Merge branch 'stricter register ID checking in regsafe()'

Eduard Zingerman says:

====================

This patch-set consists of a series of bug fixes for register ID
tracking in verifier.c:states_equal()/regsafe() functions:
 - for registers of type PTR_TO_MAP_{KEY,VALUE}, PTR_TO_PACKET[_META]
   the regsafe() should call check_ids() even if registers are
   byte-to-byte equal;
 - states_equal() must maintain idmap that covers all function frames
   in the state because functions like mark_ptr_or_null_regs() operate
   on all registers in the state;
 - regsafe() must compare spin lock ids for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE registers.

The last point covers issue reported by Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi in [1],
I borrowed the test commit from there.
Note, that there is also an issue with register id tracking for
scalars described here [2], it would be addressed separately.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221111202719.982118-1-memxor@gmail.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221128163442.280187-2-eddyz87@gmail.com/

Eduard Zingerman (6):
  bpf: regsafe() must not skip check_ids()
  selftests/bpf: test cases for regsafe() bug skipping check_id()
  bpf: states_equal() must build idmap for all function frames
  selftests/bpf: verify states_equal() maintains idmap across all frames
  bpf: use check_ids() for active_lock comparison
  selftests/bpf: test case for relaxed prunning of active_lock.id
====================

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

include/linux/bpf_verifier.h

@@ -273,9 +273,9 @@ struct bpf_id_pair {
 	u32 cur;
 };
 
-/* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */
-#define BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE (MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE)
 #define MAX_CALL_FRAMES 8
+/* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */
+#define BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE ((MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) * MAX_CALL_FRAMES)
 struct bpf_verifier_state {
 	/* call stack tracking */
 	struct bpf_func_state *frame[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];

kernel/bpf/verifier.c

@@ -13064,15 +13064,6 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
 
 	equal = memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent)) == 0;
 
-	if (rold->type == PTR_TO_STACK)
-		/* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to
-		 * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar
-		 */
-		return equal && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno;
-
-	if (equal)
-		return true;
-
 	if (rold->type == NOT_INIT)
 		/* explored state can't have used this */
 		return true;
@@ -13080,6 +13071,8 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
 		return false;
 	switch (base_type(rold->type)) {
 	case SCALAR_VALUE:
+		if (equal)
+			return true;
 		if (env->explore_alu_limits)
 			return false;
 		if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
@@ -13126,7 +13119,8 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
 		 */
 		return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 &&
 		       range_within(rold, rcur) &&
-		       tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
+		       tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) &&
+		       check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap);
 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
 		if (rcur->type != rold->type)
@@ -13150,20 +13144,14 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
 		/* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
 		return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
 		       tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
-	case PTR_TO_CTX:
+	case PTR_TO_STACK:
-	case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
+		/* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to
-	case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
+		 * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar
-	case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:
-	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
-	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
-	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
-	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
-		/* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above
-		 * would have accepted
 		 */
+		return equal && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno;
 	default:
-		/* Don't know what's going on, just say it's not safe */
+		/* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() */
-		return false;
+		return equal;
 	}
 
 	/* Shouldn't get here; if we do, say it's not safe */
@@ -13273,7 +13261,6 @@ static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_stat
 {
 	int i;
 
-	memset(env->idmap_scratch, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch));
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
 		if (!regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i],
 			     env->idmap_scratch))
@@ -13297,14 +13284,25 @@ static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	if (old->curframe != cur->curframe)
 		return false;
 
+	memset(env->idmap_scratch, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch));
+
 	/* Verification state from speculative execution simulation
 	 * must never prune a non-speculative execution one.
 	 */
 	if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative)
 		return false;
 
-	if (old->active_lock.ptr != cur->active_lock.ptr ||
+	if (old->active_lock.ptr != cur->active_lock.ptr)
-	    old->active_lock.id != cur->active_lock.id)
+		return false;
+
+	/* Old and cur active_lock's have to be either both present
+	 * or both absent.
+	 */
+	if (!!old->active_lock.id != !!cur->active_lock.id)
+		return false;
+
+	if (old->active_lock.id &&
+	    !check_ids(old->active_lock.id, cur->active_lock.id, env->idmap_scratch))
 		return false;
 
 	if (old->active_rcu_lock != cur->active_rcu_lock)

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c

@@ -2305,3 +2305,85 @@
 	.errstr = "!read_ok",
 	.result = REJECT,
 },
+/* Make sure that verifier.c:states_equal() considers IDs from all
+ * frames when building 'idmap' for check_ids().
+ */
+{
+	"calls: check_ids() across call boundary",
+	.insns = {
+	/* Function main() */
+	BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
+	/* fp[-24] = map_lookup_elem(...) ; get a MAP_VALUE_PTR_OR_NULL with some ID */
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+	BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1,
+		      0),
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+	BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, BPF_REG_0, -24),
+	/* fp[-32] = map_lookup_elem(...) ; get a MAP_VALUE_PTR_OR_NULL with some ID */
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+	BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1,
+		      0),
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+	BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, BPF_REG_0, -32),
+	/* call foo(&fp[-24], &fp[-32])   ; both arguments have IDs in the current
+	 *                                ; stack frame
+	 */
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_FP),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -24),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_FP),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -32),
+	BPF_CALL_REL(2),
+	/* exit 0 */
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	/* Function foo()
+	 *
+	 * r9 = &frame[0].fp[-24]  ; save arguments in the callee saved registers,
+	 * r8 = &frame[0].fp[-32]  ; arguments are pointers to pointers to map value
+	 */
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_1),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_2),
+	/* r7 = ktime_get_ns() */
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_0),
+	/* r6 = ktime_get_ns() */
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_0),
+	/* if r6 > r7 goto +1      ; no new information about the state is derived from
+	 *                         ; this check, thus produced verifier states differ
+	 *                         ; only in 'insn_idx'
+	 * r9 = r8
+	 */
+	BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_7, 1),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_8),
+	/* r9 = *r9                ; verifier get's to this point via two paths:
+	 *                         ; (I) one including r9 = r8, verified first;
+	 *                         ; (II) one excluding r9 = r8, verified next.
+	 *                         ; After load of *r9 to r9 the frame[0].fp[-24].id == r9.id.
+	 *                         ; Suppose that checkpoint is created here via path (I).
+	 *                         ; When verifying via (II) the r9.id must be compared against
+	 *                         ; frame[0].fp[-24].id, otherwise (I) and (II) would be
+	 *                         ; incorrectly deemed equivalent.
+	 * if r9 == 0 goto <exit>
+	 */
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_9, 0),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_9, 0, 1),
+	/* r8 = *r8                ; read map value via r8, this is not safe
+	 * r0 = *r8                ; because r8 might be not equal to r9.
+	 */
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_8, 0),
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_8, 0),
+	/* exit 0 */
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	},
+	.flags = BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ,
+	.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3, 9 },
+	.result = REJECT,
+	.errstr = "R8 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'",
+	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
+	.errstr_unpriv = "",
+	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
+},

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/direct_packet_access.c

@@ -654,3 +654,57 @@
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
 },
+{
+	"direct packet access: test30 (check_id() in regsafe(), bad access)",
+	.insns = {
+	/* r9 = ctx */
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_1),
+	/* r7 = ktime_get_ns() */
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_0),
+	/* r6 = ktime_get_ns() */
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_0),
+	/* r2 = ctx->data
+	 * r3 = ctx->data
+	 * r4 = ctx->data_end
+	 */
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_9, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_9, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_9, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
+	/* if r6 > 100 goto exit
+	 * if r7 > 100 goto exit
+	 */
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_6, 100, 9),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_7, 100, 8),
+	/* r2 += r6              ; this forces assignment of ID to r2
+	 * r2 += 1               ; get some fixed off for r2
+	 * r3 += r7              ; this forces assignment of ID to r3
+	 * r3 += 1               ; get some fixed off for r3
+	 */
+	BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_6),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, 1),
+	BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_7),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_3, 1),
+	/* if r6 > r7 goto +1    ; no new information about the state is derived from
+	 *                       ; this check, thus produced verifier states differ
+	 *                       ; only in 'insn_idx'
+	 * r2 = r3               ; optionally share ID between r2 and r3
+	 */
+	BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_7, 1),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3),
+	/* if r3 > ctx->data_end goto exit */
+	BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, 1),
+	/* r5 = *(u8 *) (r2 - 1) ; access packet memory using r2,
+	 *                       ; this is not always safe
+	 */
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_2, -1),
+	/* exit(0) */
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	},
+	.flags = BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ,
+	.result = REJECT,
+	.errstr = "invalid access to packet, off=0 size=1, R2",
+	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
+},

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/spin_lock.c

@@ -331,3 +331,117 @@
 	.errstr = "inside bpf_spin_lock",
 	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
 },
+{
+	"spin_lock: regsafe compare reg->id for map value",
+	.insns = {
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1),
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_6, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
+	BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_1),
+	BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, -4, 0),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4),
+	BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_0),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_9),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4),
+	BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_0),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_7),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 4),
+	BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_spin_lock),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_6, 0, 1),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_8),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_7),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 4),
+	BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	},
+	.fixup_map_spin_lock = { 2 },
+	.result = REJECT,
+	.errstr = "bpf_spin_unlock of different lock",
+	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
+	.flags = BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ,
+},
+/* Make sure that regsafe() compares ids for spin lock records using
+ * check_ids():
+ *  1: r9 = map_lookup_elem(...)  ; r9.id == 1
+ *  2: r8 = map_lookup_elem(...)  ; r8.id == 2
+ *  3: r7 = ktime_get_ns()
+ *  4: r6 = ktime_get_ns()
+ *  5: if r6 > r7 goto <9>
+ *  6: spin_lock(r8)
+ *  7: r9 = r8
+ *  8: goto <10>
+ *  9: spin_lock(r9)
+ * 10: spin_unlock(r9)             ; r9.id == 1 || r9.id == 2 and lock is active,
+ *                                 ; second visit to (10) should be considered safe
+ *                                 ; if check_ids() is used.
+ * 11: exit(0)
+ */
+{
+	"spin_lock: regsafe() check_ids() similar id mappings",
+	.insns = {
+	BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, -4, 0),
+	/* r9 = map_lookup_elem(...) */
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4),
+	BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1,
+		      0),
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 24),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_0),
+	/* r8 = map_lookup_elem(...) */
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4),
+	BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1,
+		      0),
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 18),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_0),
+	/* r7 = ktime_get_ns() */
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_0),
+	/* r6 = ktime_get_ns() */
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_0),
+	/* if r6 > r7 goto +5      ; no new information about the state is derived from
+	 *                         ; this check, thus produced verifier states differ
+	 *                         ; only in 'insn_idx'
+	 * spin_lock(r8)
+	 * r9 = r8
+	 * goto unlock
+	 */
+	BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_7, 5),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_8),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 4),
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_spin_lock),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_8),
+	BPF_JMP_A(3),
+	/* spin_lock(r9) */
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_9),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 4),
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_spin_lock),
+	/* spin_unlock(r9) */
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_9),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 4),
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock),
+	/* exit(0) */
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	},
+	.fixup_map_spin_lock = { 3, 10 },
+	.result = VERBOSE_ACCEPT,
+	.errstr = "28: safe",
+	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
+	.errstr_unpriv = "",
+	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
+	.flags = BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ,
+},

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/value_or_null.c

@@ -169,3 +169,52 @@
 	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 },
+{
+	"MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL check_ids() in regsafe()",
+	.insns = {
+	BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
+	/* r9 = map_lookup_elem(...) */
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+	BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1,
+		      0),
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_0),
+	/* r8 = map_lookup_elem(...) */
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+	BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1,
+		      0),
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_0),
+	/* r7 = ktime_get_ns() */
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_0),
+	/* r6 = ktime_get_ns() */
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_0),
+	/* if r6 > r7 goto +1    ; no new information about the state is derived from
+	 *                       ; this check, thus produced verifier states differ
+	 *                       ; only in 'insn_idx'
+	 * r9 = r8               ; optionally share ID between r9 and r8
+	 */
+	BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_7, 1),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_8),
+	/* if r9 == 0 goto <exit> */
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_9, 0, 1),
+	/* read map value via r8, this is not always
+	 * safe because r8 might be not equal to r9.
+	 */
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_8, 0),
+	/* exit 0 */
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	},
+	.flags = BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ,
+	.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3, 9 },
+	.result = REJECT,
+	.errstr = "R8 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'",
+	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
+	.errstr_unpriv = "",
+	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
+},