The ipc_control_data buffer is allocated as kzalloc(max_size), where
max_size covers the entire struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data including its
flexible array payload. However, the bounds checks in bytes_ext_put
and _bytes_ext_get compared user data lengths against max_size
directly, ignoring that cdata->data sits at an offset of
sizeof(struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data) bytes into the allocation.
This allowed writing up to sizeof(struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data) bytes past
the end of the heap buffer from unprivileged userspace via the ALSA TLV
kcontrol interface, and similarly allowed over-reading adjacent heap
data on the get path.
Fix all bounds checks to subtract sizeof(*cdata) from max_size so they
reflect the actual space available at the cdata->data offset. Also fix
the error-path restore in bytes_ext_put which wrote to cdata->data
instead of cdata, causing the same overflow.
Fixes: 67ec2a0916 ("ASoC: SOF: Add bytes_ext control IPC ops for IPC3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Girdwood <liam.r.girdwood@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260609083458.31193-7-peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
In sof_ipc3_bytes_put(), the size used for the memcpy is derived from
the old data->size already in the buffer, not the incoming new data's
size field. If the new data has a different size, the copy length is
wrong: it may truncate valid data or copy stale bytes.
Similarly, sof_ipc3_bytes_get() checks data->size against max_size
without accounting for the sizeof(struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data) offset
of the flex array within the allocation.
Fix bytes_put to validate and use the incoming data's sof_abi_hdr.size
from ucontrol before copying. Fix bytes_get to subtract sizeof(*cdata)
from the bounds check to match the actual available space.
Fixes: 544ac8858f ("ASoC: SOF: Add bytes_get/put control IPC ops for IPC3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Girdwood <liam.r.girdwood@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260609083458.31193-6-peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
The function is improved in the way that if the firmware returns a
validation error on the newly sent bytes, then the kernel will
automatically restore to the old bytes value for a given kcontrol.
This way, if the firmware rejects a data blob then the kernel will also
reject it, instead of saving it for the next suspend/resume cycle. The
old behaviour is that the kernel would save it anyway and on next
firmware boot it would apply the previously-rejected configuration,
leading to errors during playback.
Additionally, the function also saves previously validated
configurations, so that if the firmware does end up rejecting a new
bytes value the kernel can send an old, previously-valid configuration.
Reviewed-by: Daniel Baluta <daniel.baluta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Péter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Olaru <paul.olaru@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baluta <daniel.baluta@nxp.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230503081049.73847-2-daniel.baluta@oss.nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
The use_count of the swidget is protect by ALSA core PCM locking with the
exception when an associated kcontrol is changed.
It has been observed that a rightly timed kcontrol access during stream
stop can result of an attempt to send a control update to a widget which
has been freed up between the check of the use_count and the message
sending.
We need to protect the entire sof_widget_setup() and sof_widget_free()
execution to make it safe to rely on the use_count.
Move the code under an _unlocked() function and use a mutex to protect
the execution of the functions for concurrency.
On the control path we need to use the lock only for the kcontrol access,
the widget_kcontrol_setup() op is called with the lock already held.
Reported-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski <guennadi.liakhovetski@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230127120031.10709-18-peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
