_blob_sizes struct so it adjacent to the rest of the
SELinux initialization code and not in the middle of the LSM hook
callbacks.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The tee bus got dedicated callbacks for probe and remove.
Make use of these. This fixes a runtime warning about the driver needing
to be converted to the bus methods.
Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@baylibre.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
The tee subsystem recently got a set of dedicated functions to register
(and unregister) a tee driver. Make use of them. These care for setting the
driver's bus (so the explicit assignment can be dropped) and the driver
owner (which is an improvement this driver benefits from).
Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@baylibre.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
The key use for static-branches are not refrenced by name outside
of the security/security.c file, so make them static. This stops
the sparse warnings about "Should it be static?" such as:
security/security.c: note: in included file:
./include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h:29:1: warning: symbol
'security_hook_active_binder_set_context_mgr_0' was not declared.
Should it be static?
./include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h:29:1: warning: symbol
'security_hook_active_binder_set_context_mgr_1' was not declared.
Should it be static?
...
Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
[PM: trimmed sparse output for line-length, readability]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Enable context analysis for security/tomoyo.
This demonstrates a larger conversion to use Clang's context
analysis. The benefit is additional static checking of locking rules,
along with better documentation.
Tomoyo makes use of several synchronization primitives, yet its clear
design made it relatively straightforward to enable context analysis.
One notable finding was:
security/tomoyo/gc.c:664:20: error: reading variable 'write_buf' requires holding mutex '&tomoyo_io_buffer::io_sem'
664 | is_write = head->write_buf != NULL;
For which Tetsuo writes:
"Good catch. This should be data_race(), for tomoyo_write_control()
might concurrently update head->write_buf from non-NULL to non-NULL
with head->io_sem held."
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251219154418.3592607-35-elver@google.com
Writing to /smack/doi a value that has ever been
written there in the past disables networking for
non-ambient labels.
E.g.
# cat /smack/doi
3
# netlabelctl -p cipso list
Configured CIPSO mappings (1)
DOI value : 3
mapping type : PASS_THROUGH
# netlabelctl -p map list
Configured NetLabel domain mappings (3)
domain: "_" (IPv4)
protocol: UNLABELED
domain: DEFAULT (IPv4)
protocol: CIPSO, DOI = 3
domain: DEFAULT (IPv6)
protocol: UNLABELED
# cat /smack/ambient
_
# cat /proc/$$/attr/smack/current
_
# ping -c1 10.1.95.12
64 bytes from 10.1.95.12: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.964 ms
# echo foo >/proc/$$/attr/smack/current
# ping -c1 10.1.95.12
64 bytes from 10.1.95.12: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.956 ms
unknown option 86
# echo 4 >/smack/doi
# echo 3 >/smack/doi
!> [ 214.050395] smk_cipso_doi:691 cipso add rc = -17
# echo 3 >/smack/doi
!> [ 249.402261] smk_cipso_doi:678 remove rc = -2
!> [ 249.402261] smk_cipso_doi:691 cipso add rc = -17
# ping -c1 10.1.95.12
!!> ping: 10.1.95.12: Address family for hostname not supported
# echo _ >/proc/$$/attr/smack/current
# ping -c1 10.1.95.12
64 bytes from 10.1.95.12: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.617 ms
This happens because Smack keeps decommissioned DOIs,
fails to re-add them, and consequently refuses to add
the “default” domain map:
# netlabelctl -p cipso list
Configured CIPSO mappings (2)
DOI value : 3
mapping type : PASS_THROUGH
DOI value : 4
mapping type : PASS_THROUGH
# netlabelctl -p map list
Configured NetLabel domain mappings (2)
domain: "_" (IPv4)
protocol: UNLABELED
!> (no ipv4 map for default domain here)
domain: DEFAULT (IPv6)
protocol: UNLABELED
Fix by clearing decommissioned DOI definitions and
serializing concurrent DOI updates with a new lock.
Also:
- allow /smack/doi to live unconfigured, since
adding a map (netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add) may fail.
CIPSO_V4_DOI_UNKNOWN(0) indicates the unconfigured DOI
- add new DOI before removing the old default map,
so the old map remains if the add fails
(2008-02-04, Casey Schaufler)
Fixes: e114e47377 ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Until now, each landlock_request struct were allocated on the stack, even
if not really used, because is_access_to_paths_allowed() unconditionally
modified the passed references. Even if the changed landlock_request
variables are not used, the compiler is not smart enough to detect this
case.
To avoid this issue, explicitly disable the related code when
CONFIG_AUDIT is not set, which enables elision of log_request_parent*
and associated caller's stack variables thanks to dead code elimination.
This makes it possible to reduce the stack frame by 32 bytes for the
path_link and path_rename hooks, and by 20 bytes for most other
filesystem hooks.
Here is a summary of scripts/stackdelta before and after this change
when CONFIG_AUDIT is disabled:
current_check_refer_path 560 320 -240
current_check_access_path 328 184 -144
hook_file_open 328 184 -144
is_access_to_paths_allowed 376 360 -16
Also, add extra pointer checks to be more future-proof.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Reported-by: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/eb86863b-53b0-460b-b223-84dd31d765b9@maowtm.org
Fixes: 2fc80c69df ("landlock: Log file-related denials")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251219142302.744917-2-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
[mic: Improve stack usage measurement accuracy with scripts/stackdelta]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
KASAN reported a stack-out-of-bounds access in ima_appraise_measurement
from is_bprm_creds_for_exec:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ima_appraise_measurement+0x12dc/0x16a0
Read of size 1 at addr ffffc9000160f940 by task sudo/550
The buggy address belongs to stack of task sudo/550
and is located at offset 24 in frame:
ima_appraise_measurement+0x0/0x16a0
This frame has 2 objects:
[48, 56) 'file'
[80, 148) 'hash'
This is caused by using container_of on the *file pointer. This offset
calculation is what triggers the stack-out-of-bounds error.
In order to fix this, pass in a bprm_is_check boolean which can be set
depending on how process_measurement is called. If the caller has a
linux_binprm pointer and the function is BPRM_CHECK we can determine
is_check and set it then. Otherwise set it to false.
Fixes: 95b3cdafd7 ("ima: instantiate the bprm_creds_for_exec() hook")
Signed-off-by: Chris J Arges <carges@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
current_check_access_socket() treats AF_UNSPEC addresses as
AF_INET ones, and only later adds special case handling to
allow connect(AF_UNSPEC), and on IPv4 sockets
bind(AF_UNSPEC+INADDR_ANY).
This would be fine except AF_UNSPEC addresses can be as
short as a bare AF_UNSPEC sa_family_t field, and nothing
more. The AF_INET code path incorrectly enforces a length of
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) instead.
Move AF_UNSPEC edge case handling up inside the switch-case,
before the address is (potentially incorrectly) treated as
AF_INET.
Fixes: fff69fb03d ("landlock: Support network rules with TCP bind and connect")
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Buffet <matthieu@buffet.re>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251027190726.626244-4-matthieu@buffet.re
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Pull tomoyo update from Tetsuo Handa:
"Trivial optimization"
* tag 'tomoyo-pr-20251212' of git://git.code.sf.net/p/tomoyo/tomoyo:
tomoyo: Use local kmap in tomoyo_dump_page()
Pull landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün:
"This mainly fixes handling of disconnected directories and adds new
tests"
* tag 'landlock-6.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
selftests/landlock: Add disconnected leafs and branch test suites
selftests/landlock: Add tests for access through disconnected paths
landlock: Improve variable scope
landlock: Fix handling of disconnected directories
selftests/landlock: Fix makefile header list
landlock: Make docs in cred.h and domain.h visible
landlock: Minor comments improvements
Pull more tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
"This is targeted for tpm2-sessions updates.
There's two bug fixes and two more cosmetic tweaks for HMAC protected
sessions. They provide a baseine for further improvements to be
implemented during the the course of the release cycle"
* tag 'tpmdd-sessions-next-6.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
tpm2-sessions: Open code tpm_buf_append_hmac_session()
tpm2-sessions: Remove 'attributes' parameter from tpm_buf_append_auth
tpm2-sessions: Fix tpm2_read_public range checks
tpm2-sessions: Fix out of range indexing in name_size
Pull persistent dentry infrastructure and conversion from Al Viro:
"Some filesystems use a kinda-sorta controlled dentry refcount leak to
pin dentries of created objects in dcache (and undo it when removing
those). A reference is grabbed and not released, but it's not actually
_stored_ anywhere.
That works, but it's hard to follow and verify; among other things, we
have no way to tell _which_ of the increments is intended to be an
unpaired one. Worse, on removal we need to decide whether the
reference had already been dropped, which can be non-trivial if that
removal is on umount and we need to figure out if this dentry is
pinned due to e.g. unlink() not done. Usually that is handled by using
kill_litter_super() as ->kill_sb(), but there are open-coded special
cases of the same (consider e.g. /proc/self).
Things get simpler if we introduce a new dentry flag
(DCACHE_PERSISTENT) marking those "leaked" dentries. Having it set
claims responsibility for +1 in refcount.
The end result this series is aiming for:
- get these unbalanced dget() and dput() replaced with new primitives
that would, in addition to adjusting refcount, set and clear
persistency flag.
- instead of having kill_litter_super() mess with removing the
remaining "leaked" references (e.g. for all tmpfs files that hadn't
been removed prior to umount), have the regular
shrink_dcache_for_umount() strip DCACHE_PERSISTENT of all dentries,
dropping the corresponding reference if it had been set. After that
kill_litter_super() becomes an equivalent of kill_anon_super().
Doing that in a single step is not feasible - it would affect too many
places in too many filesystems. It has to be split into a series.
This work has really started early in 2024; quite a few preliminary
pieces have already gone into mainline. This chunk is finally getting
to the meat of that stuff - infrastructure and most of the conversions
to it.
Some pieces are still sitting in the local branches, but the bulk of
that stuff is here"
* tag 'pull-persistency' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (54 commits)
d_make_discardable(): warn if given a non-persistent dentry
kill securityfs_recursive_remove()
convert securityfs
get rid of kill_litter_super()
convert rust_binderfs
convert nfsctl
convert rpc_pipefs
convert hypfs
hypfs: swich hypfs_create_u64() to returning int
hypfs: switch hypfs_create_str() to returning int
hypfs: don't pin dentries twice
convert gadgetfs
gadgetfs: switch to simple_remove_by_name()
convert functionfs
functionfs: switch to simple_remove_by_name()
functionfs: fix the open/removal races
functionfs: need to cancel ->reset_work in ->kill_sb()
functionfs: don't bother with ffs->ref in ffs_data_{opened,closed}()
functionfs: don't abuse ffs_data_closed() on fs shutdown
convert selinuxfs
...
Open code 'tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt' to the call site, as it only
masks a call sequence and does otherwise nothing particularly useful.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@meta.com>
'name_size' does not have any range checks, and it just directly indexes
with TPM_ALG_ID, which could lead into memory corruption at worst.
Address the issue by only processing known values and returning -EINVAL for
unrecognized values.
Make also 'tpm_buf_append_name' and 'tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session' fallible so
that errors are detected before causing any spurious TPM traffic.
End also the authorization session on failure in both of the functions, as
the session state would be then by definition corrupted.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 1085b8276b ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API")
Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Pull capabilities update from Serge Hallyn:
"Ryan Foster had sent a patch to add testing of the
rootid_owns_currentns() function. That patch pointed out
that this function was not as clear as it should be. Fix it:
- Clarify the intent of the function in the name
- Split the function so that the base functionality is easier to test
from a kunit test"
* tag 'caps-pr-20251204' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux:
Clarify the rootid_owns_currentns
