Move away from an init specific init_debug() macro to a more general
lsm_pr()/lsm_pr_cont()/lsm_pr_dbg() set of macros that are available
both before and after init. In the process we do a number of minor
changes to improve the LSM initialization output and cleanup the code
somewhat.
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johhansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add function header comments for lsm_static_call_init() and
early_security_init(), tweak the existing comment block for
security_add_hooks().
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johhansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
With only security_init() calling lsm_init_ordered, it makes little
sense to keep lsm_init_ordered() as a standalone function. Fold
lsm_init_ordered() into security_init().
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johhansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Rename initialize_lsm() to be more consistent with the rest of the LSM
initialization changes and rework the function itself to better fit
with the "exit on fail" coding pattern.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Convert the lsm_blob_size fields to unsigned integers as there is no
current need for them to be negative, change "lsm_set_blob_size()" to
"lsm_blob_size_update()" to better reflect reality, and perform some
other minor cleanups to the associated code.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Rename ordered_lsm_parse() to lsm_order_parse() for the sake of
consistency with the other LSM initialization routines, and also
do some minor rework of the function. Aside from some minor style
decisions, the majority of the rework involved shuffling the order
of the LSM_FLAG_LEGACY and LSM_ORDER_FIRST code so that the
LSM_FLAG_LEGACY checks are handled first; it is important to note
that this doesn't affect the order in which the LSMs are registered.
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johhansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Rename append_ordered_lsm() to lsm_order_append() to better match
convention and do some rework. The rework includes moving the
LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE logic from lsm_prepare() to lsm_order_append()
in order to consolidate the individual LSM append/activation code,
and adding logic to skip appending explicitly disabled LSMs to the
active LSM list.
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johhansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In addition to style changes, rename set_enabled() to lsm_enabled_set()
and is_enabled() to lsm_is_enabled() to better fit within the LSM
initialization code.
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johhansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The LSM currently has a lot of code to maintain a list of the currently
active LSMs in a human readable string, with the only user being the
"/sys/kernel/security/lsm" code. Let's drop all of that code and
generate the string on first use and then cache it for subsequent use.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Move the LSM active count and lsm_id list declarations out of a header
that is visible across the kernel and into a header that is limited to
the LSM framework. This not only helps keep the include/linux headers
smaller and cleaner, it helps prevent misuse of these variables.
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johhansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Rename the builtin_lsm_order variable to lsm_order_builtin,
chosen_lsm_order to lsm_order_cmdline, chosen_major_lsm to
lsm_order_legacy, ordered_lsms[] to lsm_order[], and exclusive
to lsm_exclusive.
This patch also renames the associated kernel command line parsing
functions and adds some basic function comment blocks. The parsing
function choose_major_lsm() was renamed to lsm_choose_security(),
choose_lsm_order() to lsm_choose_lsm(), and enable_debug() to
lsm_debug_enable().
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reduce the duplication between the lsm_id struct and the DEFINE_LSM()
definition by linking the lsm_id struct directly into the individual
LSM's DEFINE_LSM() instance.
Linking the lsm_id into the LSM definition also allows us to simplify
the security_add_hooks() function by removing the code which populates
the lsm_idlist[] array and moving it into the normal LSM startup code
where the LSM list is parsed and the individual LSMs are enabled,
making for a cleaner implementation with less overhead at boot.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The new name more closely fits the rest of the naming scheme in
security/lsm_init.c. This patch also adds a trivial comment block to
the top of the function.
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johhansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
With only one caller of lsm_early_cred() and lsm_early_task(), insert
the functions' code directly into the caller and ger rid of the two
functions.
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johhansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
There are three common for loop patterns in the LSM initialization code
to loop through the ordered LSM list and the registered "early" LSMs.
This patch implements these loop patterns as macros to help simplify the
code and reduce the chance for errors.
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johhansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Continue to pull code out of security/security.c to help improve
readability by pulling all of the LSM framework initialization
code out into a new file.
No code changes.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In an effort to decompose security/security.c somewhat to make it less
twisted and unwieldy, pull out the LSM notifier code into a new file
as it is fairly well self-contained.
No code changes.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Just a couple of changes: crypto code cleanup and a IMA xattr bug fix"
* tag 'integrity-v6.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: don't clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr
lib/digsig: Use SHA-1 library instead of crypto_shash
integrity: Select CRYPTO from INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
Pull keys updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
"A few minor updates/fixes for keys"
* tag 'keys-next-6.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
security: keys: use menuconfig for KEYS symbol
KEYS: encrypted: Use SHA-256 library instead of crypto_shash
KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Move private functionality out of public header
KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Use SHA-1 library instead of crypto_shash
KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant time
Give the KEYS kconfig symbol and its associated symbols a separate menu
space under Security options by using "menuconfig" instead of "config".
This also makes it easier to find the security and LSM options.
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Instead of the "sha256" crypto_shash, just use sha256(). Similarly,
instead of the "hmac(sha256)" crypto_shash, just use
hmac_sha256_usingrawkey(). This is simpler and faster.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Pull file->f_path constification from Al Viro:
"Only one thing was modifying ->f_path of an opened file - acct(2).
Massaging that away and constifying a bunch of struct path * arguments
in functions that might be given &file->f_path ends up with the
situation where we can turn ->f_path into an anon union of const
struct path f_path and struct path __f_path, the latter modified only
in a few places in fs/{file_table,open,namei}.c, all for struct file
instances that are yet to be opened"
* tag 'pull-f_path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (23 commits)
Have cc(1) catch attempts to modify ->f_path
kernel/acct.c: saner struct file treatment
configfs:get_target() - release path as soon as we grab configfs_item reference
apparmor/af_unix: constify struct path * arguments
ovl_is_real_file: constify realpath argument
ovl_sync_file(): constify path argument
ovl_lower_dir(): constify path argument
ovl_get_verity_digest(): constify path argument
ovl_validate_verity(): constify {meta,data}path arguments
ovl_ensure_verity_loaded(): constify datapath argument
ksmbd_vfs_set_init_posix_acl(): constify path argument
ksmbd_vfs_inherit_posix_acl(): constify path argument
ksmbd_vfs_kern_path_unlock(): constify path argument
ksmbd_vfs_path_lookup_locked(): root_share_path can be const struct path *
check_export(): constify path argument
export_operations->open(): constify path argument
rqst_exp_get_by_name(): constify path argument
nfs: constify path argument of __vfs_getattr()
bpf...d_path(): constify path argument
done_path_create(): constify path argument
...
Pull d_name audit update from Al Viro:
"Simplifying ->d_name audits, easy part.
Turn dentry->d_name into an anon union of const struct qsrt (d_name
itself) and a writable alias (__d_name).
With constification of some struct qstr * arguments of functions that
get &dentry->d_name passed to them, that ends up with all
modifications provably done only in fs/dcache.c (and a fairly small
part of it).
Any new places doing modifications will be easy to find - grep for
__d_name will suffice"
* tag 'pull-qstr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
make it easier to catch those who try to modify ->d_name
generic_ci_validate_strict_name(): constify name argument
afs_dir_search: constify qstr argument
afs_edit_dir_{add,remove}(): constify qstr argument
exfat_find(): constify qstr argument
security_dentry_init_security(): constify qstr argument
Currently when both IMA and EVM are in fix mode, the IMA signature will
be reset to IMA hash if a program first stores IMA signature in
security.ima and then writes/removes some other security xattr for the
file.
For example, on Fedora, after booting the kernel with "ima_appraise=fix
evm=fix ima_policy=appraise_tcb" and installing rpm-plugin-ima,
installing/reinstalling a package will not make good reference IMA
signature generated. Instead IMA hash is generated,
# getfattr -m - -d -e hex /usr/bin/bash
# file: usr/bin/bash
security.ima=0x0404...
This happens because when setting security.selinux, the IMA_DIGSIG flag
that had been set early was cleared. As a result, IMA hash is generated
when the file is closed.
Similarly, IMA signature can be cleared on file close after removing
security xattr like security.evm or setting/removing ACL.
Prevent replacing the IMA file signature with a file hash, by preventing
the IMA_DIGSIG flag from being reset.
Here's a minimal C reproducer which sets security.selinux as the last
step which can also replaced by removing security.evm or setting ACL,
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/xattr.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int main() {
const char* file_path = "/usr/sbin/test_binary";
const char* hex_string = "030204d33204490066306402304";
int length = strlen(hex_string);
char* ima_attr_value;
int fd;
fd = open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644);
if (fd == -1) {
perror("Error opening file");
return 1;
}
ima_attr_value = (char*)malloc(length / 2 );
for (int i = 0, j = 0; i < length; i += 2, j++) {
sscanf(hex_string + i, "%2hhx", &ima_attr_value[j]);
}
if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.ima", ima_attr_value, length/2, 0) == -1) {
perror("Error setting extended attribute");
close(fd);
return 1;
}
const char* selinux_value= "system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0";
if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.selinux", selinux_value, strlen(selinux_value), 0) == -1) {
perror("Error setting extended attribute");
close(fd);
return 1;
}
close(fd);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Select CRYPTO from INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS, since
INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS selects several options that depend on CRYPTO.
This unblocks the removal of the CRYPTO selection from SIGNATURE.
SIGNATURE (lib/digsig.c) itself will no longer need CRYPTO, but
INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS was depending on it indirectly via the chain
SIGNATURE => INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE => INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Move the management of the LSM BPF security blobs into the framework
In order to enable multiple LSMs we need to allocate and free the
various security blobs in the LSM framework and not the individual
LSMs as they would end up stepping all over each other.
- Leverage the lsm_bdev_alloc() helper in lsm_bdev_alloc()
Make better use of our existing helper functions to reduce some code
duplication.
- Update the Rust cred code to use 'sync::aref'
Part of a larger effort to move the Rust code over to the 'sync'
module.
- Make CONFIG_LSM dependent on CONFIG_SECURITY
As the CONFIG_LSM Kconfig setting is an ordered list of the LSMs to
enable a boot, it obviously doesn't make much sense to enable this
when CONFIG_SECURITY is disabled.
- Update the LSM and CREDENTIALS sections in MAINTAINERS with Rusty
bits
Add the Rust helper files to the associated LSM and CREDENTIALS
entries int the MAINTAINERS file. We're trying to improve the
communication between the two groups and making sure we're all aware
of what is going on via cross-posting to the relevant lists is a good
way to start.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20250926' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lsm: CONFIG_LSM can depend on CONFIG_SECURITY
MAINTAINERS: add the associated Rust helper to the CREDENTIALS section
MAINTAINERS: add the associated Rust helper to the LSM section
rust,cred: update AlwaysRefCounted import to sync::aref
security: use umax() to improve code
lsm,selinux: Add LSM blob support for BPF objects
lsm: use lsm_blob_alloc() in lsm_bdev_alloc()
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Support per-file labeling for functionfs
Both genfscon and user defined labeling methods are supported. This
should help users who want to provide separation between the control
endpoint file, "ep0", and other endpoints.
- Remove our use of get_zeroed_page() in sel_read_bool()
Update sel_read_bool() to use a four byte stack buffer instead of a
memory page fetched via get_zeroed_page(), and fix a memory in the
process.
Needless to say we should have done this a long time ago, but it was
in a very old chunk of code that "just worked" and I don't think
anyone had taken a real look at it in many years.
- Better use of the netdev skb/sock helper functions
Convert a sk_to_full_sk(skb->sk) into a skb_to_full_sk(skb) call.
- Remove some old, dead, and/or redundant code
* tag 'selinux-pr-20250926' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: enable per-file labeling for functionfs
selinux: fix sel_read_bool() allocation and error handling
selinux: Remove redundant __GFP_NOWARN
selinux: use a consistent method to get full socket from skb
selinux: Remove unused function selinux_policycap_netif_wildcard()
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
- Proper audit support for multiple LSMs
As the audit subsystem predated the work to enable multiple LSMs,
some additional work was needed to support logging the different LSM
labels for the subjects/tasks and objects on the system. Casey's
patches add new auxillary records for subjects and objects that
convey the additional labels.
- Ensure fanotify audit events are always generated
Generally speaking security relevant subsystems always generate audit
events, unless explicitly ignored. However, up to this point fanotify
events had been ignored by default, but starting with this pull
request fanotify follows convention and generates audit events by
default.
- Replace an instance of strcpy() with strscpy()
- Minor indentation, style, and comment fixes
* tag 'audit-pr-20250926' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: fix skb leak when audit rate limit is exceeded
audit: init ab->skb_list earlier in audit_buffer_alloc()
audit: add record for multiple object contexts
audit: add record for multiple task security contexts
lsm: security_lsmblob_to_secctx module selection
audit: create audit_stamp structure
audit: add a missing tab
audit: record fanotify event regardless of presence of rules
audit: fix typo in auditfilter.c comment
audit: Replace deprecated strcpy() with strscpy()
audit: fix indentation in audit_log_exit()
Pull copy_process updates from Christian Brauner:
"This contains the changes to enable support for clone3() on nios2
which apparently is still a thing.
The more exciting part of this is that it cleans up the inconsistency
in how the 64-bit flag argument is passed from copy_process() into the
various other copy_*() helpers"
[ Fixed up rv ltl_monitor 32-bit support as per Sasha Levin in the merge ]
* tag 'kernel-6.18-rc1.clone3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
nios2: implement architecture-specific portion of sys_clone3
arch: copy_thread: pass clone_flags as u64
copy_process: pass clone_flags as u64 across calltree
copy_sighand: Handle architectures where sizeof(unsigned long) < sizeof(u64)
Move functionality used only by trusted_tpm1.c out of the public header
<keys/trusted_tpm.h>. Specifically, change the exported functions into
static functions, since they are not used outside trusted_tpm1.c, and
move various other definitions and inline functions to trusted_tpm1.c.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Use the SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA1 library functions instead of crypto_shash.
This is simpler and faster.
Replace the selection of CRYPTO, CRYPTO_HMAC, and CRYPTO_SHA1 with
CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1 and CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS. The latter is needed for
crypto_memneq() which was previously being pulled in via CRYPTO.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To prevent timing attacks, HMAC value comparison needs to be constant
time. Replace the memcmp() with the correct function, crypto_memneq().
[For the Fixes commit I used the commit that introduced the memcmp().
It predates the introduction of crypto_memneq(), but it was still a bug
at the time even though a helper function didn't exist yet.]
Fixes: d00a1c72f7 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Provides an abstraction for C bitmap API and bitops operations.
This commit enables a Rust implementation of an Android Binder
data structure from commit 15d9da3f81 ("binder: use bitmap for faster
descriptor lookup"), which can be found in drivers/android/dbitmap.h.
It is a step towards upstreaming the Rust port of Android Binder driver.
We follow the C Bitmap API closely in naming and semantics, with
a few differences that take advantage of Rust language facilities
and idioms. The main types are `BitmapVec` for owned bitmaps and
`Bitmap` for references to C bitmaps.
* We leverage Rust type system guarantees as follows:
* all (non-atomic) mutating operations require a &mut reference which
amounts to exclusive access.
* the `BitmapVec` type implements Send. This enables transferring
ownership between threads and is needed for Binder.
* the `BitmapVec` type implements Sync, which enables passing shared
references &Bitmap between threads. Atomic operations can be
used to safely modify from multiple threads (interior
mutability), though without ordering guarantees.
* The Rust API uses `{set,clear}_bit` vs `{set,clear}_bit_atomic` as
names for clarity, which differs from the C naming convention
`set_bit` for atomic vs `__set_bit` for non-atomic.
* we include enough operations for the API to be useful. Not all
operations are exposed yet in order to avoid dead code. The missing
ones can be added later.
* We take a fine-grained approach to safety:
* Low-level bit-ops get a safe API with bounds checks. Calling with
an out-of-bounds arguments to {set,clear}_bit becomes a no-op and
get logged as errors.
* We also introduce a RUST_BITMAP_HARDENED config, which
causes invocations with out-of-bounds arguments to panic.
* methods correspond to find_* C methods tolerate out-of-bounds
since the C implementation does. Also here, out-of-bounds
arguments are logged as errors, or panic in RUST_BITMAP_HARDENED
mode.
* We add a way to "borrow" bitmaps from C in Rust, to make C bitmaps
that were allocated in C directly usable in Rust code (`Bitmap`).
* the Rust API is optimized to represent the bitmap inline if it would
fit into a pointer. This saves allocations which is
relevant in the Binder use case.
The underlying C bitmap is *not* exposed for raw access in Rust. Doing so
would permit bypassing the Rust API and lose static guarantees.
An alternative route of vendoring an existing Rust bitmap package was
considered but suboptimal overall. Reusing the C implementation is
preferable for a basic data structure like bitmaps. It enables Rust
code to be a lot more similar and predictable with respect to C code
that uses the same data structures and enables the use of code that
has been tried-and-tested in the kernel, with the same performance
characteristics whenever possible.
We use the `usize` type for sizes and indices into the bitmap,
because Rust generally always uses that type for indices and lengths
and it will be more convenient if the API accepts that type. This means
that we need to perform some casts to/from u32 and usize, since the C
headers use unsigned int instead of size_t/unsigned long for these
numbers in some places.
Adds new MAINTAINERS section BITMAP API [RUST].
Suggested-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Suggested-by: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Burak Emir <bqe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yury Norov (NVIDIA) <yury.norov@gmail.com>
Nothing outside of fs/dcache.c has any business modifying
dentry names; passing &dentry->d_name as an argument should
have that argument declared as a const pointer.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> # smack part
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
When CONFIG_SECURITY is not set, CONFIG_LSM (builtin_lsm_order) does
not need to be visible and settable since builtin_lsm_order is defined in
security.o, which is only built when CONFIG_SECURITY=y.
So make CONFIG_LSM depend on CONFIG_SECURITY.
Fixes: 13e735c0e9 ("LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
[PM: subj tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch adds support for genfscon per-file labeling of functionfs
files as well as support for userspace to apply labels after new
functionfs endpoints are created.
This allows for separate labels and therefore access control on a
per-endpoint basis. An example use case would be for the default
endpoint EP0 used as a restricted control endpoint, and additional
usb endpoints to be used by other more permissive domains.
It should be noted that if there are multiple functionfs mounts on a
system, genfs file labels will apply to all mounts, and therefore will not
likely be as useful as the userspace relabeling portion of this patch -
the addition to selinux_is_genfs_special_handling().
This patch introduces the functionfs_seclabel policycap to maintain
existing functionfs genfscon behavior unless explicitly enabled.
Signed-off-by: Neill Kapron <nkapron@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: trim changelog, apply boolean logic fixup]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Switch sel_read_bool() from using get_zeroed_page() and free_page()
to a stack-allocated buffer. This also fixes a memory leak in the
error path when security_get_bool_value() returns an error.
Reported-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
With the introduction of clone3 in commit 7f192e3cd3 ("fork: add
clone3") the effective bit width of clone_flags on all architectures was
increased from 32-bit to 64-bit, with a new type of u64 for the flags.
However, for most consumers of clone_flags the interface was not
changed from the previous type of unsigned long.
While this works fine as long as none of the new 64-bit flag bits
(CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND and CLONE_INTO_CGROUP) are evaluated, this is still
undesirable in terms of the principle of least surprise.
Thus, this commit fixes all relevant interfaces of callees to
sys_clone3/copy_process (excluding the architecture-specific
copy_thread) to consistently pass clone_flags as u64, so that
no truncation to 32-bit integers occurs on 32-bit architectures.
Signed-off-by: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250901-nios2-implement-clone3-v2-2-53fcf5577d57@siemens-energy.com
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS.
An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is:
type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS
msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record
the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?".
An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
on an object security context.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subj tweak, audit example readability indents]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace the single skb pointer in an audit_buffer with a list of
skb pointers. Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as
there's no guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing
the stamp associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create
auxiliary records as have been added to the list. Functions are
created to manage the skb list in the audit_buffer.
Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS.
An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is:
type=MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS
msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
subj_apparmor=unconfined
subj_smack=_
When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record the
"subj=" field in other records in the event will be "subj=?".
An AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
multiple security modules that may make access decisions based on a
subject security context.
Refactor audit_log_task_context(), creating a new audit_log_subj_ctx().
This is used in netlabel auditing to provide multiple subject security
contexts as necessary.
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subj tweak, audit example readability indents]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a parameter lsmid to security_lsmblob_to_secctx() to identify which
of the security modules that may be active should provide the security
context. If the value of lsmid is LSM_ID_UNDEF the first LSM providing
a hook is used. security_secid_to_secctx() is unchanged, and will
always report the first LSM providing a hook.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subj tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Use umax() to reduce the code in update_mmap_min_addr() and improve its
readability.
Signed-off-by: Qianfeng Rong <rongqianfeng@vivo.com>
[PM: subj line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit 16f5dfbc85 ("gfp: include __GFP_NOWARN in GFP_NOWAIT")
made GFP_NOWAIT implicitly include __GFP_NOWARN.
Therefore, explicit __GFP_NOWARN combined with GFP_NOWAIT
(e.g., `GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN`) is now redundant. Let's clean
up these redundant flags across subsystems.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Qianfeng Rong <rongqianfeng@vivo.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: fixed horizontal spacing / alignment, line wraps]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch introduces LSM blob support for BPF maps, programs, and
tokens to enable LSM stacking and multiplexing of LSM modules that
govern BPF objects. Additionally, the existing BPF hooks used by
SELinux have been updated to utilize the new blob infrastructure,
removing the assumption of exclusive ownership of the security
pointer.
Signed-off-by: Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: dropped local variable init, style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
