Merge tag 'hardening-v6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull kernel hardening updates from Kees Cook:

 - Convert flexible array members, fix -Wstringop-overflow warnings, and
   fix KCFI function type mismatches that went ignored by maintainers
   (Gustavo A. R. Silva, Nathan Chancellor, Kees Cook)

 - Remove the remaining side-effect users of ksize() by converting
   dma-buf, btrfs, and coredump to using kmalloc_size_roundup(), add
   more __alloc_size attributes, and introduce full testing of all
   allocator functions. Finally remove the ksize() side-effect so that
   each allocation-aware checker can finally behave without exceptions

 - Introduce oops_limit (default 10,000) and warn_limit (default off) to
   provide greater granularity of control for panic_on_oops and
   panic_on_warn (Jann Horn, Kees Cook)

 - Introduce overflows_type() and castable_to_type() helpers for cleaner
   overflow checking

 - Improve code generation for strscpy() and update str*() kern-doc

 - Convert strscpy and sigphash tests to KUnit, and expand memcpy tests

 - Always use a non-NULL argument for prepare_kernel_cred()

 - Disable structleak plugin in FORTIFY KUnit test (Anders Roxell)

 - Adjust orphan linker section checking to respect CONFIG_WERROR (Xin
   Li)

 - Make sure siginfo is cleared for forced SIGKILL (haifeng.xu)

 - Fix um vs FORTIFY warnings for always-NULL arguments

* tag 'hardening-v6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (31 commits)
  ksmbd: replace one-element arrays with flexible-array members
  hpet: Replace one-element array with flexible-array member
  um: virt-pci: Avoid GCC non-NULL warning
  signal: Initialize the info in ksignal
  lib: fortify_kunit: build without structleak plugin
  panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs
  panic: Introduce warn_limit
  panic: Consolidate open-coded panic_on_warn checks
  exit: Allow oops_limit to be disabled
  exit: Expose "oops_count" to sysfs
  exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops
  panic: Separate sysctl logic from CONFIG_SMP
  mm/pgtable: Fix multiple -Wstringop-overflow warnings
  mm: Make ksize() a reporting-only function
  kunit/fortify: Validate __alloc_size attribute results
  drm/sti: Fix return type of sti_{dvo,hda,hdmi}_connector_mode_valid()
  drm/fsl-dcu: Fix return type of fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid()
  driver core: Add __alloc_size hint to devm allocators
  overflow: Introduce overflows_type() and castable_to_type()
  coredump: Proactively round up to kmalloc bucket size
  ...

include/linux/compiler.h

@@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ static inline void *offset_to_ptr(const int *off)
  * bool and also pointer types.
  */
 #define is_signed_type(type) (((type)(-1)) < (__force type)1)
+#define is_unsigned_type(type) (!is_signed_type(type))
 
 /*
  * This is needed in functions which generate the stack canary, see

include/linux/device.h

@@ -197,9 +197,9 @@ void devres_remove_group(struct device *dev, void *id);
 int devres_release_group(struct device *dev, void *id);
 
 /* managed devm_k.alloc/kfree for device drivers */
-void *devm_kmalloc(struct device *dev, size_t size, gfp_t gfp) __malloc;
+void *devm_kmalloc(struct device *dev, size_t size, gfp_t gfp) __alloc_size(2);
 void *devm_krealloc(struct device *dev, void *ptr, size_t size,
-		    gfp_t gfp) __must_check;
+		    gfp_t gfp) __must_check __realloc_size(3);
 __printf(3, 0) char *devm_kvasprintf(struct device *dev, gfp_t gfp,
 				     const char *fmt, va_list ap) __malloc;
 __printf(3, 4) char *devm_kasprintf(struct device *dev, gfp_t gfp,
@@ -226,7 +226,8 @@ static inline void *devm_kcalloc(struct device *dev,
 void devm_kfree(struct device *dev, const void *p);
 char *devm_kstrdup(struct device *dev, const char *s, gfp_t gfp) __malloc;
 const char *devm_kstrdup_const(struct device *dev, const char *s, gfp_t gfp);
-void *devm_kmemdup(struct device *dev, const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp);
+void *devm_kmemdup(struct device *dev, const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp)
+	__realloc_size(3);
 
 unsigned long devm_get_free_pages(struct device *dev,
 				  gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order);

include/linux/fortify-string.h

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ void __write_overflow_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("
 
 #define __compiletime_strlen(p)					\
 ({								\
-	unsigned char *__p = (unsigned char *)(p);		\
+	char *__p = (char *)(p);				\
 	size_t __ret = SIZE_MAX;				\
 	size_t __p_size = __member_size(p);			\
 	if (__p_size != SIZE_MAX &&				\
@@ -119,13 +119,13 @@ extern char *__underlying_strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
  * Instead, please choose an alternative, so that the expectation
  * of @p's contents is unambiguous:
  *
- * +--------------------+-----------------+------------+
- * | @p needs to be:    | padded to @size | not padded |
- * +====================+=================+============+
- * |     NUL-terminated | strscpy_pad()   | strscpy()  |
- * +--------------------+-----------------+------------+
- * | not NUL-terminated | strtomem_pad()  | strtomem() |
- * +--------------------+-----------------+------------+
+ * +--------------------+--------------------+------------+
+ * | **p** needs to be: | padded to **size** | not padded |
+ * +====================+====================+============+
+ * |     NUL-terminated | strscpy_pad()      | strscpy()  |
+ * +--------------------+--------------------+------------+
+ * | not NUL-terminated | strtomem_pad()     | strtomem() |
+ * +--------------------+--------------------+------------+
  *
  * Note strscpy*()'s differing return values for detecting truncation,
  * and strtomem*()'s expectation that the destination is marked with
@@ -144,6 +144,21 @@ char *strncpy(char * const POS p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
 	return __underlying_strncpy(p, q, size);
 }
 
+/**
+ * strcat - Append a string to an existing string
+ *
+ * @p: pointer to NUL-terminated string to append to
+ * @q: pointer to NUL-terminated source string to append from
+ *
+ * Do not use this function. While FORTIFY_SOURCE tries to avoid
+ * read and write overflows, this is only possible when the
+ * destination buffer size is known to the compiler. Prefer
+ * building the string with formatting, via scnprintf() or similar.
+ * At the very least, use strncat().
+ *
+ * Returns @p.
+ *
+ */
 __FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcat, 1, 2)
 char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q)
 {
@@ -157,6 +172,16 @@ char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q)
 }
 
 extern __kernel_size_t __real_strnlen(const char *, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(strnlen);
+/**
+ * strnlen - Return bounded count of characters in a NUL-terminated string
+ *
+ * @p: pointer to NUL-terminated string to count.
+ * @maxlen: maximum number of characters to count.
+ *
+ * Returns number of characters in @p (NOT including the final NUL), or
+ * @maxlen, if no NUL has been found up to there.
+ *
+ */
 __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char * const POS p, __kernel_size_t maxlen)
 {
 	size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
@@ -182,6 +207,19 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char * const POS p, __kernel_size
  * possible for strlen() to be used on compile-time strings for use in
  * static initializers (i.e. as a constant expression).
  */
+/**
+ * strlen - Return count of characters in a NUL-terminated string
+ *
+ * @p: pointer to NUL-terminated string to count.
+ *
+ * Do not use this function unless the string length is known at
+ * compile-time. When @p is unterminated, this function may crash
+ * or return unexpected counts that could lead to memory content
+ * exposures. Prefer strnlen().
+ *
+ * Returns number of characters in @p (NOT including the final NUL).
+ *
+ */
 #define strlen(p)							\
 	__builtin_choose_expr(__is_constexpr(__builtin_strlen(p)),	\
 		__builtin_strlen(p), __fortify_strlen(p))
@@ -200,8 +238,26 @@ __kernel_size_t __fortify_strlen(const char * const POS p)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-/* defined after fortified strlen to reuse it */
+/* Defined after fortified strlen() to reuse it. */
 extern size_t __real_strlcpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strlcpy);
+/**
+ * strlcpy - Copy a string into another string buffer
+ *
+ * @p: pointer to destination of copy
+ * @q: pointer to NUL-terminated source string to copy
+ * @size: maximum number of bytes to write at @p
+ *
+ * If strlen(@q) >= @size, the copy of @q will be truncated at
+ * @size - 1 bytes. @p will always be NUL-terminated.
+ *
+ * Do not use this function. While FORTIFY_SOURCE tries to avoid
+ * over-reads when calculating strlen(@q), it is still possible.
+ * Prefer strscpy(), though note its different return values for
+ * detecting truncation.
+ *
+ * Returns total number of bytes written to @p, including terminating NUL.
+ *
+ */
 __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t size)
 {
 	size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
@@ -227,8 +283,32 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, si
 	return q_len;
 }
 
-/* defined after fortified strnlen to reuse it */
+/* Defined after fortified strnlen() to reuse it. */
 extern ssize_t __real_strscpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strscpy);
+/**
+ * strscpy - Copy a C-string into a sized buffer
+ *
+ * @p: Where to copy the string to
+ * @q: Where to copy the string from
+ * @size: Size of destination buffer
+ *
+ * Copy the source string @p, or as much of it as fits, into the destination
+ * @q buffer. The behavior is undefined if the string buffers overlap. The
+ * destination @p buffer is always NUL terminated, unless it's zero-sized.
+ *
+ * Preferred to strlcpy() since the API doesn't require reading memory
+ * from the source @q string beyond the specified @size bytes, and since
+ * the return value is easier to error-check than strlcpy()'s.
+ * In addition, the implementation is robust to the string changing out
+ * from underneath it, unlike the current strlcpy() implementation.
+ *
+ * Preferred to strncpy() since it always returns a valid string, and
+ * doesn't unnecessarily force the tail of the destination buffer to be
+ * zero padded. If padding is desired please use strscpy_pad().
+ *
+ * Returns the number of characters copied in @p (not including the
+ * trailing %NUL) or -E2BIG if @size is 0 or the copy of @q was truncated.
+ */
 __FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t size)
 {
 	size_t len;
@@ -247,6 +327,16 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, s
 	if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
 		__write_overflow();
 
+	/* Short-circuit for compile-time known-safe lengths. */
+	if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, SIZE_MAX)) {
+		len = __compiletime_strlen(q);
+
+		if (len < SIZE_MAX && __compiletime_lessthan(len, size)) {
+			__underlying_memcpy(p, q, len + 1);
+			return len;
+		}
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * This call protects from read overflow, because len will default to q
 	 * length if it smaller than size.
@@ -274,7 +364,26 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, s
 	return __real_strscpy(p, q, len);
 }
 
-/* defined after fortified strlen and strnlen to reuse them */
+/**
+ * strncat - Append a string to an existing string
+ *
+ * @p: pointer to NUL-terminated string to append to
+ * @q: pointer to source string to append from
+ * @count: Maximum bytes to read from @q
+ *
+ * Appends at most @count bytes from @q (stopping at the first
+ * NUL byte) after the NUL-terminated string at @p. @p will be
+ * NUL-terminated.
+ *
+ * Do not use this function. While FORTIFY_SOURCE tries to avoid
+ * read and write overflows, this is only possible when the sizes
+ * of @p and @q are known to the compiler. Prefer building the
+ * string with formatting, via scnprintf() or similar.
+ *
+ * Returns @p.
+ *
+ */
+/* Defined after fortified strlen() and strnlen() to reuse them. */
 __FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strncat, 1, 2, 3)
 char *strncat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, __kernel_size_t count)
 {
@@ -573,7 +682,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr_inv(const void * const POS0 p, int c, size_t size)
 	return __real_memchr_inv(p, c, size);
 }
 
-extern void *__real_kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) __RENAME(kmemdup);
+extern void *__real_kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) __RENAME(kmemdup)
+								    __realloc_size(2);
 __FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void * const POS0 p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	size_t p_size = __struct_size(p);
@@ -585,6 +695,20 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void * const POS0 p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp
 	return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp);
 }
 
+/**
+ * strcpy - Copy a string into another string buffer
+ *
+ * @p: pointer to destination of copy
+ * @q: pointer to NUL-terminated source string to copy
+ *
+ * Do not use this function. While FORTIFY_SOURCE tries to avoid
+ * overflows, this is only possible when the sizes of @q and @p are
+ * known to the compiler. Prefer strscpy(), though note its different
+ * return values for detecting truncation.
+ *
+ * Returns @p.
+ *
+ */
 /* Defined after fortified strlen to reuse it. */
 __FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcpy, 1, 2)
 char *strcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q)

include/linux/hpet.h

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct hpet {
 			unsigned long _hpet_compare;
 		} _u1;
 		u64 hpet_fsb[2];	/* FSB route */
-	} hpet_timers[1];
+	} hpet_timers[];
 };
 
 #define	hpet_mc		_u0._hpet_mc

include/linux/overflow.h

@@ -128,6 +128,53 @@ static inline bool __must_check __must_check_overflow(bool overflow)
 	(*_d >> _to_shift) != _a);					\
 }))
 
+#define __overflows_type_constexpr(x, T) (			\
+	is_unsigned_type(typeof(x)) ?				\
+		(x) > type_max(typeof(T)) :			\
+	is_unsigned_type(typeof(T)) ?				\
+		(x) < 0 || (x) > type_max(typeof(T)) :		\
+	(x) < type_min(typeof(T)) || (x) > type_max(typeof(T)))
+
+#define __overflows_type(x, T)		({	\
+	typeof(T) v = 0;			\
+	check_add_overflow((x), v, &v);		\
+})
+
+/**
+ * overflows_type - helper for checking the overflows between value, variables,
+ *		    or data type
+ *
+ * @n: source constant value or variable to be checked
+ * @T: destination variable or data type proposed to store @x
+ *
+ * Compares the @x expression for whether or not it can safely fit in
+ * the storage of the type in @T. @x and @T can have different types.
+ * If @x is a constant expression, this will also resolve to a constant
+ * expression.
+ *
+ * Returns: true if overflow can occur, false otherwise.
+ */
+#define overflows_type(n, T)					\
+	__builtin_choose_expr(__is_constexpr(n),		\
+			      __overflows_type_constexpr(n, T),	\
+			      __overflows_type(n, T))
+
+/**
+ * castable_to_type - like __same_type(), but also allows for casted literals
+ *
+ * @n: variable or constant value
+ * @T: variable or data type
+ *
+ * Unlike the __same_type() macro, this allows a constant value as the
+ * first argument. If this value would not overflow into an assignment
+ * of the second argument's type, it returns true. Otherwise, this falls
+ * back to __same_type().
+ */
+#define castable_to_type(n, T)						\
+	__builtin_choose_expr(__is_constexpr(n),			\
+			      !__overflows_type_constexpr(n, T),	\
+			      __same_type(n, T))
+
 /**
  * size_mul() - Calculate size_t multiplication with saturation at SIZE_MAX
  * @factor1: first factor

include/linux/panic.h

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ extern long (*panic_blink)(int state);
 __printf(1, 2)
 void panic(const char *fmt, ...) __noreturn __cold;
 void nmi_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *msg);
+void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin);
 extern void oops_enter(void);
 extern void oops_exit(void);
 extern bool oops_may_print(void);

include/linux/string.h

@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ extern void kfree_const(const void *x);
 extern char *kstrdup(const char *s, gfp_t gfp) __malloc;
 extern const char *kstrdup_const(const char *s, gfp_t gfp);
 extern char *kstrndup(const char *s, size_t len, gfp_t gfp);
-extern void *kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp);
+extern void *kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) __realloc_size(2);
 extern char *kmemdup_nul(const char *s, size_t len, gfp_t gfp);
 
 extern char **argv_split(gfp_t gfp, const char *str, int *argcp);