From 79adf48fb091e32ed94113d919908be20e09f5eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Alexander=20H=C3=B6lzl?= Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2026 11:00:35 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 01/19] can: vxcan: Kconfig: fix description stating no local echo provided MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The Kconfig description of the vxcan kernel module erroneously states the the vxcan interface does not provide a local echo of sent can frames. However this behavior changed in commit 259bdba27e32 ("vxcan: enable local echo for sent CAN frames") and vxcan interfaces now provide a local echo. Change the description of the vxcan module in the Kconfig to reflect this change. Signed-off-by: Alexander Hölzl Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260619090035.17769-1-alexander.hoelzl@gmx.net [mkl: rephrase patch description] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- drivers/net/can/Kconfig | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/Kconfig b/drivers/net/can/Kconfig index e4058708ae68..a8fad6fe5302 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/net/can/Kconfig @@ -40,11 +40,8 @@ config CAN_VXCAN When one end receives the packet it appears on its pair and vice versa. The vxcan can be used for cross namespace communication. - In opposite to vcan loopback devices the vxcan only forwards CAN - frames to its pair and does *not* provide a local echo of sent - CAN frames. To disable a potential echo in af_can.c the vxcan driver - announces IFF_ECHO in the interface flags. To have a clean start - in each namespace the CAN GW hop counter is set to zero. + To have a clean start in each namespace the CAN GW hop counter is + set to zero. This driver can also be built as a module. If so, the module will be called vxcan. From c43122fef328a70045fe7621c06de6b2b8e19264 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fan Wu Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 16:41:59 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 02/19] can: esd_usb: kill anchored URBs before freeing netdevs esd_usb_disconnect() frees each CAN netdev with free_candev() inside its per-netdev loop and only calls unlink_all_urbs(dev) afterwards. The per-netdev private data (struct esd_usb_net_priv) is embedded in the net_device allocation returned by alloc_candev(), so once free_candev() has run, dev->nets[i] points to freed memory. unlink_all_urbs() then dereferences the freed dev->nets[i] to kill the per-netdev TX anchor (usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&priv->tx_submitted)), clear active_tx_jobs, and reset priv->tx_contexts[]. Reorder the teardown so the anchored URBs are killed before the netdevs are freed, matching other CAN/USB drivers in the same directory such as ems_usb, usb_8dev and mcba_usb, which unregister, then unlink, then free: unregister the netdevs first (which stops their TX queues), call unlink_all_urbs(dev) once, then free the netdevs. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. Fixes: 96d8e90382dc ("can: Add driver for esd CAN-USB/2 device") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5 Signed-off-by: Fan Wu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260709164159.497640-1-fanwu01@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- drivers/net/can/usb/esd_usb.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/esd_usb.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/esd_usb.c index d257440fa01f..f41d4a0d140f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/esd_usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/esd_usb.c @@ -1390,10 +1390,13 @@ static void esd_usb_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) netdev = dev->nets[i]->netdev; netdev_info(netdev, "unregister\n"); unregister_netdev(netdev); - free_candev(netdev); } } unlink_all_urbs(dev); + for (i = 0; i < dev->net_count; i++) { + if (dev->nets[i]) + free_candev(dev->nets[i]->netdev); + } kfree(dev); } } From 1e5185c090589f4146d728ab36417d8a5419f127 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 10:22:23 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 03/19] can: raw: add locking for raw flags bitfield With commit 890e5198a6e5 ("can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock") the formerly separate integer values have been integrated into a single bitfield. This led to a read-modify-write operation when changing a flag in raw_setsockopt() which now needs a locking to prevent concurrent access. Instead of adding a lock/unlock hell in each of the flag manipulations this patch introduces a wrapper for a new raw_setsockopt_locked() function analogue to the isotp_setsockopt[_locked]() approach in net/can/isotp.c Fixes: 890e5198a6e5 ("can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock") Reported-by: Eulgyu Kim Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20260503112200.22727-1-eulgyukim@snu.ac.kr/ Tested-by: Eulgyu Kim Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol Tested-by: Vincent Mailhol Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260504111928.41856-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net [mkl: use Closes tag instead of Link] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- net/can/raw.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/raw.c b/net/can/raw.c index a26942e78e68..82d9c0499c95 100644 --- a/net/can/raw.c +++ b/net/can/raw.c @@ -562,8 +562,8 @@ static int raw_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, return RAW_MIN_NAMELEN; } -static int raw_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, - sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) +static int raw_setsockopt_locked(struct socket *sock, int optname, + sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct raw_sock *ro = raw_sk(sk); @@ -575,9 +575,6 @@ static int raw_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, int flag; int err = 0; - if (level != SOL_CAN_RAW) - return -EINVAL; - switch (optname) { case CAN_RAW_FILTER: if (optlen % sizeof(struct can_filter) != 0) @@ -598,17 +595,11 @@ static int raw_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, return -EFAULT; } - rtnl_lock(); - lock_sock(sk); - dev = ro->dev; - if (ro->bound && dev) { - if (dev->reg_state != NETREG_REGISTERED) { - if (count > 1) - kfree(filter); - err = -ENODEV; - goto out_fil; - } + if (ro->bound && dev && dev->reg_state != NETREG_REGISTERED) { + if (count > 1) + kfree(filter); + return -ENODEV; } if (ro->bound) { @@ -622,7 +613,7 @@ static int raw_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, if (err) { if (count > 1) kfree(filter); - goto out_fil; + return err; } /* remove old filter registrations */ @@ -642,11 +633,6 @@ static int raw_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, } ro->filter = filter; ro->count = count; - - out_fil: - release_sock(sk); - rtnl_unlock(); - break; case CAN_RAW_ERR_FILTER: @@ -658,16 +644,9 @@ static int raw_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, err_mask &= CAN_ERR_MASK; - rtnl_lock(); - lock_sock(sk); - dev = ro->dev; - if (ro->bound && dev) { - if (dev->reg_state != NETREG_REGISTERED) { - err = -ENODEV; - goto out_err; - } - } + if (ro->bound && dev && dev->reg_state != NETREG_REGISTERED) + return -ENODEV; /* remove current error mask */ if (ro->bound) { @@ -676,7 +655,7 @@ static int raw_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, err_mask); if (err) - goto out_err; + return err; /* remove old err_mask registration */ raw_disable_errfilter(sock_net(sk), dev, sk, @@ -685,11 +664,6 @@ static int raw_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, /* link new err_mask to the socket */ ro->err_mask = err_mask; - - out_err: - release_sock(sk); - rtnl_unlock(); - break; case CAN_RAW_LOOPBACK: @@ -769,6 +743,26 @@ static int raw_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, return err; } +static int raw_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, + sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) +{ + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; + int err; + + if (level != SOL_CAN_RAW) + return -EINVAL; + + rtnl_lock(); + lock_sock(sk); + + err = raw_setsockopt_locked(sock, optname, optval, optlen); + + release_sock(sk); + rtnl_unlock(); + + return err; +} + static int raw_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, sockopt_t *opt) { From e4e8af62adab2fdcca230006f829407a953070cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shuhao Fu Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 10:22:26 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 04/19] can: j1939: fix lockless local-destination check j1939_priv.ents[].nusers is documented as protected by priv->lock, and its updates already happen under that lock. j1939_can_recv() also reads it under read_lock_bh(). However, j1939_session_skb_queue() and j1939_tp_send() still read priv->ents[da].nusers without taking the lock. Those transport-side checks decide whether to set J1939_ECU_LOCAL_DST, so they can race with j1939_local_ecu_get() and j1939_local_ecu_put() while userspace is binding or releasing sockets concurrently with TP traffic. This can misclassify TP/ETP sessions as local or remote and take the wrong transport path. Fix both transport paths by routing the destination-locality check through a helper that reads ents[].nusers under read_lock_bh(&priv->lock). Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Signed-off-by: Shuhao Fu Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260419140614.GA4041240@chcpu16 Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- net/can/j1939/transport.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/j1939/transport.c b/net/can/j1939/transport.c index df93d57907da..8a31cb23bc76 100644 --- a/net/can/j1939/transport.c +++ b/net/can/j1939/transport.c @@ -351,6 +351,18 @@ static void j1939_session_skb_drop_old(struct j1939_session *session) } } +static bool j1939_address_is_local(struct j1939_priv *priv, u8 addr) +{ + bool local = false; + + read_lock_bh(&priv->lock); + if (j1939_address_is_unicast(addr) && priv->ents[addr].nusers) + local = true; + read_unlock_bh(&priv->lock); + + return local; +} + void j1939_session_skb_queue(struct j1939_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb) { @@ -359,8 +371,7 @@ void j1939_session_skb_queue(struct j1939_session *session, j1939_ac_fixup(priv, skb); - if (j1939_address_is_unicast(skcb->addr.da) && - priv->ents[skcb->addr.da].nusers) + if (j1939_address_is_local(priv, skcb->addr.da)) skcb->flags |= J1939_ECU_LOCAL_DST; skcb->flags |= J1939_ECU_LOCAL_SRC; @@ -2038,8 +2049,7 @@ struct j1939_session *j1939_tp_send(struct j1939_priv *priv, return ERR_PTR(ret); /* fix DST flags, it may be used there soon */ - if (j1939_address_is_unicast(skcb->addr.da) && - priv->ents[skcb->addr.da].nusers) + if (j1939_address_is_local(priv, skcb->addr.da)) skcb->flags |= J1939_ECU_LOCAL_DST; /* src is always local, I'm sending ... */ From d83762005c13269fffa51620399fc8d09095c4f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?St=C3=A9phane=20Grosjean?= Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 10:22:27 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 05/19] can: peak: Modification of references to email accounts being deleted MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Following the sale of PEAK-System France by HMS-Networks, this update is intended to change all my @hms-networks.com email addresses to my new @peak-system.fr address. Signed-off-by: Stéphane Grosjean Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260410124251.40506-1-stephane.grosjean@free.fr Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- .mailmap | 4 ++-- drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_canfd.c | 2 +- drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_canfd_user.h | 2 +- drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_pciefd_main.c | 4 ++-- drivers/net/can/sja1000/peak_pci.c | 4 ++-- drivers/net/can/sja1000/peak_pcmcia.c | 4 ++-- drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb.c | 2 +- drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.c | 4 ++-- drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.h | 2 +- drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_fd.c | 2 +- drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_pro.c | 2 +- drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_pro.h | 2 +- include/linux/can/dev/peak_canfd.h | 2 +- 13 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/.mailmap b/.mailmap index 12f3acdebd72..918fcd6575b1 100644 --- a/.mailmap +++ b/.mailmap @@ -825,8 +825,8 @@ Sriram Yagnaraman Stanislav Fomichev Stanislav Fomichev Stefan Wahren -Stéphane Grosjean -Stéphane Grosjean +Stéphane Grosjean +Stéphane Grosjean Stéphane Witzmann Stephen Hemminger Stephen Hemminger diff --git a/drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_canfd.c b/drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_canfd.c index 06cb2629f66a..4fd1aefb780f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_canfd.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_canfd.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* Copyright (C) 2007, 2011 Wolfgang Grandegger * * Copyright (C) 2016-2025 PEAK System-Technik GmbH - * Author: Stéphane Grosjean + * Author: Stéphane Grosjean */ #include diff --git a/drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_canfd_user.h b/drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_canfd_user.h index 60c6542028cf..dc0ecb566a85 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_canfd_user.h +++ b/drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_canfd_user.h @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* CAN driver for PEAK System micro-CAN based adapters * * Copyright (C) 2003-2025 PEAK System-Technik GmbH - * Author: Stéphane Grosjean + * Author: Stéphane Grosjean */ #ifndef PEAK_CANFD_USER_H #define PEAK_CANFD_USER_H diff --git a/drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_pciefd_main.c b/drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_pciefd_main.c index 93558e33bc02..7c749301ea84 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_pciefd_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_pciefd_main.c @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * Derived from the PCAN project file driver/src/pcan_pci.c: * * Copyright (C) 2001-2025 PEAK System-Technik GmbH - * Author: Stéphane Grosjean + * Author: Stéphane Grosjean */ #include @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ #include "peak_canfd_user.h" -MODULE_AUTHOR("Stéphane Grosjean "); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Stéphane Grosjean "); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Socket-CAN driver for PEAK PCAN PCIe/M.2 FD family cards"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/drivers/net/can/sja1000/peak_pci.c b/drivers/net/can/sja1000/peak_pci.c index 4cc4a1581dd1..69c61ccf621d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/sja1000/peak_pci.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/sja1000/peak_pci.c @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ * Derived from the PCAN project file driver/src/pcan_pci.c: * * Copyright (C) 2001-2025 PEAK System-Technik GmbH - * Author: Stéphane Grosjean + * Author: Stéphane Grosjean */ #include @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ #include "sja1000.h" -MODULE_AUTHOR("Stéphane Grosjean "); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Stéphane Grosjean "); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Socket-CAN driver for PEAK PCAN PCI family cards"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/drivers/net/can/sja1000/peak_pcmcia.c b/drivers/net/can/sja1000/peak_pcmcia.c index 42a77d435b39..c3c2aa21da47 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/sja1000/peak_pcmcia.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/sja1000/peak_pcmcia.c @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * Derived from the PCAN project file driver/src/pcan_pccard.c * * Copyright (C) 2006-2025 PEAK System-Technik GmbH - * Author: Stéphane Grosjean + * Author: Stéphane Grosjean */ #include #include @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ #include #include "sja1000.h" -MODULE_AUTHOR("Stéphane Grosjean "); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Stéphane Grosjean "); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("CAN driver for PEAK-System PCAN-PC Cards"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb.c index 9278a1522aae..8fd058c32856 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb.c @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * Derived from the PCAN project file driver/src/pcan_usb.c * * Copyright (C) 2003-2025 PEAK System-Technik GmbH - * Author: Stéphane Grosjean + * Author: Stéphane Grosjean * * Many thanks to Klaus Hitschler */ diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.c index cf48bb26d46d..c7933d1acc99 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.c @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * Derived from the PCAN project file driver/src/pcan_usb_core.c * * Copyright (C) 2003-2025 PEAK System-Technik GmbH - * Author: Stéphane Grosjean + * Author: Stéphane Grosjean * * Many thanks to Klaus Hitschler */ @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ #include "pcan_usb_core.h" -MODULE_AUTHOR("Stéphane Grosjean "); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Stéphane Grosjean "); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("CAN driver for PEAK-System USB adapters"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.h b/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.h index d1c1897d47b9..65999f04f4b7 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.h +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * Derived from the PCAN project file driver/src/pcan_usb_core.c * * Copyright (C) 2003-2025 PEAK System-Technik GmbH - * Author: Stéphane Grosjean + * Author: Stéphane Grosjean * * Many thanks to Klaus Hitschler */ diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_fd.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_fd.c index eb4f5884ad73..ef9fd693e9bd 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_fd.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_fd.c @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ * CAN driver for PEAK System PCAN-USB FD / PCAN-USB Pro FD adapter * * Copyright (C) 2013-2025 PEAK System-Technik GmbH - * Author: Stéphane Grosjean + * Author: Stéphane Grosjean */ #include #include diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_pro.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_pro.c index 4bfa8d0fbb32..aefcded8e12a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_pro.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_pro.c @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * Derived from the PCAN project file driver/src/pcan_usbpro.c * * Copyright (C) 2003-2025 PEAK System-Technik GmbH - * Author: Stéphane Grosjean + * Author: Stéphane Grosjean */ #include #include diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_pro.h b/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_pro.h index 162c7546d3a8..d669c9e610c7 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_pro.h +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_pro.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * Derived from the PCAN project file driver/src/pcan_usbpro_fw.h * * Copyright (C) 2003-2025 PEAK System-Technik GmbH - * Author: Stéphane Grosjean + * Author: Stéphane Grosjean */ #ifndef PCAN_USB_PRO_H #define PCAN_USB_PRO_H diff --git a/include/linux/can/dev/peak_canfd.h b/include/linux/can/dev/peak_canfd.h index d3788a3d0942..056e0efa649f 100644 --- a/include/linux/can/dev/peak_canfd.h +++ b/include/linux/can/dev/peak_canfd.h @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ * CAN driver for PEAK System micro-CAN based adapters * * Copyright (C) 2003-2025 PEAK System-Technik GmbH - * Author: Stéphane Grosjean + * Author: Stéphane Grosjean */ #ifndef PUCAN_H #define PUCAN_H From 68973f9db76144825e4f35dfdc80fb8279eb2d57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lee Jones Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 18:55:23 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 06/19] can: bcm: defer rx_op deallocation to workqueue to fix thrtimer UAF Commit f1b4e32aca08 ("can: bcm: use call_rcu() instead of costly synchronize_rcu()") replaced synchronize_rcu() in bcm_delete_rx_op() with call_rcu() and introduced the RX_NO_AUTOTIMER flag. However, this flag check was omitted for thrtimer in the packet rx fast-path. During BCM RX operation teardown, a concurrent RCU reader (bcm_rx_handler) can race and re-arm thrtimer via bcm_rx_update_and_send() after call_rcu() has been scheduled. Once the RCU grace period elapses, bcm_op is freed. The subsequently firing thrtimer then dereferences the deallocated op, causing a UAF. Adding flag checks to the rx fast-path (bcm_rx_update_and_send) does not fully close the TOCTOU race and introduces latency for every CAN frame. Conversely, calling hrtimer_cancel() directly inside the RCU callback (softirq context) is fatal as hrtimer_cancel() can sleep, triggering a "scheduling while atomic" panic. Resolve this by deferring the timer cancellation and memory free to a dedicated unbound workqueue (bcm_wq). The RCU callback now queues a work item to bcm_wq, which safely cancels both timers and deallocates memory in sleepable process context. A dedicated workqueue is used to prevent system-wide WQ saturation and is cleanly flushed/destroyed on module unload to avoid rmmod page faults. Since the deferred work can now outlive the calling context by an unbounded amount, also take a reference on op->sk when it is assigned and drop it only once the deferred work has cancelled both timers, so a socket can no longer be freed out from under a still-armed timer whose callback (bcm_send_to_user()) dereferences op->sk. Fixes: f1b4e32aca08 ("can: bcm: use call_rcu() instead of costly synchronize_rcu()") Tested-by: Feng Xue Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp Signed-off-by: Lee Jones Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714-bcm_fixes-v15-1-562f7e3e42da@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- net/can/bcm.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index a4bef2c48a55..bdf53241bd7b 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -92,6 +93,8 @@ MODULE_ALIAS("can-proto-2"); #define BCM_MIN_NAMELEN CAN_REQUIRED_SIZE(struct sockaddr_can, can_ifindex) +static struct workqueue_struct *bcm_wq; + /* * easy access to the first 64 bit of can(fd)_frame payload. cp->data is * 64 bit aligned so the offset has to be multiples of 8 which is ensured @@ -105,6 +108,7 @@ static inline u64 get_u64(const struct canfd_frame *cp, int offset) struct bcm_op { struct list_head list; struct rcu_head rcu; + struct work_struct work; int ifindex; canid_t can_id; u32 flags; @@ -793,9 +797,12 @@ static struct bcm_op *bcm_find_op(struct list_head *ops, return NULL; } -static void bcm_free_op_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu_head) +static void bcm_free_op_work(struct work_struct *work) { - struct bcm_op *op = container_of(rcu_head, struct bcm_op, rcu); + struct bcm_op *op = container_of(work, struct bcm_op, work); + + hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer); + hrtimer_cancel(&op->thrtimer); if ((op->frames) && (op->frames != &op->sframe)) kfree(op->frames); @@ -803,9 +810,23 @@ static void bcm_free_op_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu_head) if ((op->last_frames) && (op->last_frames != &op->last_sframe)) kfree(op->last_frames); + /* the last possible access to op->timer/op->thrtimer has now + * happened above via hrtimer_cancel() - op->sk is no longer + * needed by any pending timer callback, so drop our reference + */ + sock_put(op->sk); + kfree(op); } +static void bcm_free_op_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu_head) +{ + struct bcm_op *op = container_of(rcu_head, struct bcm_op, rcu); + + INIT_WORK(&op->work, bcm_free_op_work); + queue_work(bcm_wq, &op->work); +} + static void bcm_remove_op(struct bcm_op *op) { hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer); @@ -1060,6 +1081,7 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, /* bcm_can_tx / bcm_tx_timeout_handler needs this */ op->sk = sk; + sock_hold(sk); op->ifindex = ifindex; /* initialize uninitialized (kzalloc) structure */ @@ -1221,6 +1243,7 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, /* bcm_can_tx / bcm_tx_timeout_handler needs this */ op->sk = sk; + sock_hold(sk); op->ifindex = ifindex; /* ifindex for timeout events w/o previous frame reception */ @@ -1839,11 +1862,15 @@ static int __init bcm_module_init(void) { int err; + bcm_wq = alloc_workqueue("can-bcm-wq", WQ_UNBOUND, 0); + if (!bcm_wq) + return -ENOMEM; + pr_info("can: broadcast manager protocol\n"); err = register_pernet_subsys(&canbcm_pernet_ops); if (err) - return err; + goto register_pernet_failed; err = register_netdevice_notifier(&canbcm_notifier); if (err) @@ -1861,6 +1888,8 @@ static int __init bcm_module_init(void) unregister_netdevice_notifier(&canbcm_notifier); register_notifier_failed: unregister_pernet_subsys(&canbcm_pernet_ops); +register_pernet_failed: + destroy_workqueue(bcm_wq); return err; } @@ -1869,6 +1898,8 @@ static void __exit bcm_module_exit(void) can_proto_unregister(&bcm_can_proto); unregister_netdevice_notifier(&canbcm_notifier); unregister_pernet_subsys(&canbcm_pernet_ops); + rcu_barrier(); + destroy_workqueue(bcm_wq); } module_init(bcm_module_init); From d9b091d9d22fee81ec53fb55d2032951993ceadb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 18:55:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 07/19] can: bcm: fix lockless bound/ifindex race and silent RX_SETUP failure bcm_sendmsg() reads bo->ifindex and checks bo->bound before taking lock_sock(), while bcm_notify(), bcm_connect() and bcm_release() all mutate both fields under that same lock. Because the lockless reads and the locked writes are unordered with respect to each other, a racing bcm_notify() (device unregister) or bcm_connect() (concurrent bind on another thread sharing the socket) can make bcm_sendmsg() observe an inconsistent combination, e.g. a stale bound=1 together with the now-cleared ifindex=0, silently turning a socket bound to a specific CAN interface into one that also matches "any" interface. Keep the lockless bo->bound check purely as a fast-path reject, and move the ifindex read (and a bo->bound re-check) into the locked section, where every writer already serializes. This removes the possibility of observing the two fields torn against each other, rather than trying to fix it with more READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() pairs on two independently updated fields. Annotate the now-purely-lockless bo->bound accesses consistently across all its write sites. Also fix bcm_rx_setup() silently returning success when the target device disappears concurrently instead of reporting -ENODEV, so a broken RX op is no longer left registered as if it had succeeded. Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol") Reported-by: Ginger Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/CAGp+u1aBK8QVjsvAxM2Ldzep4rEbsP9x_pV3At4g=h1kVEtyhA@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714-bcm_fixes-v15-2-562f7e3e42da@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- net/can/bcm.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index bdf53241bd7b..b612135b017d 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -1323,6 +1323,11 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, op->rx_reg_dev = dev; dev_put(dev); + } else { + /* the requested device is gone - do not + * silently succeed without registering + */ + err = -ENODEV; } } else @@ -1396,12 +1401,13 @@ static int bcm_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct bcm_sock *bo = bcm_sk(sk); - int ifindex = bo->ifindex; /* default ifindex for this bcm_op */ + int ifindex; struct bcm_msg_head msg_head; int cfsiz; int ret; /* read bytes or error codes as return value */ - if (!bo->bound) + /* Lockless fast-path check for bound socket */ + if (!READ_ONCE(bo->bound)) return -ENOTCONN; /* check for valid message length from userspace */ @@ -1417,17 +1423,38 @@ static int bcm_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) if ((size - MHSIZ) % cfsiz) return -EINVAL; + lock_sock(sk); + + /* Re-validate under the socket lock: a concurrent bcm_notify() + * may have unbound this socket (device removal) after the + * lockless fast-path check above. bo->ifindex is only ever + * mutated under lock_sock(), so reading it here - instead of + * before taking the lock - guarantees it can't be observed + * torn against bo->bound. + */ + if (!bo->bound) { + ret = -ENOTCONN; + goto out_release; + } + + /* default ifindex for this bcm_op */ + ifindex = bo->ifindex; + /* check for alternative ifindex for this bcm_op */ if (!ifindex && msg->msg_name) { /* no bound device as default => check msg_name */ DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_can *, addr, msg->msg_name); - if (msg->msg_namelen < BCM_MIN_NAMELEN) - return -EINVAL; + if (msg->msg_namelen < BCM_MIN_NAMELEN) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_release; + } - if (addr->can_family != AF_CAN) - return -EINVAL; + if (addr->can_family != AF_CAN) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_release; + } /* ifindex from sendto() */ ifindex = addr->can_ifindex; @@ -1436,20 +1463,21 @@ static int bcm_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) struct net_device *dev; dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(sk), ifindex); - if (!dev) - return -ENODEV; + if (!dev) { + ret = -ENODEV; + goto out_release; + } if (dev->type != ARPHRD_CAN) { dev_put(dev); - return -ENODEV; + ret = -ENODEV; + goto out_release; } dev_put(dev); } } - lock_sock(sk); - switch (msg_head.opcode) { case TX_SETUP: @@ -1499,6 +1527,7 @@ static int bcm_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) break; } +out_release: release_sock(sk); return ret; @@ -1535,7 +1564,12 @@ static void bcm_notify(struct bcm_sock *bo, unsigned long msg, bo->bcm_proc_read = NULL; } #endif - bo->bound = 0; + /* Paired with the lockless fast-path check in + * bcm_sendmsg(); bo->ifindex itself is only ever + * accessed under lock_sock() so it needs no + * annotation. + */ + WRITE_ONCE(bo->bound, 0); bo->ifindex = 0; notify_enodev = 1; } @@ -1676,7 +1710,7 @@ static int bcm_release(struct socket *sock) /* remove device reference */ if (bo->bound) { - bo->bound = 0; + WRITE_ONCE(bo->bound, 0); bo->ifindex = 0; } @@ -1746,7 +1780,10 @@ static int bcm_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr, int } #endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ - bo->bound = 1; + /* bo->ifindex above is fully assigned before this point; pairs + * with the lockless fast-path check in bcm_sendmsg() + */ + WRITE_ONCE(bo->bound, 1); fail: release_sock(sk); From 749179c2e25b95d22499ed29096b3e02d6dfd2b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 18:55:25 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 08/19] can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values KCSAN detected a simultaneous access to timer values that can be overwritten in bcm_rx_setup() when updating timer and filter content while bcm_rx_handler(), bcm_rx_timeout_handler() or bcm_rx_thr_handler() run concurrently on incoming CAN traffic. Protect the timer (ival1/ival2/kt_ival1/kt_ival2/kt_lastmsg) and filter (nframes/flags/frames/last_frames) updates in bcm_rx_setup() with a new per-op bcm_rx_update_lock, taken with the matching scope in the RX handlers. memcpy_from_msg() is staged into a temporary buffer before the lock is taken, since it can sleep and must not run under a spinlock. hrtimer_cancel() is always called without bcm_rx_update_lock held, since bcm_rx_timeout_handler()/bcm_rx_thr_handler() take the same lock and a running callback would otherwise deadlock against the canceller. Also close a related race: bcm_rx_setup() cleared the RTR flag in the stored reply frame's can_id as a separate, unprotected step after the frame content was already installed, so a concurrent bcm_rx_handler() could transmit a stale reply with CAN_RTR_FLAG still set. Fold that normalization into the initial frame preparation instead (on the staged buffer for updates, directly on op->frames pre-registration for new ops), so the installed frame is always atomically self-consistent. bcm_rx_handler()'s RX_RTR_FRAME check now takes a lock-protected snapshot of op->flags before deciding whether to call bcm_can_tx(), but does not hold the lock across that call. Also take a lock-protected snapshot of the currframe in bcm_can_tx() to avoid partly overwrites by content updates in bcm_tx_setup(). Finally check if a TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX/SETTIMER might have reset op->currframe between the two locked sections in bcm_can_tx(). Omit calling hrtimer_forward() with zero interval in bcm_rx_thr_handler(). kt_ival2 may have been concurrently cleared by bcm_rx_setup() before it cancels this timer, so check kt_ival2 inside the bcm_rx_update_lock. Fixes: c2aba69d0c36 ("can: bcm: add locking for bcm_op runtime updates") Reported-by: syzbot+75e5e4ae00c3b4bb544e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/6975d5cf.a00a0220.33ccc7.0022.GAE@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714-bcm_fixes-v15-3-562f7e3e42da@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- net/can/bcm.c | 180 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 135 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index b612135b017d..1e5f8d65d351 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ struct bcm_op { struct sock *sk; struct net_device *rx_reg_dev; spinlock_t bcm_tx_lock; /* protect currframe/count in runtime updates */ + spinlock_t bcm_rx_update_lock; /* protect filter/timer data updates */ }; struct bcm_sock { @@ -293,22 +294,28 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) * bcm_can_tx - send the (next) CAN frame to the appropriate CAN interface * of the given bcm tx op */ -static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op) +static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op, struct canfd_frame *cf) { struct sk_buff *skb; struct can_skb_ext *csx; struct net_device *dev; - struct canfd_frame *cf; + struct canfd_frame cframe; + bool cyclic = !cf; + unsigned int idx = 0; int err; /* no target device? => exit */ if (!op->ifindex) return; - /* read currframe under lock protection */ - spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); - cf = op->frames + op->cfsiz * op->currframe; - spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + if (cyclic) { + /* read currframe under lock protection */ + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + idx = op->currframe; + memcpy(&cframe, op->frames + op->cfsiz * idx, op->cfsiz); + cf = &cframe; + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + } dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(op->sk), op->ifindex); if (!dev) { @@ -341,14 +348,20 @@ static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op) if (!err) op->frames_abs++; - op->currframe++; + /* only advance the cyclic sequence if nothing reset currframe while + * we were sending - a concurrent TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX means this + * frame's bookkeeping belongs to a sequence that no longer exists + */ + if (!cyclic || op->currframe == idx) { + op->currframe++; - /* reached last frame? */ - if (op->currframe >= op->nframes) - op->currframe = 0; + /* reached last frame? */ + if (op->currframe >= op->nframes) + op->currframe = 0; - if (op->count > 0) - op->count--; + if (op->count > 0) + op->count--; + } spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); out: @@ -461,7 +474,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_tx_timeout_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer) struct bcm_msg_head msg_head; if (op->kt_ival1 && (op->count > 0)) { - bcm_can_tx(op); + bcm_can_tx(op, NULL); if (!op->count && (op->flags & TX_COUNTEVT)) { /* create notification to user */ @@ -478,7 +491,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_tx_timeout_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer) } } else if (op->kt_ival2) { - bcm_can_tx(op); + bcm_can_tx(op, NULL); } return bcm_tx_set_expiry(op, &op->timer) ? @@ -622,6 +635,8 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_rx_timeout_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer) struct bcm_op *op = container_of(hrtimer, struct bcm_op, timer); struct bcm_msg_head msg_head; + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); + /* if user wants to be informed, when cyclic CAN-Messages come back */ if ((op->flags & RX_ANNOUNCE_RESUME) && op->last_frames) { /* clear received CAN frames to indicate 'nothing received' */ @@ -638,6 +653,8 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_rx_timeout_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer) msg_head.can_id = op->can_id; msg_head.nframes = 0; + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); + bcm_send_to_user(op, &msg_head, NULL, 0); return HRTIMER_NORESTART; @@ -686,15 +703,26 @@ static int bcm_rx_thr_flush(struct bcm_op *op) static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_rx_thr_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer) { struct bcm_op *op = container_of(hrtimer, struct bcm_op, thrtimer); + enum hrtimer_restart ret; - if (bcm_rx_thr_flush(op)) { + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); + + /* kt_ival2 may have been concurrently cleared by bcm_rx_setup() + * before it cancels this timer - never forward with a zero + * interval in that case. + */ + if (bcm_rx_thr_flush(op) && op->kt_ival2) { hrtimer_forward_now(hrtimer, op->kt_ival2); - return HRTIMER_RESTART; + ret = HRTIMER_RESTART; } else { /* rearm throttle handling */ op->kt_lastmsg = 0; - return HRTIMER_NORESTART; + ret = HRTIMER_NORESTART; } + + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); + + return ret; } /* @@ -704,8 +732,10 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data) { struct bcm_op *op = (struct bcm_op *)data; const struct canfd_frame *rxframe = (struct canfd_frame *)skb->data; + struct canfd_frame rtrframe; unsigned int i; unsigned char traffic_flags; + bool rtr_frame; if (op->can_id != rxframe->can_id) return; @@ -729,9 +759,18 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data) /* update statistics */ op->frames_abs++; - if (op->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME) { + /* snapshot the flag under lock: op->flags/op->frames may be updated + * concurrently by bcm_rx_setup(). + */ + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); + rtr_frame = op->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME; + if (rtr_frame) + memcpy(&rtrframe, op->frames, op->cfsiz); + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); + + if (rtr_frame) { /* send reply for RTR-request (placed in op->frames[0]) */ - bcm_can_tx(op); + bcm_can_tx(op, &rtrframe); return; } @@ -743,6 +782,8 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data) traffic_flags |= RX_OWN; } + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); + if (op->flags & RX_FILTER_ID) { /* the easiest case */ bcm_rx_update_and_send(op, op->last_frames, rxframe, @@ -778,6 +819,8 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data) rx_starttimer: bcm_rx_starttimer(op); + + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); } /* @@ -1116,7 +1159,7 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, } if (op->flags & TX_ANNOUNCE) - bcm_can_tx(op); + bcm_can_tx(op, NULL); if (op->flags & STARTTIMER) bcm_tx_start_timer(op); @@ -1130,6 +1173,24 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, return err; } +static void bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, + struct bcm_op *op, void *new_frames) +{ + /* funny feature in RX(!)_SETUP only for RTR-mode: + * copy can_id into frame BUT without RTR-flag to + * prevent a full-load-loopback-test ... ;-] + * normalize this on the staged buffer, before it is + * ever installed into op->frames. + */ + if (msg_head->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME) { + struct canfd_frame *frame0 = new_frames; + + if ((msg_head->flags & TX_CP_CAN_ID) || + frame0->can_id == op->can_id) + frame0->can_id = op->can_id & ~CAN_RTR_FLAG; + } +} + /* * bcm_rx_setup - create or update a bcm rx op (for bcm_sendmsg) */ @@ -1164,6 +1225,8 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, /* check the given can_id */ op = bcm_find_op(&bo->rx_ops, msg_head, ifindex); if (op) { + void *new_frames = NULL; + /* update existing BCM operation */ /* @@ -1175,19 +1238,48 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, return -E2BIG; if (msg_head->nframes) { - /* update CAN frames content */ - err = memcpy_from_msg(op->frames, msg, - msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz); - if (err < 0) - return err; + /* get new CAN frames content before locking */ + new_frames = kmalloc(msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new_frames) + return -ENOMEM; - /* clear last_frames to indicate 'nothing received' */ - memset(op->last_frames, 0, msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz); + err = memcpy_from_msg(new_frames, msg, + msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz); + if (err < 0) { + kfree(new_frames); + return err; + } + + bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(msg_head, op, new_frames); } + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); op->nframes = msg_head->nframes; op->flags = msg_head->flags; + if (msg_head->nframes) { + /* update CAN frames content */ + memcpy(op->frames, new_frames, + msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz); + + /* clear last_frames to indicate 'nothing received' */ + memset(op->last_frames, 0, + msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz); + } + + if (msg_head->flags & SETTIMER) { + op->ival1 = msg_head->ival1; + op->ival2 = msg_head->ival2; + op->kt_ival1 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival1); + op->kt_ival2 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival2); + op->kt_lastmsg = 0; + } + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); + + /* free temporary frames / kfree(NULL) is safe */ + kfree(new_frames); + /* Only an update -> do not call can_rx_register() */ do_rx_register = 0; @@ -1198,6 +1290,7 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, return -ENOMEM; spin_lock_init(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + spin_lock_init(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); op->can_id = msg_head->can_id; op->nframes = msg_head->nframes; op->cfsiz = CFSIZ(msg_head->flags); @@ -1239,6 +1332,8 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, kfree(op); return err; } + + bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(msg_head, op, op->frames); } /* bcm_can_tx / bcm_tx_timeout_handler needs this */ @@ -1266,29 +1361,22 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, /* check flags */ if (op->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME) { - struct canfd_frame *frame0 = op->frames; - /* no timers in RTR-mode */ hrtimer_cancel(&op->thrtimer); hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer); - - /* - * funny feature in RX(!)_SETUP only for RTR-mode: - * copy can_id into frame BUT without RTR-flag to - * prevent a full-load-loopback-test ... ;-] - */ - if ((op->flags & TX_CP_CAN_ID) || - (frame0->can_id == op->can_id)) - frame0->can_id = op->can_id & ~CAN_RTR_FLAG; - } else { if (op->flags & SETTIMER) { - /* set timer value */ - op->ival1 = msg_head->ival1; - op->ival2 = msg_head->ival2; - op->kt_ival1 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival1); - op->kt_ival2 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival2); + /* set timers (locked) for newly created op */ + if (do_rx_register) { + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); + op->ival1 = msg_head->ival1; + op->ival2 = msg_head->ival2; + op->kt_ival1 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival1); + op->kt_ival2 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival2); + op->kt_lastmsg = 0; + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); + } /* disable an active timer due to zero value? */ if (!op->kt_ival1) @@ -1298,9 +1386,11 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, * In any case cancel the throttle timer, flush * potentially blocked msgs and reset throttle handling */ - op->kt_lastmsg = 0; hrtimer_cancel(&op->thrtimer); + + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); bcm_rx_thr_flush(op); + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); } if ((op->flags & STARTTIMER) && op->kt_ival1) From e6c24ba95fc3f1b5e1dcd28b1c6e59ef61a9daa5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 18:55:26 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 09/19] can: bcm: fix CAN frame rx/tx statistics KCSAN detected a data race within the bcm_rx_handler() when two CAN frames have been simultaneously received and processed in a single rx op by two different CPUs. Use atomic operations with (signed) long data types to access the statistics in the hot path to fix the KCSAN complaint. Additionally simplify the update and check of statistics overflow by using the atomic operations in separate bcm_update_[rx|tx]_stats() functions. The rx variant runs under bcm_rx_update_lock to prevent races when resetting the two rx counters; the tx variant runs under bcm_tx_lock and only needs to guard its own counter's overflow. As the rx path resets its values already at LONG_MAX / 100, there is no conflict between the two locking domains (bcm_rx_update_lock vs. bcm_tx_lock) even for ops that use both paths. The rx statistics update and the frames_filtered update in bcm_rx_changed() were previously performed in two separate bcm_rx_update_lock sections. For an rx op subscribed on all interfaces (ifindex == 0), bcm_rx_handler() can run concurrently on different CPUs, so a counter reset by one CPU between these two sections could leave frames_filtered larger than frames_abs on another CPU, producing a bogus (even negative) reduction percentage in procfs. Update the statistics in the same critical section as bcm_rx_changed() to close this gap, which also removes the now unneeded extra lock/unlock pair around the traffic_flags calculation. Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol") Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714-bcm_fixes-v15-4-562f7e3e42da@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- net/can/bcm.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index 1e5f8d65d351..03c98e4cc677 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct bcm_op { int ifindex; canid_t can_id; u32 flags; - unsigned long frames_abs, frames_filtered; + atomic_long_t frames_abs, frames_filtered; struct bcm_timeval ival1, ival2; struct hrtimer timer, thrtimer; ktime_t rx_stamp, kt_ival1, kt_ival2, kt_lastmsg; @@ -229,10 +229,13 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) list_for_each_entry_rcu(op, &bo->rx_ops, list) { - unsigned long reduction; + long reduction, frames_filtered, frames_abs; + + frames_filtered = atomic_long_read(&op->frames_filtered); + frames_abs = atomic_long_read(&op->frames_abs); /* print only active entries & prevent division by zero */ - if (!op->frames_abs) + if (!frames_abs) continue; seq_printf(m, "rx_op: %03X %-5s ", op->can_id, @@ -254,9 +257,9 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) (long long)ktime_to_us(op->kt_ival2)); seq_printf(m, "# recv %ld (%ld) => reduction: ", - op->frames_filtered, op->frames_abs); + frames_filtered, frames_abs); - reduction = 100 - (op->frames_filtered * 100) / op->frames_abs; + reduction = 100 - (frames_filtered * 100) / frames_abs; seq_printf(m, "%s%ld%%\n", (reduction == 100) ? "near " : "", reduction); @@ -280,7 +283,8 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) seq_printf(m, "t2=%lld ", (long long)ktime_to_us(op->kt_ival2)); - seq_printf(m, "# sent %ld\n", op->frames_abs); + seq_printf(m, "# sent %ld\n", + atomic_long_read(&op->frames_abs)); } seq_putc(m, '\n'); @@ -290,6 +294,24 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) } #endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ +static void bcm_update_rx_stats(struct bcm_op *op) +{ + /* prevent overflow of the reduction% calculation in bcm_proc_show() */ + if (atomic_long_inc_return(&op->frames_abs) > LONG_MAX / 100) { + atomic_long_set(&op->frames_filtered, 0); + atomic_long_set(&op->frames_abs, 0); + } +} + +static void bcm_update_tx_stats(struct bcm_op *op) +{ + /* tx_op has no reduction% calculation - use the full range and + * just keep the displayed counter non-negative on overflow + */ + if (atomic_long_inc_return(&op->frames_abs) == LONG_MAX) + atomic_long_set(&op->frames_abs, 0); +} + /* * bcm_can_tx - send the (next) CAN frame to the appropriate CAN interface * of the given bcm tx op @@ -346,7 +368,7 @@ static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op, struct canfd_frame *cf) spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); if (!err) - op->frames_abs++; + bcm_update_tx_stats(op); /* only advance the cyclic sequence if nothing reset currframe while * we were sending - a concurrent TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX means this @@ -505,12 +527,9 @@ static void bcm_rx_changed(struct bcm_op *op, struct canfd_frame *data) { struct bcm_msg_head head; - /* update statistics */ - op->frames_filtered++; - - /* prevent statistics overflow */ - if (op->frames_filtered > ULONG_MAX/100) - op->frames_filtered = op->frames_abs = 0; + /* update statistics (frames_filtered <= frames_abs) */ + if (atomic_long_read(&op->frames_abs)) + atomic_long_inc(&op->frames_filtered); /* this element is not throttled anymore */ data->flags &= ~RX_THR; @@ -756,24 +775,30 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data) op->rx_stamp = skb->tstamp; /* save originator for recvfrom() */ op->rx_ifindex = skb->dev->ifindex; - /* update statistics */ - op->frames_abs++; - /* snapshot the flag under lock: op->flags/op->frames may be updated - * concurrently by bcm_rx_setup(). - */ + /* op->flags/op->frames may be updated concurrently by bcm_rx_setup() */ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); - rtr_frame = op->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME; - if (rtr_frame) - memcpy(&rtrframe, op->frames, op->cfsiz); - spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); + rtr_frame = op->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME; if (rtr_frame) { + bcm_update_rx_stats(op); + /* snapshot RTR content under lock */ + memcpy(&rtrframe, op->frames, op->cfsiz); + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); + /* send reply for RTR-request (placed in op->frames[0]) */ bcm_can_tx(op, &rtrframe); return; } + /* update statistics in the same critical section as bcm_rx_changed() + * below: frames_filtered must never be checked/incremented against a + * frames_abs snapshot from a concurrent bcm_rx_handler() call on + * another CPU for the same (wildcard) op, or frames_filtered can end + * up larger than frames_abs. + */ + bcm_update_rx_stats(op); + /* compute flags to distinguish between own/local/remote CAN traffic */ traffic_flags = 0; if (skb->sk) { @@ -782,8 +807,6 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data) traffic_flags |= RX_OWN; } - spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); - if (op->flags & RX_FILTER_ID) { /* the easiest case */ bcm_rx_update_and_send(op, op->last_frames, rxframe, From 7b2c3eabc4dafc062a25e10711154f2107526a78 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 18:55:27 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 10/19] can: bcm: add missing rcu list annotations and operations sashiko-bot remarked the missing use of list_add_rcu() in bcm_[rx|tx]_setup() to have a proper initialized bcm_op structure when bcm_proc_show() traverses the bcm_op's under rcu_read_lock(). To cover all initial settings of the bcm_op's the list_add_rcu() calls are moved to the end of the setup code. While at it, also fix the mirroring removal side: bcm_release() called bcm_remove_op() - which frees the op via call_rcu() - on ops that were still linked in bo->tx_ops/bo->rx_ops, without list_del_rcu() first. Unlink each op with list_del_rcu() before handing it to bcm_remove_op(), matching the existing pattern in bcm_delete_tx_op()/bcm_delete_rx_op(). Reported-by: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20260610094654.A1FFE1F00893@smtp.kernel.org/ Fixes: dac5e6249159 ("can: bcm: add missing rcu read protection for procfs content") Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714-bcm_fixes-v15-5-562f7e3e42da@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- net/can/bcm.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index 03c98e4cc677..5c1e83eeb4ff 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) (reduction == 100) ? "near " : "", reduction); } - list_for_each_entry(op, &bo->tx_ops, list) { + list_for_each_entry_rcu(op, &bo->tx_ops, list) { seq_printf(m, "tx_op: %03X %s ", op->can_id, bcm_proc_getifname(net, ifname, op->ifindex)); @@ -1017,6 +1017,7 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, struct bcm_sock *bo = bcm_sk(sk); struct bcm_op *op; struct canfd_frame *cf; + bool add_op_to_list = false; unsigned int i; int err; @@ -1158,8 +1159,7 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, hrtimer_setup(&op->thrtimer, hrtimer_dummy_timeout, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); - /* add this bcm_op to the list of the tx_ops */ - list_add(&op->list, &bo->tx_ops); + add_op_to_list = true; } /* if ((op = bcm_find_op(&bo->tx_ops, msg_head->can_id, ifindex))) */ @@ -1181,6 +1181,10 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, op->flags |= TX_ANNOUNCE; } + /* add this bcm_op to the list of the tx_ops? */ + if (add_op_to_list) + list_add_rcu(&op->list, &bo->tx_ops); + if (op->flags & TX_ANNOUNCE) bcm_can_tx(op, NULL); @@ -1373,9 +1377,6 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, hrtimer_setup(&op->thrtimer, bcm_rx_thr_handler, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); - /* add this bcm_op to the list of the rx_ops */ - list_add(&op->list, &bo->rx_ops); - /* call can_rx_register() */ do_rx_register = 1; @@ -1449,10 +1450,12 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, bcm_rx_handler, op, "bcm", sk); if (err) { /* this bcm rx op is broken -> remove it */ - list_del_rcu(&op->list); bcm_remove_op(op); return err; } + + /* add this bcm_op to the list of the rx_ops */ + list_add_rcu(&op->list, &bo->rx_ops); } return msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz + MHSIZ; @@ -1786,8 +1789,10 @@ static int bcm_release(struct socket *sock) remove_proc_entry(bo->procname, net->can.bcmproc_dir); #endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ - list_for_each_entry_safe(op, next, &bo->tx_ops, list) + list_for_each_entry_safe(op, next, &bo->tx_ops, list) { + list_del_rcu(&op->list); bcm_remove_op(op); + } list_for_each_entry_safe(op, next, &bo->rx_ops, list) { /* @@ -1818,8 +1823,10 @@ static int bcm_release(struct socket *sock) synchronize_rcu(); - list_for_each_entry_safe(op, next, &bo->rx_ops, list) + list_for_each_entry_safe(op, next, &bo->rx_ops, list) { + list_del_rcu(&op->list); bcm_remove_op(op); + } /* remove device reference */ if (bo->bound) { From 12ce799f7ab1e05bd8fbf79e46f403bfe5597ebc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 18:55:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 11/19] can: bcm: extend bcm_tx_lock usage for data and timer updates Stage new CAN frame content for an existing tx op into a kmalloc()'d buffer and validate it there, mirroring the approach already used in bcm_rx_setup(). Only copy the validated data into op->frames while holding op->bcm_tx_lock, so bcm_can_tx() and bcm_tx_timeout_handler() can no longer observe a partially updated or unvalidated frame. Add a missing error path for memcpy_from_msg() when copying CAN frame data from userspace. Also move the kt_ival1/kt_ival2/ival1/ival2 updates in bcm_tx_setup() under op->bcm_tx_lock, and read kt_ival1/kt_ival2/count under the same lock in bcm_tx_set_expiry() and bcm_tx_timeout_handler(), closing the torn 64-bit ktime_t read on 32-bit platforms. Fixes: c2aba69d0c36 ("can: bcm: add locking for bcm_op runtime updates") Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714-bcm_fixes-v15-6-562f7e3e42da@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- net/can/bcm.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index 5c1e83eeb4ff..68a62f605432 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ struct bcm_op { struct canfd_frame last_sframe; struct sock *sk; struct net_device *rx_reg_dev; - spinlock_t bcm_tx_lock; /* protect currframe/count in runtime updates */ + spinlock_t bcm_tx_lock; /* protect tx data and timer updates */ spinlock_t bcm_rx_update_lock; /* protect filter/timer data updates */ }; @@ -472,12 +472,18 @@ static bool bcm_tx_set_expiry(struct bcm_op *op, struct hrtimer *hrt) { ktime_t ival; + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + if (op->kt_ival1 && op->count) ival = op->kt_ival1; - else if (op->kt_ival2) + else if (op->kt_ival2) { ival = op->kt_ival2; - else + } else { + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); return false; + } + + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); hrtimer_set_expires(hrt, ktime_add(ktime_get(), ival)); return true; @@ -494,25 +500,47 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_tx_timeout_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer) { struct bcm_op *op = container_of(hrtimer, struct bcm_op, timer); struct bcm_msg_head msg_head; + bool tx_ival1, tx_ival2; + + /* snapshot kt_ival1/kt_ival2/count under lock to avoid torn + * ktime_t reads racing with concurrent bcm_tx_setup() updates + */ + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + tx_ival1 = op->kt_ival1 && (op->count > 0); + tx_ival2 = !!op->kt_ival2; + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + + if (tx_ival1) { + u32 flags, count; + struct bcm_timeval ival1, ival2; - if (op->kt_ival1 && (op->count > 0)) { bcm_can_tx(op, NULL); - if (!op->count && (op->flags & TX_COUNTEVT)) { + /* snapshot variables under lock to avoid torn reads racing + * with concurrent bcm_tx_setup() updates + */ + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + flags = op->flags; + count = op->count; + ival1 = op->ival1; + ival2 = op->ival2; + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + + if (!count && (flags & TX_COUNTEVT)) { /* create notification to user */ memset(&msg_head, 0, sizeof(msg_head)); msg_head.opcode = TX_EXPIRED; - msg_head.flags = op->flags; - msg_head.count = op->count; - msg_head.ival1 = op->ival1; - msg_head.ival2 = op->ival2; + msg_head.flags = flags; + msg_head.count = count; + msg_head.ival1 = ival1; + msg_head.ival2 = ival2; msg_head.can_id = op->can_id; msg_head.nframes = 0; bcm_send_to_user(op, &msg_head, NULL, 0); } - } else if (op->kt_ival2) { + } else if (tx_ival2) { bcm_can_tx(op, NULL); } @@ -1036,6 +1064,8 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, /* check the given can_id */ op = bcm_find_op(&bo->tx_ops, msg_head, ifindex); if (op) { + void *new_frames; + /* update existing BCM operation */ /* @@ -1046,11 +1076,23 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, if (msg_head->nframes > op->nframes) return -E2BIG; - /* update CAN frames content */ + /* get new CAN frames content into a staging buffer before + * locking: validate and normalize the frames there so that + * bcm_can_tx() / bcm_tx_timeout_handler() never observe a + * partially updated or unvalidated frame in op->frames + */ + new_frames = kmalloc(msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new_frames) + return -ENOMEM; + for (i = 0; i < msg_head->nframes; i++) { - cf = op->frames + op->cfsiz * i; + cf = new_frames + op->cfsiz * i; err = memcpy_from_msg((u8 *)cf, msg, op->cfsiz); + if (err < 0) { + kfree(new_frames); + return err; + } if (op->flags & CAN_FD_FRAME) { if (cf->len > 64) @@ -1060,37 +1102,39 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, err = -EINVAL; } - if (err < 0) + if (err < 0) { + kfree(new_frames); return err; + } if (msg_head->flags & TX_CP_CAN_ID) { /* copy can_id into frame */ cf->can_id = msg_head->can_id; } } + + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + + /* update CAN frames content */ + memcpy(op->frames, new_frames, msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz); + op->flags = msg_head->flags; - /* only lock for unlikely count/nframes/currframe changes */ if (op->nframes != msg_head->nframes || - op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX || - op->flags & SETTIMER) { - - spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); - - if (op->nframes != msg_head->nframes || - op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX) { - /* potentially update changed nframes */ - op->nframes = msg_head->nframes; - /* restart multiple frame transmission */ - op->currframe = 0; - } - - if (op->flags & SETTIMER) - op->count = msg_head->count; - - spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX) { + /* potentially update changed nframes */ + op->nframes = msg_head->nframes; + /* restart multiple frame transmission */ + op->currframe = 0; } + if (op->flags & SETTIMER) + op->count = msg_head->count; + + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + + kfree(new_frames); + } else { /* insert new BCM operation for the given can_id */ @@ -1165,10 +1209,12 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, if (op->flags & SETTIMER) { /* set timer values */ + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); op->ival1 = msg_head->ival1; op->ival2 = msg_head->ival2; op->kt_ival1 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival1); op->kt_ival2 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival2); + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); /* disable an active timer due to zero values? */ if (!op->kt_ival1 && !op->kt_ival2) From 62ec41f364648be79d54d94d0d240ee326948afd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 18:55:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 12/19] can: bcm: validate frame length in bcm_rx_setup() for RTR replies bcm_tx_setup() validates cf->len against the CAN/CAN FD DLC limits before installing frames for TX_SETUP, but bcm_rx_setup() never did the same for the RTR-reply frame configured via RX_SETUP with RX_RTR_FRAME. Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol") Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714-bcm_fixes-v15-7-562f7e3e42da@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- net/can/bcm.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index 68a62f605432..2d9c9cd74536 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -1246,22 +1246,37 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, return err; } -static void bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, - struct bcm_op *op, void *new_frames) +static int bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, + struct bcm_op *op, void *new_frames) { + struct canfd_frame *frame0 = new_frames; + + if (!(msg_head->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME)) + return 0; + + /* this frame is sent out as-is by bcm_can_tx() whenever a matching + * remote request is received, so validate its length the same way + * bcm_tx_setup() validates TX_SETUP frames before installing it + */ + if (msg_head->flags & CAN_FD_FRAME) { + if (frame0->len > 64) + return -EINVAL; + } else { + if (frame0->len > 8) + return -EINVAL; + } + /* funny feature in RX(!)_SETUP only for RTR-mode: * copy can_id into frame BUT without RTR-flag to * prevent a full-load-loopback-test ... ;-] * normalize this on the staged buffer, before it is * ever installed into op->frames. */ - if (msg_head->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME) { - struct canfd_frame *frame0 = new_frames; + if ((msg_head->flags & TX_CP_CAN_ID) || + frame0->can_id == op->can_id) + frame0->can_id = op->can_id & ~CAN_RTR_FLAG; - if ((msg_head->flags & TX_CP_CAN_ID) || - frame0->can_id == op->can_id) - frame0->can_id = op->can_id & ~CAN_RTR_FLAG; - } + return 0; } /* @@ -1324,7 +1339,11 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, return err; } - bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(msg_head, op, new_frames); + err = bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(msg_head, op, new_frames); + if (err < 0) { + kfree(new_frames); + return err; + } } spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); @@ -1397,16 +1416,12 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, if (msg_head->nframes) { err = memcpy_from_msg(op->frames, msg, msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz); - if (err < 0) { - if (op->frames != &op->sframe) - kfree(op->frames); - if (op->last_frames != &op->last_sframe) - kfree(op->last_frames); - kfree(op); - return err; - } + if (err < 0) + goto free_op; - bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(msg_head, op, op->frames); + err = bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(msg_head, op, op->frames); + if (err < 0) + goto free_op; } /* bcm_can_tx / bcm_tx_timeout_handler needs this */ @@ -1505,6 +1520,14 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, } return msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz + MHSIZ; + +free_op: + if (op->frames != &op->sframe) + kfree(op->frames); + if (op->last_frames != &op->last_sframe) + kfree(op->last_frames); + kfree(op); + return err; } /* From d59948293ea34b6337ce2b5febab8510de70048c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 18:55:30 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 13/19] can: bcm: add missing device refcount for CAN filter removal sashiko-bot remarked a problem with a concurrent device unregistration in isotp.c which also is present in the bcm.c code. A former fix for raw.c commit c275a176e4b6 ("can: raw: add missing refcount for memory leak fix") introduced a netdevice_tracker which solves the issue for bcm.c too. bcm_release(), bcm_delete_rx_op() and bcm_notifier() relied on dev_get_by_index(ifindex) to re-find the device for an rx_op before unregistering its filter. If a concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER has already unlisted the device from the ifindex table, that lookup fails and can_rx_unregister() is silently skipped, leaving a stale CAN filter pointing at the soon-to-be-freed bcm_op/socket. Hold a netdev_hold()/netdev_put() tracked reference on op->rx_reg_dev from the moment the rx filter is registered in bcm_rx_setup() until it is unregistered in bcm_rx_unreg(), and use that reference directly in bcm_release() and bcm_delete_rx_op() instead of re-looking the device up by ifindex. Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260707094716.63578-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol") Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714-bcm_fixes-v15-8-562f7e3e42da@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- net/can/bcm.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index 2d9c9cd74536..25842061800b 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct bcm_op { struct canfd_frame last_sframe; struct sock *sk; struct net_device *rx_reg_dev; + netdevice_tracker rx_reg_dev_tracker; spinlock_t bcm_tx_lock; /* protect tx data and timer updates */ spinlock_t bcm_rx_update_lock; /* protect filter/timer data updates */ }; @@ -937,6 +938,7 @@ static void bcm_rx_unreg(struct net_device *dev, struct bcm_op *op) /* mark as removed subscription */ op->rx_reg_dev = NULL; + netdev_put(dev, &op->rx_reg_dev_tracker); } else printk(KERN_ERR "can-bcm: bcm_rx_unreg: registered device " "mismatch %p %p\n", op->rx_reg_dev, dev); @@ -967,17 +969,14 @@ static int bcm_delete_rx_op(struct list_head *ops, struct bcm_msg_head *mh, * Only remove subscriptions that had not * been removed due to NETDEV_UNREGISTER * in bcm_notifier() + * + * op->rx_reg_dev is a tracked reference taken + * when the subscription was registered, so it + * stays valid here even if a concurrent + * NETDEV_UNREGISTER already unlisted the dev. */ - if (op->rx_reg_dev) { - struct net_device *dev; - - dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(op->sk), - op->ifindex); - if (dev) { - bcm_rx_unreg(dev, op); - dev_put(dev); - } - } + if (op->rx_reg_dev) + bcm_rx_unreg(op->rx_reg_dev, op); } else can_rx_unregister(sock_net(op->sk), NULL, op->can_id, @@ -1496,7 +1495,17 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, bcm_rx_handler, op, "bcm", sk); - op->rx_reg_dev = dev; + /* keep a tracked reference so that a later + * unregister can safely reach the device even + * if a concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER has + * already unlisted it by ifindex + */ + if (!err) { + op->rx_reg_dev = dev; + netdev_hold(dev, + &op->rx_reg_dev_tracker, + GFP_KERNEL); + } dev_put(dev); } else { /* the requested device is gone - do not @@ -1873,16 +1882,14 @@ static int bcm_release(struct socket *sock) * Only remove subscriptions that had not * been removed due to NETDEV_UNREGISTER * in bcm_notifier() + * + * op->rx_reg_dev is a tracked reference taken + * when the subscription was registered, so it + * stays valid here even if a concurrent + * NETDEV_UNREGISTER already unlisted the device. */ - if (op->rx_reg_dev) { - struct net_device *dev; - - dev = dev_get_by_index(net, op->ifindex); - if (dev) { - bcm_rx_unreg(dev, op); - dev_put(dev); - } - } + if (op->rx_reg_dev) + bcm_rx_unreg(op->rx_reg_dev, op); } else can_rx_unregister(net, NULL, op->can_id, REGMASK(op->can_id), From 3b762c0d950383ab7a002686c9136b9aa55d2d70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 18:55:31 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 14/19] can: bcm: fix stale rx/tx ops after device removal RX: an RX_SETUP update(!) for an existing op skipped can_rx_register() unconditionally, even when a concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER had already torn down its registration (op->rx_reg_dev == NULL). This silently did not re-enable frame delivery for that updated filter. bcm_rx_setup() now re-registers in that case, while leaving rx_ops with ifindex = 0 (all CAN devices) which never carry a tracked rx_reg_dev registered as-is. TX: bcm_notify() only handled bo->rx_ops on NETDEV_UNREGISTER, leaving tx_ops with an active cyclic transmission re-arming its hrtimer indefinitely to execute bcm_tx_timeout_handler(). Cancelling the hrtimer prevents the runaway timer and any injection into a later reused ifindex, since nothing else calls bcm_can_tx() for the op until an explicit TX_SETUP update re-arms it. Unlike bcm_rx_unreg(), which clears the tracked rx_reg_dev for rx_ops, the ifindex is intentionally left unchanged for tx_ops. bcm_tx_setup() always rejects ifindex 0, so clearing it would strand the op: neither a later TX_SETUP (bcm_find_op()) nor TX_DELETE (bcm_delete_tx_op()) could ever find it again, since both require an exact ifindex match. Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20260708094536.DDF821F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org/ Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20260708154039.347ED1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/ Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol") Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714-bcm_fixes-v15-9-562f7e3e42da@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- net/can/bcm.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index 25842061800b..a53dba6ab8b8 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -1287,6 +1287,7 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, struct bcm_sock *bo = bcm_sk(sk); struct bcm_op *op; int do_rx_register; + int new_op = 0; int err = 0; if ((msg_head->flags & RX_FILTER_ID) || (!(msg_head->nframes))) { @@ -1371,8 +1372,15 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, /* free temporary frames / kfree(NULL) is safe */ kfree(new_frames); - /* Only an update -> do not call can_rx_register() */ - do_rx_register = 0; + /* Don't register a new CAN filter for the rx_op update unless + * a concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER notifier already tore down + * the previous registration. In this case the receiver needs + * to be re-registered here so that this update doesn't + * silently stop delivering frames for the given ifindex. + * Ops with ifindex = 0 (all CAN interfaces) never carry a + * tracked rx_reg_dev and stay registered as-is. + */ + do_rx_register = (ifindex && !op->rx_reg_dev) ? 1 : 0; } else { /* insert new BCM operation for the given can_id */ @@ -1439,6 +1447,7 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, /* call can_rx_register() */ do_rx_register = 1; + new_op = 1; } /* if ((op = bcm_find_op(&bo->rx_ops, msg_head->can_id, ifindex))) */ @@ -1452,7 +1461,7 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, if (op->flags & SETTIMER) { /* set timers (locked) for newly created op */ - if (do_rx_register) { + if (new_op) { spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); op->ival1 = msg_head->ival1; op->ival2 = msg_head->ival2; @@ -1482,7 +1491,10 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); } - /* now we can register for can_ids, if we added a new bcm_op */ + /* now we can register for can_ids, if we added a new bcm_op + * or need to re-register after a NETDEV_UNREGISTER tore down + * the previous registration of an existing op + */ if (do_rx_register) { if (ifindex) { struct net_device *dev; @@ -1514,18 +1526,32 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, err = -ENODEV; } - } else + } else { err = can_rx_register(sock_net(sk), NULL, op->can_id, REGMASK(op->can_id), bcm_rx_handler, op, "bcm", sk); + } + if (err) { - /* this bcm rx op is broken -> remove it */ - bcm_remove_op(op); + /* newly created bcm rx op is broken -> remove it */ + if (new_op) { + bcm_remove_op(op); + return err; + } + + /* an existing op just stays unregistered. + * Cancel op->timer and (defensively) op->thrtimer. + * Other settings can't be reached until the next + * successful RX_SETUP. + */ + hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer); + hrtimer_cancel(&op->thrtimer); return err; } - /* add this bcm_op to the list of the rx_ops */ - list_add_rcu(&op->list, &bo->rx_ops); + /* add a new bcm_op to the list of the rx_ops */ + if (new_op) + list_add_rcu(&op->list, &bo->rx_ops); } return msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz + MHSIZ; @@ -1745,11 +1771,19 @@ static void bcm_notify(struct bcm_sock *bo, unsigned long msg, case NETDEV_UNREGISTER: lock_sock(sk); - /* remove device specific receive entries */ + /* rx_ops: remove device specific receive entries */ list_for_each_entry(op, &bo->rx_ops, list) if (op->rx_reg_dev == dev) bcm_rx_unreg(dev, op); + /* tx_ops: stop device specific cyclic transmissions on the + * vanishing ifindex. Cancelling the timer is enough to stop + * cyclic bcm_can_tx() calls as there is no re-arming. + */ + list_for_each_entry(op, &bo->tx_ops, list) + if (op->ifindex == dev->ifindex) + hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer); + /* remove device reference, if this is our bound device */ if (bo->bound && bo->ifindex == dev->ifindex) { #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_FS) From 58fd6cbc8541216af1d7ed272ea7ac2b66d50fd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 18:55:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 15/19] can: bcm: fix data race on rx_stamp/rx_ifindex in bcm_rx_handler() For an rx op subscribed on all interfaces (ifindex == 0), the same op is registered once in the shared per-netns wildcard filter list, so bcm_rx_handler() can run concurrently on different CPUs for frames arriving on different net devices. op->rx_stamp and op->rx_ifindex were written before bcm_rx_update_lock was taken, allowing concurrent writers to race each other - including a torn store of the 64-bit rx_stamp on 32-bit platforms. Beyond a torn store bcm_send_to_user() must report the timestamp/ifindex of the very same frame whose content it is delivering. So the assignment is placed in the same unbroken bcm_rx_update_lock section as the content comparison. As a side effect, the RTR-request frame feature (which never reach bcm_send_to_user()) no longer updates rx_stamp/rx_ifindex, since only the notification path needs them. Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol") Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20260707145135.5BC831F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714-bcm_fixes-v15-10-562f7e3e42da@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- net/can/bcm.c | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index a53dba6ab8b8..f213a0b37791 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -800,11 +800,6 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data) /* disable timeout */ hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer); - /* save rx timestamp */ - op->rx_stamp = skb->tstamp; - /* save originator for recvfrom() */ - op->rx_ifindex = skb->dev->ifindex; - /* op->flags/op->frames may be updated concurrently by bcm_rx_setup() */ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); @@ -836,6 +831,14 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data) traffic_flags |= RX_OWN; } + /* save rx timestamp and originator for recvfrom() under lock. + * For an op subscribed on all interfaces (ifindex == 0) + * bcm_rx_handler() can run concurrently on different CPUs so + * the CAN content and the meta data must be bundled correctly. + */ + op->rx_stamp = skb->tstamp; + op->rx_ifindex = skb->dev->ifindex; + if (op->flags & RX_FILTER_ID) { /* the easiest case */ bcm_rx_update_and_send(op, op->last_frames, rxframe, From 2f5976f54a04e9f18b25283036ac3136be453b17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 18:55:33 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 16/19] can: bcm: track a single source interface for ANYDEV timeout/throttle ops An ANYDEV rx op (ifindex == 0) with an active RX timeout and/or throttle timer has no defined semantics when matching frames arrive from several interfaces: bcm_rx_handler() can run concurrently for the same op on different CPUs, racing hrtimer_cancel()/ bcm_rx_starttimer() against bcm_rx_timeout_handler() and causing spurious RX_TIMEOUT notifications and last_frames corruption. The same concurrency lets throttled multiplex frames from different interfaces clobber the single rx_ifindex/rx_stamp fields shared by the op. Add op->if_detected to track the first interface that delivers a matching frame while a timeout/throttle timer is configured, and reject frames from any other interface for that op. The claim is decided in bcm_rx_handler() before hrtimer_cancel() touches op->timer, so a rejected frame can never disturb the claimed interface's watchdog. RTR-mode ops are excluded via RX_RTR_FRAME, independent of kt_ival1/kt_ival2, since those may briefly hold a stale value from an earlier non-RTR configuration. The claim is released in bcm_notify() on NETDEV_UNREGISTER and in bcm_rx_setup() when SETTIMER reconfigures the timer values. A (re-)claim is only possible on CAN devices in NETREG_REGISTERED dev->reg_state to cover the release in bcm_notify() where reg_state becomes NETREG_UNREGISTERING until synchronize_net(). Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol") Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20260709105031.1A39C1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714-bcm_fixes-v15-11-562f7e3e42da@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- net/can/bcm.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index f213a0b37791..3d637a1e0ac1 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ struct bcm_op { struct hrtimer timer, thrtimer; ktime_t rx_stamp, kt_ival1, kt_ival2, kt_lastmsg; int rx_ifindex; + int if_detected; /* first received ifindex in ANYDEV rx_op mode */ int cfsiz; u32 count; u32 nframes; @@ -797,6 +798,33 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data) return; } + /* An ANYDEV op with an active RX timeout and/or throttle timer + * tracks a single source interface: claim the first interface that + * delivers a matching frame and reject frames from any other one, + * before hrtimer_cancel() below can touch op->timer - this avoids + * racing bcm_rx_timeout_handler() across concurrent interfaces. + * RX_RTR_FRAME ops are excluded, as kt_ival1/kt_ival2 may briefly + * hold a stale value from an earlier non-RTR configuration. + */ + if (!op->ifindex) { + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); + + if (!(op->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME) && + (op->kt_ival1 || op->kt_ival2)) { + /* don't claim to vanishing interface */ + if (!op->if_detected && + READ_ONCE(skb->dev->reg_state) == NETREG_REGISTERED) + op->if_detected = skb->dev->ifindex; + + if (op->if_detected != skb->dev->ifindex) { + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); + return; + } + } + + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); + } + /* disable timeout */ hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer); @@ -831,10 +859,9 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data) traffic_flags |= RX_OWN; } - /* save rx timestamp and originator for recvfrom() under lock. - * For an op subscribed on all interfaces (ifindex == 0) - * bcm_rx_handler() can run concurrently on different CPUs so - * the CAN content and the meta data must be bundled correctly. + /* save rx timestamp and originator for recvfrom() under lock: an + * ANYDEV op without an active timer can still run concurrently on + * different CPUs, so content and meta data must be bundled here. */ op->rx_stamp = skb->tstamp; op->rx_ifindex = skb->dev->ifindex; @@ -1369,6 +1396,7 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, op->kt_ival1 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival1); op->kt_ival2 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival2); op->kt_lastmsg = 0; + op->if_detected = 0; /* reclaim ifindex in ANYDEV mode */ } spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); @@ -1775,10 +1803,21 @@ static void bcm_notify(struct bcm_sock *bo, unsigned long msg, lock_sock(sk); /* rx_ops: remove device specific receive entries */ - list_for_each_entry(op, &bo->rx_ops, list) + list_for_each_entry(op, &bo->rx_ops, list) { if (op->rx_reg_dev == dev) bcm_rx_unreg(dev, op); + /* release an ANYDEV op's claim (see bcm_rx_handler()) + * on this now confirmed-gone interface. + */ + if (!op->ifindex) { + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); + if (op->if_detected == dev->ifindex) + op->if_detected = 0; + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock); + } + } + /* tx_ops: stop device specific cyclic transmissions on the * vanishing ifindex. Cancelling the timer is enough to stop * cyclic bcm_can_tx() calls as there is no re-arming. From 9b1a02e0d980ac6b0e36a90378f847062f81d7e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 19:59:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 17/19] can: isotp: use unconditional synchronize_rcu() in isotp_release() isotp_notify() unregisters the (RCU) CAN filters via can_rx_unregister() and clears so->bound without waiting for a grace period. isotp_release() uses so->bound to decide whether it needs to call synchronize_rcu() before cancelling so->rxtimer, so when NETDEV_UNREGISTER runs first it skips that synchronize_rcu() and can cancel the timer while an in-flight isotp_rcv() is still executing and about to re-arm it via isotp_send_fc(), leading to a use-after-free timer callback on the freed socket. sakisho-bot remarked a problem with rtnl_lock held in isotp_notify(), therefore make isotp_release() always call synchronize_rcu() before cancelling the timers, regardless of so->bound. This still closes the original race (isotp_notify() clearing so->bound without waiting for in-flight isotp_rcv() callers before isotp_release() cancels the RX timer) without adding any RCU wait to the netdevice notifier path. Fixes: 14a4696bc311 ("can: isotp: isotp_release(): omit unintended hrtimer restart on socket release") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20260707085210.6B6C01F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/ Reported-by: Nico Yip Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260712-isotp-fixes-v10-1-793a1b1ce17f@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- net/can/isotp.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/can/isotp.c b/net/can/isotp.c index c48b4a818297..d30937345bcd 100644 --- a/net/can/isotp.c +++ b/net/can/isotp.c @@ -1237,11 +1237,18 @@ static int isotp_release(struct socket *sock) SINGLE_MASK(so->txid), isotp_rcv_echo, sk); dev_put(dev); - synchronize_rcu(); } } } + /* Always wait for a grace period before touching the timers below. + * A concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER may have already unregistered our + * filters and cleared so->bound in isotp_notify() without waiting + * for in-flight isotp_rcv() callers to finish, so this call must not + * be skipped just because so->bound is already 0 here. + */ + synchronize_rcu(); + hrtimer_cancel(&so->txfrtimer); hrtimer_cancel(&so->txtimer); hrtimer_cancel(&so->rxtimer); From 20bab8b88baac140ca3701116e1d486c7f51e311 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 19:59:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 18/19] can: isotp: fix use-after-free race with concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER isotp_release() looked up the bound network device via dev_get_by_index() using the stored ifindex. During device unregistration the device is unlisted from the ifindex hash before the NETDEV_UNREGISTER notifier chain runs, so a concurrent isotp_release() could find no device, skip can_rx_unregister() entirely, and still proceed to free the socket. Since isotp_release() had already removed itself from the isotp notifier list at that point, isotp_notify() would never get a chance to clean up either, leaving a stale CAN filter that keeps pointing at the freed socket. Fix this the same way raw.c already does: hold a tracked reference to the bound net_device in the socket (so->dev/so->dev_tracker) from bind() onward instead of re-resolving it from the ifindex, and serialize bind()/release() with rtnl_lock() so that so->dev is always consistent with what the NETDEV_UNREGISTER notifier sees. so->dev stays valid regardless of ifindex-hash unlisting, and is only ever cleared by whichever of isotp_release()/isotp_notify() gets there first, so the filter is always removed exactly once. isotp_bind() now rejects a (re)bind with -EAGAIN while so->[tx|rx].state isn't ISOTP_IDLE yet, so a timer left running by a prior NETDEV_UNREGISTER can't act on a newly bound so->ifindex. Both checks share the same lock_sock() section, so there is no window in which a concurrent isotp_notify() clearing so->bound could be missed. Fixes: e057dd3fc20f ("can: add ISO 15765-2:2016 transport protocol") Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20260707101420.47F261F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260712-isotp-fixes-v10-2-793a1b1ce17f@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- net/can/isotp.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/isotp.c b/net/can/isotp.c index d30937345bcd..44c044eb83e1 100644 --- a/net/can/isotp.c +++ b/net/can/isotp.c @@ -152,6 +152,8 @@ struct isotp_sock { struct sock sk; int bound; int ifindex; + struct net_device *dev; + netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; canid_t txid; canid_t rxid; ktime_t tx_gap; @@ -978,6 +980,14 @@ static int isotp_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) goto err_event_drop; } + /* so->bound is only checked once above - a wakeup may have + * unbound/rebound the socket meanwhile, so re-validate it + */ + if (!so->bound) { + err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL; + goto err_out_drop; + } + /* PDU size > default => try max_pdu_size */ if (size > so->tx.buflen && so->tx.buflen < max_pdu_size) { u8 *newbuf = kmalloc(max_pdu_size, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1219,28 +1229,30 @@ static int isotp_release(struct socket *sock) list_del(&so->notifier); spin_unlock(&isotp_notifier_lock); + rtnl_lock(); lock_sock(sk); - /* remove current filters & unregister */ - if (so->bound) { - if (so->ifindex) { - struct net_device *dev; + /* remove current filters & unregister + * tracked reference so->dev is taken at bind() time with rtnl_lock + */ + if (so->bound && so->dev) { + if (isotp_register_rxid(so)) + can_rx_unregister(net, so->dev, so->rxid, + SINGLE_MASK(so->rxid), + isotp_rcv, sk); - dev = dev_get_by_index(net, so->ifindex); - if (dev) { - if (isotp_register_rxid(so)) - can_rx_unregister(net, dev, so->rxid, - SINGLE_MASK(so->rxid), - isotp_rcv, sk); - - can_rx_unregister(net, dev, so->txid, - SINGLE_MASK(so->txid), - isotp_rcv_echo, sk); - dev_put(dev); - } - } + can_rx_unregister(net, so->dev, so->txid, + SINGLE_MASK(so->txid), + isotp_rcv_echo, sk); + netdev_put(so->dev, &so->dev_tracker); } + so->ifindex = 0; + so->bound = 0; + so->dev = NULL; + + rtnl_unlock(); + /* Always wait for a grace period before touching the timers below. * A concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER may have already unregistered our * filters and cleared so->bound in isotp_notify() without waiting @@ -1253,9 +1265,6 @@ static int isotp_release(struct socket *sock) hrtimer_cancel(&so->txtimer); hrtimer_cancel(&so->rxtimer); - so->ifindex = 0; - so->bound = 0; - sock_orphan(sk); sock->sk = NULL; @@ -1310,6 +1319,7 @@ static int isotp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr, int l if (!addr->can_ifindex) return -ENODEV; + rtnl_lock(); lock_sock(sk); if (so->bound) { @@ -1317,6 +1327,17 @@ static int isotp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr, int l goto out; } + /* A transmission or reception that outlived a previous binding + * (unbound by NETDEV_UNREGISTER) may still be draining; the FC/echo + * and RX watchdog timers bound how long this takes. Checked together + * with so->bound in the same lock_sock() section above, so there is + * no window in which a concurrent isotp_notify() could be missed. + */ + if (so->tx.state != ISOTP_IDLE || so->rx.state != ISOTP_IDLE) { + err = -EAGAIN; + goto out; + } + /* ensure different CAN IDs when the rx_id is to be registered */ if (isotp_register_rxid(so) && rx_id == tx_id) { err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL; @@ -1329,14 +1350,12 @@ static int isotp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr, int l goto out; } if (dev->type != ARPHRD_CAN) { - dev_put(dev); err = -ENODEV; - goto out; + goto out_put_dev; } if (READ_ONCE(dev->mtu) < so->ll.mtu) { - dev_put(dev); err = -EINVAL; - goto out; + goto out_put_dev; } if (!(dev->flags & IFF_UP)) notify_enetdown = 1; @@ -1354,16 +1373,25 @@ static int isotp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr, int l can_rx_register(net, dev, tx_id, SINGLE_MASK(tx_id), isotp_rcv_echo, sk, "isotpe", sk); - dev_put(dev); - /* switch to new settings */ so->ifindex = ifindex; so->rxid = rx_id; so->txid = tx_id; so->bound = 1; + /* bind() ok -> hold a reference for so->dev so that isotp_release() + * can safely reach the device later, even if a concurrent + * NETDEV_UNREGISTER has already unlisted it by ifindex. + */ + so->dev = dev; + netdev_hold(so->dev, &so->dev_tracker, GFP_KERNEL); + +out_put_dev: + /* remove potential reference from dev_get_by_index() */ + dev_put(dev); out: release_sock(sk); + rtnl_unlock(); if (notify_enetdown) { sk->sk_err = ENETDOWN; @@ -1566,7 +1594,7 @@ static void isotp_notify(struct isotp_sock *so, unsigned long msg, if (!net_eq(dev_net(dev), sock_net(sk))) return; - if (so->ifindex != dev->ifindex) + if (so->dev != dev) return; switch (msg) { @@ -1582,10 +1610,12 @@ static void isotp_notify(struct isotp_sock *so, unsigned long msg, can_rx_unregister(dev_net(dev), dev, so->txid, SINGLE_MASK(so->txid), isotp_rcv_echo, sk); + netdev_put(so->dev, &so->dev_tracker); } so->ifindex = 0; so->bound = 0; + so->dev = NULL; release_sock(sk); sk->sk_err = ENODEV; @@ -1645,6 +1675,7 @@ static int isotp_init(struct sock *sk) so->ifindex = 0; so->bound = 0; + so->dev = NULL; so->opt.flags = CAN_ISOTP_DEFAULT_FLAGS; so->opt.ext_address = CAN_ISOTP_DEFAULT_EXT_ADDRESS; From cf070fe33bfbd1a4c21236078fadb35dd223a157 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 19:59:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 19/19] can: isotp: serialize TX state transitions under so->rx_lock The TX state machine (so->tx.state) is driven from three contexts: sendmsg() claiming and progressing a transfer, the RX path consuming Flow Control/echo frames, and two hrtimers timing out a stalled transfer. Mixing a lock-free cmpxchg() claim in sendmsg() with hrtimer_cancel() calls made under so->rx_lock elsewhere left windows where a frame or timer callback could act on a state that had already moved on, corrupting an unrelated transfer. so->rx_lock now covers the full lifecycle of a TX claim: sendmsg() takes it to check so->tx.state is ISOTP_IDLE, switch it to ISOTP_SENDING, bump so->tx_gen and drain the previous transfer's timers - all as one critical section. isotp_rcv_fc()/isotp_rcv_cf() already run under this lock via isotp_rcv(), and isotp_rcv_echo() now takes it itself, so none of them can ever observe a transfer mid-claim. This also means a transfer can no longer be handed to sendmsg()'s cleanup paths (signal or send error) while another thread is concurrently claiming or finishing it, so those paths can cancel timers and reset the state unconditionally. isotp_release() claims the socket the same way, so a racing sendmsg() sees a consistent ISOTP_SHUTDOWN and skips arming its timer or sending. Only the hrtimer callbacks stay outside so->rx_lock, since they run under so->rx_lock's cancellation elsewhere and taking it themselves would deadlock. so->tx_gen lets them recognize whether the transfer they timed out is still the one currently active, so they don't report an error against a transfer that has since completed or been superseded. Fixes: e057dd3fc20f ("can: add ISO 15765-2:2016 transport protocol") Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20260710142146.BDAE61F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260712-isotp-fixes-v10-3-793a1b1ce17f@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- net/can/isotp.c | 202 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 160 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/isotp.c b/net/can/isotp.c index 44c044eb83e1..54becaf6898f 100644 --- a/net/can/isotp.c +++ b/net/can/isotp.c @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ struct isotp_sock { canid_t rxid; ktime_t tx_gap; ktime_t lastrxcf_tstamp; - struct hrtimer rxtimer, txtimer, txfrtimer; + struct hrtimer rxtimer, txtimer, txfrtimer, echotimer; struct can_isotp_options opt; struct can_isotp_fc_options rxfc, txfc; struct can_isotp_ll_options ll; @@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ struct isotp_sock { u32 force_tx_stmin; u32 force_rx_stmin; u32 cfecho; /* consecutive frame echo tag */ + u32 tx_gen; /* generation, bumped per new tx transfer */ struct tpcon rx, tx; struct list_head notifier; wait_queue_head_t wait; @@ -378,6 +379,15 @@ static int isotp_rcv_fc(struct isotp_sock *so, struct canfd_frame *cf, int ae) hrtimer_cancel(&so->txtimer); + /* isotp_tx_timeout() may have given up on this job while + * hrtimer_cancel() above waited for it to finish; so->rx_lock + * (held by our caller isotp_rcv()) rules out a concurrent claim, + * so a plain recheck is enough here. + */ + if (so->tx.state != ISOTP_WAIT_FC && + so->tx.state != ISOTP_WAIT_FIRST_FC) + return 1; + if ((cf->len < ae + FC_CONTENT_SZ) || ((so->opt.flags & ISOTP_CHECK_PADDING) && check_pad(so, cf, ae + FC_CONTENT_SZ, so->opt.rxpad_content))) { @@ -424,7 +434,7 @@ static int isotp_rcv_fc(struct isotp_sock *so, struct canfd_frame *cf, int ae) so->tx.bs = 0; so->tx.state = ISOTP_SENDING; /* send CF frame and enable echo timeout handling */ - hrtimer_start(&so->txtimer, ktime_set(ISOTP_ECHO_TIMEOUT, 0), + hrtimer_start(&so->echotimer, ktime_set(ISOTP_ECHO_TIMEOUT, 0), HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); isotp_send_cframe(so); break; @@ -577,6 +587,14 @@ static int isotp_rcv_cf(struct sock *sk, struct canfd_frame *cf, int ae, hrtimer_cancel(&so->rxtimer); + /* isotp_rx_timer_handler() may have raced us for so->rx.state + * while hrtimer_cancel() above waited for it to finish, already + * reporting ETIMEDOUT and resetting the reception; don't process + * this CF into a reassembly that has already been given up on. + */ + if (so->rx.state != ISOTP_WAIT_DATA) + return 1; + /* CFs are never longer than the FF */ if (cf->len > so->rx.ll_dl) return 1; @@ -872,20 +890,36 @@ static void isotp_rcv_echo(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data) struct canfd_frame *cf = (struct canfd_frame *)skb->data; /* only handle my own local echo CF/SF skb's (no FF!) */ - if (skb->sk != sk || so->cfecho != *(u32 *)cf->data) + if (skb->sk != sk) return; + /* unlike isotp_rcv_fc()/isotp_rcv_cf(), not already under so->rx_lock + * (no isotp_rcv() caller here), so take it ourselves + */ + spin_lock(&so->rx_lock); + + /* so->cfecho may since belong to a new transfer; recheck under lock */ + if (so->cfecho != *(u32 *)cf->data) + goto out_unlock; + /* cancel local echo timeout */ - hrtimer_cancel(&so->txtimer); + hrtimer_cancel(&so->echotimer); /* local echo skb with consecutive frame has been consumed */ so->cfecho = 0; + /* claiming a transfer also takes so->rx_lock, so a plain recheck + * is enough: so->tx.state can't have flipped to ISOTP_SENDING for + * a new claim while we're still in here + */ + if (so->tx.state != ISOTP_SENDING) + goto out_unlock; + if (so->tx.idx >= so->tx.len) { /* we are done */ so->tx.state = ISOTP_IDLE; wake_up_interruptible(&so->wait); - return; + goto out_unlock; } if (so->txfc.bs && so->tx.bs >= so->txfc.bs) { @@ -893,53 +927,83 @@ static void isotp_rcv_echo(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data) so->tx.state = ISOTP_WAIT_FC; hrtimer_start(&so->txtimer, ktime_set(ISOTP_FC_TIMEOUT, 0), HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); - return; + goto out_unlock; } /* no gap between data frames needed => use burst mode */ if (!so->tx_gap) { /* enable echo timeout handling */ - hrtimer_start(&so->txtimer, ktime_set(ISOTP_ECHO_TIMEOUT, 0), + hrtimer_start(&so->echotimer, ktime_set(ISOTP_ECHO_TIMEOUT, 0), HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); isotp_send_cframe(so); - return; + goto out_unlock; } /* start timer to send next consecutive frame with correct delay */ hrtimer_start(&so->txfrtimer, so->tx_gap, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); + +out_unlock: + spin_unlock(&so->rx_lock); } -static enum hrtimer_restart isotp_tx_timer_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer) +/* shared by so->txtimer's and so->echotimer's callbacks. Both timers get + * cancelled under so->rx_lock elsewhere, so this must stay lock-free to + * avoid deadlocking with that; uses so->tx_gen instead to avoid tainting + * a new transfer with an error from the one that just timed out. + */ +static enum hrtimer_restart isotp_tx_timeout(struct isotp_sock *so) { - struct isotp_sock *so = container_of(hrtimer, struct isotp_sock, - txtimer); struct sock *sk = &so->sk; + u32 gen = READ_ONCE(so->tx_gen); + u32 old_state = READ_ONCE(so->tx.state); /* don't handle timeouts in IDLE or SHUTDOWN state */ - if (so->tx.state == ISOTP_IDLE || so->tx.state == ISOTP_SHUTDOWN) + if (old_state == ISOTP_IDLE || old_state == ISOTP_SHUTDOWN) + return HRTIMER_NORESTART; + + /* only claim the timeout if the state is still unchanged */ + if (cmpxchg(&so->tx.state, old_state, ISOTP_IDLE) != old_state) return HRTIMER_NORESTART; /* we did not get any flow control or echo frame in time */ - /* report 'communication error on send' */ - sk->sk_err = ECOMM; - if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) - sk_error_report(sk); + if (READ_ONCE(so->tx_gen) == gen) { + /* report 'communication error on send' */ + sk->sk_err = ECOMM; + if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) + sk_error_report(sk); + } - /* reset tx state */ - so->tx.state = ISOTP_IDLE; wake_up_interruptible(&so->wait); return HRTIMER_NORESTART; } +/* so->txtimer: fires when a Flow Control frame does not arrive in time */ +static enum hrtimer_restart isotp_tx_timer_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer) +{ + struct isotp_sock *so = container_of(hrtimer, struct isotp_sock, + txtimer); + + return isotp_tx_timeout(so); +} + +/* so->echotimer: fires when a sent CF/SF's local echo does not arrive */ +static enum hrtimer_restart isotp_echo_timer_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer) +{ + struct isotp_sock *so = container_of(hrtimer, struct isotp_sock, + echotimer); + + return isotp_tx_timeout(so); +} + static enum hrtimer_restart isotp_txfr_timer_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer) { struct isotp_sock *so = container_of(hrtimer, struct isotp_sock, txfrtimer); /* start echo timeout handling and cover below protocol error */ - hrtimer_start(&so->txtimer, ktime_set(ISOTP_ECHO_TIMEOUT, 0), + hrtimer_start(&so->echotimer, ktime_set(ISOTP_ECHO_TIMEOUT, 0), HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); /* cfecho should be consumed by isotp_rcv_echo() here */ @@ -960,13 +1024,24 @@ static int isotp_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) int ae = (so->opt.flags & CAN_ISOTP_EXTEND_ADDR) ? 1 : 0; int wait_tx_done = (so->opt.flags & CAN_ISOTP_WAIT_TX_DONE) ? 1 : 0; s64 hrtimer_sec = ISOTP_ECHO_TIMEOUT; + struct hrtimer *tx_hrt = &so->echotimer; + u32 new_state = ISOTP_SENDING; int off; int err; if (!so->bound || so->tx.state == ISOTP_SHUTDOWN) return -EADDRNOTAVAIL; - while (cmpxchg(&so->tx.state, ISOTP_IDLE, ISOTP_SENDING) != ISOTP_IDLE) { + /* claim the socket under so->rx_lock: this serializes the claim + * with the RX path and with sendmsg()'s own error paths below, so + * none of them can ever see a transfer mid-claim + */ + for (;;) { + spin_lock_bh(&so->rx_lock); + if (READ_ONCE(so->tx.state) == ISOTP_IDLE) + break; + spin_unlock_bh(&so->rx_lock); + /* we do not support multiple buffers - for now */ if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) return -EAGAIN; @@ -975,11 +1050,23 @@ static int isotp_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) return -EADDRNOTAVAIL; /* wait for complete transmission of current pdu */ - err = wait_event_interruptible(so->wait, so->tx.state == ISOTP_IDLE); + err = wait_event_interruptible(so->wait, + so->tx.state == ISOTP_IDLE); if (err) - goto err_event_drop; + return err; } + /* new transfer: bump so->tx_gen and drain the old one's timers, + * still under the so->rx_lock we just claimed the socket with + */ + WRITE_ONCE(so->tx.state, ISOTP_SENDING); + WRITE_ONCE(so->tx_gen, READ_ONCE(so->tx_gen) + 1); + hrtimer_cancel(&so->txtimer); + hrtimer_cancel(&so->echotimer); + hrtimer_cancel(&so->txfrtimer); + so->cfecho = 0; + spin_unlock_bh(&so->rx_lock); + /* so->bound is only checked once above - a wakeup may have * unbound/rebound the socket meanwhile, so re-validate it */ @@ -1096,18 +1183,33 @@ static int isotp_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) so->cfecho = *(u32 *)cf->data; } else { /* standard flow control check */ - so->tx.state = ISOTP_WAIT_FIRST_FC; + new_state = ISOTP_WAIT_FIRST_FC; /* start timeout for FC */ hrtimer_sec = ISOTP_FC_TIMEOUT; + tx_hrt = &so->txtimer; /* no CF echo tag for isotp_rcv_echo() (FF-mode) */ so->cfecho = 0; } } - hrtimer_start(&so->txtimer, ktime_set(hrtimer_sec, 0), + spin_lock_bh(&so->rx_lock); + if (so->tx.state == ISOTP_SHUTDOWN) { + /* isotp_release() has since taken over and already drained + * our timers - don't send into a socket that's going away + */ + spin_unlock_bh(&so->rx_lock); + kfree_skb(skb); + dev_put(dev); + wake_up_interruptible(&so->wait); + return -EADDRNOTAVAIL; + } + /* WAIT_FIRST_FC for standard FF, else stays ISOTP_SENDING */ + so->tx.state = new_state; + hrtimer_start(tx_hrt, ktime_set(hrtimer_sec, 0), HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); + spin_unlock_bh(&so->rx_lock); /* send the first or only CAN frame */ cf->flags = so->ll.tx_flags; @@ -1120,13 +1222,10 @@ static int isotp_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) pr_notice_once("can-isotp: %s: can_send_ret %pe\n", __func__, ERR_PTR(err)); + spin_lock_bh(&so->rx_lock); /* no transmission -> no timeout monitoring */ - hrtimer_cancel(&so->txtimer); - - /* reset consecutive frame echo tag */ - so->cfecho = 0; - - goto err_out_drop; + hrtimer_cancel(tx_hrt); + goto err_out_drop_locked; } if (wait_tx_done) { @@ -1142,14 +1241,21 @@ static int isotp_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) return size; +err_out_drop: + /* claimed but nothing sent yet - no timer to cancel */ + spin_lock_bh(&so->rx_lock); + goto err_out_drop_locked; err_event_drop: - /* got signal: force tx state machine to be idle */ - so->tx.state = ISOTP_IDLE; + /* interrupted waiting on our own transfer - drain its timers */ + spin_lock_bh(&so->rx_lock); hrtimer_cancel(&so->txfrtimer); hrtimer_cancel(&so->txtimer); -err_out_drop: - /* drop this PDU and unlock a potential wait queue */ + hrtimer_cancel(&so->echotimer); +err_out_drop_locked: + /* release the claim; so->rx_lock still held from above */ + so->cfecho = 0; so->tx.state = ISOTP_IDLE; + spin_unlock_bh(&so->rx_lock); wake_up_interruptible(&so->wait); return err; @@ -1211,13 +1317,20 @@ static int isotp_release(struct socket *sock) so = isotp_sk(sk); net = sock_net(sk); - /* wait for complete transmission of current pdu */ - while (wait_event_interruptible(so->wait, so->tx.state == ISOTP_IDLE) == 0 && - cmpxchg(&so->tx.state, ISOTP_IDLE, ISOTP_SHUTDOWN) != ISOTP_IDLE) + /* best-effort: wait for a running pdu to finish, but don't block on + * it forever - give up after the first signal + */ + while (so->tx.state != ISOTP_IDLE && + wait_event_interruptible(so->wait, so->tx.state == ISOTP_IDLE) == 0) ; - /* force state machines to be idle also when a signal occurred */ + /* claim the socket under so->rx_lock like sendmsg() does, so its + * claim can't race the forced ISOTP_SHUTDOWN below; force it + * unconditionally, even when a signal cut the wait above short + */ + spin_lock_bh(&so->rx_lock); so->tx.state = ISOTP_SHUTDOWN; + spin_unlock_bh(&so->rx_lock); so->rx.state = ISOTP_IDLE; spin_lock(&isotp_notifier_lock); @@ -1263,6 +1376,7 @@ static int isotp_release(struct socket *sock) hrtimer_cancel(&so->txfrtimer); hrtimer_cancel(&so->txtimer); + hrtimer_cancel(&so->echotimer); hrtimer_cancel(&so->rxtimer); sock_orphan(sk); @@ -1702,10 +1816,14 @@ static int isotp_init(struct sock *sk) so->rx.buflen = ARRAY_SIZE(so->rx.sbuf); so->tx.buflen = ARRAY_SIZE(so->tx.sbuf); - hrtimer_setup(&so->rxtimer, isotp_rx_timer_handler, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); - hrtimer_setup(&so->txtimer, isotp_tx_timer_handler, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); - hrtimer_setup(&so->txfrtimer, isotp_txfr_timer_handler, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, - HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); + hrtimer_setup(&so->rxtimer, isotp_rx_timer_handler, + CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); + hrtimer_setup(&so->txtimer, isotp_tx_timer_handler, + CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); + hrtimer_setup(&so->echotimer, isotp_echo_timer_handler, + CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); + hrtimer_setup(&so->txfrtimer, isotp_txfr_timer_handler, + CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); init_waitqueue_head(&so->wait); spin_lock_init(&so->rx_lock);