kselftest/arm64: Add seccomp ptrace x0 bypass test

As Kees suggested, add a test that verifies that seccomp observes the
correct first argument after a ptracer modifies x0 at a syscall-enter-stop
on arm64.

The first syscall argument and the return value share register x0.
The original value is saved in orig_x0 on entry and used by
syscall_get_arguments(), but ptrace changes to x0 were not
automatically reflected there.  This test checks the kernel re-syncs
orig_x0 after a ptrace stop so that seccomp sees the modified
argument.

A seccomp filter allows write(2,...) and kills the task for any other
fd.  The tracer changes fd from 2 to 1 at entry.  If orig_x0 remains
stale, the child exits normally (bypass, test fails).  If orig_x0 is
correctly updated, the child is killed by SIGSYS (test passes).

Before the fix:
	 ./seccomp_ptrace_x0_bypass
	TAP version 13
	1..1
	not ok 1 seccomp_ptrace_x0_bypass
	# Totals: pass:0 fail:1 xfail:0 xpass:0 skip:0 error:0

After the fix:
	# ./seccomp_ptrace_x0_bypass
	TAP version 13
	1..1
	[   19.475951] audit: type=1326 audit(1784254846.284:2): auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 ses=4294967295 pid=227 comm="seccomp_ptrace_" exe="/mnt/seccomp0
	[   19.477852] audit: type=1701 audit(1784254846.284:3): auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 ses=4294967295 pid=227 comm="seccomp_ptrace_" exe="/mnt/seccomp1
	ok 1 seccomp_ptrace_x0_bypass
	# Totals: pass:1 fail:0 xfail:0 xpass:0 skip:0 error:0

Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260716120640.6590-1-will@kernel.org/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/202607152004.DEA95D63@keescook/
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/.gitignore

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 hwcap
 ptrace
+seccomp_ptrace_x0_bypass
 syscall-abi
 tpidr2

tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/Makefile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 # Copyright (C) 2021 ARM Limited
 
-TEST_GEN_PROGS := hwcap ptrace syscall-abi tpidr2
+TEST_GEN_PROGS := hwcap ptrace syscall-abi tpidr2 seccomp_ptrace_x0_bypass
 
 include ../../lib.mk
 

tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/seccomp_ptrace_x0_bypass.c

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Test that seccomp, tracepoints and audit observe the correct syscall
+ * arguments after a ptracer has modified them at syscall-enter-stop.
+ *
+ * On arm64, both the first argument and the return value of a syscall
+ * are passed in register x0.  The original x0 is saved in
+ * pt_regs::orig_x0 during syscall entry and returned as the first
+ * argument by syscall_get_arguments().  Because ptrace modifications
+ * to x0 are not automatically reflected in orig_x0, seccomp, tracepoints
+ * and audit may see a stale value unless orig_x0 is explicitly
+ * re-synchronised after a ptrace stop.
+ *
+ * This test sets up a seccomp filter that allows write(2, ...) but kills
+ * the task for any other fd.  A ptracer changes the fd argument from 2
+ * to 1 at the syscall-enter stop.  If the orig_x0 re-sync works, seccomp
+ * sees the modified argument (fd=1) and kills the child with SIGSYS
+ * (test passes).  If orig_x0 is not re-synced, seccomp sees the original
+ * fd=2, the write succeeds and the child exits normally (test fails,
+ * vulnerability present).
+ */
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/ptrace.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <asm/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/elf.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+
+#include "kselftest.h"
+
+#ifndef __NR_write
+#define __NR_write 64
+#endif
+
+#define EXPECTED_TESTS 1
+
+#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__
+#define ARG0_OFFSET	(offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args))
+#else
+#define ARG0_OFFSET	(offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args) + 4)
+#endif
+
+static int do_child(void)
+{
+	if (ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0, NULL, NULL))
+		ksft_exit_fail_perror("PTRACE_TRACEME");
+
+	if (raise(SIGSTOP))
+		ksft_exit_fail_perror("raise(SIGSTOP)");
+
+	/*
+	 * Seccomp filter:
+	 *    If syscall is not write -> ALLOW
+	 *    If syscall is write:
+	 *	- If args[0] (fd) == 2 -> ALLOW
+	 *	- Otherwise -> KILL
+	 */
+	struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+		BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),	/* nr */
+		BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, __NR_write, 0, 3),
+		BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS, ARG0_OFFSET),	/* args[0] */
+		BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, 2, 1, 0),
+		BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
+		BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+	};
+	struct sock_fprog prog = {
+		.len = ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+		.filter = filter,
+	};
+
+	if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0))
+		ksft_exit_fail_perror("prctl NO_NEW_PRIVS");
+
+	if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog))
+		ksft_exit_fail_perror("prctl SECCOMP");
+
+	/*
+	 * Invoke write(2, ...) while the tracer will change the first
+	 * argument (fd) from 2 to 1 at syscall entry.
+	 */
+	syscall(__NR_write, 2, NULL, 0);
+	_exit(0);
+}
+
+static int do_parent(pid_t child)
+{
+	bool bypass = false;
+	int status;
+
+	/* Wait for the initial SIGSTOP */
+	if (waitpid(child, &status, 0) != child)
+		ksft_exit_fail_msg("waitpid failed");
+
+	if (!WIFSTOPPED(status) || WSTOPSIG(status) != SIGSTOP)
+		ksft_exit_fail_msg("unexpected stop status");
+
+	if (ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, child, 0, PTRACE_O_TRACESYSGOOD | PTRACE_O_EXITKILL))
+		ksft_exit_fail_perror("PTRACE_SETOPTIONS");
+
+	if (ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALL, child, 0, 0))
+		ksft_exit_fail_perror("PTRACE_SYSCALL");
+
+	while (1) {
+		int sig;
+
+		if (waitpid(child, &status, 0) != child)
+			ksft_exit_fail_msg("waitpid lost child");
+
+		if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
+			/* Child exited normally – bypass succeeded */
+			bypass = true;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+			sig = WTERMSIG(status);
+			if (sig == SIGSYS)
+				break;
+			ksft_exit_fail_msg("child died unexpectedly from signal %d (%s)",
+					   sig, strsignal(sig));
+		}
+
+		if (!WIFSTOPPED(status))
+			ksft_exit_fail_msg("unexpected wait status");
+
+		sig = WSTOPSIG(status);
+
+		if (sig == (SIGTRAP | 0x80)) {
+			struct user_regs_struct regs;
+			struct iovec iov = {
+				.iov_base = &regs,
+				.iov_len = sizeof(regs),
+			};
+
+			if (ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, child, NT_PRSTATUS, &iov))
+				ksft_exit_fail_perror("PTRACE_GETREGSET");
+
+			unsigned long syscall_nr = regs.regs[8];
+			unsigned long x0 = regs.regs[0];
+
+			/* Modify fd from 2 to 1 at write entry */
+			if (syscall_nr == __NR_write && x0 == 2) {
+				regs.regs[0] = 1;
+				if (ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, child, NT_PRSTATUS, &iov))
+					ksft_exit_fail_perror("PTRACE_SETREGSET");
+			}
+
+			if (ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALL, child, 0, 0))
+				ksft_exit_fail_perror("PTRACE_SYSCALL");
+		} else {
+			/* Forward other signals */
+			if (ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALL, child, 0, sig))
+				ksft_exit_fail_perror("PTRACE_SYSCALL");
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* bypass == true means vulnerability exists -> test fails */
+	return bypass ? EXIT_FAILURE : EXIT_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+	pid_t child;
+
+	ksft_print_header();
+	ksft_set_plan(EXPECTED_TESTS);
+
+	child = fork();
+	if (child < 0)
+		ksft_exit_fail_msg("fork failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (!child)
+		return do_child();
+
+	/*
+	 * do_parent() returns EXIT_SUCCESS if the child was killed by
+	 * SIGSYS (i.e. seccomp correctly saw the modified argument),
+	 * and EXIT_FAILURE if the child exited normally (bypass).
+	 */
+	int result = do_parent(child);
+
+	ksft_test_result(result == EXIT_SUCCESS, "seccomp_ptrace_x0_bypass\n");
+
+	ksft_print_cnts();
+	return result;
+}