Merge tag 'bpf-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf

Pull BPF fixes from Daniel Borkmann:

 - Fix BPF verifier to preserve full pointer state for commuted
   scalar += pointer arithmetic (Yiyang Chen, Eduard Zingerman)

 - Fix a use-after-free of request sockets in the BPF TCP iterator
   batching (Jose Fernandez)

 - Fix a use-after-free of sk_redir in the BPF sockmap send verdict
   path (Chengfeng Ye)

 - Fix a netns reference imbalance in the BPF conntrack kfuncs
   (Chengfeng Ye)

 - Fix bpf_get_fsverity_digest() dynptr assumptions and silent
   digest truncation (Eric Biggers)

 - Fix bpf_tcp_{gen,check}_syncookie to check sk_state before
   sk_protocol to make sure it is a full socket (Luxiao Xu)

 - Fix rqspinlock to reset the tail when preserving the queue
   on deadlock (Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi)

* tag 'bpf-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf:
  rqspinlock: Reset tail when preserving queue on deadlock
  bpf: Check sk_state before sk_protocol in bpf_tcp_*_syncookie
  fsverity: Fix silent truncation in bpf_get_fsverity_digest()
  fsverity: Fix bpf_get_fsverity_digest() dynptr assumptions
  bpf: tcp: Fix use-after-free in bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch()
  bpf: Fix netns reference imbalance in conntrack kfuncs
  bpf, sockmap: Fix sk_redir use-after-free in send verdict
  selftests/bpf: Cover commuted pointer state propagation
  bpf: Propagate untrusted pointer state in commuted arithmetic
  bpf: Preserve pointer state for commuted arithmetic
  bpf: Simplify sanitize_err() signature
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds
2026-08-07 08:08:57 -07:00
10 changed files with 198 additions and 76 deletions

View File

@@ -572,9 +572,10 @@ int __lockfunc resilient_queued_spin_lock_slowpath(rqspinlock_t *lock, u32 val)
/* Disable queue destruction when we detect deadlocks. */
if (ret == -EDEADLK) {
if (!next)
if (!try_cmpxchg_tail(lock, tail, 0)) {
next = smp_cond_load_relaxed(&node->next, (VAL));
arch_mcs_spin_unlock_contended(&next->locked);
arch_mcs_spin_unlock_contended(&next->locked);
}
goto err_release_node;
}

View File

@@ -13557,23 +13557,21 @@ static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt;
}
static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason,
const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason)
{
static const char *err = "pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root";
const char *op = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD ? "add" : "sub";
u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
switch (reason) {
case REASON_BOUNDS:
verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, %s\n",
off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src, err);
regs[src].type == SCALAR_VALUE ? src : dst, err);
break;
case REASON_TYPE:
verbose(env, "R%d has pointer with unsupported alu operation, %s\n",
off_reg == dst_reg ? src : dst, err);
regs[src].type == SCALAR_VALUE ? dst : src, err);
break;
case REASON_PATHS:
verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s from different maps, paths or scalars, %s\n",
@@ -13709,13 +13707,6 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return -EACCES;
}
/*
* Accesses to untrusted PTR_TO_MEM are done through probe
* instructions, hence no need to track offsets.
*/
if (base_type(ptr_reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM && (ptr_reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED))
return 0;
switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) {
case PTR_TO_CTX:
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
@@ -13745,11 +13736,19 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return -EACCES;
}
/* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id.
* The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset.
/* For 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits the complete pointer
* register state. Individual fields may be adjusted later by pointer
* arithmetic. Callers guarantee that below does not overwrite off_reg.
*/
dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type;
dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
if (dst_reg != ptr_reg)
*dst_reg = *ptr_reg;
/*
* Accesses to untrusted PTR_TO_MEM are done through probe
* instructions, hence no need to track offsets.
*/
if (base_type(ptr_reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM && (ptr_reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED))
return 0;
if (!check_reg_sane_offset_scalar(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) ||
!check_reg_sane_offset_ptr(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type))
@@ -13762,7 +13761,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
&info, false);
if (ret < 0)
return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret);
}
switch (opcode) {
@@ -13792,7 +13791,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
break;
case BPF_SUB:
if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
if (dst_reg != ptr_reg) {
/* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */
verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
dst);
@@ -13855,7 +13854,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return -EFAULT;
}
if (ret < 0)
return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret);
}
return 0;
@@ -14607,7 +14606,7 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
if (ret < 0)
return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL);
return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret);
}
/* Calculate sign/unsigned bounds and tnum for alu32 and alu64 bit ops.
@@ -14810,8 +14809,8 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg);
if (err)
return err;
return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
src_reg, dst_reg);
off_reg = *dst_reg;
return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, src_reg, &off_reg);
}
} else if (ptr_reg) {
/* pointer += scalar */