Some fixes may require user space to check if they are applied on the
running kernel before using a specific feature. For instance, this
applies when a restriction was previously too restrictive and is now
getting relaxed (e.g. for compatibility reasons). However, non-visible
changes for legitimate use (e.g. security fixes) do not require an
erratum.
Because fixes are backported down to a specific Landlock ABI, we need a
way to avoid cherry-pick conflicts. The solution is to only update a
file related to the lower ABI impacted by this issue. All the ABI files
are then used to create a bitmask of fixes.
The new errata interface is similar to the one used to get the supported
Landlock ABI version, but it returns a bitmask instead because the order
of fixes may not match the order of versions, and not all fixes may
apply to all versions.
The actual errata will come with dedicated commits. The description is
not actually used in the code but serves as documentation.
Create the landlock_abi_version symbol and use its value to check errata
consistency.
Update test_base's create_ruleset_checks_ordering tests and add errata
tests.
This commit is backportable down to the first version of Landlock.
Fixes: 3532b0b435 ("landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features")
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250318161443.279194-3-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Any driver that needs these library functions should already be selecting
the corresponding Kconfig symbols, so there is no real point in making
these visible.
The original patch that made these user selectable described problems
with drivers failing to select the code they use, but for consistency
it's better to always use 'select' on a symbol than to mix it with
'depends on'.
Fixes: e56e189855 ("lib/crypto: add prompts back to crypto libraries")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Retrieve the netif_wildcard policy capability in security_netif_sid()
from the locked active policy instead of the cached value in
selinux_state.
Fixes: 8af43b61c1 ("selinux: support wildcard network interface names")
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: /netlabel/netif/ due to a typo in the description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Certain bpf syscall subcommands are available for usage from both
userspace and the kernel. LSM modules or eBPF gatekeeper programs may
need to take a different course of action depending on whether or not
a BPF syscall originated from the kernel or userspace.
Additionally, some of the bpf_attr struct fields contain pointers to
arbitrary memory. Currently the functionality to determine whether or
not a pointer refers to kernel memory or userspace memory is exposed
to the bpf verifier, but that information is missing from various LSM
hooks.
Here we augment the LSM hooks to provide this data, by simply passing
a boolean flag indicating whether or not the call originated in the
kernel, in any hook that contains a bpf_attr struct that corresponds
to a subcommand that may be called from the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250310221737.821889-2-bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Remove my old, no longer functioning, email address from comments.
Could alternatively replace with my current email but seems
redundant with MAINTAINERS and prone to being out of date.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The function can be replaced by evict_inodes. The only difference is
that evict_inodes() skips the inodes with positive refcount without
touching ->i_lock, but they are equivalent as evict_inodes() repeats the
refcount check after having grabbed ->i_lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250307144318.28120-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
The vanilla has_capability() function has been unused since 2018's
commit dcb569cf6a ("Smack: ptrace capability use fixes")
Remove it.
Fixup a comment in security/commoncap.c that referenced it.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <linux@treblig.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>
Add support for wildcard matching of network interface names. This is
useful for auto-generated interfaces, for example podman creates network
interfaces for containers with the naming scheme podman0, podman1,
podman2, ...
To maintain backward compatibility guard this feature with a new policy
capability 'netif_wildcard'.
Netifcon definitions are compared against in the order given by the
policy, so userspace tools should sort them in a reasonable order.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Some filesystems, such as NFS, cifs, ceph, and fuse, do not have
complete control of sequencing on the actual filesystem (e.g. on a
different server) and may find that the inode created for a mkdir
request already exists in the icache and dcache by the time the mkdir
request returns. For example, if the filesystem is mounted twice the
directory could be visible on the other mount before it is on the
original mount, and a pair of name_to_handle_at(), open_by_handle_at()
calls could instantiate the directory inode with an IS_ROOT() dentry
before the first mkdir returns.
This means that the dentry passed to ->mkdir() may not be the one that
is associated with the inode after the ->mkdir() completes. Some
callers need to interact with the inode after the ->mkdir completes and
they currently need to perform a lookup in the (rare) case that the
dentry is no longer hashed.
This lookup-after-mkdir requires that the directory remains locked to
avoid races. Planned future patches to lock the dentry rather than the
directory will mean that this lookup cannot be performed atomically with
the mkdir.
To remove this barrier, this patch changes ->mkdir to return the
resulting dentry if it is different from the one passed in.
Possible returns are:
NULL - the directory was created and no other dentry was used
ERR_PTR() - an error occurred
non-NULL - this other dentry was spliced in
This patch only changes file-systems to return "ERR_PTR(err)" instead of
"err" or equivalent transformations. Subsequent patches will make
further changes to some file-systems to return a correct dentry.
Not all filesystems reliably result in a positive hashed dentry:
- NFS, cifs, hostfs will sometimes need to perform a lookup of
the name to get inode information. Races could result in this
returning something different. Note that this lookup is
non-atomic which is what we are trying to avoid. Placing the
lookup in filesystem code means it only happens when the filesystem
has no other option.
- kernfs and tracefs leave the dentry negative and the ->revalidate
operation ensures that lookup will be called to correctly populate
the dentry. This could be fixed but I don't think it is important
to any of the users of vfs_mkdir() which look at the dentry.
The recommendation to use
d_drop();d_splice_alias()
is ugly but fits with current practice. A planned future patch will
change this.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227013949.536172-2-neilb@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Although the LSM hooks for loading kernel modules were later generalized
to cover loading other kinds of files, SELinux didn't implement
corresponding permission checks, leaving only the module case covered.
Define and add new permission checks for these other cases.
Signed-off-by: Cameron K. Williams <ckwilliams.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kipp N. Davis <kippndavis.work@gmx.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: merge fuzz, line length, and spacing fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull landlock fixes from Mickaël Salaün:
"Fixes to TCP socket identification, documentation, and tests"
* tag 'landlock-6.14-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
selftests/landlock: Add binaries to .gitignore
selftests/landlock: Test that MPTCP actions are not restricted
selftests/landlock: Test TCP accesses with protocol=IPPROTO_TCP
landlock: Fix non-TCP sockets restriction
landlock: Minor typo and grammar fixes in IPC scoping documentation
landlock: Fix grammar error
selftests/landlock: Enable the new CONFIG_AF_UNIX_OOB
Pull integrity fixes from Mimi Zohar:
"One bugfix and one spelling cleanup. The bug fix restores a
performance improvement"
* tag 'integrity-v6.14-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Reset IMA_NONACTION_RULE_FLAGS after post_setattr
integrity: fix typos and spelling errors
It seems that the attr parameter was never been used in security
checks since it was first introduced by:
commit da97e18458 ("perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks")
so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun@huaweicloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
If SMACK label has CIPSO representation w/o categories, e.g.:
| # cat /smack/cipso2
| foo 10
| @ 250/2
| ...
then SMACK does not recognize such CIPSO in input ipv4 packets
and substitues '*' label instead. Audit records may look like
| lsm=SMACK fn=smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb action=denied
| subject="*" object="_" requested=w pid=0 comm="swapper/1" ...
This happens in two steps:
1) security/smack/smackfs.c`smk_set_cipso
does not clear NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT
from (struct smack_known *)skp->smk_netlabel.flags
on assigning CIPSO w/o categories:
| rcu_assign_pointer(skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat, ncats.attr.mls.cat);
| skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl = ncats.attr.mls.lvl;
2) security/smack/smack_lsm.c`smack_from_secattr
can not match skp->smk_netlabel with input packet's
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap
because sap->flags have not NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT (what is correct)
but skp->smk_netlabel.flags have (what is incorrect):
| if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
| if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
| NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
| found = 1;
| break;
| }
This commit sets/clears NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT in
skp->smk_netlabel.flags according to the presense of CIPSO categories.
The update of smk_netlabel is not atomic, so input packets processing
still may be incorrect during short time while update proceeds.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This reverts commit ccfd889acb
The indicated commit
* does not describe the problem that change tries to solve
* has programming issues
* introduces a bug: forever clears NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT
in (struct smack_known *)skp->smk_netlabel.flags
Reverting the commit to reapproach original problem
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Using RCU lifetime rules to access kernfs_node::name can avoid the
trouble with kernfs_rename_lock in kernfs_name() and kernfs_path_from_node()
if the fs was created with KERNFS_ROOT_INVARIANT_PARENT. This is usefull
as it allows to implement kernfs_path_from_node() only with RCU
protection and avoiding kernfs_rename_lock. The lock is only required if
the __parent node can be changed and the function requires an unchanged
hierarchy while it iterates from the node to its parent.
The change is needed to allow the lookup of the node's path
(kernfs_path_from_node()) from context which runs always with disabled
preemption and or interrutps even on PREEMPT_RT. The problem is that
kernfs_rename_lock becomes a sleeping lock on PREEMPT_RT.
I went through all ::name users and added the required access for the lookup
with a few extensions:
- rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_create() drops all locks and then uses the name
later on. resctrl supports rename with different parents. Here I made
a temporal copy of the name while it is used outside of the lock.
- kernfs_rename_ns() accepts NULL as new_parent. This simplifies
sysfs_move_dir_ns() where it can set NULL in order to reuse the current
name.
- kernfs_rename_ns() is only using kernfs_rename_lock if the parents are
different. All users use either kernfs_rwsem (for stable path view) or
just RCU for the lookup. The ::name uses always RCU free.
Use RCU lifetime guarantees to access kernfs_node::name.
Suggested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+6ea37e2e6ffccf41a7e6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/67251dc6.050a0220.529b6.015e.GAE@google.com/
Reported-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/20241102001224.2789-1-hdanton@sina.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250213145023.2820193-7-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
If CONFIG_AUDIT is not set then
SMACK does not generate audit messages,
however, keeps audit control file, /smack/logging,
while there is no entity to control.
This change removes audit control file /smack/logging
when audit is not configured in the kernel
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Since inception [1], SMACK initializes ipv* child socket security
for connection-oriented communications (tcp/sctp/dccp)
during accept() syscall, in the security_sock_graft() hook:
| void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, ...)
| {
| // only ipv4 and ipv6 are eligible here
| // ...
| ssp = sk->sk_security; // socket security
| ssp->smk_in = skp; // process label: smk_of_current()
| ssp->smk_out = skp; // process label: smk_of_current()
| }
This approach is incorrect for two reasons:
A) initialization occurs too late for child socket security:
The child socket is created by the kernel once the handshake
completes (e.g., for tcp: after receiving ack for syn+ack).
Data can legitimately start arriving to the child socket
immediately, long before the application calls accept()
on the socket.
Those data are (currently — were) processed by SMACK using
incorrect child socket security attributes.
B) Incoming connection requests are handled using the listening
socket's security, hence, the child socket must inherit the
listening socket's security attributes.
smack_sock_graft() initilizes the child socket's security with
a process label, as is done for a new socket()
But ... the process label is not necessarily the same as the
listening socket label. A privileged application may legitimately
set other in/out labels for a listening socket.
When this happens, SMACK processes incoming packets using
incorrect socket security attributes.
In [2] Michael Lontke noticed (A) and fixed it in [3] by adding
socket initialization into security_sk_clone_security() hook like
| void smack_sk_clone_security(struct sock *oldsk, struct sock *newsk)
| {
| *(struct socket_smack *)newsk->sk_security =
| *(struct socket_smack *)oldsk->sk_security;
| }
This initializes the child socket security with the parent (listening)
socket security at the appropriate time.
I was forced to revisit this old story because
smack_sock_graft() was left in place by [3] and continues overwriting
the child socket's labels with the process label,
and there might be a reason for this, so I undertook a study.
If the process label differs from the listening socket's labels,
the following occurs for ipv4:
assigning the smk_out is not accompanied by netlbl_sock_setattr,
so the outgoing packet's cipso label does not change.
So, the only effect of this assignment for interhost communications
is a divergence between the program-visible “out” socket label and
the cipso network label. For intrahost communications this label,
however, becomes visible via secmark netfilter marking, and is
checked for access rights by the client, receiving side.
Assigning the smk_in affects both interhost and intrahost
communications: the server begins to check access rights against
an wrong label.
Access check against wrong label (smk_in or smk_out),
unsurprisingly fails, breaking the connection.
The above affects protocols that calls security_sock_graft()
during accept(), namely: {tcp,dccp,sctp}/{ipv4,ipv6}
One extra security_sock_graft() caller, crypto/af_alg.c`af_alg_accept
is not affected, because smack_sock_graft() does nothing for PF_ALG.
To reproduce, assign non-default in/out labels to a listening socket,
setup rules between these labels and client label, attempt to connect
and send some data.
Ipv6 specific: ipv6 packets do not convey SMACK labels. To reproduce
the issue in interhost communications set opposite labels in
/smack/ipv6host on both hosts.
Ipv6 intrahost communications do not require tricking, because SMACK
labels are conveyed via secmark netfilter marking.
So, currently smack_sock_graft() is not useful, but harmful,
therefore, I have removed it.
This fixes the issue for {tcp,dccp}/{ipv4,ipv6},
but not sctp/{ipv4,ipv6}.
Although this change is necessary for sctp+smack to function
correctly, it is not sufficient because:
sctp/ipv4 does not call security_sk_clone() and
sctp/ipv6 ignores SMACK completely.
These are separate issues, belong to other subsystem,
and should be addressed separately.
[1] 2008-02-04,
Fixes: e114e47377 ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel")
[2] Michael Lontke, 2022-08-31, SMACK LSM checks wrong object label
during ingress network traffic
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/6324997ce4fc092c5020a4add075257f9c5f6442.camel@elektrobit.com/
[3] 2022-08-31, michael.lontke,
commit 4ca165fc6c ("SMACK: Add sk_clone_security LSM hook")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
I want to be sure that ipv6-specific code
is not compiled in kernel binaries
if ipv6 is not configured.
[1] was getting rid of "unused variable" warning, but,
with that, it also mandated compilation of a handful ipv6-
specific functions in ipv4-only kernel configurations:
smk_ipv6_localhost, smack_ipv6host_label, smk_ipv6_check.
Their compiled bodies are likely to be removed by compiler
from the resulting binary, but, to be on the safe side,
I remove them from the compiler view.
[1]
Fixes: 00720f0e7f ("smack: avoid unused 'sip' variable warning")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Fix typos and spelling errors in security/smack module comments that
were identified using the codespell tool.
No functional changes - documentation only.
Signed-off-by: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Pull tomoyo fixes from Tetsuo Handa:
"Redo of pathname patternization and fix spelling errors"
* tag 'tomoyo-pr-20250211' of git://git.code.sf.net/p/tomoyo/tomoyo:
tomoyo: use better patterns for procfs in learning mode
tomoyo: fix spelling errors
tomoyo: fix spelling error
When CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_ASSERTS is disabled, there is a
warning that sock is unused:
security/apparmor/file.c: In function '__file_sock_perm':
security/apparmor/file.c:544:24: warning: unused variable 'sock' [-Wunused-variable]
544 | struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
| ^~~~
sock was moved into aa_sock_file_perm(), where the same check is
present, so remove sock and the assertion from __file_sock_perm() to fix
the warning.
Fixes: c05e705812 ("apparmor: add fine grained af_unix mediation")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202501190757.myuLxLyL-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
This follows the established practice and fixes a build failure for me:
security/apparmor/file.c: In function ‘__file_sock_perm’:
security/apparmor/file.c:544:24: error: unused variable ‘sock’ [-Werror=unused-variable]
544 | struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
| ^~~~
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
clang warns:
security/apparmor/label.c:206:15: error: address of array 'new->vec' will always evaluate to 'true' [-Werror,-Wpointer-bool-conversion]
206 | AA_BUG(!new->vec);
| ~~~~~~^~~
The address of this array can never be NULL because it is not at the
beginning of a structure. Convert the assertion to check that the new
pointer is not NULL.
Fixes: de4754c801 ("apparmor: carry mediation check on label")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202501191802.bDp2voTJ-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
It is desirable to allow LSM to configure accessibility to io_uring
because it is a coarse yet very simple way to restrict access to it. So,
add an LSM for io_uring_allowed() to guard access to io_uring.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Hamza Mahfooz <hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
[PM: merge fuzz due to changes in preceding patches, subj tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit 2039bda1fa ("LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook")
added a new flag to the security_kernel_read_file() LSM hook, "contents",
which was set if a file was being read in its entirety or if it was the
first chunk read in a multi-step process. The SELinux LSM callback was
updated to only check against the file label if this "contents" flag was
set, meaning that in multi-step reads the file label was not considered
in the access control decision after the initial chunk.
Thankfully the only in-tree user that performs a multi-step read is the
"bcm-vk" driver and it is loading firmware, not a kernel module, so there
are no security regressions to worry about. However, we still want to
ensure that the SELinux code does the right thing, and *always* checks
the file label, especially as there is a chance the file could change
between chunk reads.
Fixes: 2039bda1fa ("LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The dac_mmap_min_addr belongs to min_addr.c, move it to
min_addr.c from /kernel/sysctl.c. In the previous Linux kernel
boot process, sysctl_init_bases needs to be executed before
init_mmap_min_addr, So, register_sysctl_init should be executed
before update_mmap_min_addr in init_mmap_min_addr. And according
to the compilation condition in security/Makefile:
obj-$(CONFIG_MMU) += min_addr.o
if CONFIG_MMU is not defined, min_addr.c would not be included in the
compilation process. So, drop the CONFIG_MMU check.
Signed-off-by: Kaixiong Yu <yukaixiong@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <joel.granados@kernel.org>
Commit 0d73a55208 ("ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock")
mistakenly reverted the performance improvement introduced in commit
42a4c60319 ("ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr"). The unused bit mask was
subsequently removed by commit 11c60f23ed ("integrity: Remove unused
macro IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS").
Restore the performance improvement by introducing the new mask
IMA_NONACTION_RULE_FLAGS, equal to IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS without
IMA_NEW_FILE, which is not a rule-specific flag.
Finally, reset IMA_NONACTION_RULE_FLAGS instead of IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS in
process_measurement(), if the IMA_CHANGE_ATTR atomic flag is set (after
file metadata modification).
With this patch, new files for which metadata were modified while they are
still open, can be reopened before the last file close (when security.ima
is written), since the IMA_NEW_FILE flag is not cleared anymore. Otherwise,
appraisal fails because security.ima is missing (files with IMA_NEW_FILE
set are an exception).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.16.x
Fixes: 0d73a55208 ("ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Fix typos and spelling errors in integrity module comments that were
identified using the codespell tool.
No functional changes - documentation only.
Signed-off-by: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Fix spelling error in selinux module comments that were identified
using the codespell tool.
No functional changes - documentation only.
Signed-off-by: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit 08ae2487b2 ("tomoyo: automatically use patterns for several
situations in learning mode") replaced only $PID part of procfs pathname
with \$ pattern. But it turned out that we need to also replace $TID part
and $FD part to make this functionality useful for e.g. /bin/lsof .
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Add the const qualifier to all the ctl_tables in the tree except for
watchdog_hardlockup_sysctl, memory_allocation_profiling_sysctls,
loadpin_sysctl_table and the ones calling register_net_sysctl (./net,
drivers/inifiniband dirs). These are special cases as they use a
registration function with a non-const qualified ctl_table argument or
modify the arrays before passing them on to the registration function.
Constifying ctl_table structs will prevent the modification of
proc_handler function pointers as the arrays would reside in .rodata.
This is made possible after commit 78eb4ea25c ("sysctl: treewide:
constify the ctl_table argument of proc_handlers") constified all the
proc_handlers.
Created this by running an spatch followed by a sed command:
Spatch:
virtual patch
@
depends on !(file in "net")
disable optional_qualifier
@
identifier table_name != {
watchdog_hardlockup_sysctl,
iwcm_ctl_table,
ucma_ctl_table,
memory_allocation_profiling_sysctls,
loadpin_sysctl_table
};
@@
+ const
struct ctl_table table_name [] = { ... };
sed:
sed --in-place \
-e "s/struct ctl_table .table = &uts_kern/const struct ctl_table *table = \&uts_kern/" \
kernel/utsname_sysctl.c
Reviewed-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> # for kernel/trace/
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> # SCSI
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> # xfs
Acked-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Acked-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Bill O'Donnell <bodonnel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ashutosh Dixit <ashutosh.dixit@intel.com>
Acked-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <joel.granados@kernel.org>
Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:
"Mainly individually changelogged singleton patches. The patch series
in this pull are:
- "lib min_heap: Improve min_heap safety, testing, and documentation"
from Kuan-Wei Chiu provides various tightenings to the min_heap
library code
- "xarray: extract __xa_cmpxchg_raw" from Tamir Duberstein preforms
some cleanup and Rust preparation in the xarray library code
- "Update reference to include/asm-<arch>" from Geert Uytterhoeven
fixes pathnames in some code comments
- "Converge on using secs_to_jiffies()" from Easwar Hariharan uses
the new secs_to_jiffies() in various places where that is
appropriate
- "ocfs2, dlmfs: convert to the new mount API" from Eric Sandeen
switches two filesystems to the new mount API
- "Convert ocfs2 to use folios" from Matthew Wilcox does that
- "Remove get_task_comm() and print task comm directly" from Yafang
Shao removes now-unneeded calls to get_task_comm() in various
places
- "squashfs: reduce memory usage and update docs" from Phillip
Lougher implements some memory savings in squashfs and performs
some maintainability work
- "lib: clarify comparison function requirements" from Kuan-Wei Chiu
tightens the sort code's behaviour and adds some maintenance work
- "nilfs2: protect busy buffer heads from being force-cleared" from
Ryusuke Konishi fixes an issues in nlifs when the fs is presented
with a corrupted image
- "nilfs2: fix kernel-doc comments for function return values" from
Ryusuke Konishi fixes some nilfs kerneldoc
- "nilfs2: fix issues with rename operations" from Ryusuke Konishi
addresses some nilfs BUG_ONs which syzbot was able to trigger
- "minmax.h: Cleanups and minor optimisations" from David Laight does
some maintenance work on the min/max library code
- "Fixes and cleanups to xarray" from Kemeng Shi does maintenance
work on the xarray library code"
* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2025-01-24-23-16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (131 commits)
ocfs2: use str_yes_no() and str_no_yes() helper functions
include/linux/lz4.h: add some missing macros
Xarray: use xa_mark_t in xas_squash_marks() to keep code consistent
Xarray: remove repeat check in xas_squash_marks()
Xarray: distinguish large entries correctly in xas_split_alloc()
Xarray: move forward index correctly in xas_pause()
Xarray: do not return sibling entries from xas_find_marked()
ipc/util.c: complete the kernel-doc function descriptions
gcov: clang: use correct function param names
latencytop: use correct kernel-doc format for func params
minmax.h: remove some #defines that are only expanded once
minmax.h: simplify the variants of clamp()
minmax.h: move all the clamp() definitions after the min/max() ones
minmax.h: use BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG() for the lo < hi test in clamp()
minmax.h: reduce the #define expansion of min(), max() and clamp()
minmax.h: update some comments
minmax.h: add whitespace around operators and after commas
nilfs2: do not update mtime of renamed directory that is not moved
nilfs2: handle errors that nilfs_prepare_chunk() may return
CREDITS: fix spelling mistake
...
